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PREFACE
This dissertation is an examination of the struggle to
desegregate the public schools of Virginia from 1954 to 1972.
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education attacked the
social foundation of eleven southern states when it declared
that racially segregated schools were "inherently unequal."
Brown I,, in fact, was one of many controversial decisions made
by the Supreme Court as it reflected the egalitarian spirit
of the 1950's and 1960's.

By 1970, however, a growing list

of legal scholars questioned the wisdom and effectivemess of
the Warren Court's judicial activism.
criticism was the Brown decision.

A major target of this

In 19 70, when I began my

research, it was apparent that the school desegregation deci
sion was in deep trouble.

My major objective was to trace the

tortuous path of the school cases in one southern state in
order to determine the most significant forces in slowing or
advancing the implementation of the Brown decision.

I chose

Virginia since it was and continues to be a key state in the
school litigation.
In addition to examining the politics of school deseg
regation, I investigated the roles of the federal and state
courts in interpreting Brown I as well as the performance of
Virginia's Negro leadership in pressing for school integra
tion.

My study of Virginia discusses the tremendous resources

iii
available to a state intent on thwarting a Supreme Court
ruling.

My dissertation supports the thesis that the Supreme

Court's ability to oversee a social revolution, without the full
support of Congress and the President, is limited and sometimes
counter-productive.
In the course of my research and writing I incurred
numerous debts.

Professor Alfred H. Kelly, who directed this

dissertation, offered many constructive suggestions.

Pro

fessor Richard Miles read the entire dissertation and added
several valuable observations.

My wife Claudia not only pro

vided encouragement but also typed much of the dissertation.
Finally, the librarians and archivists at Wayne State Univer
sity, the University of Virginia, and the Virginia State
Library were generous in offering their services.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 195 4, the United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education declared that segregated schools
were inherently unequal.^

The Court held that the laws which

either required or permitted separate schools in seventeen
states violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

The decision marked a watershed in the long

struggle of the American Negro to destroy all vestiges of
second-class citizenship.

The Negro triumph, in part, was an

indication of .growing concern in the United States about the
obvious inequities in American society which had been made
especially apparent by the egalitarian rhetoric of World
War II and the Cold War.

It also symbolized the Negro's in

creasing economic and political power which could no longer
be overlooked by the leaders of the United States.

Finally,

victory before the Supreme Court was an important source of
black pride, since it was the result of a well-conceived legal
strategy devised by a band of skillful black lawyers.^
For the eleven Southern states, by contrast, May 17,
1954, was referred to as "Black Monday."

The Brown decision

1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2Alfred H. Kelly, "The School Desegregation Case," in
Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, ed. by John A.
Garraty
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962) , pp. 244-54.
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2
had a double meaning for the South.
has written:

For, as C. Vann Woodward

"It reversed a constitutional trend started long

before Plessy v. Ferguson, and it marked the beginning of the
3
end of Jim Crow."
The immediate reaction of the South, de
pending on the region, varied from hysteria or disbelief to a
grudging reluctance to accept the "law of the land."

Bewil

derment evolved into a policy of massive resistance whereby
southern political leaders attempted to organize both state
and regional defiance to the Brown decision.

At the root of

southern defiance was the commitment to a hierarchical society
based on white supremacy and a belief in Negro inferiority.
This neo-Bourbon political tradition was buttressed by small,
manageable electorates and malapportioned state legislatures.^
A fundamental aspect of the South's resistance was di
rectly related to Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in the
Brown decision. Southern conservatives charged that the
Supreme Court had departed from the law, and, in effect, had
amended the Constitution on the strength of certain findings
in psychology and sociology.

Resistance was justified, in

part, on the claim that nine new justices would reverse the
Brown decision. Theoretically, the South's criticism of the
Brown decision was not without foundation.

Justice Warren

3
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow,
(London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1966),
p. 147.
4Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance:
Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1969), pp. 237-50.

3
himself had dismissed the historical evidence as "inconclu
sive."

While he cited the decisions involving the desegre

gation of graduate schools, his application of them to the
case at hand was not convincing even to legal scholars sym
pathetic to the decision.

A survey of the legal journals

indicates that most "friendly critics" would agree with Robert
Harris' observations that "...the decision in the Segregation
Cases was a great decision. The opinion, on the other hand,
< •
3
was not a great opinion."
The technical plausibility of the
South's case helped to shift the argument from vulgar racism
to a point in constitutional law.

By focusing on legal points

massive resisters were able to win the support of citizens re
luctant to be identified with the extremists.

As the Warren

Court made other controversial decisions, especially in the
area of federal-state relations, the South hoped to gain
greater support in its campaign to reverse the Brown decision.
The Supreme Court and the lawyers of the National Asso
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People recognized that
the task, of implementing the school decision would be formi
dable.

From the NAACP's point of view, the anticipation of

5Robert J. Harris "The Constitution, Education and
Segregation," Temple Law Quarterly, XXIX (Summer, 1956),
p. 432. For a discussion of the friendly critics see Ira M.
Heyman, "The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation and the Frien
dly Critics," California Law Review XLIX (March, 1961), 10425. Heyman's article includes a discussion of Herbert Wechsler's influencial analysis, "Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law," in the Harvard Law Review, 73 (November,
1959), p. 35. A defense of the Supreme Court is found in
Charles L. Black Jr. "The Lawfulness of the Segregation De
cisions," Yale Law Journal LXIX (January, 1960), pp. 421-30.

resistance accounted for the Supreme Court's delay in deline
ating the principles for implementation until May 31, 1955, in
the second Brown decision.

From the NAACP's point of view,

Virginia, on the surface, offered several advantages as a
starting point for a successful campaign to desegregate the
schools of the South.

Among these were a relatively small

Negro population (22.2 per cent in 1950), regional variety,
and a tradition of non-violent race relations.

Equally signi

ficant, the Virginia Conference of the NAACP was the largest
of any Southern state at the time of the decision.

The organ

ization had formed its own legal counsel under the able direc
tion of Oliver W. Hill.

Virginia, instead, chose to assume

the lead in the South's defiance of the Brown decision.
Since 1954, Virginia has passed through essentially
three stages in its efforts to defy or to cope with the Brown
decision.

The first stage, and by far the most controversial,

was the period of massive resistance between 1954 and 1959.
During these years, Virginia refused to comply with the Brown
decision.

Instead, it adopted legislation which ultimately

closed the schools in three school districts.

Today, men

prominently associated with the policy defend it as basically
constructive.

The legislation and litigation, according to

their explanation, bought time which permitted Virginians to
adjust to the revolution in race relations.

Thus, this inter

pretation concludes, when Virginia's schools opened their

^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294
C1955) .
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doors to Negroes for the first time in February of 1959, there
7

was. no violence.

This interpretation has been contested.

In

a recently published study of Virginia politics, J. Harvie Wil
kinson questioned whether the rhetoric of massive resistance
actually had the cooling effect which its proponents later
claimed for it.

Taking issue with another basic tenet of the

massive resisters, Wilkinson concluded:

"Massive resistance

was more a calculated maneuver than an emotional imperative."

O

In 1959 Virginia passed into the second phase of the
school struggle which lasted until 1968.

This period was dom

inated by time-consuming litigation, a bitter feud in Prince
Edward County, and finally the active participation of the
federal government in the desegregation process following the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The most significant

legal development during this period was the Supreme Court's
qualified rejection of the freedom of choice assignment plan.
Racially neutral on its face, freedom of choice, in practice,
was a clever scheme for perpetuating segregated schools. In
9
Green v. County Board of New Kent County (196 8), the Supreme
Court held that a freedom of choice assignment plan was unac
ceptable unless it led to desegregated schools.

The Green de-

^Interviews.
o

J. Harvie Wilkinson III. Harry Byrd and the Changing
Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966'! (Charlottesville: The
University of Virginia Press, 19 68), p. 151.
9391 U.S. 430 (1968).

cision meant that the test of subsequent school plans was
their capacity to achieve school integration.
Following the Green decision, Virginia entered a third
stage of the desegregation controversy which has aroused emo
tions recalling the frenzy of massive resistance.

In

Virginia, the new phase of the school debate was centered in
those cities where relatively large Negro populations and
racially separated neighborhoods stand as formidable obstacles
to desegregation.

Although the Supreme Court accepted busing

as a tool of integration in Swann v. Charlotte-Meeklenburg
(1971),^ in 1972 the future of the school desegregation ex
periment was still unclear.

The emergence of busing as a

national political issue, resegregation in America's urban
areas and an apparent decline in enthusiasm for integration
among whites and Negroes led; one constitutional expert, Alex
ander Bickel, to suggest that "the desegregation movement
stands at the point where it may be abandoned." ^
The wavering of the public mood on integration, in
turn, seemed to encourage a limited retreat on the part of the
Supreme Court.

Although it accepted busing as a desegregation

tool, the Court, in Swann, criticized racial balancing and
wrote that school systems with racially identifiable schools

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (19 71)”.
~
^Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea
of Progress
(New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and
Row, 19 70), pp. 150-51.
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were not necessarily objectionable. 12 In 19 72, the Court's
conclusions were not encouraging to advocates of unconventional
plans for achieving integration such as the crossing of poli
tical boundaries.
The purpose of my dissertation is to trace the segre
gation cases in Virginia from Brown to consolidation.
doing my research was guided by several questions:
Virginia choose massive resistance?

In so

Why did

What were the most impor

tant factors in determining the pace of implementation after
massive resistance?

How did the federal district judges re

spond to their role in implementing the Brown decision?

My

major conclusion is that massive resistance was avoidable.
Although Virginians were not integrationists, initially many
able leaders thought that a local option plan would work in
Virginia.

The switch to masjsive resistance was made possible

by the extraordinary influence of black belt legislators in
the Virginia Democratic party, the editorial skill of James
J. Kilpatrick and the prestige of Virginia's senior Senator,
Harry F. Byrd.

Although the resort to race politics enabled

the Byrd Organization to defeat the Republican party in 195 7,
the moderate and conservative wings parted company with the
failure of massive resistance.

In 1960 Virginia turned to

local option and until 1966 was very successful in limiting
desegregation to token numbers.

Despite an active legal cam

paign by the Virginia NAACP, real progress toward desegrega

^Swann,

402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).

ting public schools was not realized until NAACP lawyers were
reinforced by the federal government following the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.

However, this linkage between desegrega

tion and the leadership of the federal government was
threatened as busing and consolidation became national issues
Furthermore, after eighteen years black Virginians as well as
white were divided as to the wisdom of maintaining the strug
gle to integrate Virginia's schools.

PART I.

VIRGINIA AND THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE

CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND
In 1954, Virginia possessed the potential for compli
ance as well as resistance to the Brown decision.

Two char

acteristics of the Old Dominion suggested the possibility of
a policy of gradual adjustment to the Brown ruling.

One was

its relatively small Negro population, and the other was its
social and economic diversity.^
The total population of the Commonwealth in 1950 was
3,318,680, of which approximately 22.2 percent was black. 2
Of even greater significance; was the uneven distribution of
the Negro population.

In thirty-two counties, all except

three located in the western portion of the state, Negroes did
not exceed ten percent of the white population.

The ratio of

Negroes to whites ranged from ten to forty percent in thirtyfive counties centered in the central Piedmont.

However,

twenty-seven of these counties contained Negro populations
below thirty percent.

Only thirty-one Southside and Tidewater

^■Robbins Gates, The Making of
Virginia's Politics of Public School
(.Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press,
Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance
versity Press, 1961) pp. 1-2.
^Gates, p. 12.
10

Massive Resistance:
Desegregation, 1954-1956
1962), pp. 1-2; Benjamin
(Bloomington: Indiana Uni-

11
counties had populations where the Negro ratio exceeded forty
percent.

Of the thirty-two independent cities, twenty-four

registered Negro populations under thirty percent.
If one accepted the theory that the obstacles to deseg
regation were reduced when the number of Negroes was small, a
desegregation scheme which made accommodations for regional
differences seemed quite plausible.

In fact, in some of the

southwestern counties which bused their sparse numbers of Negro
children to regional high schools, desegregation appeared to
be an administrative necessity.

4

There were other regional variations that worked to
erode the notion of a monolithic Virginia.

Foremost among

these was the growth of the state's urban areas, especially in
suburban Washington, D.C. and around Hampton Roads.

Here Vir

ginia's racial orthodoxy already had been severely tested.
The Arlington-Fairfax area, the state's fastest growing re
gion, was heavily populated by employees of the federal govern
ment, who often migrated from other states.

This made the

Tenth Congressional District more cosmopolitan and somewhat of
a political enigma.

On local and state levels, it elected

^Ibid., pp. 1-12.
^Doxey A. Wilkerson, "Some Correlates ofRecent Pro
gress Toward Equalizing White and Negro Schools in Virginia"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1958),
pp. 233-67. The author described several southwestern coun
ties which had such small Negro populations that the school
children were bused to a regional Negro high school. Economi
cally, desegregation of white schools was less expensive than
building a Negro school.
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relatively liberal candidates, but in national elections, it
tended to support conservatives.
The area around Hampton Roads, including the cities of
Norfolk and Newport News, was dominated by the United States
Navy and the shipping industry.

Economically linked to the

federal government and housing a large population of military
personnel, it was not surprising that the area demonstrated a
greater willingness to co-operate with national policies.

Nor

was it surprising that three of the first five desegregation
suits in the state were filed in Arlington, in Norfolk and in
Newport News.
The Ninth Congressional District, in the southwestern
corner of Virginia, was another political maverick.

Known

as the "Fightin1 Ninth," it was the only region in the Old
Dominion where the two-party: system had remained viable for
the first half of the twentieth century.

Its uniqueness was

attributed to the negligible role the Negro played in its his
tory, to a diversified economy which included the troubled
raining industry of its far western counties and, finally, to
its distance from Richmond, Virginia's capital.
Northwest of the "Ninth" sprawled the Shenandoah
Valley.

Basically rural, the Sixth and especially the Seventh

Congressional Districts could be expected to support the state
Democratic party.
To the east rested the Piedmont, wedged between the
Blue Ridge Mountains and the Tidewater.

With the exception of

the industrialization around the Richmond-Petersburg-Hopewell

13
area, it was basically rural and politically conservative.
Unlike Arlington or Norfolk, Richmond had powerful links with
Virginia's past.

Its beautiful capitol and monuments to

Confederate war heroes were an ever-present reminder of Rich
mond's and Virginia's history.

The city's two daily news

papers, the Richmond Times-Dispatch and the Richmond News
Leader, were especially influential in affecting state poli
tical policy.

They were the principal newspapers read by

state officials and legislators when the General Assembly was
in session.

Their advantage was augmented by the prestige and

skill of their editors, Virginus Dabney of the Times-Dispatch,
and, especially after 1954, James Jackson Kilpatrick of the
5
News Leader.
Although there were fresh political breezes in Vir
ginia, the most salient feature of its politics for the first
half-century was its impressive consensus.

Much of this was

due to the skillful organization of the Democratic party,
which in the 1950's was guided by its aging patriarch, Senator
Harry Flood Byrd.

The strength of the Democratic party was in

rural Virginia, where it appealed to the rustic virtues of
hard work, individualism and integrity.
The party's political base lay principally in the black
belt, where the most potent issue was race.

As expected, the

c:
James Latimer, "Virginia Politics, 1950-1960"
(Richmond: unpublished manuscript, 1961), pp. 12-17.
Mr. Latimer is the highly regarded political writer for the
Richmond Times-Dispatch. The paragraphs describing Virginia's
demographic differences were drawn from his manuscript which
he permitted me to read.
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greatest resistance to the Brown decision came from the Southside, the name given to the region where most of the black
belt counties are found.

In these tobacco and peanut coun

ties, the pattern of Negro subordination had its roots in
ante-bellum Virginia.

From the "great fear" produced by Nat

Turner's rebellion, through Reconstruction, and down to the
present, the region’s politics concentrated on perpetuating
white supremacy.

Race relations here were characterized by

paternalism, a sense of place and reportedly a lack of violence.

Behind the veneer of its plantation past, one Vir

ginian has described the Southside as a "bleak country of red
clay and scrub pine; of somnolent small towns; of marginal,
worked-out farms; of much poverty, ignorance, and prejudice."

7

The poverty which prevailed in these counties weighed
more heavily on its Negroes, who suffered from poor schools
and little economic opportunity.

The well-known violation of

the "separate-but-equal" doctrine was especially flagrant in
the Southside.

Even after 1941, as Virginia made steady pro

gress toward equalizing its schools, these counties lagged be
hind the remainder of the state.

Desegregation was opposed on

the theory that it threatened white civilization with the specQ

ter of racial amalgamation.

^Wilkinson, pp. 9-22.
^Cabel Phillips, "Virginia— The State and the State
of Mind," New York Times Magazine, July 28, 19 57, p. 49,
quoted in Wilkinson, p. 10.
^Wilkerson, pp. 74-80.
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The Southside wielded political power far in excess of
its actual population.

In this respect, its influence com-

pared favorably to the black belts of other Southern states.

9

Several factors combined to give the Southside an ascendant
role in Virginia politics.

First, in a state where the popu

lar vote in general elections had been steadily declining
since 1900, the proportion of Southsiders voting continually
exceeded the remainder of the state.

Second, the uniform an

tipathy to Federal spending, to "big" government in general
and to the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions meant that
the vote would be overwhelmingly conservative.

Third, because

of the consensus, the Southside's representatives in the
General Assembly enjoyed greater longevity.

As a result, they

usually received the best committee assignments and chaired
the strategic committees.^

Their privileged position in the

General Assembly was furthered by a slight overrepresentation
in the Southside's favor.^

Finally, the interests of the

black belt were well represented in the hierarchy of the Demo
cratic party.

For example, during the school struggle major

roles were played by the congressional representatives of the

Q
V.
O. Key, Jr. and Alexander Heard, Southern Politic
In State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of
Random House, 19 59), pp. 5-10.
"^Wilkinson, pp. 51-52.
Gates, p» 26o

16
Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts, Watkins Abbitt and
William "Bill" Tuck.
The response to the school cases was to be determined
by the consensus achieved in the Democratic organization.

The

organization was a perpetuation of oligarchical rule which had
its roots in colonial Virginia.

Until recently, the tradition

had been interrupted only by Reconstruction and the Readjustor
movement.

During this brief interlude, Virginia had witnessed

greater mass participation in government, as well as an effort
to institute certain democratic reforms.

At the same time,

the Old Dominion had been racked by corruption associated with
railroad politics and ballot box stuffing.

At the turn of the

century, during the progressive era, conservative Virginians
were able to regain power on a platform aimed at restoring in
tegrity to government.

A series of cautious reforms, includ

ing the strengthening of the State Corporation Commission,
were achieved at the expense of popular democracy.

12

A key to the new organization's success was its ability
to limit the size of the electorate to a "manageable" number.
A major step in restricting the size of the electorate was
taken in the Constitutional Convention of 1902.

Ostensibly

aimed at eliminating the Negro from the state's political
life, the poll tax and "understanding" tests drafted by this

12Raymond H. Pulley, Old Virginia Restored: An In
terpretation of the Progressive Impulse, 1870-1930 (Charlottes
ville: The University Press of Virginia, 1968), pp. 34-42,
104-08.

17
assembly were also aimed at disfranchising poor whites in po
litically insecure counties.

The subsequent provision for a

Democratic party primary and skillful organization completed
the political foundation which thereafter endured for some
• a. years.13
sixty
In the 1920's a youthful Harry Byrd managed to take
charge of the organization at the point when age had caught up
with the Old Guard.

In Raymond H. Pulley's view, the young

politician admirably satisfied the tradition of Virginia poli
tics.

A descendant of the first William Byrd and a self-made

success in business, he was Horatio Alger wrapped in a pedi
gree.

In 1926, at the age of thirty-eight, Harry Byrd was

elected governor.

During his four year tenure, by liberally

applying the techniques of business, he won much acclaim for
14
consolidating the administration of the state's government.
Byrd also strengthened the governor's office by expanding his
appointive power through shortening the ballot.

He described

this reform as "a reactionary step, for it reaffirms the wis
dom of our fathers and admits that they knew what they were
about," since from "1776 to 1852, not a single State official
15
was elected by direct vote of the people."
Also, as gover
nor, he so successfully committed Virginia to a policy of "pay
as you go" regarding the financing of highways, that the program

"^Ibid. ,

pp. 69-91, 126-31.

14Ibid.,

pp. 177-78.

15Quoted in Ibid.,p. 179.

18
became, until recently, an unassailable tenet of the Commonwealth's fiscal policy. 16

Moving to the United States Senate

in 19 33, Byrd continued to oversee Virginia politics, while
he jousted with the economic programs of the welfare state. 17
As the 1950's opened, Senator Byrd still loosely guided the
organization which V. 0. Key aptly described as "a political
museum piece. 11^
The explanation for the organization's longevity was
not limited to electoral advantages.

Among leading Virgin

ians, a remarkable consensus existed concerning the operation
and purpose of government.

J. Lindsay Almond once likened it

to "a club" or "a loosely knit association" composed of men
"who share the philosophy of Senator Byrd." 19

Following this

analogy, Byrd's role was more like chairman of the board than
political boss.
The first priority of the "club" was to provide honest
and efficient government.

The organization's honesty, as its

16

Ibid., pp. 180-81. Virginia’s reputation as a
low-tax state was based on the absence of a general sales tax.
Consequently urban areas were hit hard since they contributed
a larger share of state revenue from corporate and individual
income taxes while also bearing the burden of local services
(Wilkinson, pp. 41-43).
17

Latimer, pp. 26-27. Ironically Senator Byrd and
Franklin D. Roosevelt were sworn into office on the same day,
March 4, 1933 . Byrd apparently enjoyed referring to himself
as "one of the last of the old New Dealers." He claimed that
his political philosophy had not budged from the Democratic
platform written in 19 32.
18 v
n,,
Key, p. 19.
1Q
.
.
.
Time, September 22 , 1958 , p. 16, quoted in Wilkinson,

p. 16 .

19
frugality, was legendary.

A sense of noblesse oblige, already

centuries old, accompanied the responsibility to provide good
government.

The notion of government service as the duty of a

gentleman was bolstered by the token salary received by a mem
ber of the General Assembly.

A tradition of government by an

elite extended into the 1960's, but has been eroded by such
reforms as reapportionment and the repeal of the poll tax. 20
While a consensus existed, all was not left to chance.
The success of the organization was also related to an almost
mysterious ability to impose a certain uniformity on political
activity.

Although unstructured, methods existed for evalu

ating, elevating and possibly disciplining ambitious politi
cians who desired to move from the courthouse to the top of
the heap.

Usually, the State Compensation Board and the cir

cuit court judges were singled out by observers as helping to
insure regularity.

The former, chaired for many years by

E.. R. Combs, a Byrd lieutenant, set the salaries and office
expenses of locally elected officials who also handled state
business.

The Board was a perennial target of anti

organization Democrats and Republicans, who charged it

with

using its power to advance the fortunes of the Democratic

20 Invariably organization men reminded me during
interviews that no legislator could be "paid off." Even
critics of the organization attested to its honesty.

20
•
j •
21
organization.

Virginia's forty circuit judges were elected by the
General Assembly for eight year terms and were delegated broad
appointive powers, including the naming of the Electoral
Board, the Welfare Board and the School Trustee Electoral
Board.

Since the local legislators recommended, and the Demo

cratic caucus nominated circuit court judges, the election was
perfunctory.

Although often little was known about the judge,

it could be safely predicted that his politics were orthodox. 22

Because the School Trustee Electoral Board appointed

the school boards in most counties, the circuit judge could
indirectly influence school policy.
Also contributing to the organization's stability was
the provision for a certain amount of competition within the
ranks.

Nevertheless, when several men sought the same office

the "nod" from Byrd usually tipped the balance in favor of the
Senator's candidate.
The path of a Virginian who sought a career in politics
usually followed a familiar pattern.

An aspiring politician

often earned a law degree, preferably at the University of

21Wilkinson, pp. 31-35, 52-53.
Investigations of
the State Compensation Board have never proven foul play.
99Ibid., Circuit judges in Virginia have a good repu
tation in Virginia. Not until the recent 1971 session of the
General Assembly has the routine of electing judges been al
tered. Now prospective judges are invited, but not required,
to answer questions in a public hearing before the Courts of
Justice Committees of both houses of the General Assembly.
See Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 28, 19 71, p. A-l.

21
Virginia.

He then practiced law, often with an eye on the po

sition of commonwealth's attorney for some locality.

After he

established a local reputation, election to the General Assem
bly or Congress could follow.

If a politician passed these

hurdles and proved to be capable and reliable, he hoped for
the organization hierarchy's support for the governorship.
Nevertheless, an ambitious man who had successfully cultivated
the courthouse clique could win the organization's endorsement
without being the hierarchy's first choice.

Such was the case

of J. Lindsay Almond, who was governor during the collapse of
• 4.'
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massive resistance.
Finally, the organization's political successes meant
that the development of political opposition was difficult to
mount.

The anti-Byrd Democrats were badly organized, poorly

financed, and without an electoral base.

Anti-organization

Democrats supported the national Democratic party, urged pub
lic reforms and attempted to expose organization doubledealing. 24

Despite their weaknesses, in the 1949 Democratic

primary, Francis Pickens Miller almost stole the Party's nomi
nation for governor away from John Battle, the organization
candidate.

The narrow margin of victory was viewed as a sign
25
of disillusionment with the organization's frugality.
In 1949, the state Republican party held its first pri-

22Ibid., p . 24.
2^Key, pp. 27-34.
2“*Wilkinson, pp. 91-98.
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mary in the history of Virginia.

A major obstacle to the

G.O.P.'s success was that ideologically paany Republicans were
in agreement with Byrd democrats.

Thus, some political obser

vers believed that Battle's victory over the more liberal
Miller was due to Republicans who "crossed-over" to vote in
the Democratic primary.

2g

By 1954, the organization was still in command, but its
mastery of Virginia politics was no longer as effortless as it
had been in the past.

In the 1953 gubernatorial race, the Re

publicans almost defeated the Democratic candidate.

The or

ganization standard bearer in this campaign was Thomas B.
Stanley, a colorless but dedicated Byrd democrat.

Stanley had

served his time as a state delegate for sixteen years before
going to Congress where he sat from 19 46 to 195 3.

A country

boy, Stanley, with initial help from his father-in-law, had
earlier become a wealthy furniture manufacturer.

Both he and

his wife, Anne Bassett Stanley, had been generous contributors
to the

organization's campaign chests.

The nomination of this

easy-going businessman appeared to be a reward for dedicated
service.

Either unwilling or unable to speak on major issues,

Stanley quickly acquired the sobriquet, "Mr. No Comment."
While Stanley was a fumbling speaker, his opponent, state Sena
tor Ted Dalton, was an articulate and sophisticated campaigner.
The Radford Republican attacked the state's electoral laws,
the power of the circuit judges and the state's effort in pro-

26Latimer, pp. 34-35.
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viding public services.

Apparently, Dalton was defeating

Stanley until he suggested financing highway improvements
through revenue bonds.

The breach of "pay-as-you-go" per

mitted Senator Byrd to enter the campaign and to rescue the
outclassed Stanley.

Though defeated, Dalton polled 182,887

votes to Stanley's 225,87 8, the best showing of any Republican
candidate in the twentieth century.

The Dalton vote very

likely indicated his great personal appeal as well as the
growing demand of Virginians for a more progressive and ener
getic government.

Otherwise, the Republican party fared badly

as indicated by the election of only five Republicans to the
House of Delegates, a loss of one from the previous Assembly.

27

Governor Stanley's poor election showing left many con
cerned about his ability to handle the duties of the Govern
or's office.

Among organization men apprehension turned into

temporary fury following Stanley's Inaugural Address.

Contra

dicting one of his few campaign promises, the Governor pro
posed a penny increase in the gasoline tax.

During the 1954

General Assembly, the proposal died a quiet death.

28

Already troubled, Stanley also faced an uprising in the
organization from a group of relatively young and ambitious
Democrats nicknamed "Young Turks".

The primary goal of the

"Turks" was to reform the organization without upsetting its
structure.

One major objection to organization policy was its

^ Ibid., pp. 54-62 .
^^Ibid., p . 6 3.
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poor record in providing public services.

According to

national statistics, Virginia ranked near the bottom in public
education, health and welfare.

The "Turks" were also disen

chanted with the hierarchy's reluctance to advance younger
members into positions of power.

The group was especially

distressed with the manner in which committee assignments were
distributed by the Speaker of the House, E. Blackburn Moore, a
confidant of Senator Byrd. 29
Intra-organization feuding surfaced in a fierce debate
to suspend state Senator Harry Byrd, Jr.'s Tax Credit Act of
1950.

The law provided for a rebate to taxpayers of general

funds collected in excess of budget estimates.

The "Turks"

revolted at the end of the 1954 session of the General Assem
bly when it was announced that $7,000,000 was to be returned
to the taxpayers.

Believing that the money should be used to

aid the needy public school system, they formed a coalition in
the House, suspended the Byrd law and amended the budget to
increase its appropriation by $7,000,000 for public services.
Foiled in the more conservative Senate, a compromise was
worked out in which a third of the money was added to the bud
get.

The press generally regarded the concession as a signi

ficant victory for the "Turks," and predicted that the organi
zation thereafter would have to pay greater attention to its
30
younger members and the issues they raised.

^ Ibid., p . 64.
^Ibid. , pp. 64-65.

25
Prior to Brown v. Board of Education,
had gotten off to a bad start.

Governor Stanley

The organization was still in

command, but political victories now were achieved with
greater difficulty.

The tradition of the organization, with

its "adding machine mentality," clashed increasingly with the
31
growing demand for public services.
The Supreme Court's
decision offered the organization a new opportunity to exploit
the race issue, in order to thwart the "Young Turks" and to
demolish the Republican party.

Yet the school decision posed

a dilemma, since one wing of the organization, if pushed to
the brink, preferred social and economic progress to loyalty
to Senator Byrd.

Ultimately the organization was destroyed by

the school issue, since the conservative wing was to refuse to
retreat, once massive resistance was demonstrated to be a
bankrupt policy.

31The phrase is borrowed from Key, p. 27.

CHAPTER II
REACTION TO BROWN I
Before 1950, the Negro struggle for equal educational
opportunity in Virginia focused on a legal campaign to in
crease the salaries of Negro teachers, to improve the studentteacher ratio in black classrooms, and to equalize the value
of black and white school facilities.^

The difference in the

value of black and white school property, in particular,
demonstrated the sham of the "separate but equal" doctrine in
Virginia.

In 1947, the per capita value of Negro school

property was still only 47.3 percent of white school property.
However, as a tesult of a flurry of equalization suits
directed by black lawyers, by 1951 the relative value of Negro
school property jumped to 64.9 percent.

2

Successes m

Surry,

Gloucester, and King George counties led one unnamed Negro
lawyer to observe that "between 1948 and 1950, half of the
counties with large Negro populations were ready for suits-3
if we had had the money to handle them."
Black lawyers were
so successful in federal courts that G. Tyler Miller, the

^Wilker son, pp. 76-78 , 149-91, 248-54.
^Ibid♦, p . 78
^Quoted in Ibid., p. 267.
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State Superintendent of Schools, asked them to be more
patient.

He justified this request by arguing "that the

quality of the education program depends more upon the teacher
than upon the buildings or any other factors."^
In September of 1950 the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu
cational Fund decided to change its legal strategy.

Instead

of pursuing equalization suits, the NAACP chose to concentrate
5

its entire legal effort on abolishing segregated schools.

For the black lawyers of the Virginia NAACP, now organized
into a legal staff under the able direction of Oliver W. Hill,
the transition from equalization to desegregation suits was
easy.

In northern and southwestern counties the case for de

segregated schools was strong, since Negro children were
forced to leave their own counties to receive an education in
regional Negro schools.^

Also, Negro lawyers were convinced

that an equal education could not be obtained in segregated
black schools, even in those counties where equalization suits
had been won.

They were persuaded that the equalization of

physical plants was not capable of destroying the white com
munity's view that black schools and their graduates were in7
ferior.
Thus one attorney actively involved in these cases

4
Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 19, 19 48, quoted
in Wilkerson, p. 267.
5
Kelly, "The School Desegregation Case," p. 257.
^Wilkerson, p. 268.
7
Interview, Oliver W. Hill.
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recalled:

"We were careful never to affirm the validity of

segregation.

We looked forward to the time when an integration
Q

case would emerge."
On May 23, 1951, the Virginia NAACP filed a desegrega
tion suit against the school board of Prince Edward County.
When one considered the leading role played by the Virginia
NAACP in the equalization suits, a desegregation case originat
ing in Virginia was no surprise.

However, the decision to

initiate proceedings in Prince Edward County was quite acci
dental and ultimately unfortunate.

The legal counsel appar

ently had planned to test the Plessy precedent in Pulaski
County, where no Negro schools existed.

However, on April 23,

1951, the Negro high school students of Prince Edward County
organized a strike to protest the dreadful conditions pre
vailing in the black high school.

Lacking guidance, the stu

dents sought the advice of two black Richmond lawyers, Oliver
Hill and Spotswood Robinson, III.

Both men were understanda

bly cautious in approaching a case in a Southside county.
Traditionally, Southside Negroes were less militant, and
therefore less disposed to accept the rigors of a lengthy law
suit.

Furthermore, in rural areas, the Negro was more exposed

to all forms of community harassment.

Finally, Hill and

Robinson knew that the greatest opposition to desegregation
would come in the Southside.

Despite such liabilities, the

NAACP, according to Hill, decided to handle the case because

^Wilkerson, p. 268.
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of the dedication exhibited by the students.

The only condi

tions of the NAACP, subsequently accepted, were that the
parents agree to authorize and support a suit aimed at deseg9
regation rather than equalization.
The change in the NAACP1s legal strategy had an ironic
but not unexpected effect as Virginia proceeded with even
greater haste to bridge the gap between Negro and white school
facilities.

In 1950, Governor John Battle inaugurated a pro

gressive program for financing public school construction in
Virginia.

Historically the localities were responsible for

bearing the cost of school construction.

But under Battle's

prodding, the 1950 General Assembly appropriated $45,000,000
for school construction grants to the localities and promised
another $30,000,000 when it met in 1952.^

Although the so-

called Battle Funds were designed to upgrade all schools,
generous grants were made to Southside counties for the con
struction of new black schools.

For example, $300,000 of the

Battle money was used to help construct the new Negro high
school in Prince Edward County and another $400,000 was ear
marked to assist in the construction of a black school in
Dinwiddie County.

11

A civic leader in the latter county ob-

^Bob Smith, They Closed Their Schools (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 42-69. The or
iginal case was Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. 1952)".
■^Wilkerson, pp. 98-99 .
^Ibid. , p . 2 82.
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served:

"Before the Prince Edward case, nothing happened in

Dmwiddie County."

12

By achieving actual equality, state

officials hoped to ameliorate conditions prevailing in Vir
ginia's Negro schools and also to improve their case for pre
serving segregated schools.

A superintendent of schools in

the Hampton Roads area recalled:

" It was believed, especially

by people, that if we equalized we wouldn't have to inteX. ,,13
grate.
The net effect of the integration suit on equalization
was dramatic.

The per capita value of Negro school property

jumped from 64.9 percent in 1951 to 86.2 percent of white
schools in 1954. 14

After the Brown decision, despite efforts

of Governor Stanley, the value of Negro property dipped to
78.1 percent.

The reasons for the decline are numerous. Some

school districts, no doubt,, saw cutting back funds as a way of
penalizing Negroes for their stubborn commitment to desegre
gation.

Other districts did not want to build new Negro

schools until the effect of the Brown decision and Virginia's
response was clarified.

15

No doubt a number of Negroes would

have preferred equalization to the strained race relations re
sulting from the Brown decision.

However, one minister voiced

the opinion of many Virginia blacks who fought for integrated

"^Quoted in Ibid., p. 282.
13T,
.
Ibid.
Ibid.., p . 78 .
~^Ibid., pp. 283-86.
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schools when he said:

"Before the integration cases, they

(white leaders) were patronizing; we had 'good relations,1 no
problems.

They thought of us as children.
16
respect us whether they like us or not."

Now they have to

The immediate impact of the 1954 decision was somewhat
softened when the Supreme Court postponed issuing any specific
orders for implementation until the states had opportunity, in
further argument, to make suggestions regarding implementation.

17

The decision to postpone the decree led to the unusual

situation where the Supreme Court delayed the enforcement of
a constitutional right.

Fear of widespread evasion of an

immediate order plus some sympathy for the difficulty in
changing traditional racial patterns accounted for the delay.

18

In Virginia the initial response to the Brown decision
was mild.

On May 18, 1954, Governor Stanley made a brief but

statesmanlike comment to the press.

He counseled Virginians

to respond "calmly and take time to carefully and dispassion
ately consider the situation before coming to conclusions on
steps which should be taken."

Rather than acting hastily,

Stanley promised to call on representatives of state and local

■^Quoted in Ibid., p. 285.
^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) .
18Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence Clyde Ferguson,
J r ., Desegregation and The Law: The Meaning of the School Se
gregation Cases
(New York : Vintage Books, 1962)", p p . 160-62 .

government to devise a plan which would be "acceptable to our
citizens and in keeping with the edict of the court."

Aston

ishingly the statement concluded that the "views of leaders of
both races will be invited in the course of these studies.
The intent of the speech was to leave the Governor a maximum
amount of flexibility.

He had not committed the state to any

program except a further study of the situation.

The state

ment was made without the aid of organization advice.

Ob

viously, the Governor intended to move cautiously until the
"word" came in from the organization.
Stanley's reference to biracial cooperation was a slip
for which he later received some criticism from anti
organization sources.

Has Stanley ever seriously considered

working with black leaders?

The answer was provided on May 2 4

when five Negro leaders, including Oliver Hill, were invited
to the Governor's office.

Stanley congratulated the leaders

on their legal triumph, but requested that they accept volun
tary segregation.

To a man this proposal was rejected.

The

Negro delegates recognized that desegregation could not be
achieved immediately throughout the state.

Nevertheless, they

urged the Governor to make a start toward desegregation.

The

meeting was a failure and marked the end of any significant
interaction on the school issue between the leaders of both
races for the next six years.^

19 Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 1954, p. 1.
20

1
Gates, p. 30;
interview with Oliver Hill.
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The reaction of the Governor was not unexpected.
Whereas Virginia's Negroes had been relatively well treated,
they had nevertheless been considered wards of the state.
After 1954 white Virginians reminded the state's black citi
zens that white money paid for Negro schools.

By creating

ill will, the warning continued, Negroes only jeopardized
black education.

21

The refusal of Virginia's Negroes to sub

mit to such a threat marked a new stage of activism among
black leaders which would be manifested in Virginia's poli
tics during the 1960's.
Initially Virginia's elected officers and opinion
makers seemed to believe that the solution to the school
crisis was through a policy of local option supplemented by
private education.

Writing to the powerful state senator from

the Southside, Garland Gray, Stanley said:

"I do not agree

with the decision but I believe defiance of the Court would
tend to aggravate the situation and deprive us of the chance
of coming to some understanding that would minimize the effects of the ruling on our social and educational systems."

22

One month after the Brown decision, Attorney General J. Lind
say Almond told Virginus Dabney that according to reports,

21

Report of the Commission on Public Education to
the Governor of Virginia, Garland Gray, Chairman, (Commonwealth
of Virginia: Division of Purchase and Printing, 1955), p. 7.
Subsequently cited as the Gray Report.
22

Letter, Thomas B. Stanley to Garland Gray, May 24,
1954, Virginia State Library Archives, Stanley Letter File.
Local option would permit a school district to decide whether
it wished to desegregate.
If a locality voted against inte
gration, some provision for easing the transition to private
education was expected.
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northern and southwestern counties would "let the Negroes into
white schools and eliminate colored teachers."

Almond thought

a solution could be worked out for the Southside counties but
cautioned Dabney that "there is a lot of politics in this
thing."

The Attorney General noted certain politicians were

already "sounding off about being 'unalterably' opposed to any
integration at all for the benefit of the voters." 23

James

Jackson Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond News Leader, also
subscribed to local option and private education as a suitable
solution to the school problem.

In addition, he thought that

"Given enough time, a great part of the problem--especially in
the cities--could be handled by the re-location of school
24
buildings, and the gerrymandering of enrollment lines."
Newspaper editorials, with their emphasis on the prob
lems and possibilities of a gradual approach, reflected the
ideas expressed in private correspondence.

Postponement of

the enforcement order was interpreted as evidence that the
Supreme Court recognized the complexities of school desegre
gation.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch also referred to the sig

nificance of the decision for Negro teachers.

The paper

pointed out that white parents would not readily allow their

Letter, Virginus Dabney to D. Tennant Bryan, June
23, 1954, University of Virginia Archives, Dabney Letter File.
^Letter, James J„ Kilpatrick to Harry F. Byrd, May
20, 1954, University of Virginia Archives, Kilpatrick Letter
File.
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children to be taught by Negroes and suggested, for this
reason, that caution was needed.

25

Although Stanley and Almond seemed to lean toward local
option, the men who were generally regarded as the organiza
tion's top hierarchy never subscribed to any policy that could
be represented as compliance.
fore the phrase was coined.

They were massive resisters be
Foremost among this group were

Senator Byrd and Congressmen Howard W. Smith, Watkins Abbitt
and William Tuck.

Smith was the powerful chairman of the

House Rules Committee, while the latter two represented the
Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts in Virginia's Southside.

In the General Assembly, E. Blackburn Moore, Speaker of

the House, and Garland Gray were usually considered part of the
inner circle. 26

They viewed the Supreme Court's decision to

postpone implementation as an opportunity to build up opposi
tion to its ruling.

The view was expressed by Gray in a

letter to Stanley in which the former warned the Governor
about the consequences of any delay by Virginia's leaders in
expressing their indignation with the Brown decision.

The re

sult, he said, would be that "our people may be slowly pushed
into a position of accepting the decision of the Supreme
Court."

The stake in the issue for the Southside, he contin

ued, was "our culture and racial purity," since desegregation
27
would lead "to intermarriage between the races."

25Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 1954, p. 1.
nc

Identification through interviews.

27Letter, Garland Gray to Thomas B. Stanley, May 20,
1954, Virginia State Library, Archives, Stanley Letter File.
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The organization, of course, could place great pressure
on Stanley and Almond.

The Governor's administration had not

started well, and if he mishandled the school issue, would be
viewed eventually as a disaster.

Stanley readily accepted the

advice of the organization hierarchy, and especially that of
Senator Byrd, who had saved him in 1953,

While recognizing

that the governorship was a tough spot for any man at this
time, Byrd exhibited some concern over Stanley's ability to
handle the situation.

He wrote to Kilpatrick that Stanley

"will need all the assistance and advice he can get." 2 8
Though strong-willed and considered a good lawyer,
Attorney General Almond's freedom of action was restricted by
his personal political ambitions.

Because of his unpredicta

bility and independent streak, Almond had never been fully ac
cepted by the organization^ hierarchy.

However, by 1954 , the

Attorney General had won statewide recognition for his defense
of Virginia in the Prince Edward case. Almond intended to use
this fame as a springboard to the governorship.

In fact, in

1948, he had left a seat in Congress for the office of attor
ney general with the belief "that the new position would put
me on a direct route to the governorship."

Acting on this as

sumption, Almond sought Byrd's approval for his candidacy in
1953.

Unsuccessful in this bid, the Attorney General later

said:
no

Letter, Harry F. Byrd to Jack Kilpatrick, May 19,
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter
File.

I saw that I had reached the end of the political
road unless I went out on my own . . . I began cautiously
laying the foundation that would be my approach to the
governorship in 1957. I accepted nearly every oppor
tunity to speak on public issues, and at considerable
sacrifice, I kept myself before the p e o p l e . 29
As part of his strategy, Almond acted discreetly at high level
policy meetings where he was confronted with politically
loaded questions.
to stay m

Almond himself stated:
"I was very careful
30
my place as legal adviser."
He did not want to

be identified with an unpopular position or to be tagged as an
integrationist.
While the Attorney General later emphasized his differ
ences with the organization, they appear to have been exagge
rated.

He shared with other Virginia political leaders a

strong commitment to states' rights and racial separation.
Even in 1964, Almond admitted that while he accepted the de
segregation of graduate schools, he was opposed to the
"throwing together" of tender, adolescent children.

31

Per

haps the crucial difference was that Almond always recognized
that if the federal government exerted its power, the states
would have to submit.

Yet this realization was easily subor

dinated to his political aspirations.

7Q

As was demonstrated by

Luther J. Carter "Inside Byrd's Organization",
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 7, 1964, p. 1. On June 7, 8 and
9, Almond permitted an interview in which he discussed his
role in massive resistance. By 1964 he was considered the
martyr of massive resistance.
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his subsequent gubernatorial campaign, Almond was, above all,
an opportunist.
By early June, it was apparent that the organization
was going to use the grace period provided by the Supreme
Court to build a case against desegregation.

On June 1,

Governor Stanley announced that of five hundred letters which
he had received, practically all opposed desegregation.

Nine

days later, he suggested that most Negroes preferred separate32
but-equal education.
The announcement was followed on
June 20 by a defiant resolution signed by twenty state legis
lators from Virginia's Fourth Congressional District.

The

Southsiders pledged their "unalterable opposition to the principle of integration of the races m

the schools."

33

More ominously, on June 26, Governor Stanley asked for
the repeal of Section 129 of; the Virginia Constitution which
provided that the General Assembly "shall establish and main
tain an efficient system of public free schools throughout the
state."

The operation, Stanley explained, would give the

General Assembly the power to eliminate the public schools in
any or all parts of Virginia.

Finally, the Governor pledged

to "use every legal means at my command to continue segregated
schools in Virginia."

34

32Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 2, 1954, p. 1, June
11, 1954, p. 13.
33Ibid., June 21, 1954, p. 1.
3^Ibid., June ,27, 1954, p. 1.
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While asking for the repeal of Section 129, Stanley
said that he had no intention of abolishing the public school
system.

Anti-organization Democrats and Republicans were not

satisfied with this qualification.

Delegate Robert Whitehead,

a respected anti-Byrd Democrat, recalled that among certain
legislators there existed a strong aversion to public educa
tion.

He feared that the repeal of Section 129 could evolve

into a wholesale abandonment of public education.

Assuring

the people of the Old Dominion that he was no integrationist,
Whitehead urged Virginia to chart a course between "the
leadership of the radical elements of the NAACP, rabid for in
tegration at any cost, and that of the Tories whose concern
for the public school system has never been more than skin
deep."

35

Whitehead spoke for a substantial minority of Vir

ginians who believed that the state's progress depended more
on maintaining education than maintaining segregation.

As

Whitehead's speech indicated, the greatest threat to the ef
fectiveness of moderate segregationists was that they would
become identified with the NAACP and integraitionists.
The reluctance of moderate political leaders to become
too closely associated with the Virginia NAACP meant that the
Negro position would not be represented at all in the politi
cal forum.

Furthermore, the NAACP position was distorted as

Virginia's leaders subjected the Negro organization to a bar
rage of derogatory epithets.

In August, Attorney General

35Ibid., June '29, 1954, p. 10.
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Almond charged that the Negro organization would be better
named the "National Association for the Agitation of Colored
People."

He promised that the NAACP was "not going to write
the ticket in Virginia." 36
On August 28, Stanley announced the appointment of
thirty-two legislators to study the school problem.

The ab

sence of Negroes, businessmen or educators on the Commission
on Public Education represented a triumph for the irreconcilables.

Earlier, while Stanley had been pondering the compo

sition of his committee, Gray advised him that "I do not have
much confidence in any solution that might be suggested by
professional educators, clergymen or negroes

[sic]." 37

In a

letter to a constituent which found its way to Howard Smith's
desk, Representative Tuck wrote that the worst aspect of a biracial commission was that it "would endeavor to find ways of
integrating.
integrate." 38

My view is that we should study ways how not to
Some newspapers and religious organizations had

attempted to influence Stanley to stick to his earlier promise
of a more broadly based commission but had obviously

o

c

Ibid., August 20, 1954, p. 1; August 26, 1954,

p. 1.
37

Ibid.; Letter, Garland Gray to Thomas B. Stanley,
May 20, 1954, Virginia State Library, Archives, Stanley Letter
File.
38Letter, William M. Tuck to Harry E. Cassidy,
June 29, 1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter
File.
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failed.

39

The Governor justified his departure by explaining

that any problem relating to public education must first pass
the General Assembly.

"The more first-hand information mem

bers of the Legislature can obtain, the better equipped they
will be to deal with the problem.
If Southsiders were happy with the decision to limit
the commission to legislators, they were overjoyed with
Stanley's appointments.

While there were at least two members

from each congressional district, nineteen came from districts
which had black belt counties.

The Fourth (Southside) had six

representatives, while the more populous Second (NorfolkPrincess Anne) and the Tenth (Arlington-Fairfax) had only
five.

On the important eleven-man executive committee, the

Ninth was not represented.
leading state Republican,

The absence of Ted Dalton, the
along with Robert Whitehead and

Armistead Boothe, prominent anti-organization Democrats, was

significant.41

39

Gates, pp. 31-3 2. The Lynchburg News and Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot were critical of Stanley while the News Leader
came to his defense. Bill Tuck backed up Stanley by~wrTtTng
that "you are one hundred per cent right, in my opinion, in
not appointing a bi-racial commission." Letter, William M.
Tuck to Thomas B. Stanley, August 30, 1954, Virginia State
Library, Archives, Stanley Letter File.
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 29 , 1954 , p. 1,

^Gates, pp. 34-36. Organization men defended the
distribution of the Gray Commission with the argument that
since the problem was in the black belt, legislators from this
region should have the most to say about the problem.
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When the commission held its first meeting on Septem
ber 13, Governor Stanley set the tone for its work by reasser
ting the view that "public sentiment" and the "best interests"
of Virginia demanded segregation.

Stanley reiterated the po

sition that his major goal was to "use every legal means at my
command to preserve segregated schools in Virginia."

42

The

influence of the conservatives on the commission was demon
strated immediately by the selection of State Senator Garland
Gray as chairman. 43

Thus, the Gray commission was hardly a

fact-finding body of the best talent in Virginia.

Although

Governor Stanley had suggested that the Commission conduct
hearings throughout the state, the only public session was
held in Richmond on November 15, 1954.

In fact, between

Stanley's announcement and the Commission's report on
November 11, 1955, a cloud of secrecy hung over the body.
What took place in these private meetings?

Basically a

split existed between the Southsiders and legislators who be
lieved that some accommodation would have to be made with the
Brown decision.

Southsiders urged that Virginia completely

disregard the Brown decision.

Fearing the precedent of even

token desegregation in any part of the state, the irreconcilables demanded that Virginia assume a state-wide posture of
resistance.

This position was expressed by Robert Y. Button,

42 Richmond Times-Dispatch,
^Ibid.,

September 14, 1954, p. 1.

August 29, 1954 , p. 1,
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a state senator from Culpeper, to Howard Smith.

"I realize the

appeal in giving the utmost freedom to the local school boards
in the operation of the schools/1 Button wrote, "but I am
afraid if this is done there will be integration in certain
counties where the problem is not very acute/'

Senator Button

believed that the basis for opposing desegregation in the
Southside would be damaged if after "a reasonable number of
years a considerable portion of the State would have inte
grated schools,

o

o

/'

The Culpeper Senator predicted that the

Southside might abandon its public schools rather than inte
grate.

He preferred "a statewide plan that would prevent any

integration . . . even though certain counties might prefer to
integrate immediately." 44
Politically, the black belt politicians argued that
their public careers were finished if they were "soft" on in
tegration.

At the same time, Southsiders recognized the ad

vantages of using the school issue to enhance their political
careers.

Garland Gray, for example, in early October, pub-

lically said, "I don't intend to have my grandchildren go to
school with them/’45

Consequently, if another politician took

^Letter, Robert Button to Howard W. Smith, July 20,
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
Culpeper County is in the northern Piedmont, and in 19 50, it
had a Negro population estimated at 27.9 percent.
Senator
Button was a reliable organization man and served on the Gray
Commission.
45Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 6, 19 54, p. 1.
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a more compromising position in the black belt, he opened him
self up to the charge that he was an "integrationist."
During the secret meetings of the Gray Commission, a
substantial number of men believed that some accommodation had
to be made with the Brown decision.

This group, composed of

legislators outside the black belt, was equally shocked by the
Supreme Court's ruling and also preferred segregated schools.
While sensitive to the Southside's problem, the accommodationists, many of them lawyers, argued that, however disagreeable,
the Brown decision was the "law of the land."

When the South-

siders suggested that either the Governor or the General
Assembly assume control of the schools, the accommodationists,
aided by the advice of counsel David J. Mays, suggested that
such a move was legally impossible.

Mays was of the opinion

that Virginia could not hide, behind the Eleventh Amendment's
provision prohibiting suits against a state.

Having a good

legal argument and aware that some areas could tolerate token
desegregation, the accommodationists eventually urged a policy
of local option.

Permitting the individual localities to de

cide whether they wished to desegregate, the accommodationists
argued, would satisfy the Supreme Court as well as the South4fi
side.
While the accommodationists had certain immediate ad
vantages, time was on the side of the resisters.

A C

The hiatus

.

A description of the meetings came from interviews
with members of the Gray Commission. The minutes of the
meetings are still unavailable. David J. Mays was a prominent
Richmond lawyer who also won a Pulitzer Prize for his bio
graphy of Edmund Pendleton.
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between Brown I and Brown II offered the resisters an oppor
tunity to summon arguments for defying the Supreme Court.
While the Gray Commission was meeting, other important
developments, both private and public, took place.

Of immense

importance to Virginia's response was the position taken by
Senator Harry Byrd.

Following the Brown decision, the Senator

had briefly commented that Brown was "the most serious blow
that has been struck against the rights of the States in a
matter vitally affecting their authority and welfare." 47

How

deeply Senator Byrd would involve himself in this problem was
at first unknown.

While he had interceded in the 1953 guber

natorial election, the Senator wrote Kilpatrick that Washington
responsibilities were making it difficult for him to devote
much attention to Virginia affairs.

48

However, by August,

Senator Byrd seemed actively involved in an attempt to direct
Virginia policy.

Unknown to the public, the Senator tried unsuccessfully
to persuade Stanley and Almond to withdraw from the school de
segregation cases.

By August, however, Almond wrote to Byrd:

"It is my understanding from reliable sources that some are
endeavoring to prevail upon the Governor that Virginia should
withdraw from any further connection with the case."

The

^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18 , 1954, p. 1.

48Letter, Harry F. Byrd to James J. Kilpatrick, May 12,
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter File.
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Attorney General opposed the strategy and was concerned about
the political ramifications,,

"That which we have known and

believed in, sometimes called the 'organization,! might well
founder in the event of the absence of thinking and a coura
geous and constructive program with reference to this explosive
subject."

The Attorney General hoped "that certain forces in

Virginia will not be permitted to kick this subject around
as a political football."

If the public sensed a difference

of opinion, Almond predicted that it "could prove fatal.
Clea.rly Senator Byrd was among those pressing Stanley
to pull out of the case.

On August 30, Byrd sent a copy of

the Almond letter to Howard Smith, and indicated his displea
sure with the Attorney General's "irrevocable decision to
appear before the Supreme Court even though he is not author50
ized to do so by the Governojr."
Several days later, the
Senator wrote Smith that he could not understand why the
Governor "changed his mind" on the Supreme Court strategy.
Byrd added that he had invited Almond to visit him in Wash
ington for a discussion of the issue.
would be futile."

Yet, Byrd thought, "it

Momentarily frustrated, he concluded:

"It appears to me the whole matter is being handled very

49
Letter,
August 16, 195 4,
ter Files.
50
Letter,
1954, University

J. Lindsay Almond Jr. to Harry F. Byrd,
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Let
Harry F. Byrd to Howard Smith, August 30,
of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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injudiciously, but I do not know what we can do."

S1

Almond

sidestepped a meeting with Byrd by writing that prior speak52
ing engagements made this impossible.
Most likely the
encounter would have been uncomfortable for both men.

Governor

Stanley apparently considered pulling out of the case, but
had been persuaded by Almond against this course.
Why had Senator Byrd urged Virginia to withdraw from
the Brown case?

The exchange of letters indicated that Byrd

believed that withdrawal would emphasize Virginia's unwilling
ness to recognize the Supreme Court's authority over state
education.

Furthermore, Byrd and others may have thought

that they could argue that the enforcement decree did not
apply to Virginia, if the state did not participate in the
suit.

Support for this interpretation is suggested by the

fact that Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi refused to enter,
, .
. .
.
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for similar reasons, amici curiae arguments.
Among irreconcilables local option and continued par
ticipation in the Brown case were opposed, because they were
considered to be signs of compliance with the Supreme Court's
decision.

The major goal of the resisters was to convince

the public that no justification for compliance existed.

51

Letter, Harry F. Byrd to Howard W. Smith, September 2,
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
52Letter, J. Lindsay Almond Jr. to Harry F. Byrd,
September 2, 1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith
Letter File.
53Blaustein and Ferguson, Jr., p. 159.
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To accomplish this objective, organization speakers lashed
out at the Supreme Court.

Representative Tuck, in a typical

fire-eating speech, charged that the Supreme Court was a
"super legislature," and that it played into the hands of the
Communists by splitting the races.

In referring to the sup

posed advantages won by the "Communists in Moscow," Tuck
hoped to counter the argument that segregation harmed Ameri
can foreign policy in the developing Asian and African
nations.

Furthermore, by implication, Tuck introduced the

conspiracy thesis as a possible explanation for the Brown
decision.

Besides the Communist conspiracy, Tuck fretted over

the clerical conspiracy.

The former Governor assured Vir-

. .
.
54
ginians that segregation was not un-Christian.
Attorney General Almond, a tub-thumping orator from
the old school, joined Tuck in attacking the Warren Court.
The Brown decision, he charged, defied the Constitution by
amending the Fourteenth Amendment and repealing the Tenth
Amendment.

Emphasizing that education was the exclusive

right of the states, Almond declared that he would defend
this right to the end of his public life.

Speaking to a

group which had just passed a resolution opposing integra
tion, the Attorney General promised:

"In Virginia, we

cannot and we will not have colored teachers to teach white
children." 55

Although he was the chief law officer of the

54Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 15, 1954, p. 1.
55Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 27, 1954, p. 1.
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state, Almond seemed to encourage evasion of Virginia's com
pulsory attendance law.

The Attorney General doubted whether

any "Commonwealth's Attorney would dare to prosecute" a vio
lation of the school law.

If such a case developed, he believed

that "no jury will convict on charges of non-attendance in
integrated schools.
The organization also attempted to speak for Virginia's
Negroes.

Political leaders asserted that the Brown decision

and not white Virginians were responsible for the apparent
differences between the races.

Almond explained that the

Brown ruling not only undermined "the concepts, principles
and mores of the South," but "cares nothing for the welfare
of the Negro race."

57

The races, Congressman Tuck explained,

"understand each other's problems and we have been able to
maintain mutual respect."

He predicted that "we will contin

ue to coexist on the same sort of basis despite the handicaps
58
put upon us by this decision."
Governor Stanley also sug
gested that Negroes actually preferred separate schools.
Furthermore, the Governor thought that desegregation would be
upsetting psychologically for Negro children at the bottom of
white classes.

59

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 28, 1954, p. 1.
57Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 26, 1954, p. 4.
^Ibid., October 15 , 1954 , p. 1.
CQ

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 11, 1954, p. 12.
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In addition to speeches, the resisters helped to or
ganize "spontaneous" demonstrations of public indignation with
the Brown decision.

The irreconcilables who met in Petersburg

on June 20, for example, initiated a letter-writing campaign
to the Governor.

As a result, sixty-one localities submitted

resolutions supporting segregated schools.

fi

D

More significant was the creation of an organized
interest group, the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Indivi
dual Liberties, committed to protecting segregation.

Though

more responsible, the Defenders played a role in Virginia
similar to the White Citizens Councils of other states.
Chartered by the State Corporation Commission on October 26,
1954, the Defenders was organized in Virginia's Southside.
Among the founders of the group was J. Barrye Wall, editor
and publisher of the Farmville Herald in Prince Edward
County.

Wall's newspaper subsequently became a mouthpiece

for the Defenders.

The officers of the organization included

respected businessmen and public servants.^

Consistent with

Virginia's general policy, Defenders' objectives empha
sized respectability.

A concerted effort was made to avoid

any association with extremist groups like the Klu Klux Klan.
The Defenders recognized that its credibility as a respect
able organization rested on support from state political
leaders.

Racial violence would have jeopardized such a

^Smith, p. 88.
^ G a t e s , pp. 36-38.
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favorable association.
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The group's certificate of incor

poration indicated that its goal was to foster states'
rights.

All applicants signed a statement which contained a

provision that "segregation of the races is a right of the
63
state government."
The founders of the Defenders emphasized that one of
its purposes was to maintain peace by channeling discontent.
However, one observer wrote that the group concentrated on
encouraging "a spirit of legal rebellion."

A symbiotic rela

tionship seemed to exist between Byrd Democrats and the
Defenders.

The former provided speakers who lent respecta

bility, whereas the latter provided "grass roots" opposition
6
to the Brown decision.
A

The Gray Commission, emotional speeches and the de
velopment of a "grass roots'- organization were designed to
develop state-wide conformity to the Democratic organization's
viewpoint.

However, in the fall of 1954, an alternative ap

proach was submitted by sources outside the organization's
hierarchy.

Heading the opposition was Armistead L. Boothe, a

state delegate from Alexandria, identified with the Young
Turks.

Boothe was alarmed by Stanley's recommendation of

June 25, to revoke Section 129 of the Virginia Constitution.

^Smith, pp. 98-99 .
63Gates, p . 37.
^Smith, p. 88.
Supra, p. 29.
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Fearing the consequences of an amendment, Boothe sent a
"Turkey-gram" to members of the General Assembly.

In the

circular, he indicated that Stanley's proposal was a threat to
public education which could seriously divide the Democratic
party.

He urged the assembly to search for a solution which

conformed with the Brown decision.^

Boothe followed the

memorandum with a questionnaire which polled the legislators
regarding their attitudes on desegregation, Section 129, and
related questions.

The results, which were made public, in

dicated an almost unamimous opposition to forced desegregation.
In the face of the Brown decision, however, most legislators
seemed to prefer a policy of local option. 7
&

All the signs indicated that Boothe's efforts would
carry little weight with Governor Stanley and his advisers.
State Senator Button, before: filling out the questionnaire,
requested the advice of Howard Smith.

The wily old Democrat

recommended that Button ignore the questionnaire.

"Frankly,

I do not think the Governor is going to pay very much atten
tion to Armistead's representation.
Following the appointments of the Gray Commission,
Delegate Boothe persisted in his efforts to influence public

66

A copy of the Turkey-gram is m the Smith Letter
File. Though undated, it must have followed Stanley's state
ment of June 25th.
^Southern School Mews, Vol. 1, No. 2 (October, 1954),
p. 14.
fi

R

Letter, Robert Button to Howard W. Smith, July 13,
1954, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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opinion.

He recommended that Virginia should present an im

plementation scheme to the Supreme Court when the case was
69
reargued.
In October, Boothe publically endorsed a plan of
local option.

By eliminating discrimination and segregation

wherever no social problem is created by it, Boothe argued,
Virginia would be demonstrating "good faith" as well as rec. .
70
ognizmg regional differences.

In fact, however, the Alex

andria Democrat was no rabid integrationist, even with respect
to areas with relatively small Negro populations.

In these

localities Negro enrollment would be limited to "outstanding
Negro students who have all the mental, moral and physical
qualities to attend and pass through any school of their
choice whether it be white or colored if they are in their
proper geographical districts."

The result of such careful

selection, Boothe predicted, would mean "that a predominantly
white school may have a limited number of qualified Negro
students who want to go there."

71

The Boothe plan won the public support of only a few
prominent politicians, among them anti-organization Democrat
Robert Whitehead.

Whitehead proposed "...a solution that

will be within the law as finally interpreted by the highest
court in the land, and yet with the least possible disloca-

69Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 25, 1954, p. 1.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 21, 1954, p. 1.
^Ibid., October 23 , 1954, p. 6.
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tion of our present system*

This is not the time for dema

gogic harangues by persons in or out of public office*

Our

present situation should not be used as a vote-getting
springboard on which to inflame the voters of Virginia."

72

In turn, Whitehead was denounced by Representative
Tuck for his endorsement of local option.

The imflammable

Tuck charged that Whitehead was a "double-crosser" and an
"integrationist."

73

Several days later the Norfolk

Virginian-Pilot, which supported both Boothe and Whitehead,
remarked that influential citizens seemed to be afraid to express themselves.

74

The Tuck-Whitehead exchange certainly

did not encourage dissent.

Nevertheless, local option, be

cause of its flexibility, was a very attractive solution to
Virginia1s problem.
On November 15 , 1954., the Gray Commission held its
only public hearing, in the Richmond Mosque.

Some 2,000

people gathered in the Richmond auditorium to listen to ap
proximately 130 speakers deal with the question:

"What

course should Virginia follow in light of the Supreme Court
decision m

the segregation cases?"

75

The hearing, m

part,

was a necessary formality, since Stanley and the Gray Commis-

72 Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 22, 1954, p. 1.
^ Ibid., October 23, 1954, October 25, 1954, p. 1.
74Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 1,
1954, p.
75 The Richmond News Leader, November 16, 1954, p. 1.
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sion members had led the public to believe that the study
commission would hold a number of state-wide fact-finding
sessions.

Rather than seeking information, the Richmond

meeting was converted into another attempt to establish a
point of view.

By stating the question so loosely, the Gray

Commission invited rabid segregationists to shout down the
Brown decision.

Recognizing the political possibilities of

the assembly, large delegations, especially in the Southside,
were organized for a trip to Richmond.

76

The Norfolk

Virginian-Pilot believed a false question had been raised,
since the commission permitted Virginians to perceive the
issue as a choice between integration versus segregation.
Virginia, the Norfolk newspaper stressed, should aevote its
energy to preserving the public school system by working out
a reasonable accommodation with the Brown decision. 77
As expected, the Richmond hearing accomplished nothing.
Attitudes ranged from total noncompliance, to a dedicated
effort to conform to the Brown decision.

A close correlation

between location, black belt or northern Virginia, and expressions of defiance or compliance was observed. 78 Perhaps
the most significant result was that Virginians not ade-

^ Ibid. , November 5 , 1954 , p. 6.
7 7Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 5, 1954,
p. 6.
^Gates, pp. 39-41.
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quately represented on the Gray Commission prevented extreme
segregationists from dominating the hearing.

Following the

ordeal, the Gray Commission announced that it had no plans
for further hearings.

The Richmond meeting was never re-

peated. 79
On November 15, Virginia submitted a brief to the Sup
reme Court in preparation for oral arguments.

Regarding the

specific questions asked by the Court, Virginia opposed any
deadline for ending segregation.

Also, the Old Dominion pre

ferred giving the lower courts jurisdiction over the cases
rather than appointing a special body to supervise implemen
tation.

"Neither court decree nor executive order can force

in those sections (where citizens have stated they will not
consent to compulsory integration) a result so basically op
posed by a majority," the brief defiantly stated.

In issuing

a decree, Virginia thought standards of health, housing and
scholastic achievement must be taken into consideration.

Re

versing the NAACP argument, the Old Dominion contended that a
final decree should be postponed until the effects of inte
gration on students was documented.

The Brown decision,Vir

ginia warned, had raised the "spectre of impending education
al chaos.
The NAACP's brief was more specific in its recommenda-

79Richmond Times-Dispatch., November 25, 1954, p. 1.
^Thld. , November 16, 1954, p. 1.

tions.

The Negro lawyers wanted the Supreme Court to desig

nate September, 1955 or September, 1956, as the date for
opening schools on a desegregated basis.

In response to

Virginia's defiant actions, the NAACP no longer trusted any
81
•
gradual program of desegregation.
The note of defiance in Virginia's brief was struck
again in a preliminary report submitted by the Gray Commis
sion announcing that it intended to "explore avenues toward
formulation of a progran, within the framework of the law,
designed to prevent enforced integration of the races in the
public schools of Virginia."

The recommendation was based

on an analysis of public opinion derived from the public hear
ing, "communications" with the Governor, "conversations with
the people," and "actions" taken by school boards and boards
of supervisors.

Not only were these "communications" unso

phisticated as a measure of public opinion, they were also
somewhat contrived.
sed integration.

Most white Virginians, to be sure, oppo

Yet, in many parts of the state, gradual de-

segration was apparently regarded as preferable to closing
the public schools.

The Gray Commission recognized this, since

it contended that any desegregation plan depended on "local con
ditions" as well as the support of the "majority of the people.
While the Commission predicted school closures or the impair
ment of public education in many areas of the state, it

81-ru
‘^
Ibid.
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implicitly admitted that many sections could also adjust to the
problem posed by the Brown decision. 82
The preliminary Gray Report amounted to a compromise
between the Southsiders and the accommodationists.

When com

bined with the November 15 brief, the report also indicated
that in parts of Virginia there would be total defiance of
the Brown decision.

Governor Stanley and Attorney General

Almond approved of the report.

However, the editors of a

number of newspapers expressed dissatisfaction.

Two newspa

pers, the Newport News Daily Press and the Danville Bee, con
sidered any plan premature until the Supreme Court had issued
an implementating decree.

Focusing on the virtual absence of

public hearings, the Roanoke Times commented:

"Doesn't the

commission trust the people or has it made up its mind about
what it will do?"

Even more, scathing was the Norfolk

Virginian-Pilot which charged that the Gray Commission had
perverted its purpose.

The Commission, one editorial ex

claimed, had not attempted to study methods by which the tra
ditional system of education could be changed without harming
public schools or race relations.

Instead, the Commission

had concerned itself "with establishing a point of view in
Virginia." 83

The preliminary report of the Gray Commission

marked the end of the first phase of Virginia's response to

83Ibid. , January 20 , 1955, p. 1.
83Southern School News, Vol. 1, No. 6 (February, 1955),
p. 11.
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the Brown decision.

The Gray Commission would now turn its

attention to an examination of "legal methods" for circumven
ting the Court’s ruling.
Thus while most Virginians were critical of the Sup
reme Court's decision, large areas of Virginia were expected
to conform with an implementation order.

However, the hier

archy of the Democratic organization, based in the Southside,
never favored compliance with the Brown decision.

Unable to

secure a moratorium on desegregation from Virginia's Negro
leaders, Governor Stanley dedicated himself to preserving
segregated schools.

The Governor's position reflected his

personal convictions as well as the sentiments of the organi
zation's leaders to whom Stanley was indebted.
The enormous influence of the black belt on Governor
Stanley was indicated by the composition of the Gray Commis
sion.

In commission meetings, extreme segregationists could

riot only protect their interests but detect individuals who
were "soft" on integration.

Attorney General Almond, ex

tremely ambitious for the office of governor, was most sensi
tive to the political implications of the school issue.
While recognizing that race politics would make an adjust
ment to the Brown decision more difficult, he more than
equaled Tuck and Gray in encouraging defiance.

Almond real

ized that without the Southside's support, he had no chance
for the Democratic nomination.
Despite disproportionate representation on the Gray
Commission, the diehard segregationists were unable to im-

60
pose a statewide defiance of the Brown decision.

Any threat

to public education, especially Section 129, would have im
mediately ripped the organization apart.

In order to be ac

ceptable to all wings of the organization, a school plan
would have had to preclude massive school closings.

The

drift toward local option represented a compromise between
resisters and accommodationists.

Nevertheless, the ingredi

ents for a statewide policy of massive resistance lingered
just below the surface.

The organizational hierarchy was

willing, and the enemies (the NAACP and the Supreme Court)
had been identified.
an explosion.

Only a catalyst was needed to generate

CHAPTER III
FROM LOCAL OPTION TO INTERPOSITION
Following the preliminary Gray Report, Virginia began
the search for a technique by which localities could subvert
t^ie Brown decision.

On February 25 , 1955 , the director of

the State Department of Conservation and Development, Raymond
V. Long, announced that Seashore State Park would be leased
to a private operator.

The decision had been prompted by a

suit filed in 1951 by Negroes to use the park.

According to

Long, the lease was necessary to protect Virginia's invest
ment by insuring the park's; continued use at the estimated
average of 200,000 persons per year.

Victor J. Ashe, a well-

known Negro attorney in Norfolk, announced that he would at
tempt to block the lease on the grounds that it was an il
legal attempt to maintain a segregated facility.'*'
The Seashore case had a significant bearing on the
school issue.

If Virginia escaped an order to desegregate a

public park by leasing the facility to a private operator,
the same technique could possibly be used to "save" public
schools ordered to desegregate.

In the federal district

court of Judge Walter E, Hoffman, the Negro plaintiffs asked

^Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 26, 1955, p. 1.
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for an order temporarily restraining the negotiation of the
lease.

Judge Hoffman, aware of the relationship between re

creation and the school issue, asked Virginia's counsel:

"If

the state of Virginia has authority to lease a State park,
would it not be possible for a municipal corporation to lease
its public schools to private individuals?"

Henry T.

Wickham, special assistant to the Attorney General, answered
affirmatively.

2

Believing that the lease could be a "fore

runner" of other action, Hoffman granted the temporary injunction sought by the Negroes. 3
On July 7, 1955, Judge Hoffman issued a permanent in
junction prohibiting further exclusion from Seashore State
Park by race and requiring a provision against discrimination
in any lease negotiated with a private operator.

The pro

posed lease was unconstitutional, wrote Hoffman, because it
proposed "to accomplish by indirection exactly what all
4
Courts have said cannot be done."
The significance of the Hoffman decision was not
missed by the state press.

A Richmond Times-Dispatch edi

torial concluded that the ruling "put all plans to lease pub5
lie school property to private persons in grave jeopardy."

^Ibid., March 13, 1955, p. 1.
^Ibid..
^Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development,
133 F. Supp. 53, 56 (E.d'7 Va. 1955).” "“
“
5

Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 9, 1955,

p. 8.

63
Criticizing state leadership, the Norfolk Virginia-Pilot
wrote that Virginia gained nothing by endeavoring to avoid
C

integration by "short-cuts and circuitous routes."

Fol

lowing the park ruling, the state announced that Seashore
State Park would be closed, while the eight remaining parks
would be operated on a segregated basis.

7

Another measure directly related to the Brown deci
sion was the announcement by the State Department of Educa
tion of a major revision in teacher contracts.

Instead of

offering a nine month contract, school boards were allowed to
insert a clause in a teacher's contract which permitted the
board to terminate the contract after thirty days notice.
Secondly, the new contracts would designate the name of the
school to which the teacher was assigned, rather than merely
the county or city.

The change was made, according to the

State Department of Education, to anticipate a decrease in
enrollments in case the Supreme Court ordered an immediate
end to racial segregation.

However, the new provision would

also apply to teachers whose classes suffered a decline in
attendance.

Some observers believed that the contract revi

sion was intended to serve as an incentive to Negro teachers
to persuade pupils to remain in Negro public schools.

One

^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 9, 1955,
p. 8.
7

Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 13, 1955,

p. 8.
^Ibid., April 6, 1965, p. 1.

paper suspected that the effect was to threaten Negro teach
ers with unemployment if Negro children transferred to
white schools.

Negro teachers would consequently be reduced
9

to "recruiting agents."

The third district of the Negro

Virginia Teacher's Association agreed with this analysis and
denounced the thirty day rule as an evasive device which
would drive teachers out of the profession.'*'^
While Virginia searched for methods of evading a de
segregation order, the State's attorney made a final plea be
fore the Supreme Court.
stressed several themes.

During the oral argument, Virginia
One was that the effect of desegre

gation on white children was unknown.

Academically, satis-

tics were cited which indicated the Negro scholastic
achievement was well below that of white children.

Virginia'

lawyers suggested that desegregated classrooms would disrupt
the normal education of white children.

Moreover, the ef

fects of mere physical contact with Negro children were un
known.

Records of tuberculosis, syphilis, gonorrhea and il

legitimate births showed that their incidence was exceedingly
high among the Negro population.'*''*'

Archibald G. Robertson,

counsel for Virginia, added that the record "of disease and

9

Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, April 20, 1955,

p. 6.
“^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 17, 1955, p. 1.
11

Leon Friedman, ed., Argument; The Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court (New York: Chelsea House Publishers,
1969), p. 428.

illegitimacy is just a drop in the bucket compared to the
promiscuity."

He concluded that "white parents at this time

would not appropriate the money to put their children among
other children with that sort of background."

12

Secondly, the defendants argued that a statewide de
cree was untenable, considering the regional differences in
Virginia..

The "most powerful single influence on racial at

titudes,"

Attorney General Almond submitted, was the ratio,

of Negroes to whites in a county or city.

Considering Vir

ginia's various attitudes and traditions, Almond hoped that
each locality would be free to deal with the school problem
in its own way.'*‘3
Thirdly, Virginia warned the Court that the state
faced "the bleak prospect of serious impairment or possible
destruction of our public school system."

Such an eventu

ality, Almond contended, must be weighed against the Negro
demand for immediate enforcement of the desegregation deci
sion.

In fashioning an order, the Attorney General reminded

the Supreme Court that it dealt with "the warp and woof of
their (Virginia's) mores of life..."

The Attorney General

recognized the power of the Supreme Court to enforce a grad
ual adjustment of school policy, but added "that does not
mean enforced integration to us in Virginia."

In closing,

Almond reminded the Court that the Eighteenth Amendment was

12Ibid.
13Ibid., pp. 428-35.
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repealed "because it affected the way of life of the American
i
..14
people.

The lawyers for the NAACP asked the Supreme Court for
an entirely different decree.

In their oral arguments,

Spotswood Robinson, III, and Thurgood Marshall, for the
plaintiffs, asked that the Court's order provide for the ini
tiation of administrative steps preparatory to the assignment
of Negro children to desegregated schools in Prince Edward
County m

September 1955 or 1956.

15

The request was grounded

on the principle that the right to a desegregated education
was both "personal and present."

To delay, the Negro lawyers

contended, would mean that some Negro children would lose
forever rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

16

The NAACP lawyers countered Virginia's arguments in
several ways.

The discrepancy- in scholastic achievement,

they argued, proved that segregated schools were not equal.
Regarding educational problems caused by differences in
ability, Thurgood Marshall had a simple solution:

"Put the

dumb colored children in with the dumb white children, and
put the smart colored children with the smart white children
— that is no problem."

17

Marshall also objected to a decree

that took into consideration regional differences.

^ Ibi.d., pp. 431-35.
15Ibi,d. , pp. 384, 394.
16rbi,d. , pp. 390-92, 394 , 409.
17Ibid., p. 402.

The Negro
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attorney asserted "that there is no local option on the Fourteenth Amendment in the question of rights..."

18

Finally,

Marshall argued that the threat of closed schools was exag
gerated.

Although he admitted that white parents did not

want their children attending schools with Negroes, Marshall
argued that these same parents would prefer desegregation to
closed schools. 19
On May 31, 1955, Chief Justice Earl Warren read the
order implementing the 1954 ruling.

The Supreme Court reman

ded the cases to the lower courts, ordering them to work out
solutions with, the local school officials based on "equitable
principles."

The guidelines established by the Supreme Court

were very vague.

District court judges were to consider

local problems, but also require "a prompt and reasonable
start toward full compliance."

No deadline was set by the

Supreme Court for the completion of the desegregation process
except that it should be accomplished "with all deliberate
speed.
Virginia enthusiastically endorsed the second Brown
decision.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch observed that the

Supreme Court had responded to Southern opinion.

An edito

rial predicted decades of litigation, especially if subse-

18Ibid., pp. 399-400.
19Ibid., p. 399.
^9Rrown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299-301
U9551 .
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quent school cases were not treated as "class actions."

Ger

rymandering, academic testing, repealing 129, modifying com
pulsory assignment laws and local option were all suggested
as possible tactics of evasion.

The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot

thought the Court's ruling was "a wise attempt to adjust
constitutional principles and practical problems."

Governor

Stanley was urged by the Norfolk paper to take the lead in
prompting "good faith compliance."

A note of criticism came

from the Lynchburg Daily Advance which pointed out that the
Supreme Court had passed "the toughest part of what it
brought into being on the lower courts."

District court

judges would soon appreciate the observation.

21

Virginia's Negroes were disappointed with the second
Brown decision.

During the year that had elapsed since the

first decision, the Democratic organization had indicated
that it would exploit every chance to evade the decision.
The loose language of the Brown decision only multiplied the
opportunities for evasion.

22

Following the second Brown decision, Virginia contin
ued its search for techniques to thwart desegregation.

On

June 10, the Gray Commission suggested to the Governor and
State Board of Education that Virginia maintain segregated

21

Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 1, 1955,
p. 8; Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 1, 1955, p. 4;
Southern School News, VoT^ 1, No. To" (June, 19 55)/ p. 8.
22

Interview with Oliver Hill; Richmond Afro-American,
June 4, 1955, p . 1.,
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schools for the 1955-1956 school year.

Desegregation, accor

ding to the recommendation, was not "practicable or feasible
from an administrative standpoint or otherwise."

A special

session of the General Assembly was considered unwise until
the Commission on Public Education could submit a legislative
n
23
plan.
The Commission’s proposal worried the Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot which preferred some sign of compliance.

An

editorial suggested that some school districts could "ini
tiate a system designed to achieve an orderly equitable ad
justment."

Attacking the secret nature of the Gray Commis

sion, the editorial observed;

"The risk of doing nothing

grows the greater because the record of the Gray Commission
24
suggests a purpose to do as little as possible."
Whereas
the Richmond Times-Dispatch thought the Commission's position
was sound, the editor thought some desegregation could be in25
iti.ated in southwest Virginia or the Shenandoah Valley.
The Gray Commission obviously feared local initiative.
Though the June 10 policy declaration did not have the force
of law, the Commission hoped that local school boards would
follow a statewide policy.

Two weeks later, Governor Stanley

and the State Board of Education announced that they would

23Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 11, 1955, p. 1.
^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 12, 1955,
p. 6.
Editorial, 'Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 12, 1955,
p. 8.
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follow the advice of the Commission and make segregation in
public schools the official policy of Virginia for the coming
school year.

Had a local school board attempted to desegre9/•
gate, the Board would have been unsure of its response.
When faced with the same question, Stanley responded weakly
that "he wouldn't like to answer."

27

The school boards,

fearful of making an unpopular decision, seemed to prefer
shifting the responsibility for desegregating the schools to
the state.
Virginia's leaders decided that they would not take
any steps toward desegregation unless ordered to do so.
Since neither President Dwight D. Eisenhower nor Congress in
dicated any eagerness to prod the South, the entire burden to
force action rested on the lower courts.

However, since the

courts could not act until suits were filed, the ultimate re
sponsibility for engineering desegregation rested with the
NAACP.

On June 4, 1955, an emergency meeting of NAACP offi

cials from all the Southern states was held in Atlanta.

In

an eight-point directive, the NAACP promised legal action in
the fall of 1955 against recalcitrant school districts.
Litigation was to be preceded by petitions to school boards
with the hope of forcing compliance by enlisting the support
of various community organizations.

28

Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 24, 1955, p. 1.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 26, 1955, pt.2, p. 1.
2 fi

1

Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 5, 1955, p. 1.
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In Virginia, Oliver Hill summed up the NAACP philoso
phy:

"If no plans are announced or taken by the time the

school begins this fall, 1955, the time for law suits has ar
rived... only in this way does the mandate of the Supreme
Court...become fully operative."

29

On June 30, 1955, W. Les

ter Banks, Executive Secretary of the Virginia Conference,
sent a directive to the state branches which stated:

"It is

the immediate job of our branches to see to it that each
school board begins to deal with the problem of providing
non-discriminatory education."

Along with this message,

Banks, sent petitions and instructions concerning their use.
Anticipating future legal difficulties he cautioned:

"The

signing of the petition by a parent or guardian may well be
only the first step to an extended court fight.

Therefore,

discretion and care should :be exercised to secure petitioners
who will—-if need be--go all the way."33
The NAACP effort to mount an effective campaign
against segregated schools was to be described as an insidious
campaign skirting the boundaries of the law.

Almost immedi

ately, Almond reviled the Negro organization as "drunk with
31
power and hell-bent to preserve chaos."
The Richmond

3^Ibid. , June 8, 1955 ,

p. 1.

^ Report of the Committee on Offenses Against the Ad
ministration of Justice, "Appendix 12,w (Commonwealth of Vir
ginia: Division of Purchase and Printing, 1957), p. 49.
3Southern School News, Vol. II, No. 2 (August, 1955),
p. 12.
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Times-Dispatch joined in this condemnation by attacking the
NAACP for its "aggressive insistence on complete integration
32
m every walk of life."
Virginia's decision to postpone any desegregation for
a year while it searched for evasive measures was assisted by
the action of several lower federal courts in the cases re
manded to them by the Supreme Court.

On July 15, 1955, a

special three-judge district court ruled on the South Caro
lina case,

Briggs v. Elliott.

The district court, in a per

curiam opinion, enjoined the defendant school board from
making racially discriminatory assignments, but only after it
had made the necessary adjustments "with all deliberate
speed."

The court retained jurisdiction of the case, but the

school board had won a delay.

Because the three judges then

decided to discuss the meaning of the Brown decision, the im
pact of the Briggs ruling was far-reaching for the South.

In

a concise obiter dictum, the judges explained that the
Supreme Court
has not decided that the federal courts are to take
over or regulate the public schools of the states.
It
has not decided that the states must mix persons of
different races in the schools or must require them to
attend schools or must deprive them of the right of
choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided,
and all that it has decided, is that a state may not
deny to any person on account of race the right to at
tend any school that it maintains . . . . The Constitu
tion, in other words, does not require integration. It
merely forbids discrimination.
It does not forbid
such segregation as occurs of voluntary action. It

32Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 16, 1955,
p . 12.
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merely forbids the use of government power to en
force segregation.33
The Briggs dictum applied two prevailing ideas regard
ing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Brown decision.

First,

the three judges recalled that historically courts had held
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state, but not pri
vate, racial discrimination.

Therefore, the three judges be

lieved that the federal courts were not required to inter
fere with the choice of white and Negro parents to send
their children to segregated schools.

Secondly, the dictum

made use of the untested understanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed no positive obligation upon the States to
achieve racial equality.

If public schools remained segre

gated after racially discriminatory policies were abolished,
the federal courts were under no obligation to order the
states to go further in achieving desegregation.

The two

ideas expressed in the Briggs opinion held out hope to the
South that desegregation could be contained by either encour
aging voluntary segregation or by devising assignment schemes
which ostensibly had no relation to race.

3J

Much of the influence of the Briggs dictum has been
attributed to the prestige of Judge John J. Parker of the
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, who presided

^ Briggs v. Elliott, 13 2 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C.
1955).
^^Archibald Cox, The Warren Court: Constitutional De
cision as an Instrument of Reform
(Cambridge: Harvard Uni
versity Press, 1968), p. 28.
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over the court which wrote the opinion.

Judge Parker was

widely regarded as the premier jurist of the South.

While

Briggs was a per curiam opinion,
it was generally ascribed
35
to Judge Parker.
Far into the 1960's, defiant school boards
and conservative federal judges cited the Briggs doctrine as
authority for opposing affirmative action to desegregate.
Negro lawyers,

For

Briggs proved to be a thorny obstacle in their

efforts to achieve actual desegregation.
On July 18, 19 55, another three-judge court ordered
Prince Edward County School Board to admit students without
regard to race "with all deliberate speed."

As in the South

Carolina case, the court authorized a delay pending necessary
arrangements and retained jurisdiction over the case.

The

court specifically stated that it was impossible to operate
the school on a desegregated basis by September of 19 55.

36

Governor Stanley concurred with the opinion, since the
court's decision confirmed his earlier policy declaration.
He did not believe the opinion necessitated "any hurry-up or
unduly rushing into a special session of the General Assembly"
37
.
.
.
to work out school problems.
The Democratic organization
did not want a special session until the Gray Commission

3 5Blaustein and Ferguson, Jr., Desegregation and the
Law, pp. 178-79.
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward Coun
ty, I Race Rel. L. Rep. 82 (E.D. Va. 1955).
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 20, 1955, p. 1.
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could settle on a plan to prevent enforced integration.
Hints of Virginia's plans to deal with desegregation
came in September.

On the twelfth, Stanley announced that he

planned to call a special session for November to consider
legislation designed to prevent enforced integration. 38

Two

days later, the Governor announced th.at he would ask for a
ruling on the constitutionality of Item 210 of the Appropri
ations Act for 1954-56, which provided tuition grants- to any
school for the children of servicemen killed or disabled.

At

issue was whether this appropriation, granted for twenty-six
years, violated Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution
which, prohibited appropriations of public funds for private
schools.

When State Comptroller Sidney C. Day, Jr., notified

Almond that he would stop all payments under Item 210, the
stage was set for a "friendly suit." 39

Virginia's newspapers

recognized that there was a relationship between the suit and
some sort of plan to finance private education on a large
scale.^
While the Gray Commission delayed its report pending
the suit, opposition to the proposed special session devel
oped.

Republican Ted Dalton argued that the school issue

could be debated in the regular session on January 1956.

A

38
Richmond Times ^Dispatch., September 13, 1954 , p. 1.
~^Ibid., September 15 , 1955 , p. 1.
^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 16,
1955, p. 6? Editorial, Richmond TImei"-Dispa-1ch, September 18,
1955, p. 2B.
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special assembly so close to the regular session, Dalton
feared, would invite

steamroller tactics.

Since the thirty-

two men of the Gray Commission would exert a great deal of
influence as so-called "experts," Dalton's anxiety was well41
founded.
With, state elections in November of 1955, the
Virginian-Pilot also opposed giving lame duck legislators the
opportunity to make decisions having an effect in 1956.

The

Norfolk newspaper hoped for the election of more Young Turks
and suspected that Stanley was uneasy over the possibility.
A sampling of the General Assembly also demonstrated a pre
ference for

postponing action on the school problem until the

,
.
42
regular session.
Prior to the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, the organization's hierarchy also made a public bid
to influence the Gray Commission.

In a letter to the Commis

sion, Representatives Tuck and Abbitt announced that they
favored a plan which made "public financial support of integ
rated public schools dependent upon the will of the people of
each county or city wherein integration of the races in the
schools may take place."

Closed schools were preferable to

desegregated education, they argued, because "of the revul
sion of thepeople to the forced
against their will."^

integration thereof and

Speaking to the Defenders on the same

41Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 28, 1955, p. 6.
42
Editorial, Ibid., September 14, 1955, p. 6; Edi
torial, October 12, 1955, p. 6.
43
Ibid., October 25, 1955, p. 1.
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day, Tuck promised to battle any attempt "to distort the
minds, to pollute the education, to defile and make putrid
the pure Anglo-Saxon blood that courses through the innocent
veins of our helpless children."

No room for compromise ex

isted on the school issue, according to Tuck.

"We are for

integration or we are against it." 44
The Tuck-Abbitt version of local option actually pro
vided three layers of defense against integration--the school
board, the board of supervisors or governing body, and fin
ally the people.

As Tuck and Abbitt later explained to

Governor Stanley:
The proposal does not envision extending to the
voters of a county the right to bring about integra
tion in such counties as Arlington and Charles City,
but it does give the people in these counties the
right to defeat integration after it has been put upon
them by the school board and the governing bodies of
the localities as a last; and final stop gap: In other
words, it is just one additional safeguard reserved to
the people of the localities.45
Considering the procedure for appointing school board mem
bers, the probability of placing the issue before the people
in many communities would have been doubtful.
Senator Byrd indicated his approval of the Tuck-Abbitt

Ibid., p. 8. In June 1955, Tuck had suggested a
plan whichTTneluded repealing Section 129, providing tuition
grants, and withdrawing state appropriations from desegre
gated schools. Letter, William M. Tuck to Thomas B. Stanley,
June 22, 1955, Virginia State Library, Archives, Stanley Let
ter File.
45Letter, William M. Tuck and Watkins M. Abbitt to
Thomas B„ Stanley, May 10., 1956, University of Virginia,
Archives, Smith Papers.
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plan, believing that "it in no wise conflict[ed] with the
Supreme Court decision."

Significantly, he added that he was

not sure this was the final answer but warned that "Negro
children will suffer the most if some substitute school system is forced upon those localities."46
After Attorney General Almond's action against Comp
troller Day, the Gray Commission and the Governor remained
silent regarding the proposed special session.

The impetus

and guidelines for further action were finally provided by
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on November 7, 1955,
when it held the tuition grant program unconstitutional.

In

Almond v. Day, the Court ruled that Item 210 not only vio
lated section 141 but also the provisions for separation of
church, and state in the Constitutions of Virginia and the
United States.

Since private schools were not sufficiently

endowed, tuition grants were described by the court as an ap
propriation to a private school, "its very lifeblood."

Fur

thermore, the violation of the Constitution was not avoided
by paying the grants to the parents or guardians of the chil
dren, for they were "merely the conduit or channel through
whom the aid from the State to the school is transmitted."
Recognizing the relationship between its ruling and rumored
school legislation, the Court observed:
To sustain the validity of Item 210 . . . would
mean that by like appropriation the General Assembly
might divert public funds to the support of a system

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 1, 1955, p. 1.
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of private schools which the Constitution now for
bids. If that be a desirable end, it should be ac
complished by amending our Constitution in a manner
therein provided.
It should not be done by judicial
legislation.47
Pronouncing the decision to be "eminently correct,"
Attorney General Almond announced that Virginia could "now
chart her course accordingly."

48

Governor Stanley thought

the ruling would be helpful to the Gray Commission and the
49
General Assembly.
Sounding a note of caution, the Norfolk VirginianPilot wondered whether a tuition grant plan would be consti
tutional following an amendment of Section 141.

An editorial

expected that public support of private schools would violate
the expanding concept of "state action" under the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Above all, the editorial expressed a fear that

Virginia's public school sy-stem was about to be uprooted.

50

On November 11, 1955, after approximately fifteen
months of deliberation, the Gray Commission delivered a re
port to Governor Stanley.

The major recommendations of the

Gray Plan calledfor a system of local assignments and
tion grants plus

tui

"legislation to provide that no child be re

quired to attend a school wherein both white and colored are

47Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 427-431 C1955); 89 S.E.
2d 851, 8lT!F59~(Va Sup. Ct. of App. 1955) .
4 8Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot, November 8 ,1955, p. 1.
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 8 , 1955 , p. 1.
50 Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 9,
1955, p. 6 .

taught . . . ."

Because of Almond v. Day, the Commission

advised the Governor to summon a special session of the
General Assembly to initiate the process whereby Section 141
could be amended. 51
The Gray plan represented a compromise between strong
segregationists and accommodationists.

To the satisfaction

of the total resisters, the report stated in several places
that one objective was to prevent "enforced integration."
Moreover, a variety of suggestions were made with the inten
tion of easing the transition from public schools to private
schools.

Included among these were provisions for educa

tional levies or cash appropriations where schools were
closed; expansion of the Virginia Supplemental Retirement
Act to accommodate teachers who switched from public to pri
vate schools; and the authorization of local school boards to
shorten the school year in "an emergency situation."

However

the provision for pupil assignments by local school boards
meant that localities with small Negro populations could move
cautiously toward desegregation.

A variety of "non-racial"

factors to guide school boards in making assignments ensured
the prospect of token desegregation.

52

The recommendations of the Gray Report were also pre
faced by a brief presentation of the Brown decision, and
this became the official Virginia interpretation.

51 Gray Report, p. 8 .
52 Ibid., p p . 9-12.

The effect
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of the analysis was to encourage disrespect for the Supreme
Court's decision and to provide an excuse for ignoring it in
the black belt.

The Gray Report stated the Supreme Court had

overturned a method of providing public education secured by
history and earlier decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson (163
U.S. 537) and Gong Lum v. Rice C275 U.S. 78).

However, the

importance of the school decision, the Report emphasized, ex
tended beyond public education to the nature of constituti
onal democracy.

The Brown decision meant "that the most

fundamental of the rights of the states and of their citizens
exist by the Court's sufferance and that the law of the land
is whatever the Court may determine it to be by the process
of judicial legislation."

53

The Supreme Court's reliance on psychological and so
ciological research in overturning legal precedent was
stressed by the Commission.

Of the scholars listed in the

famous footnote, only Gunnar Myrdal was cited by name.

He

was described as "a European sociologist of slight experience
in the United States" who suggested "that the adoption of the
Constitution was in its inception a fraud upon the common
people and that in his opinion it is now an outworn docutr A

ment.

The Gray Report thus seemed to officially substan

tiate the impression given by extremists of a conspiracy as
sociated with the Brown decision.

^ Ibido , p . 6 .
54 Ibid.

The Gray Report won widespread approval in Virginia.
The Richmond Times-Dispatch described it as halfway between
two extremes, with local option as its distinguishing fea55
. . .
ture.
The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot described the recommendations as an earnest attempt to solve Virginia's problems. 56
However, the NAACP and the Defenders, on opposite poles of
public opinion, expressed dissatisfaction with the Commis
sion's report.

The former described the proposals as "le

gally indefensible, morally wrong and economically unsound."

57

The Defenders, dissatisfied with the assignment

plan, thought the Gray Plan was a harbinger of desegregation. 58
On November 14, Governor Stanley announced that he
would call for a special session of the General Assembly to
meet on November 30, 1955. . The legislators were asked to ap
prove a bill which would permit a popular referendum on the
question of calling a constitutional convention to amend
Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution.

59

Using the Con

vention system of amending the Constitution, Section 141

55 Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 13,
1955, p. 6 .
56 Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 13,
1955, p. 6 .
57Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 14, 1955, p. 1.
Ibid., November 13, 1955, p. 1.
Ibid., November 15, 1955, p. 1.

could be altered in a matter of months. 60
The debate over the Gray Report, however, was not the
only item on the minds of Virginians wrestling with the
school issue.

On November 21, 19 55, the Richmond News Leader

entered the first of a series of editorials devoted to the
theme of interposition.

The enthusiastic response to the

ideas associated with James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John
C.Calhoun and John Taylor of Caroline County turned the tide
in favor of defiant segregationists who had reluctantly
signed the Gray Report.
The leading figure in the Virginia campaign to pass a
resolution of interposition was James J. Kilpatrick.

At the

age of thirty-one, Kilpatrick succeeded Douglas Southall
Freeman, the distinguished biographer of Robert E. Lee, as
61
the editor of the Richmond News Leader.

For Kilpatrick,

the Brown decision marked a turning point in his career.

His

persuasive editorials not only played an important role in
paving the way for massive resistance, but they also won a
national reputation for their author.

Once Virginia chose

^ Constitution of Virginia, Art. XV, Sec. 197. The
Virginia Constitution provided an alternative method to the
convention system for amending the Constitution. A majority
vote for the proposed amendment in successive meetings of the
General Assembly, followed by the ratification of a majority
of the electorates made the amendment a part of the Constitu
tion.
Muse, p. 20. Though born in Oklahoma, Muse observed
that Kilpatrick succeeded in becoming "more Virginian than
Virginia."
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massive resistance, he became the Old Dominion's most articu
late defender of the South's social and political traditions.
The Richmond editor's pungent writing style was admirably
suited for sallies against the Supreme Court and the federal
"octopus."
Kilpatrick's attraction to interposition apparently
was inspired by a short pamphlet on the subject written by
William Old, an elderly country lawyer.

62

As late as June

1955, Kilpatrick seemed to see no option for Virginia other
than to battle the Brown decision by time consuming litiga
tion.

"To defy the court openly would be to enter upon an

archy; the logical end would be a second attempt at secession
from the Union.

And though the idea is not without merit, it

is impossible of execution.

63
We tried that once before."

Accepting the consequences:of local option in Southside Vir
ginia, Kilpatrick believed that:
abandonment of public schools anywhere would be a tra
gedy, it would be a bad thing, to be undertaken only
as a last resort. But I also feel that there is one
thing that would be even worse than abandonment, and
that is the dire consequences of integration in those
areas of heavy negro [sic] populations where the edu
cation of both races would suffer thereby and the vi
tality and integrity of our white society inevitably
would be debased by the compulsory intimacy of

Southern School News, Vol. II, No. 9 (March, 1956),
p. 14. William Old was subsequently made a circuit court
judge as a reward for his contribution to massive resistance.
/* o

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, June 10, 1955*
p. 10.
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prolonged racial mixing.^
Yet, in principle, local option meant submitting to the Su
preme Court, since some schools would be desegregated.

Kil

patrick hoped that Virginia's opposition to the Supreme Court
would be more decisive and dramatic.

By uniting Virginia's

past with its present, interposition offered the Old Dominion
a set of ready-made ideas, heroes, and symbols for a more de
fiant stand.
Between November 1955 and February 1956, Kilpatrick
persuaded, cajoled and generally directed Virginia's legis
lators in the drafting of a resolution of interposition.
Writing to Robert Whitehead, a staunch critic of interposi
tion, Kilpatrick thought that "some approach could be found,
through an eloquent Resolution of Interposition, that would
elevate this whole controversy above the sorry level of
racial segregation and put it on a high plane of fundamental
principles^^

The fundamental principle or "transcendent

issue" according to Kilpatrick, was spelled out by the Gray
Commission's warning that with the Brown decision, the Con
stitution could be altered at the whim of the Supreme Court.
The Constitution, the Richmond editor asserted, had been

^Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Robert Whitehead,
June 10, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead
Letter File.
Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Robert Whitehead,
November 24, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, White
head Letter File.
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amended without resort to the procedure outlined in Article V
of the Constitution.

66
Regardless of one's position on inte

gration, Kilpatrick believed:
All Virginians, liberal and conservative alike,
from the Tidewater or the Valley, are united in a
devotion to the Constitution and a reverence for its
proper administration.
If we fail now to make at
least an effort to preserve the Constitution from the
greedy hands of the Supreme Court, bent upon shaping
it as a thing of wax, we shall have failed as Ameri
cans and Virginians in an hour of solemn c i r s i s . 6 7
Portraying the school issue as a grave constitutional
crisis, Kilpatrick urged that Virginia's last resort was the
"right of interposition."

He defended interposition by re

capitulating the theory of state sovereignty refined by John
C. Calhoun.

Kilpatrick explained to his readers that the

Union was a compact of sovereign states who delegated certain
specific powers to the central government.

If the central

government broke the compact in a "deliberate," "palpable" or
"dangerous" way, interposition was the last resort of the
states.

The Civil War, an editorial explained,

altered the basic structure of the compact."

"in no way

All the Civil

War demonstrated was that "when one group of States is de
termined by force to contest the effort of another group of
States to withdraw from the Union, law and sovereign rights
are blown to the four winds and the issue is resolved on
/-

r*

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, November 21, 19 55,

p. 10.
^ Ibid„, November 23, 1955, p. 10.
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naked force alone."

68

For Kilpatrick the grievance was clear, and he urged
the legislators to use the special session to pass a resolu
tion of interposition.
immediate action.

The editorial gave four reasons for

The first was that Virginia's policy,

whatever the result, should be based on "fundamental prin
ciples."

The legislators who had descended upon Richmond

were reminded:
tion.

"This is our heritage.

This is our tradi

This was the philosophy of the great men who walked in

the halls of our own Capitol."

Secondly, interposition ele

vated the controversy from race to constitutionalism.

"There

is a tactical advantage in higher ground, and we would do
well to seek it," the editor counseled.

Thirdly, Virginia,

by acting promptly might provide the spark to unite the South
against the Supreme Court. 'Lastly, the Gray plan, while sup
portable, was a policy of expediency rather than principle.
Local assignment and tuition grants implied recognition of
the Brown decision.

"This newspaper would submit that Vir

ginia can stand on fundamental principles, where on expediency we must fall."
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The enthusiasm for interposition came at a rather awk
ward moment.

Public attention had been focused on amending

Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution since the decision

^ Ibid. , November 22, 1955, p. 10; November 23 , 195 5,
p. 10.
9

Ibid., November 29, 1955, p. 12.
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of Almond v. Day.

On the night of November 29, members of

the Gray Commission reportedly debated the merits of interpo
sition until after midnight.

Officially they decided against

pushing for interposition because of the "exigencies of time
and the understood conditions of the Assembly's special ses70
sion made it impossible to develop the plan properly."
Privately Kilpatrick told Tom Waring, editor of the Charles
ton News and Courier, that the decision
was wholly a matter of political expediency, for mem
bers of both the House and State Senate were wildly
enthusiastic about the plan and might have gone off
ill-prepared unless they had been restrained. The
difficulty that finally caused us to put it off until
January was our fear that many persons, whose votes
we need in a State Referendum in January would feel
that interposition had solved everything and would
stay away from the polls. 7-1Delaying action on an interposition resolution was
probably advised for two other reasons.

First, since the

special session had been called for the limited purpose of
passing a bill to hold a referendum, interpositionists prob
ably feared that altering the session's objective would hurt
the chances of passing the bill with an emergency clause.
Without a four-fifths vote in each house, the referendum bill
would not become effective until ninety days after the ses
sion's adjournment.

Secondly, to win a decisive victory in

the referendum, the total resisters recognized the need of

^^Ibid., December 1, 1955, p. 14.
71Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Tom Waring, Decem
ber 9, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick
Letter File.

89
winning the support of moderate organization men.

For ex

ample, ex-Governors Colgate Darden and John Battle could be
expected to support the Gray Plan, but not interposition.
Thus, the General Assembly agreed to limit its action to the
referendum bill requested by Governor Stanley and to bills
having the unanimous consent of the Assembly. 72
Despite the General Assembly's action, James Kilpatrick's
editorials introduced the idea that Virginia's response
to the Brown decision could be converted from a grudging,
limited compliance to a glorious crusade to save the United
States Constitution.

A variety of words and phrases were

associated with the crisis, such as:

"superlegislature,"

"rape of the Constitution," "transcendent issue" and "funda
mental principles."

Thus, not only extreme segregationists

but moderate segregationists were attracted by Kilpatrick's
seemingly more sophisticated arguments.

For example,

FitzGerald Bemiss, a moderate who later voted against the
massive resistance laws, was, at first, attracted to the
Kilpatrick editorials.

After referring to the Gray Plan in a

letter, he said, "But far more important is the solemn matter
of these most fundamental principles which are covered in
Jack Kilpatrick's editorial series . . . .

Jack has attracted

a great deal of attention in the great public service of

7 2Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 1, 1955, p. 1.
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developing this series." 7 3
As usual, opposition to the Kilpatrick editorials came
from anti-organization sources.

In a letter to Kilpatrick,

Robert Whitehead wrote:
Frankly, I do not understand their [the editorials]
purpose, and in all candor, I must say that I think they
are serving no good purpose in the present troublesome
period.
The doctrine of nullification and secession became
obsolete at Appomattox in April, 1865. With their
death, interposition also died.
I see no point in resurrecting the dead in order
to vex the living. In my opinion, nothing but harm can
come from it.
Before the House of Delegates, Whitehead continued his attack
on those who advocated ignoring the Brown decision.

The Nel

son County Democrat reminded his colleagues that the "Con
stitution, as construed by the Supreme Court, whether its con
struction be right or wrong, is the supreme law of this land,
and every member of this Assembly has taken an oath to sup
port it."

Whitehead wondered how the leaders of Virginia

could "expect our people to obey the decision of our
[Virginia] courts, if we incited them to ignore the decisions

7 3Letter, FitzGerald Bemiss to Prescott S. Bush, De
cember 21, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick
Letter File. Later Bemiss altered his position so that he
never was identified with interposition enthusiasts. His dis
satisfaction with interposition was prompted by a study of
several books sent to him by a lawyer friend. Although
Bemiss subsequently voted for the interposition resolution,
he viewed his vote a mere protest against the Brown decision.
74Letter, Robert Whitehead to James J. Kilpatrick,
November 25, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, White
head Letter File.
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of the highest court in the land."

75

The Norfolk Virginian-

Pilot supported Whitehead in his criticism of interposition.
Such a "fantasy," an editorial charged, would only "encourage
those who believe that quick and complete abandonment of the
schools should be forced upon the State."
Thus during 1955, Virginia had concentrated its ef
forts on devising a program for "preventing enforced integra
tion" in the black belt countries.

Not strong enough to force

a state-wide plan, arch segregationists signed the Gray
Report which permitted local option.

Even school districts

which chose to desegregate, following a court order, could
erect a variety of obstacles which would either postpone or
restrict desegregation to token members.

Gradualism was en

dorsed by the second Brown decision and an important dictum
written in Briggs v. Elliott.

Years of litigation were pre

dicted before any meaningful desegregation would be achieved.
Yet to many of the organization hierarchy, local option was
the path of expediency and ultimately capitualation.

How

ever, no inspiring slogan, banner or mission had been found
to unite Virginia.

The gap was filled by worn-out state

sovereignty arguments, forcefully written by a zealous cham
pion of Virginia society, James J. Kilpatrick.

In December,

7 5Remarks of Delegate Robert Whitehead of Nelson
County before the House of Delegates of Virginia on Decem
ber 1, 1955, pp. 2-3.
7 fiEditorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 1,
1955, p. 6.
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nevertheless, the role of interposition in Virginia's re
sponse to the Gray Plan was unclear.

Whether interposition

would be used to replace the Gray Plan or be viewed as
merely a "dignified protest" was yet to be determined., 77

77

Editorial, Richmond Times--Dispatch, December 2,
1955, p„ 5. The editorial thought interposition would serve
as a "dignified protest."

CHAPTER IV
REFERENDUM AND INTERPOSITION
As scheduled, the General Assembly met in special
session on November 30, 1955, to consider legislation re
quested by the Gray Commission and endorsed by Governor
Stanley.

The legislators were asked to pass a bill which

would provide for a popular referendum on the question of
calling a constitutional convention to amend Section 141 of
Virginia's Constitution, prohibiting the appropriation of
public funds for private schools.

On December 2 the House

of Delegates and the Senate- passed the referendum bill by
virtually unanimous votes of 93 to 5 and 38 to 1.

The fol

lowing day, Governor Stanley set January 9 as the date of
the referendum.^
The almost unanimous decision of the General Assembly
was not an endorsement of total resistance to the Supreme
Court.

Legislators from districts outside the Southside

accepted the Gray Commission's analysis that without tuition
grants there would be no education in the black belt.

Con

sidering the example of Prince Edward County, the prospect

1Richniond Times-Dispatch, December 3, 1955, p. 1;
December 4, 19 55, p.( 1.
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of massive school closures in the black belt could not be
denied.

2

During a pub.Lie hearing, George H. Parker, Jr.,

Commonwealth's Attorney for Southampton County warned:
"There111 be no appropriations for schools by the Board of
Supervisors . . . if a single colored child enters a school
3
with whites."
The same fear was expressed by J. Randolph
Tucker, a Richmond delegate who served on the Gray Commission
and subsequently voted against the massive resistance laws.
Tucker argued "that localities with heavy Negro population
would close their schools rather than integrate.

Tuition

grants make up the best method the commission could devise to
assure education would continue in these localities. . . .
The idea that localities outside the Southside had a
responsibility to help the black belt counties was also
expressed by Robert Whitehead.

In a speech before the House

of Delegates, he stressed that he thought a local assignment
plan would be a satisfactory solution to Virginia's problems.
However, Whitehead reasoned that a rejection of the referendum
bill might jeopardize the local assignment plan.

2

.

.

Whitehead

.

Gates, pp. 46-47. Anticipating a desegregation order,
a private educational corporation was formed in the spring of
1955 in Prince Edward County. The board of supervisors was
prepared to withhold public funds if the schools were desegre
gated. In July of 1955, the district court granted a delay
and the board of supervisors made appropriations on a monthly
basis. Five other black belt counties followed Prince Edward's
example and financed their public schools on a monthly basis.
3
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 1, 1955, p. 1.
^Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 2, 19 55, p. 1.

95
viewed the Gray Plan as a compromise and expected black belt
legislators to fight local assignment unless they were assured
tuition grants.

Considering the tuition aid plan and pupil

assignment program as part of a "double-barrel approach,"
Whitehead announced that he would "vote to permit the people
to share in the decision as to the proposed change."

He only

hoped that "the private schools which may come into existence
as the result of tuition grants for pupils from public funds
will not dangerously impair the functioning of our public
5
school system."
The position of Tucker and Whitehead con
vinced many legislators that by voting for the referendum bill
public schools would not be destroyed.
From December 4 to January 9, Virginia politics were
dominated by the referendum campaign.

For Governor Stanley

and the proponents of amending Section 141, a convincing
referendum victory depended on capturing the uncommitted white
voters outside of the black belt.

The pro-amendment campaign

concentrated on convincing the voters that an affirmative vote
in no way damaged the future of public schools.

To insure the

credibility of their position, the pro-referendum forces
utilized men and women prominently associated with education
in organizing and explaining their position.

Governor Stanley,

5
Remarks of Robert Whitehead of Nelson County before
the House of Delegates of Virginia on December 1, 19 55, p. 1.
Since he was considered a friend of public education, White
head's endorsement of the referendum bill helped to win support
from legislators who feared that tuition grants were a big
step toward the disestablishment of public education.

for example, named Dr. Dabney Lancaster, former State Superin
tendent of Public Instruction and president emeritus of Longwood College, to direct the privately financed State Referendum
g
Information Center.
Other prominent Virginians enlisted by
the pro-referendum campaign included former Governor John S.
Battle; Colgate Darden, the president of the University of
Virginia and former Governor; Dowell J. Howard, the State
Superintendent of Education; and Thomas C. Boushall, the pres
ident of the Bank of Virginia and a member of the State Board
of Education.

In endorsing a vote for the amendment, a

Times-Dispatch editorial stressed that such distinguished
friends of public education would not associate themselves with
a campaign to destroy Virginia's public school system.

7

Colgate Darden provided the most dramatic moment of the
campaign.

Among the most effective speakers for the referen

dum, Darden paused in the middle of the campaign to urge the
pro-amendment leaders to proclaim their commitment to Section
129 of the Virginia Constitution which required the legislag

ture to maintain "an effective system of free public schools."
The request raised two underlying fears held by Darden and his
friends.

First, they were concerned that defiant segregationists

might use the referendum as a mandate for imposing a statewide
g
Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 10, 1955, p. 1.
^Editorial, Ibid., December 15, 1955, p. 20.
o

Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 21, 1955, p. 1.
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policy of segregation.

Secondly, they wanted some assurance

that Negro public education would not be abandoned by bitter
whites of the black belt.

On the latter issue, the State

Referendum Information Center did not rule out the closure of
Negro schools.

Regardless of the amendment, the Center exg
plained, a locality could refuse to appropriate money.
Although pressed for an answer to Darden's question,

Governor Stanley remained evasive.

If Negro schools were

closed, Stanley thought "the General Assembly undoubtedly will
be given consideration to any further steps that should be
taken.The

Governor also believed that raising the issue

of Section 129 would only confuse the people

.

^

Finally, on

December 28, Stanley relented and announced that he would
"strongly recommend to the General Assembly that it exercise
its authority to see that the provision of Section 129 of the
Constitution is fully carried out."

12

The answer was still

vague enough to permit a locality to close its public schools.
Darden, however, expressed his satisfaction and made a strong
appeal for the passage of the referendum.

13

Virginians opposed to the referendum formed the Virginia
Society for Preservation of Public Education.

A variety of

g
Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 18, 1955,
p. 6 ; December 21, 1955, p^ 6 .
1 ^Quoted in Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December
21, 1955, p. 6 .
^^Ibid., December 23, 1955, p. 6 .
12

Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 29, 1955, p. 1.

^ I b i d ., December 31, 1955, p. 1.
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anti-organization Democrats and Young Turks, such as Armistead
Boothe and Stuart B. Carter, were associated with this group.
Their objections to the tuition grants were that they would
not work, were of doubtful constitutionality, and would under14
mine the public schools.
The emphasis on saving the public
schools was consistent with Boothe's earlier endorsement of
local option.
The anti-amendment campaign lacked organization, money
and outstanding personalities.

Furthermore, it did not win the

support of important interest groups in the state.

Two organi

zations, the Virginia Federation of Labor and the Virginia
Council on Human Relations, which opposed the amendment, did
not have much influence among white voters.

Ministers who spoke

out against the amendment and favored compliance with the Su
preme Court's decision were considered to have gone beyond
their religious domain.

15

The alleged threat posed by the

ministers to passage of the amendment was dismissed by the jest:
16
"They may have the preachers, but we've got the congregations."
Finally, only two major daily newspapers, the Norfolk VirginianPilot and the Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, opposed passage of the
referendum bill.

17

^^Ibid., December 20, 1955, p. 1.
■^Gates, pp. 7 9-81.
^ Richmond Times-Pi spa tch, January 1, 1956 , p. 1.
■ ^ G a t es ,

p.

82.
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Ten days before the referendum, the State Referendum
Information Center released a major policy statement on the
Gray Plan.

The statement emphasized that tuition grants and

local assignment were necessary to prevent forced integration
and that there was no obligation to integrate under the Brown
decision.

"If you believe in local self-government by people

who know local customs and local needs, you should vote on
18
January 9 for the Convention."

The effect of this announce

ment was to broaden the January 9 referendum beyond the limited
question of calling a convention to amend Section 141.

Thus,

pro-amendment forces portrayed the referendum as a test of the
entire Gray Plan.
In a thorough analysis of the referendum campaign,
Robbins Gates later wrote:

"However confused the issue may

have become, no citizen of;Virginia could claim that he had
19
purposely been left uninformed."

Recent documents demonstrate

•that the suspicions of Darden and other moderate organization
men that the Gray Plan was to be dropped were well-founded.
Before the referendum was held, the organization's hierarchy
decided to drop the Gray Plan and adopt a more belligerent
stance toward the Supreme Court.

However, the enthusiasm for

TQ
Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 1, 1956, p. 1.
19

Gates, p. 74.
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interposition was checked as a precaution against endangering the margin of victory in the referendum. 20 Editor Kil
patrick was especially eager to push on with interposition.
He wrote Harry Byrd, Jr. that his correspondents in Mississippi
and South Carolina were urging the adoption of an interposition
resolution in Virginia.

Since the Old Dominion did not possess

the same racist image, they thought a Virginia resolution
"would carry far greater national impact than the same action
m

South Carolina, Georgia, or Mississippi."

21

The idea of a

united Southern front also appealed to Senator Harry Byrd.
Congratulating Kilpatrick on his splendid exposition of inter
position, Byrd mentioned that Senator James Eastland of Missis
sippi said that the editorials were "gaining great popularity
all through the South."
dum campaign, Byrd said:

Relating this to the Virginia referen
"Above all, we must not compromise

our convictions by premature legislation."

Plainly, the

Virginia Senator did not want Virginia to commit itself to the
Gray Plan and limited compliance to the Supreme Court’s deci
sion.

However, Byrd advised the enthusiastic editor to cool

temporarily the interposition fires because nothing should be
said "that will injure the big vote we must secure on January
9 , as this will be the foundation stone for our future

9n
Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Tom Waring, December 9,
1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter File.
9i
Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Harry Byrd, Jr.,
December 19, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kil
patrick Letter File.'
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battles."

22

Thus, several weeks before the referendum, the

organization's hierarchy prepared to convert the expected
victory at the polls into a mandate for total resistance to
the Supreme Court's decision.
A combination of local and Southern enthusiasm for
interposition plus the encouragement of Senator Byrd inten
sified Kilpatrick's ardor for defiance.

The Richmond editor

assured Byrd that interposition "is basically and fundamen
tally sound, it transcends the race issue, and it offers hope
for a check and balance that must be asserted against the
Supreme Court before all reserved powers of the States are
whittled away by judicial legislation."

Kilpatrick wrote of

his eager anticipation for the conclusion of the referendum
campaign since
the necessity for .keeping interposition statements
under wraps will have ended. You can imagine how
impatient I am to put aside the Gray Commission's
program, which is a hodgepodge of expediency and com
promise, in favor of a direct, forthright stand based
upon fundamental principles of our Constitution. Like
yourself, I am convinced that if as many as ten or
eleven States would unite in a single front, the court
23
would find its mandates almost impossible of enforcement.
Just as Virginia had been the capital of the Confederacy,
Senator Byrd and editor Kilpatrick hoped to make it the leader

22

Letter, Harry F. Byrd to James J. Kilpatrick,
December 23, 1955, University of Virginia, Archives, Kil
patrick Letter File.
2 3Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Harry F. Byrd, Decem
ber 28, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter
File .
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of the South's struggle against the Supreme Court's attack
upon white supremacy.
Some hint that the Gray Plan was to be "put aside"
was given during the referendum campaign.

On December 17,

1955, Senator Byrd issued a statement placing all of his
immense prestige behind the referendum.

"The conditions con

fronting us are such that we will succeed better by going on
a flexible basis or on a basis of standby legislation than by
attempting to enact complete and final legislation to begin
with the school term next September."

By postponing action,

Byrd suggested that "it is possible that some form of action
can be accepted as a pattern for all the Southern states.

The

battle to preserve our public school system may last for many
years and we may find it necessary to change our tactics from
time to time."

The Senator then suggested that not even the

Supreme Court fully endorsed the Brown decision.

"If segre

gation was illegal on May 17, 1954, as declared by the Supreme
Court, then it was illegal in September, 1954, when the
Supreme Court permitted the schools to continue on a segre24
gated basis.
Governor Stanley also made several comments during the
referendum campaign which hinted at a reversal of Virginia’s
policy.

On December 19, Stanley indicated that he would not

2 4Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 18, 1955, p. 4.
Byrd also mentioned that Negroes would suffer the most from
desegregation since "the cost of schools is borne nearly en
tirely by the white,population." Apparently Byrd still hoped
that black citizens could be frightened into pursuing a course
of voluntary segregation.
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decide on recommending the Gray Plan to the General Assembly
25
until after the referendum.
Three days before the referen
dum, Stanley told a statewide radio audience that a "no vote"
was a vote "for mixed schools in Virginia."

26

Apparently,

by underscoring the race issue, the Governor was attempting
to erect some rationale for interpreting the expected triumph
as authority for delaying action on the Gray Plan.
On January 9, the referendum to hold a limited consti
tutional convention was adopted by an impressive margin of
27
304,154 votes to 146,164 votes.
As expected, the percentage
of voters who went to the polls in each district was greatest
where the number of Negro voters was the highest.

Black belt

whites voted emphatically for the amendment, most likely with
the hope of preventing enforced desegregation anywhere in
Virginia.

Significantly, Negroes voted with the same unanimity

against calling a constitutional convention.

Outside the black

belt, the referendum carried all but ten counties, although
28
with lower percentages.

9

c.

Ibid., December 20, 1955, p. 1.

^ Ibid., January 7, 1956 , p. 1.
27

Ibid.

1

9o

Gates, pp. 86-95.
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The reasons for pro-amendment votes were unclear in
white areas outside the black belt.

The endorsement of a

constitutional convention by Battle, Darden, and Lancaster
probably influenced a number of white voters.

Others

obviously shared racial views similar to the Defenders .

How

ever, many probably voted "yes", hoping that the Gray Plan
could help Southside Virginia without damaging local control
of education.

Many Virginians assumed that they would con

tinue to control local school policy as well as the rate of
desegregation.
A cautious analysis of the referendum was made by the
Richmond Times-Pispatch, which supported the amendment of
Section 141 as a means of saving the public schools. Accord
ing to an editorial, the referendum was only a "first step
toward putting the Gray Plan into effect."

The Commission's

goal, the editor emphasized, was "to avoid enforced .integra
tion not to avoid all integration."

Furthermore, the

editorial added, the Commission never recommended closing
"the entire public school system of Virginia."

A policy of

gradual desegregation, consistent with "Judge Parker's ruling"
29
was the course advised' by the Times-Dispatch.
With the referendum safely won, the organization's
inner circle concentrated on distorting the meaning of the
referendum.

Leading the way was the determined editor of

the News Leader who wrotes

"Overwhelmingly, Virginia wants

29Editorial, Richmond Times-Pispatch, January 10, 1956,
p. 12 .
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no part of integrated public schools.

Beyond question,

Virginia objects to the Supreme Court's usurpation of power
beyond its authority.

^

Senator Byrd added his prestige to

this interpretation by observing that the referendum was
simply an indication of "the opposition of the people to
31
integration."
After misrepresenting the purpose of the referendum,
Kilpatrick urged that Virginia alter its strategy.

He

opposed an early constitutional convention which also meant
postponing the other recommendations of the Gray Plan.
Instead of acting on the Gray Plan, Kilpatrick urged the
General Assembly, which was to meet on January 11, to act
on a resolution of interposition.

32

He explained that inter

position was an "announcement" by a state that an "alleged
infraction" of the Constitution "be judged by all the States."
Moreover, the editor asserted, erroneously, that enforcement
of the "objectionable construction" was suspended by activat. .
33
m g the process of interposition.
The Times-Di spatch, assuming a moderate stance,
thought interposition "would be a useful and important

^

°Editorials, Richmond News Leader , January 10, 1956

p- 12 .
31 Richmond Times-Dispatch, J anuary 11, 1955, p. 1.
32 Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 10, 1956,
p- 1 2 .
3 3Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 12, 1956,

p . 12.
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gesture" only as a symbol of protest.

34

More critical of

interposition was the Virginian-Pilot which argued that the
idea was falsely described as a technique for evading the
Brown decision.

Furthermore, the editor warned that inter

position with its "intent to circumvent the Supreme Court
decision" could taint the Gray Plan with illegality. 35
The controversy over Virginia's school policy was
further complicated by an announcement from the Arlington
School Board that it intended to implement a local plan of
desegregation.

The Arlington plan called for gradual deseg

regation beginning with the elementary schools in 1956
junior high in 1957, and senior in 1958.

p

Segregated schools

would be provided for children of parents who were opposed
to desegregation.

However, the parents would have to provide

the transportation to the segregated schools.

The plan was

defended as being consistent with the recommendations of the
Gray Plan and the tradition of local control of education.
The Arlington proclamation led to a heated debate over state
and local responsibility for public education.

Garland Gray

was furious and proposed a moratorium on local action "until

■^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 11,
1956, p. 12.
O r

Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 14, 1956,
p. 6.
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the State's policy is finally determined by the Governor
and the duly elected representatives of the People of the
Commonwealth."3 6
On January 11, the regular session of the General
Assembly convened and five days later it deferred the Gray
Plan to a special session.

The rationale given by the

legislators was that the Assembly would be occupied fully
with normal legislative matters.

A Constitutional Convention

was set for March 5 by the Assembly.

37

The Times-Dispatch

approved of the delay and believed that a special session
in June would allow the Assembly sufficient time to pass an
assignment plan and tuition grants for September. 38
The delay worked to the advantage of resisters attempt
ing to win support for interposition.

On January 19, 1956,

State Senator Harry C. Stuart, along with thirty-four other
members of the Virginia Senate, introduced a resolution of
interposition.

The act was rich with Virginia symbolism.

Stuart was the great nephew of J.E.B. Stuart and January 19
39
was the anniversary of Robert E. Lee's birth.
However, the

Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 15, 1956, p. 1.
^ Ibid. , January 17 , 1956, p. 1.
"^Editorial, Ibid., p. 12.
3Q

Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 20, 1956, p. 1.

Stuart resolution did not satisfy more rabid interpositionists since it contained a startling omission:
declare the Brown decision "null and void."

it did not
Instead, the

resolution pledged "to take all appropriate measures, honor
ably, legally, and constitutionally available to us to resist
this illegal encroachment upon our sovereign powers." 40

Al

though Kilpatrick had argued that a resolution of interposi
tion automatically suspended the implementation of the Brown
decision, the Stuart resolution rejected this interpretation.
Specifically, the interpositionists agreed to omit a clause,
favored by Kilpatrick, which had stated that Virginia's
school segregation law was still "in full force and effect."
As Kilpatrick explained, a strong resolution was dropped on
the recommendations of State Senators Robert Button and
Albertis Harrison who counseled that only a mild declaration
had a chance of winning acceptance outside the South.

41

Instead of interposition, Virginia's leadership hoped,
as Kilpatrick explained, to explore all tactics for preventing
"enforced integration of our schools until the question of the
42
court's decree is put to rest,"
By employing every available
evasive maneuver, Virginia segregationists hoped to prevent

^ 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 445
4^Richmond News Leader, January 19, 1956, p. 14.
42
q

Ibid.

integration on the theory that an amendment to the federal
Constitution or a subsequent Supreme Court decision would
reverse the desegregation decision.

Organization men pointed

to other examples where the Supreme Court had responded to
political pressure by reversing controversial decisions.
Defiance also served the Democratic organization in another
way.

By postponing desegregation the Party could claim to

have exhausted every method of preventing desegregation.

The

longer the struggle endured, the longer the political benefits.
No potential massive resister publicly spoke of winning time
to ease racial tensions so that Virginia could eventually
desegregate.

Instead, defiant segregationists, as explained

by the News Leader, promised "litigation, legislation, appeals
to sister States for a Constitutional amendment, judicial
proceedings within our State courts" in an effort to block
enforcement of the Brown decision.

43

The unwillingness of Virginia's legislators to accept
an extreme nullification statement indicated that a majority
recognized the theoretical and practical shortcomings of
Kilpatrick's argument.

When Delegate Robert Whitehead de

nounced the watered-down resolution of interposition, the
exasperated Kilpatrick moaned:

^Ibid., January 27 , 1956 , p. 10.
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There was a time when Virginia could recognize
the face of tyranny. We had strong men in this
Commonwealth then, fearless men, who loved liberty,
men who would resist usurpation. What has become ..
of this spirit? How has our heritage been wasted?
On February 1, the General Assembly approved the Stuart
Resolution by votes of 3 6 to 2 in the Senate and 90 to 5 in
45
the House of Delegates.
A number of legislators prefaced
support of Virginia's declaration by stating that their vote
represented a protest rather than an attempt to nullify the
Supreme Court's decision.

Robert Whitehead again warned:

"The lack of general resistance to the adoption of this
resolution stems from the fact that a large portion of the
membership is laboring under the delusion that it is nothing
more than a strong protest against the May 17, 1954, decision."
.46
(his emphasis)
Despite the concessions of the interpositionists, Whitehead was worried that Virginians later would
misconstrue the Stuart Resolution as a legislative endorsement
for total resistance.

Whitehead concluded by indicting Kil

patrick for confusing the people and leading them "to think
that he has discovered a staff on which they can lean, when
m

fact it is but a broken reed." 47

^ Ibid„, January 23, 1956 , p. 10.
45
Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 2, 1956, p. 1.
46

Remarks of Delegate Robert Whitehead of Nelson
County before the House of Delegates of Virginia on
Fe bruary 1, 1956 .
Ibid .

In the Senate, Ted Dalton made a speech similar to
Whitehead's.

"We’re spinning our wheels on a big word that

is going to mislead our people into thinking it will preserve
48
separate schools."
Looking into the future, Dalton predic
ted that the resolution was only strengthening the legal case
of the NAACP as an example of circumvention.
the Assembly's conduct, Dalton concluded:
49
cry at the moon?"

Exasperated by

"Are we going to

Probably only a few legislators thought that Virginia
had accomplished anything of substance by passing the reso
lution.

Most agreed with the sponsor of the resolution, Harry

Stuart, who confessed;

"The resolution in itself will not

legally suspend the enforcement of the decision in Virginia.
However, he hoped that the resolution would "set in motion a
chain of actions that will:not only impede the enforcement of
it in Virginia, but will entirely obliterate the decision in
Virginia and elsewhere." 51

Only a very few shared Kilpatrick 1

zeal for recapturing the spirit of 1798.

Mills Godwin, a

black belt senator and a massive resister who was later to
become governor, remarked;

"I am just so glad that I have a

chance to raise my voice in behalf of this great principle."

48Richmond News Leader, February 1, 1956, p. 1.
49
Ibid .
5ft
Ibid., January 27, 1955, p. 1.
Ibid .
5? Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 2, 1956, p. 3.
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Publicly and privately Kilpatrick admitted that little
of substance was accomplished by the Stuart Resolution.
Legally, Kilpatrick wrote, "our action was persuasive, decla
ratory, expressive of policy and opinion— nothing more.

As

for the future, it can be said at the moment only that Vir
ginia has made her appeal; we must wait for our sister States
to respond."

53

Similar expressions combining both wishful

thinking and realism were expressed by Kilpatrick in a letter
to Senator Byrd.

With the resolution about to be passed, the

Richmond editor wrote that while "we hope earnestly that
interposition will void the Supreme Court's decision, we can
not say as a matter of certainty that that will be the effect.
I imagine that it will depend entirely upon how much force
the Supreme Court is able to exert in carrying out its man
dates.

If Eisenhower should send troops in to enforce the

court decision, I believe we would find that our resolution
had not actually 'voided' these decisions at all."

54

Technically the extreme interpositionists like Kil
patrick were forced to make major concessions .

They would

have preferred joining Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia in
"nullifying" the Brown decision.

55

However, numerous lawyers

among the Virginia legislators recognized that they could not

5 3Editorial, Richmond News Leader, February 2, 1956,
p . 12 .

54

Letter, James J. Kilpatrick to Harry F. Byrd, January
30, 1956, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Lettsr
File.
55I Race Rel. L. Rep. 440 (Miss); I Race Rel. L. Rep.
438 (Ga.); I Race Rel. L. Rep. 437 (Ala.).
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overlook the Civil War and a hundred years of constitutional
history.

Though they disagreed with the decision, moderate

segregationists accepted the jurisdiction of the federal
courts and the federal government’s power to enforce the law.
The extremists, nonetheless, won an important strategic vic
tory.

In subsequent months the legislative history of the

resolution, as Robert Whitehead predicted, was forgotten and
massive resisters were able to use the Stuart Resolution to
justify the school closing laws.
While the attention of the General Assembly was
focused on the interposition debate, other bills were intro
duced which anticipated massive resistance.

John B. Boat

wright, a staunch segregationist from Buckingham County,
introduced a bill which would have prohibited the spending
of state funds for racially mixed schools.

56

Though unsuc

cessful, Boatwright's bill indicated the determination of
some legislators to adopt massive resistance immediately.
The General Assembly did pass legislation aimed at
disciplining Arlington County and discouraging similar local
initiative.

Oddly enough, Arlington was the only Virginia

county to elect its own board of education.

On January 30,

1956, Delegate Frank Moncure of Stafford County introduced
a bill which repealed the statutory provision providing for

rC

Richmond Times-"Dispatch, January 25, 1956 , p. 6.
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the popular election of school boards.

57

Calling for the

defeat of the bill, a Richmond Times-Dispatch editorial chas
tised Moncure and the other patrons of the legislation for
their "unjustifiable interference with local self-government
and an attempt to
game." 58

change the rules in the middle of the

Nevertheless, the bill easily became law. 59

Under

pressure, the Arlington School Board assured the General
Assembly that they would postpone desegregation until a state
wide policy had been formulated„^
Delegate Boatwright also introduced another bill aimed
at correcting the unorthodox views of the northern Virginians.
Boatwright's legislation would have prohibited certain classes
of federal employees from serving on school boards or holding
other local offices.
defeated.^

At the end of B’ebruary the bill was
;

Aside from the interposition resolution, however, the
most controversial proposal relating to education was a joint
House Resolution introduced by the conservative Speaker of
the House, E. Blackburn Moore.

The resolution, presented to

the House on February 20, declared that public schools should

57 Richmond News Leader, January 30, 1956, p. 1.
rO

Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 1,
1956, p 0 16.
59
Acts of General Assembly, Chapter 591, Reg. Sess.
1956, p. 949“
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 6 , 1956, p. 1.
61Richmond News Leader, February 10, 1956, p. 1.,
February 29, 1956, p. 1.
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continue to be operated on a segregated basis for the
1956-1957 school year.

Uncertainty regarding the date and

the length of the special session plus the need for time for
local administrative adjustments were among the reasons offered
for postponing desegregation.

62

Strategically, the recommen

dation was consistent with the policy outlined in the inter
position resolution which was to use all "appropriate measures"
to resist the Brown decision.

Postponing action would also

allow the organization time to develop a case for abandoning
the Gray Plan.

Though not a law,, the Moore resolution, if

passed, would have carried great weight with the Governor.
Outside the black belt, Virginia newspapers attacked
the Moore resolution.

Before the resolution was drawn up

the Times-Dispatch charged its sponsors with "bad faith."

An

editorial argued that the Gray Plan and the pro-amendment
campaign had recommended "haste so as to provide educational
aid in the school years 1956-1957."

Citizens who voted to

aid black belt counties and to facilitate desegregation in
regions with few Negroes, the editor remarked, were not told
"that the people really voted on January 9 not to have any
integration at all."

63

r o

Richmond Times-Dispatch , February 21, 1956, p. 1.
^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 13,
1956, p. 14.
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This sense of betrayal was especially strong in south
west Virginia where the Negro population was negligible.

The

editor of the Bristol Herald Courier recalled that politicians
had stumped the southwest "exhorting haste in protecting our
fellow Virginians in the east and promising local option to
localities where integration might be acceptable."

64

Joining

the Times-Dispatch and the Bristol Herald Courier were the
Lynchburg News, Charlottesville Daily Progress, Roanoke Times ,
Danville Bee, Staunton News Leader, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
and the Lynchburg Advance, to name a few. 6 5

Generally the

papers believed that the Moore resolution patently violated
the "good faith" requirement of Brown II and endangered the
effort to restrict desegregation through the local option
scheme.

The Charlottesville Daily Progress wrote that Vir

ginia had to choose between "segregation in Arlington and a
few similar localities or the protection of the rest of the
State against the desegregation decree.
The Richmond News Leader, not surprisingly, supported
the Moore resolution and repudiated local option.

Though not

a law, the editor held that "the localities, as creatures of

^Quoted in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 27,
1956, p. 12.
65 Ibid., February 23, 1956, p. 6 , February 27, 1956,
p. 6 . On these dates the Times-Dispatch listed the news
papers supporting and defending the Moore Resolution.

66Quoted in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 23,
1956, p. 6.
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the State, or children of the State, would be expected to
obey such policy declarations implicitly."

Recalling the

resolution of interposition, the editorial suggested that to
permit local assignment would be viewed as a "surrender by
the State to the very encroachment to which we have just declared that we would never surrender." 67

As Whitehead pre

dicted, the organization interpreted interposition as broadly
as possible.

68

Furthermore, whereas the organization defended

a localities privilege to close public schools, it attacked
local authority to maintain desegregated public schools .

The

attempt to impose a statewide school policy involved a mass
of contradictions.
The Moore resolution also contributed to a confronta
tion between its sponsor and Attorney General Almond, both
suspected of having design^ on moving to the Governor's man
sion.

Two days after the resolution was introduced, the

Attorney General observed that it would not be consistent with
"deliberate speed." 6 9

Supporting Almond was Lieutenant

Governor A.E.S. Stephens who believed the Moore resolution
would make Virginia's position "legally untenable."

70

In

fi7
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, February 13, 1956,
p . 10 .
C Q

See page 110 for Whitehead's observations.
fiQ
Richmond News Leader, February 22, 1956, p. 1.
^ I b i d ., February 20, 1956, p. 1.
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reply, Moore argued that the resolution was consistent with
his interpretation of "deliberate speed." which was still
undefined by the federal courts.

71

Byrd's close friend

charged that no person could oppose his resolution if he
"opposes the mixing of the races in the public schools." 72
Almond side-stepped the attempt to paint him as an integrationist by stating that the Moore resolution would be a
"dangerous weapon in the hands of the opposition."

Any plan

designed to avoid the "serious impairment or destruction"
of race mixing, the Attorney General continued, must fall
"within the framework of the law."

73

In the midst of the Moore-Almond exchange, Senator
Byrd issued a1 brief statement from Washington calling for
massive resistance:
If we can organize the Southern States for massive
resistance to this order [to desegregate] I think
that in time the rest of the country will realize
that racial integration is not going to be accepted
in the South.
In interposition, the South has a perfectly l^gal
means of appeal from the Supreme Court’s order.
Byrd's statement was probably timed to give maximum support
to a declaration against the Brown decision which was being

71 Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 22, 1956, p. 6.
72

Ibid .
7 3Richmond News Leader, February 27, 1956, p. 1.
74Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 25, 1956, p. 1.
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drafted by southern senators and representatives.

7S

But the

statement also may have been designed to win votes for the
Moore resolution.

The interaction of state and regional

policy statements figured to bolster resistance in both
spheres„
Despite Senator Byrd's intervention the Moore resolu
tion died in the Senate Rules Committee in early March, after
being passed by the House of Delegates .

In presenting his

resolution Speaker Moore clashed with some members of the
Rules Committee.

Lieutenant Governor Stephens wondered if

Moore intended to brand "anyone who opposes this resolution
as an integrationist."

Avoiding the question, Moore stuck to

the position that Virginians should resort to every possible
delay and would make "a big mistake if we speedily move into
a position which permitted ,a start toward integration.”
Senator Edward Breeden of Norfolk replied that he wanted seg
regated schools but, referring to Almond's objections of the
Moore resolution, said:

"It's a matter of whether the law

yer's advice should be followed or the layman's.”

Most sena

tors apparently objected to taking action which appeared to
conflict with the Gray Plan or which might hurt Virginia’s
case m

, 76
court.

7 6Ibid.

On the same day that Byrd's statement was
printed, the~~Times-Dispatch reported that Southern leaders
were working on a regional policy statement.
76Ibid., March 9, 1956, p. 1. The Moore resolution,
in an amended form, .passed the House on February 28 by a vote
of 62-34. The amendment stated that the resolution should
not influence the Governor's decision to call a special session.

120

On March 11, ninety-six southern congressmen and
senators adopted a so-called "Southern Manifesto" pledging
themselves "to use all legal means" to reverse the Brown
decision.

Virginia's two senators and all of its representa77
tives signed the Manifesto.
In an effort to win broad

support the declaration omitted the use of words such as
"interposition" and "nullification."

Senator Byrd described

the Manifesto as "part of the plan of massive resistance we've
been working on and I hope and believe it will be an effective
i,78
action.

Although Senator Byrd had coined the term "massive
resistance," Virginia still balked at accepting this policy.
The General Assembly adjourned without passing any genuine
massive resistance legislation.

However, the legislature

indicated a readiness to move toward total defiance at a more
suitable time.

Beside passing the Moncure Bill, the Assembly

approved a resolution, introduced by Samuel E. Pope, to pre
vent interscholastic or intramural athletic competition between
the races.

The Times-Pispatch considered the Pope resolution

"wrong and indefensible,,"

and believed it brought "Virginia

77 Ibid„, March 12, 1956, p. 1. Virginia's two Repub
lican Representatives, Richard Poff and Joel Broyhill, joined
their Democratic colleagues in signing the declaration.
Eventually 101 of the 128 Southerners in Congress signed the
"manifesto". Albert Gore, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Estes
Kefauver were the only Southern Senators who failed to sign
the document.
7fi
Ibid., March 13, 1956, p. 1.
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and the United States into disrepute in many parts of the
79
world."
Though the resolution was not a law, Attorney
General Almond relied upon it in advising school officials
to maintain segregated athletic competition. 80
Along with legislation aimed at regulating school
policy, the General Assembly passed another law designed to
harass the desegregation efforts of the NAACP. The statute
gave the courts the authority to require the disclosure of
certain information by parties who brought suits against school
boards.

81

For example, the courts could request the names of

contributors supporting school litigation or require oaths that
the case was instituted by the actual plaintiffs named in the
suit.

Delegate John J. Williams, one of the sponsors of the

legislation, admitted that the law intended to hinder the
OO
NAACP.
In early March while the General Assembly completed
i'ts work, the delegates to the constitutional convention voted
unanimously to amend Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution.
The amendment permitted the General Assembly and local govern
ing bodies "to appropriate public funds for Virginia students
in public and nonsectarian private schools."

The convention,

^Editorial, Ibid., March 12, 1956 , p. 16.
^Ibid., March 26, 1956 , p. 1.
oi
Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 67 0, Reg.
Sess., 1956, p. 1026.
pn

Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 21, 19 56, p. 1.
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which included ten Defenders, also endorsed interposition by
a vote of 35 to 3 . ^
With the work of the General Assembly and the constitu
tional convention completed, Virginia waited for the Governor
to designate a date for a special session of the General
Assembly to act on the recommendations of the Gray Committee.
Governor Stanley resisted pressure to move rapidly on the
Gray Plan.

During the referendum campaign the Governor had

pressed for speedy action.

However, the Governor now viewed

the Gray Plan as "standby proposed legislation for such time
as it's deemed proper."

Instead Stanley hoped Virginia would

find "some method whereby we might continue, even beyond the
next school year, our present system.
The struggle over school policy, as the referendum
campaign and the meeting of- the General Assembly demonstrated,
was deeply enmeshed in politics.

The seeds of the organiza

tion's destruction were contained in the school issue.

One

wing of the organization represented by Colgate Darden and
John Battle was convinced that any deterioration of Virginia’s
schools threatened social and economic programs of the state.
Though segregationists, they preferred accommodation to school
closures.

Governor Stanley's weak endorsement of Section 129

was aimed at alleviating some of their fears .

^ ^Ibid., March 8 , 1956 , p. 1.
^ Ibid ., Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 10, 1956 ,
p. 1.
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The extreme segregationists were not strong enough to
risk total resistance until the Supreme Court and interposition
were made the major issues in Virginia politics .

The massive

resisters, through Kilpatrick's editorials, emphasized that
the Brown decision was not only a bad decision, but part of a
trend which threatened:

"the whole concept of this Union,

(of which) the greatest feature of its architecture, was the
concept of dual sovereignty. . . . "

85

Thus, the defense of

constitutional government, as interpreted by the states, superceded Virginia's obligation to public education or to obey
the law.

Perhaps even more significant, the legitimacy of the

Brown decision was made to appear debatable.

Furthermore,

Virginians were told that legal methods were available for
evading the desegregation order.

Even interposition, coun

seled Senator Byrd, was a "legal means" of challenging the
Supreme Court.

As a result, conservative politicians could

support their black belt colleagues without indulging in racial
epithets .
Despite the pressure for massive resistance, many
legislators were uneasy about abandoning the Gray Plan.

After

the referendum campaign, advocating total resistance seemed
dishonest.

Many legislators had rationalized their interpo

sition vote as a mere protest which in no way conflicted with
their support of local option.
oc
Richmond News Leader, February 2, 1956, p. 12.

124
In the debate on the Moore resolution, the underlying
issue of race surfaced.

Moreover, in voting on the Moncure

Bill, Pope resolution, or the NAACP Bill, legislators knew
that their commitment to segregation was also being tested*
The manipulation of the race issue was the lever for imposing
orthodoxy in the organization*

The politically ambitious,

like Attorney General Almond, recognized that to be "soft"
on integration meant losing the black belt and the endorsement
of Senator Byrd*

Loyalty to white supremacy and constitutional

principles interacted to give the organization a tremendous
political advantage*
Ironically by emphasizing "fundamental principles,"
the organization was forced to compromise its greatest source
of pride— integrity.

The conduct of the referendum campaign

was riddled with deception.

Interposition raised hopes which

its author and defenders recognized as patently false.

By

giving alternating interpretations of Virginia's interposition
resolution, massive resisters only compounded the confusion.
While accusing the federal government of totalitarianism, the
General Assembly demonstrated its intolerance in efforts to
discipline Arlington County and the NAACP.
The rise of massive resistance was not the result of a
statewide grass roots movement*

The Democratic organization

was determined to defy the Supreme Court from the very beginning.
However, limited compliance as outlined by the Gray Commission
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seemed to be Virginia's only alternative.

With the inter

position mania, coupled with regional resistance, the Demo
cratic organization thought itself strong enough to adopt
a more defiant course.

CHAPTER V
MASSIVE RESISTANCE
In the spring and early summer of 1956 action on the
school issue stalled temporarily, as the Old Dominion waited
on its Governor to call a special session of the General
Assembly.

Plainly, Governor Stanley contemplated delay un

til the federal courts ordered white schools to admit Negro
children.

Thus the timing of the special session would be

determined, in part, by the aggressiveness of the NAACP law
yers in the courts.

Recognizing that no school district would

voluntarily desegregate, Spotswood Robinson and Oliver Hill
announced their intention to litigate intensively until white
school doors were open to Negro children.

"We feel that we

have been more than patient," the lawyers e x p l a i n e d E s 
tablishing September 1956 as the target date for desegregation,
the NAACP represented Negro parents in suits filed in Newport
News, Norfolk, Arlington and Charlottesville.

Unlike the

Prince Edward case, which was renewed, the new litigation was
instituted in more favorable settings.

None of the new suits

^Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 22, 1956, p. 1.
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were in the black belt, and with the exception of Charlottesville, all were m

urban areas.

2

Defendant school boards were placed in an awkward posi
tion between a possible court order to desegregate and an in
formal state policy of preserving segregated schools.

Repre

sentatives of school boards pressed Governor Stanley to call
a special session so that school officials could present some
evidence of meeting the requirements of the Brown decision
to the federal judges.

Finally Governor Stanley asked the

Gray Commission to reassemble in order to find a plan of
3
legally avoiding desegregation.
While Governor Stanley procrastinated, Byrd, Smith,
Tuck and Abbitt worked feverishly to devise a school plan for
the Governor.

Congressman Howard Smith played the leading

role in developing legal gambits for evading court orders to
desegregate.

Smith suggested tnat Virginia could prevent

integration by withholding funds from desegregated schools,
by using the state police power to close mixed schools, or by
merely disregarding the state's obligation to provide public
education under Section 129 of the Virginia Constitution.
The last recommendation was offered on the theory that Sections
129 and 14-0, (voided by Brown) were inseparable.

By repealing

Section 140, Smith argued, the Supreme Court had upset: the

^Southern School News, Vol. II, No. 11 (May, 1956),
p. 3; Vol. 2, No. 12 (June, 1956), p. 13,” Vol. 3, No. 1
(July, 1956), p. 11.
Richmond Times-Dispatcn, May 1, 1956, p. 1.
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Commonwealth's ability to provide an "efficient" public
education under Section 129.^
Representative Smith's major objective was to lay the
foundation for a dramatic confrontation between the Federal
Government and Virginia.
creating such a clash.

He recommended two methods for
First, he suggested that the General

Assembly should assume complete responsibility for desegrega
ting public schools.

Then, citing the Eleventh Amendment,

the General Assembly would withdraw its consent to be sued
after refusing to integrate public schools.

Secondly, Smith

believed that any assignment plan should provide an appeals
system which left the ultimate judgment of student placement
S
to tne Governor.
When the Governor refused to assign a
Negro child to a white school, Smith predicted that the Su~
preme Court would be placed' "in the embarrassing position of
having to issue an order against a Governor of a sovereign
state, which they could not enforce."^
The recommendations offered by Smith would also serve
Virginia in other ways during the school crisis.

By employ

ing evasive legal tactics, he predicted, Virginia could tie
up desegregation litigation for several years.

Moreover, if

the Governor and the General Assembly assumed greater respon-

^Undated memorandum in Box 110 of the Smith Letter File,
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
"’ibid.
^Letter, Howdra W. Smith to Harry F. Byrd, May 4, 19 56,
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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sibility, Smith reasoned that the pressure on local school
boards would be relieved.

7

Excited by the prospects of

this strategy, Judge Smith urged Senator Byrd to join him in
placing his ideas before Governor Stanley.

"One voice crying

in the wilderness seems to make no impression." 8
Each of the suggestions made by Judge Smith was dubious
constitutionally.
of law.

Even he doubted their validity in a court

Writing to David J. Mays, counsel for the Gray Com

mission, Smith explained:

"May I repeat what I said last

night that I haven't the faintest idea of winning any case on
this subject before the Supreme Court and these suggestions
are made with the idea of raising and stressing every possible
9
point in the litigation."
Consuming time and embarrassing
the Supreme Court were uppermost in Smith's mind.
Despite Smith's influence, David J. Mays wrote him
that the recommendations regarding the Eleventh Amendment
would offer Virginia no legal defense.

Sterling v. Constantin

(287 U.S. 378) and Ex Parte Young (209 U.S. 123), Mays con
tinued, made "it pretty clear to me that the Governor of the
State is subject to injunctive order in the Federal Court when

7

Undated memorandum, Smith Letter File.

^Letter, May 4, 19 56.
9Letter, Howard W. Smith to David J. Mays, May 10, 1956,
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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he is violating rights under the Federal Constitution,"1^
Nonetheless Smith met with the Gray Commission in Richmond
on May 26, in order to introduce his views.

The secret

meeting, like many during this period, was attended by other
representatives of the organization's hierarchy.

While Smith

introduced his legal arguments, Representative William Tuck
pointed out the political advantages of "walking the last
mile."

Tuck argued that by using every tactic of delay, the

organization would satisfy the voters that it had made very
effort to obstruct desegregation.11

With an election in 1957

in the offing, this strategy carried considerable weight with
the Commission's members, especially those from the Southside.
As a result of the meeting with the Commission and the
exchange with David Mays, Smith dropped his affection for the
Eleventh Amendment as a leg^l ploy.
Curry Carter, Smith explained:

Writing to State Senator

"I do not think there is any

sure answer to the problem except the purse strings.

As the

State Constitution requires the Commonwealth to conduct a se
gregated system of schools, as well as an efficient system, it
seems to me that the Legislature if it chose to do so, is fully

10 Letter, David J. Mays to Howard W. Smith, May 25, 19 56,
University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.

11The meeting is mentioned in a letter from Howard W.
Smith to Honorable Curry Carter, June 4, 1956, University of
Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File. An interview with a
participant of the meeting, who preferred to remain unnamed,
discussed the issues covered by Smith and the remarks made by
Representative Tuck.
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justified in denying funds to integrated schools."12

As sub

sequent events proved, a consensus rapidly developed among
the massive resisters that segregation in all of Virginia's
schools could be maintained only by a fund-withholding policy.
By June, the Governor still had not set the date of a
special session.

Attorney General Almond publicly asked

Governor Stanley to call an emergency meeting of the Assembly.
In charge of providing legal counsel for the school boards,
Almond urged the state legislature "to meet the attack of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
I have fought to the end of my legal rope." 13
Almond's plea brought to the surface a difference of
opinion among Virginia's elected officials.

E. Blackburn

Moore wondered if the Attorney General intended to "fight for
a continuance of segregated; schools . . .

or does he desire

legislation that would permit any form of integration for
this coming school year?" 14

Endeavoring to maintain his

reputation as an uncompromising segregationist, Almond charged
Moore with "deliberately distorting and misrepresenting my
position."

Pointing out that Moore offered no plan for Vir

ginia, the Attorney General promised to "continue the fight

12 Ibid., Smith to Carter.

13 Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 1, 1956, p. 1.

14

Ibid., June 4, 1956, p. 1.
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to preserve segregation in the Virginia public school sys
tem."

Despite the House Speaker's attempt to portray him as

"soft" on integration Almond was "sure the people of Virginia
f

do know who has waged the fight against the NAACP .

The

Moore-Almond exchange ended with the House Speaker asking
that the Attorney General specify the legislation he preferred.
Speaker Moore firmly opposed any legislation "which would put
the stamp of state approval on integration in any public school
of Virginia „

In recalling the incident eight years later,

Almond interpreted Moore's attack as "a calculated attempt
to embarrass me when I announced for governor.

I knew at the
17
time when Moore cackled it was an echo of Byrd's chirp. "
Following the Gray Commission's recommendation, Gover
nor Stanley announced on June 6 that a special session of the
18
General Assembly would be convened within ninety days.
By
mid-June massive resisters were apprehensive about the forth
coming meeting of the Legislature,,

On June 15 a group of

Southsiders, who could be counted on to defy the Supreme Court,
held a private meeting in Petersburg.

Discussing the con

ference with Judge Smith, Garland Gray said:

"We agreed that

^ Ibid., June 5, 1956, p. 1.
17Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 8 , 1964, p. 1.
18

Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 7, 1956, p. 1.
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unless something is done between now and the call of the
Session to bring some pressure on other members of the Legis
lature, we may reach Richmond and finally enact some of the
Gray Commission's program.

The group I met with today is

willing to go to any extreme that may be necessary to prevent
integration anywhere in Virginia."

Senator Gray reminded

Judge Smith that "to prevent ill-advised legislation in the
coming Session, it is going to be necessary for everyone to
use all the influence that he can between now and whatever
date the Assembly convenes."

The consensus of the conference

was also relayed to the Governor, by phone, from Petersburg.
Gray reported that the Governor was "apparently of the same
opinion as we are and like us also, he is becoming satiated
with attorneys who constantly think only in terms of comt
pliance.
".19

Pilled with apprehension, the organization hierarchy
scheduled a meeting for July 2 in Byrd's Washington office in
order to prepare a plan for the upcoming session.
were suggested by Gray for the conference's agenda.

Four items
First,

Gray suggested that Virginia issue a declaration dedicating
itself to segregated public schools.

Secondly, he thought

that state funds should be withheld from school districts
which decide to desegregate their schools.

Thirdly, he urged

19Letter, Garland Gray to Howard W. Smith, June 15,
1956, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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that the right to sue local school boards be repealed except
for contractual disputes.

Finally, Gray believed that all

contested school assignments should be handled by the Gover
nor.

Meeting as planned, the participants worked out the

fundamentals of the school plan presented by Governor Stanley
0-7 2 0
on AugustO. 27.

The exact date of the special session was delayed pend
ing the outcome of desegregation suits in the federal courts.
Since Judge Hoffman postponed the hearings in the Norfolk and
Newport News cases until November,the Governor focused his
attention on the litigation being conducted in Charlottesville,
Arlington and Prince Edward County.

Governor Stanley prob

ably hoped that the courts would accept Virginia's legal argu
ments or at least postpone segregation for another year.
hope was short-lived.

The

During the Charlottesville hearing, on

July 12, Judge John Paul informally concluded that the Negro
plaintiffs were entitled to a decree which permitted them to
enter white schools in September, 1956.

Judge Paul did not

conceal from the litigants that his opinion was influenced by

20

Letter, Garland Gray to Honorable Howard W. Smith,
June 19, 19 56, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter
File. The letter stated that the following state legislators
would attend the meeting: J. D. Hagood, C. W. Cleaton, Samuel
E. Pope, Jack Daniel, Mills Godwin, Stuart Wheatley, and
Garland Gray. Most likely Watkins Abbitt and Bill Tuck joined
Smith and Byrd. Attorney General Almond did not attend but
stated that David J. Mays gave them the "straight dope" on
the law. Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 8 , 1964, p. 1.
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recent events in Virginia.

Up to the constitutional conven

tion, Virginia seemed to be acting in good faith, said Paul.
But, he continued:
what.

"Then something happened.

I don't know

But from that day since, nothing has been done except

to follow the policy of calculated delay.

I don't think I

am being unduly critical in saying that because I think the
governor, himself, admits that this is his purpose:
nothing until forced to do so. . . . "

21

to do

While Judge Paul did

not want his court to be a party "to a policy which has as
its purpose delay and evasion of the Supreme Court of the
United States," he was no social revolutionary.

According to

the Judge, the Brown decision did not mean "that everybody
can run to whatever school he wants to attend.

...

I don't

think any decree should be sweeping enough to say to every
Negro child in Charlottesville 'you can go to whatever school
you want.'"

A variety of "legitimate reasons for discrimina-

t’ion" in assigning pupils existed, Judge Paul concluded.

22

In his written opinion and decree of August 6, Paul
swiftly disposed of the defense's argument.

"It has long

been settled that suits against state officers to restrain
the enforcement of state laws which contravene the Federal
Constitution are not suits against state."

On this point

Judge Paul cited Sterling v. Constantin (2 87 U.S. 37 8) and

2]

"Quoted in Southern School Nev/s, Vol. Ill, No. 2
(August, 19 56), p. 12.
" Richmond News Leader, July 13, 1956, p. 1.
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Ex Parte Young (209 U.S. 123) a

The judge also agreed with

the plaintiffs that the school superintendent could not be
dismissed as a defendant and that the Negro plaintiffs could
bring suit without making formal application to attend a
white school.

Judge Paul observed that following a request

by the plaintiffs' attorneys to reorganize the public schools,
the school board's reply indicated that they had no intention
of complying with the Supreme Court's decision.

Application

to Charlottesville schools would amount to a time-consuming
and useless formality.

The Charlottesville School Board was

ordered to discontinue its discriminatory admissions policy
beginning in September, 1956.

23

Three weeks later, Judge

Paul suspended his injunction pending the school board's
appeal to a higher court.

24

At the end of July, Judge Albert V. Bryan rejected
Virginia's legal arguments in the Arlington school case.

Bry

an's injunction provided for the admission of Negro children
to elementary schools on January 31, 1957, and to junior and
senior high schools in September, 19 57.

The delay was aimed

at giving the defendants an opportunity to adjust to any
25
legislation passed by the General Assembly.

22Allen v. School Board of the City of Charlottesville,
I Race Rel. L. Rep. 886, 888-89 (W.D. Va» 1956).
2^I Race Rel. L. Rep. 89 0.
25Thompson v. County School Board of Arlington County,
144 Fo SuppT^TT^r^X^^ETFrTiT^ITsTr-”
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As Judge Paul had done in the Charlottesville case,
Bryan commented on the meaning of the Brown decision.

Draw

ing on the Briggs dictim, Bryan wrote that the Supreme Court
did not "compel the mixing of the different races in the
public schools.

. . .

The order of the court is simply that

no child shall be denied admission to a school on the basis
of race or color."

The Judge emphasized that his opinion did

not nullify present or future assignment plans as long as they
were not based on race.

Concluding his opinion, Bryan pre

dicted that "compliance with that [Brown] ruling may well not
necessitate such extensive changes in the school system as
4.' • 4- ..26
some anticipate.
The Charlottesville-Arlington cases established several
imporcant precedents for desegregation cases in Virginia’s
federal courts.

First, the;cases demonstrated that federal

district judges, thought Virginians by birth, meant to uphold
the Supreme Court’s ruling in the segregation cases.

Total

noncompliance and far-fetched legal arguments were to receive
little sympathy.

Secondly, the judges indicated that they

did not intend to supervise a social revolution or operate a
local public school system.

They accepted the interpretation

of the Brown decision written in Briggs v. Elliott.

Thirdly,

the judges, especially Bryan, invited the state government
to adopt a pupil assignment plan.

The judges hinted that

other criteria besides race and time-consuming plans of appeal
might well result in only token desegregation which the courts

26Id. at 240.
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nonetheless would find acceptable.

27

The editor of the

Times"Dispatch wrote that the rulings of Judges Paul and Bry
an would form the background of the special session.

The

opinions, the editor thought, meant that any school plan devised by the General Assembly must permit some desegregation. 2 8
On July 23, Governor Stanley officially launched Vir
ginia down the road to massive resistance.

Setting August 27

as the date for the special session, Stanley said that he in
tended to recommend cutting off state funds to schools which
integrated their classrooms.

The Governor also opposed any

plan which accepted the principle of racial integration. 29
The announcement actually came as no surprise to Byrd's
opponents, since word of the Washington meeting was common
knowledge.

Recognizing that Stanley was lodged in the Byrd-

Tuck-Abbitt-Smith camp, the anti-organization Democrats pon
dered the political ramifications of massive resistance.
Martin A. Hutchinson, who challenged Byrd in the 19 46 Demo
cratic primary for the Senate, wrote:

"Suppose Moore

[E.

Blackburn Moore] or some other candidate boldly stated that if

27Judge Sterling Hutcheson, who would handle the Prince
Edward case, proved to be an exception to the role.
In a
series of decisions Hutcheson postponed a desegregation order
because of the tremendous opposition to desegregation which
developed in Prince Edward County.
98

Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 1, 1956,

p. 10.
^Ibid., July 24 , 1956, p. 1.
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elected Governor he would see that the schools were operated
just as they have been come what may:

Would not such an

appeal have considerable support in Virginia?" 30

Robert White

head told Cabell Phillips, a prominent journalist born in
Virginia, that "it now appeared that the Negro issue could be
exploited to advantage by Byrd and his crowd for many years
to come, and that I had heard the boast has been made that it
31
was good for 25 years."
Byrd Democrats might challenge the
Hutchinson-Whitehead statements of anti-organization Democrats.
Yet the subsequent campaign of Attorney General Almond proved
that Hutchinson and Whitehead were accurate political fore
casters .
In order to insure the success of massive resistance,
the Gray Commission had to accept the fund cut-off.

Many mem

bers of the school study commission believed that the Gray plan
was still the best method of dealing with the desegregation
order in Virginia.

Moreover, many commission members winced

at the inconsistancy between supporting local option and tuition
grants during the referendum campaign, and then supporting a
32
fund witholding plan at the special session.

30

Letter, Martin A. Hutchinson to Robert Whitehead,
July 31, 1956, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead
Letter File.
31Notes of Robert Whitehead, August 2, 1956, University
of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter File.
Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 23, 1956,
p. 12. The editorial elaborated on the inconsistency between
fund witholding and pupil assignment.
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Southside legislators played a prominent role in
countering.the argument of the adherents of the Gray Plan,
They sought understanding for their plight by arguing that any
sort of compromise, in the racially tense black belt, meant cer
tain political defeat.

Black belt legislators reminded their

opponents that supporting the Gray Plan was easier where there
was no "Negro problem,"

Finally, the massive resisters appealed

for loyalty to the Democratic organization.

They argued that

once fund withholding had failed, Virginia could fall back on
the Gray Plan,

In the process, the Southsiders asserted, de

segregation would have been postponed and their electorate
satisfied that Virginia had "walked the last mile,"

33

Before the public, the massive resisters played on
racial fears and also argued that the opportunity for perma
nently containing or regulating desegregation was nonexistant.
Representative Tuck summarized this point of view when he
warned

i

There is no middle ground, no compromise. We're either
for integration or against it and I'm against it. . . .

33 The position of Southside legislators was derived from
interviews with two members of the Gray Commission who took
opposing points of view on fund withholding. The position
that the political realities prevented anything but the most
extreme stance by a black belt politician is still held today.
Mills Godwin, for example, has said "that no member, especially
from Southside, could have stayed in the General Assembly,
who had not held strong views on integration of the public
schools„" Quoted in M. Carl Andrews, No Higher Honor; The
Story of Mills E. Godwin (Richmond: Dietz Press, 1970) ,
p. 41.
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If they {other regions of Virginia] won't stand with us
then I say make 'em. We cannot compromise. . . .
We
may have to have five, ten, or one hundred special ses
sions or even have the Assembly stay in constant
session. . . .
If you ever let them [Negroes] integrate
anywhere the whole state will be integrated in a short
time.34
Tuck was correct only in predicting that Negro leaders would
not be satisfied with token integration.

However, he was

dreadfully wrong in forecasting integration "in a short time."
One of the staunchest defenders of Governor Stanley's
position was James Kilpatrick.

The Richmond editor literally

laid out the strategy of the massive resisters in the editorial
pages of the Richmond News Leader.

Following Stanley's an

nouncement, Kilpatrick came to the Governor's defense.

To

adopt pupil assignment, the editor wrote, would be "a conces
sion that the Supreme Court had acted lawfully."
any compromise was "an abandonment . . .

Furthermore,

of the constitutional

principles so ringingly asserted just a few months ago."

With

out offering an explanation, the editor argued that white
people "are less ready for it [desegregation] than they were
two years ago." 35

The unwillingness of Virginia's highest

elected officials to offer leadership and defiant editorials
by Kilpatrick certainly helped to explain the deteriorating
situation„

^ Richmond Times-Dispatch , July 28 , 1956 , p. 1.

QC
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, July 24, 1956,
p. 6.
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The News Leader believed that Virginia's goal "should
be to fight a holding action."

Thus, if "a year's delay can

be gained, then let us gain it."

The purpose of evasion was

to give other states a chance to react to the Brown decision.
Pointing out that courts reverse decisions or that some future
amendment might guarantee segregated schools, Kilpatrick wrote
"we may yet win unqualified victory." 36

Even more signifi

cant, delay provided "that much more time for resistance to
harden and determination to grow more resolute."

The editor

never argued that time could be used to ease the problems of
adjustment.

In viewing the future, editor Kilpatrick often

recalled the example of Prohibition.

If fifteen years were

needed to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment, he wrote, "we ought
to be willing to fight as long to win reversal of Brown v .
Board of Education." 37
The purpose of raising constitutional arguments was to
shift the argument away from race.

However, with crucial leg

islative decisions about to be made, Kilpatrick also exploited
the race issue.

He argued that if concessions were made and

then the Supreme Court reversed itself, Virginia might not be
able to undo the damage.
38
then."

"The eggs, will have been scrambled

Using Washington, D. C. as a test case, Kilpatrick

played on the themes of racial violence and sexual offenses

36Ibid., July 27, 1956, p. 10.
3^Ibid., August 28, 1956, p. 10.
38Ibid., July 24, 1956, p. 10.
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associated with desegregated school systems. 39

Negroes,

the editor charged, have "demonstrably lower aptitudes for
learning and shockingly different standards of moral behavior. . .

40

Racial mixing, Kilpatrick was sure, would

be more harmful to whites than helpful to Negroes.

"Once

our schools are race-mixed, that last essential barrier to
complete racial amalgamation will have been abandoned."

The

result, the editor predicted, would be to reduce the South
"to the melancholy status of another Cuba, a Puerto Rico, a
Brazil0"44
The Kilpatrick editorials spelled out a strategy and
a psychology of resistance.

The plan initially had a certain

flexibility since even Kilpatrick admitted that as a last re42
sort, Virginia might have to resort to an assignment plan.
The idea that Virginia could eventually retreat to something
like the Gray Plan appealed to legislators reluctant to follow
the Southside.

However, the emphasis on "fundamental prin

ciples" and racial fears eventually cancelled political flexi
bility.

Once massive resistance was adopted, politicians were

4QIbid., August 1, 1956, p. 12.
41Ib-id., August 6 , 1956 , p. 12.
42Ibid., July 27,1956, p. 10. Kilpatrick wrote that
"pupil assignment is the last resort, not the first."

144
not able to admit that the hot rhetoric was a charade.
On August 21 and 22, Stanley's recommendations won the
grudging endorsement of the Gray Commission.

The executive

committee supported the Governor by a narrow 6-4 vote, while
the full Commission approved the new policy by a 19-12 margin.
With a few exceptions, the split in the voting demonstrated
a significant correlation between a member's vote and the Negro
population of his constituency.

43

With the special session about to meet, Senator Byrd
made an effort to ensure victory for a program of total re
sistance.

From his home in Berryville, the Senator said:

If Virginia surrenders, . . . the rest of the South
will go down, too. . . .
I am a law abiding citi
zen . . . but I do not believe the Supreme Court is so
sacred we can't criticize it.
. . . Why can't we
fight this thing with every ounce of energy and capacity?
I think we are on strong ground. 44:
As Governor Stanley prepared to welcome the emergency
assembly, the Richmond Times-Dispatch wrote that not a single
daily newspaper outside the Southside and Tidewater backed
the Governor.

A survey of the Virginia dailies emphasized

that editors were not only annoyed by the abandonment of the
Gray Plan, but feared that closed schools would hinder

^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 22, 1956, p. 1;
August 23, 1956, p. 1.
^Ibid. , August 26 , 1956 , p. 1.
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economic development and invite federal intervention. 45
Countering the criticism from the press, Governor Stanley
claimed that ninety-five percent of Virginia's white citizens
supported his policy. 46
Addressing the General Assembly on August 27, Governor
Stanley, amid cheers and rebel yells, outlined his plan to
prevent integration in Virginia.

47

The objective was to be

reached by closing schools about to be desegregated by with
holding state funds.

Fund cutoff was to be complemented by

a proposal to provide tuition grants for students who wished
to attend private, non-sectarian schools.

Other suggestions

included state legal assistance to school boards and retire
ment coverage for public school teachers moving to private
48
schools 0

45Editorial, Ibid., p. 2D. The News Leader (Editorial,
August 27, p. 10) wanted a year's delay but preferred a plan
Worked out by Donald Richberg, former chairman of the National
Recovery Administration and Charlottesville resident. Pre
sented to the General Assembly by state Senator Edward 0.
McCue of Charlottesville, the McCue-Richberg plan called for
the General Assembly to assume control of public education
and to defend itself from a suit by use of theEleventh Amend
ment. In no way original,the idea
had beensuggested by
Representative Howard Smith and Judge William Old before being
championed by Richberg and McCue.
^ Ibid., August 24 , 1956 , p. 1.
^^ Ibid., August 28, 1956, p. 1.
Ap
Inaugural Address and Addresses delivered to the
General AssemBly" oT'vTrginia by^homas”TJ7“Braniey, r93^TT9 58
TCommonweaXtH of Virginias Division of Purchase and Printing,
1958), pp. 1-8.

In defending his program, Governor Stanley concen
trated on three issues.

First, Stanley argued that any future

school closures did not violate Section 129 of the Virginia
Constitution since, by definition, integrated schools were
automatically not "efficient."

Secondly, the Governor held

that the state would not be responsible for closing Virginia's
schools.

"If any school is closed, it will be because a per

son, or persons, of one race seeks to force his way into a
school in which the opposite race is taught."

Finally,

Governor Stanley reminded the Assembly of its duty to uphold
the constitutional principles enunciated in the interposition
49
resolution.
The opposition to the Stanley Plan was more formidable
than during the referendum campaign.

Colgate Darden, Dabney

Lancaster and Thomas C. Boushall, all of whom had campaigned
50
for the amendment of Section 141, opposed the Governor.
Lancaster, who had directed the State Referendum Information
Center, was especially disillusioned.

He disclosed that

Governor Stanley had "convinced me that the original recommen
dation of the Gray Commission offered the best hope of avoiding
integration."

Darden charged that the Stanley Plan was un

constitutional, disrespectful of local government, and harmful

^-'ibid. , pp. 5-8 .
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to areas with small Negro populations.

He predicted that the

measure would generate great hostility toward the South51
side.
The Darden-Lancaster views, presented to a public
hearing early in September, were met by firm endorsements of the
Stanley Plan from Representative Tuck, Abbitt and Smith. 52
The Senate floor leader, Mills E. Godwin, Jr., who read the
statement of the organization's hierarchy to the hearing, also
elaborated on the evils of the Brown decision.

"Integration,

however slight, anywhers in Virginia would be a cancer eating
at the very life blood of our public school system."

Regard

ing Virginia's response to the Supreme Court's decision
Godwin emphasized:

"If we think it is right, we should accept

it without circumvention or evasion.

If it is wrong, we

should never accept it at all.

Men of conscience and principle
53
do not compromise with either right or wrong."
During the public hearing all the familiar arguments
for and against the Stanley Plan were repeated.

However,

Henry T, Wickham, Jr., special assistant to the attorney gen
eral, and David J. Mays, counsel for the Gray Commission,
clarified several aspects of the Stanley Plan.

Wickham pointed

out that the plan was designed to prevent integration rather

51Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 2, 1956, p. 1.
^Ibid. , September 8 , 1956, p. 8.
^Ibid. , September 5 , 1956 , p. 1.
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than to provide "a legal defense against integration suits," 54
Mays thought that fund witholding might get through the courts
if the localities were permitted to operate with local funds.
Turning to the matter of an assignment plan, he warned that
one would be approved by the federal courts only if it offered
the aggrieved party the opportunity for relief.

Cutting off

funds, Mays contended, tainted the constitutionality of any
. .
.
55
Virginia assignment policy.

Considering legal advice and

the early district court decisions, the proponents of the
Stanley Plan were aware of its constitutional shortcomings.
The legal criticisms of the Stanley Plan were neutralized or
confused on September 10 when Attorney General Almond rendered
an opinion supporting the constitutionality of fund withhold
ing.

He said the General Assembly had the power to define an

"efficient." school system.

-The Legislature, Almond believed,

had no duty to support an "inefficient, or in other words,
desegregated school system."

.

56

54
Ibid.

^^Ibide, September 6, 1956, p. 1.
56
Ibid., September 10, 1956, p. 1. Later when Almond had
become the celebrated martyr of massive resistance, he claimed
that he had told the Governor that fund witholding would not be
accepted by the courts.
If this was true, the record still
shows that he played an important role in 4:he passage of legis
lation which he viewed as hopelessly unconstitutional.
His
private beliefs in no way reduced his responsibility for de
veloping support for massive resistance. Norfolk VirginianPilot, June 8, 1964, p. 1.
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The opponents of the Stanley Plan introduced bills
that would have permitted either statewide or local referenda
on the fund witholding measure.
to reduce

the likelihood of massive school closings by giving

the people an
policy.

57

The purpose of the bills was

opportunity to retain control over local school

The Governor, in turn, hoped to win greater support

for his major bill by offering two bills (H.B. 77 and S.B. 56)
which were designed to reduce fears of massive school closings.
Originally, Stanley's bill (H.B. I) would have closed a school
district’s elementary schools, if an attempt was made to dese
gregate one elementary school, or a school district’s secondary
schools, if an attempt was made to desegregate one high
school. 58
On September 12, Stanley offered the new bills
which had

the effect of limiting the school closing

fund cut

off provisions to the school where admission was sought by a
member of the opposite race.

Included in the new bills were pro

visions which attempted to confer legal immunity on the Governor
and General Assembly or their representatives.

59

As Robbins

Gates observed, the attempt to place the Governor and General

^ ^Ga/tes , pp. 17 6-78 .
58H.B„ 1, Journal of the House, Extra Sess. 1956.
°^S.B. 56, Journal of the Senate, Extra Sess. 19 56.
The bill specifically stated that neither the Governor nor the
state was to be subjected to a law suit while carrying out
school policy. House Bill 77 provided the same sort of
immunity to school board members.
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Asembly between the Supreme Court and the school boards was
a "magnificent obsession that had haunted Virginia's segre
gationists from the very first.
The effort by Governor Stanley to widen the margin of
victory was not successful.

The advocates of the Gray Plan

were able to force votes on a local option amendment to
Stanley's bill in both the Senate and the House,

By votes

of 59 to 39 and 21 to 17, the House and Senate respectively
defea.ted the attempt to amend Stanley's bill.

The challenge

turned back, the Governor's forces passed an unamended bill
by a 61 to 37 vote in the house and a 22 to 16 vote in the
Senate.

61

During the House debate, Howard H. Adams, Chief

patron of the Stanley Bill urged the delegates to support the
Governor because:

"It is our duty and responsibility to see

that our racial purity and ;distinctiveness is maintained at
all costs.

Our country can remain the world leader it is in

no other way."

62

•

The opponents questioned the constitution

ality of the Stanley Bill and urged a more flexible plan.
Though defeated,

the local optionists put up a determined

fight.
Virginia did not enter massive resistance with an im
pressive consensus in the General Assembly.

The votes on fund

^Gates, p. 181.
^ R ichmond Times-Dispatch, September 18, 1956, p. 1.
62

, .
Ibid.

withholding seemed to support Delegate Harry B. Davis' observation that Virginia reacted "as if it were two states." 63
With two exceptions, black belt legislators voted against
local option.

Republicans (all seven for local option), the

Arlington delegation, and urban legislators (Richmond, Norfolk,
and Roanoke) voted almost unanimously for local option.

While

no integrationists, the urban legislators recognized that
housing patterns would slow the pace of desegregation in the
cities.

Moreover, they feared that the possibility of school

closings, would threaten economic growth.

The area outside

the black belt where the organization won most dramatically
was in rural Virginia.

Loyalty to the organization and the

tradition of rural, conservative rule helped to explain the
vote of men without a "black problem."

64

After the battle over fund withholding, the remaining
bills which supplemented the school closing measure easily
passed the General Assembly.

Altogether the legislature passed
65
twenty-three bills which dealt with the school problem.
Af

ter fund cut-off, the most important as a barrier against
desegregation was the law creating a three-man pupil placement
board.

The placement board was given the authority to assign

all pupils in the state according to "nonracial" criteria.

6 3TU.
.
Ibid.

64

Gates ? pp„ 184-8 8.

Southern School News, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October, 1956),
p. 16. This number has a brief description of the twenty-three
bills passed by the General Assembly.
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The assignment guidelines were vague enough to prevent the
possibility of assigning any Negro child to a white school.
A cumbersome system of appeals was devised so that the com
plainants would be unable to receive relief during the school
66

year.

The major constitutional flaw of the assignment plan
was its association with the school closing law.

If the

placement board assigned a Negro to a white school, which was
unlikely, the Negro would be denied relief since the school
would be closed.

The Governor would then take over the school

and attempt to reorganize it so that classes could be resumed
on a segregated basis.

If unsuccessful, the school could be

returned to the local officials and presumably be operated
with local funds. 67

The remote possibility of local finan

cing, was the "loophole" th;at some Virginians believed would
save Virginia's assignment plan.
• '

68

The special session also passed legislation which

helped individuals and communities to move from public to
private education.

Of these measures, the most important

fi 6

Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 70, Extra Sess.
1956, pp. 74-77. The pupil placement board was expected to
relieve pressure on the local school boards from desegregation
suits. Other statutes which were intended to ease the problems
of the localities included state legal aid and permission to
appropriate school funds on a monthly basis.
^Ibid., Chapter 68, pp. 69-72.
^ Southern School News, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October, 1956),
p. 16.
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required state and local governments to provide funds for
students seeking to enroll in private non-sectarian schools.
The tuition grant was not to exceed the normal per pupil cost
of attending a public school in the locality where the grant
was requested. 69

Besides providing tuition grants, the

General Assembly amended the Virginia Supplemental Retirement
Act so that teachers moving from public to private schools
would not lose state retirement benefits.

Finally, the State

Board of Education was prohibited from refusing to accredit
any school or diploma issued by a school using a building or
facilities which did not meet the standards of the State
Board.70
Related to the school legislation was a package of
laws designed to harm, if not eliminate NAACP legal action in
Virginia.

The so-called anti-NAACP laws included:

provisions

requiring the registration of persons or organizations invol
ved in racial litigation, broader definitions and harsher
penalties for lawyers engaging in legal malpractice, and the
establishment of two joint committees to investigate organi
zations involved in racial activities and the effectiveness
71
of the laws against malpractice.
The anti-NAACP laws were

69Acts of the General Assembly, Chapters 56, 57, 58, 62,
Extra Sess. 1956 , pp. 56-60 , 62.
7^Ibid., Chapters 39, 65, pp. 42-48, 65.
71Ibid., Chapters 31-37, pp. 29-42.
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a product of the intense hatred generated against the Negro
organization following the Brown decision.

The legislators

most interested in the legislation believed that the NAACP
did not represent the "average" Negro.

Delegate C. Harrison

Mann, on introducing the legislation said:

"He doubted

seriously that Virginia Negroes would have brought a single
school suit had they not been stirred up from the outside."

72

Some of the more conservative legislators viewed the organization as subversive. 73

Though unsympathetic with the NAACP's

objectives, both Richmond newspapers opposed the legislation
74
as a threat to traditional constitutional freedom.
The
anti-NAACP legislation passed easily, although the Richmond
Times"Dispatch reported that many legislators privately
opposed the laws, but feared being labelled "friends of the
NAACP" or "integrationists

75

During the emergency session, the rationale of massive
Resistance was explained and defended by Albertis S. Harrison,
Jr., a highly regarded black belt Senator.

72Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 11, 1956, p. 1.
7 3T
Interviews
74Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 29, 1956, p. 8.,
Richmond News Leader, September 10, 1956, p. 10.
75
'Ibid., September 21, 1956, p. 1.
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By sovereign legislative act instructing the
sovereign head of a sovereign state to preserve the
peace and tranquility, and to forbid compulsory in
tegration, S „ B 0 56 would seek to force the federal
courts to decide the presently undecided question
of whether a state must operate integrated schools and
compel children to attend therm
So far, the federal
courts have said only that a state may not segregate
children by race,
Virginia, Harrison concluded, was defining "the legal battleground for the ultimate test of state sovereignty."

76

Senator Harrison's analysis contained two major con
stitutional themes.

The first was the anachronistic theory

of dual sovereignty popularized by Kilpatrick.

Though organi

zation leaders apparently recognized the shortcomings of
interposition,
to Virginia.

they continued to endorse it as an option open
Secondly,

Harrison made use of the Briggs inter

pretation of the Brown decision to argue that Virginia's obli
gation to desegregate public schools was unclear.
combined,

When

the two ideas persuaded enough legislators that

massive resistance was a perfectly

legal maneuver.

The expla

nation also helped to combat the charge that the legislators
were setting a bad example by resisting the law of the land.
The minimum objective of the school closing legislation
was to delay a desegregation order by introducing other issues
for litigation.

In the immediate sense, many legislators thought

that by postponing desegregation by even one year,

"^Ibid., September 22 , 1956 , p. 1.

scores of
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white students would "move up one more grade without the risks
and evils of race mixing,,"

77

More optimistic were those who

hoped that as part of a southern response, Virginia's resis
tance would persuade either Congress or the Supreme Court to
reverse the school decisions.

Others wished to see whether the

President would use troops in a confrontation with the Governor.
Regardless of the outcome of Virginia's legislation in the
courts, the massive resisters explained, the state could fall
back to the Gray Plan.

The people, the organization leaders

argued, would be satisfied that Virginia's leaders had exhaus
ted all "legal tactics" for preventing desegregation.
In the long run, the school closing legislation was
doomed for several reasons.

First, the plan completely ignored

regional differences in Virginia.

If threatened with school

closings, areas outside the; black belt would refuse to sacri
fice their public schools for the sake of the Southside.
Second, the laws clashed with the tradition of local control
over education.

If Virginians disliked policies dictated from

Washington, many also questioned orders from Richmond.

Finally,

the federal courts of Virginia had already indicated that they
would rule against blatant attempts to evade the Brown decision.
Massive resistance marked the high point of a strategy
to retard the pace of desegregation through time-consuming liti
gation.

Although sometimes viewed as just another tactic in

^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, August 28, 1956, p. 10.
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Virginia's legal arsenal, total resistance was transformed
into a sacred goal.

In leading Virginia down the path of mas

sive resistance, Senator Harry Byrd and Southside legislators
played the leading roles.

The Senator's commitment to mas

sive resistance was magnified by the view that Virginia was
the test state of the South.

If desegregation failed in Vir

ginia, Byrd thought the South would triumph in its attempt to
reverse the school decision.

For the Southside, the political

heart of the Byrd organization, desegregation clashed with
over three hundred years of history.

Regardless of the poli

tical ramifications, black belt legislators would have been
massive resisters.

In adopting the course of massive resistance,

they risked and ultimately succeeded in fracturing the organi
zation.

Yet total resistance offered political opportunities

since the race issue in an emotional atmosphere could be used
to devastate political opponents.

With the race issue, rural

Virginia made its stand against the nationwide equalitarian
movement which would ultimately increase the power of the Negro
and the cities.

As 1956 passed into history the organization

turned its attention to winning the gubernatorial election, to
defending massive resistance in the federal courts and to dis
crediting the opponents of Virginia's school policy.

PART II.

THE DECLINE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE

CHAPTER VI
THE 19 57 STATE ELECTION
On November 17, 1956, Virginians received some insight
into the political and legal ramifications of the Common
wealth's school policyo

Unwilling to risk the loss of another

opportunity, J. Lindsay Almond announced that he would seek
the Democratic party's nomination for governor in the 1957
primary.

On the same day Judge Walter J. Hoffman hinted that

he would declare unconstitutional the recently enacted pupil
placement plan.'*'
Attorney General Almond's announcement was unusual in
two ways.

First, most political observers could not recall

dny recent politician declaring his candidacy so early.
Second, Almond's political plans were made public without ob
serving the customary formality of consulting Senator Byrd.
Ever since 1954, Almond had devoted every possible moment to
building up support for his candidacy.

As Attorney General he

had continuous contact with local sheriffs, commonwealth's
attorneys, clerks and other members of the organization's in
frastructure.

By securing the support of the grass roots and

by acting early, Almond hoped to present the organization's

1Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 1956, p. 1.
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hierarchy with a fait accompli before his competition could
2

organize.

In order to win the organization's approval the
Attorney General had to have the endorsement of the black
belt.

Undoubtedly a segregationist, Almond, the lawyer, had

some doubts about the future success of massive resistance.
But, Almond, the politician, recognized that his political
future depended on out doing any segregationist candidate.
Thus, in declaring his candidacy, the Attorney General remarked
"For more than five years I have fought to save our public
school system from destruction and to defend Virginia's right
to govern in her own internal affairs and in the lawful exer
cise of her inherent constitutional sovereignty.

...

I shall

continue to fight with never diminishing faith that right will
3
ultimately triumph."
In seeking the governorship Almond sub
sequently outstripped any Virginian in his dedication to the
maintenance of segregated education.
Almond's strategy worked perfectly.

Garland Gray, con

sidered Almond's major challenger, hurriedly canvassed the
organization, and determined that he could not secure adequate
support.

On December 6, the state Senator from Waveriey

announced that he would not seek the Democratic party's nomi
nation.

In a brief statement Gray said that the school crisis

2Luther J. Carter, "State House Bid Delayed", Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot, June 8, 1964, p. 1.
Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 19 56, p. 6-D.
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was the most serious the Commonwealth had faced in recent
generations„

Considering the circumstances, Gray thought

that "a division among the proponents of segregated
schools, . . . would be far-reaching and perhaps even disas4
trous."
On the same day, Delegate Robert Whitehead announced
that he would not enter the Democratic primary.

Any hope the

anti-organization Democrat had of being a factor in the pri
mary was dashed by Gray's withdrawal from the contest.

Only

a split in the organization would have provided anti-Byrd

Democrats with a chance m

the race for the nomination. 5

On December 11, Senator Harry Byrd endorsed Almond's
candidacy.

The Senator described Almond as "a candidate

tried and tested by many years of arduous public service as a
judge, congressman, and attorney-general of Virginia.

He is

well equipped to deal with the extremely difficult problems
how confronting Virginia."

Equally significant was Byrd's

advice "to begin promptly" the organizational work for the
November campaign instead of waiting until after the primary.6
Political observers could not recall an instance when Senator
Byrd had spoken so candidly or so early.

James Latimer, Rich

mond Times-Dispatch’s political reporter, described Byrd's

^Southern School News, Vol. Ill, No. 7 (January, 1957),

p . 11.
JIbid .

^Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 12, 1956, p. 1.
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performance as "a rare evocation of command powers."

7

Al

though the Virginia patriarch predicted an unprecedented
victory, he wanted to take nothing for granted.
Within a month, the organization closed its ranks be
hind the fiery Attorney General,

Almond's hard work and

political boldness paid off, since the major obstacles to his
success now were eliminated.

Avoiding a fratricidal war, the

Democratic organization turned its attention to smashing the
GOP and winning a mandate for massive resistance.
Ironically, on the day that Almond dedicated his candi
dacy to preserving segregated schools, he listened to Judge
Walter J. Hoffman attack Virginia's Pupil Placement Plan, one
of the bulwarks devised by the special session to prevent ing

tegrauion.

The hearing before Judge Hoffman, on November 17,

was prompted by motions entered by the school boards of Nor
folk and Newport News which asked the court to dismiss dese
gregation petitions filed by Negro parents.

The school boards

contended that the newly enacted assignment plan provided the
plaintiffs with an administrative remedy which must be exhaust
ed before relief was sought in the federal courts.

Consolidat

ing the two cases, Judge Hoffman restricted the argument to
the constitutionality of the placement law since related issues

7

James Latimer, p. 83.

^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 18, 1956, p. 1.
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were about to be disposed of by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the appeal from the Arlington-Charlottesville de. .
9
cisions.
During the hearing the NAACP lawyers argued that the
Pupil Placement Act was unconstitutional in intent and failed
to provide an adequate administrative remedy.

The Negro law

yers explained that the assignment plan was one part of an
elaborate attempt to defy the Supreme Court.

The lawyers for

the defense retorted that the intent of the legislators was
unclear and that the assignment plan was unrelated to other
legislation passed by the General Assembly.

jMoreover, they

maintained that regardless of the General Assembly's intent,
the plan permitted a locality to operate a desegregated school
system with local funds.

Because of this loophole, the defense

contended, the Virginia plan was no different from North and
South Carolina statutes upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals o

9
Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 19, 1956, p. 1. Judge
Walter Hoffman, who heard the Norfolk and Newport News cases,
was an Eisenhower appointee.
The Republican candidate for
Attorney General in 1953, Judge Hoffman was widely criticized
by massive resisters. Not only were his decisions unpopular,
but Hoffman frequently chastized the Democrats for the brand of
leadership they offered the state. Today Judge Hoffman is an
outspoken critic of busing and applauded by those who formerly
scolded himc During massive resistance, the style rather than
the substance of Hoffman's decisions made him unpopular. As
Judges Paul and Bryan, Hoffman was guided by the Briggs dictum
in dealing with school cases.
^ N o r f o lk Virginian-Pilot, November 18, 1957, p._l. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the North Carolina plan
in Carson v. Warlick, 238 F . 2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) and the
South Carolina plan in Hood v. Board of Trustees, 232 F. 2d
626 (4th Cir. 1956).
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Judge Hoffman left little doubt that the future of the
Pupil Placement Plan was in jeopardy.

"If I had to rule on

it today I would throw it out the window ."11

Equally annoy

ing to Virginia's political leadership was Judge Hoffman's
practice of questioning the motives which prompted the emergen
cy legislation.

"Was it or was it not a design to flaunt the

decision of the Supreme Court . . . which . . . I ' m bound to
follow?"

The legislation was "good politically," Judge Hoffman

observed, but it did not "reflect good judgment."12

Judge

Hoffman even taunted Attorney General Almond by interrupting
him in the midst of an explanation of the assignment plan to
comment:

"They sure made it complicated didn't they?"11

Vir

ginia, Hoffman continued, had no alternative but to attempt
to implement the Brown decision.
14
to eat it."

"We've got it and we've got

Prior to Judge Hoffman's decision, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the district court decisions in the
Arlington and Charlottesville cases. 15

With Judge John J.

Parker writing the opinion, the court agreed that the Eleventh

11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 1956,

p. 1 .
12

.

.

.

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 18, 1956,

p. B-l.

14 Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 1956,
p. 1 .
15

School Board, of Charlottesville v. Allen, 240 F.
2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956).
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Amendment provided no protection to state officials or agencies
attempting to obstruct the enjoyment "of individual rights
under the Constitution.

. .

16

Noting the intransigency of

the school boards, the court found the decrees ordering dese
gregation to be reasonable.

"The decrees do not attempt to

direct the school officials as to how they shall perform their
duties or exercise the discretion vested in them by law, but
simply forbid them to discriminate against the plaintiffs, or
other Negro children similarly situated.

. . . " 17

Finally the

court held individual applications for admission were unneces
sary considering the stated policies of the school boards.
Equity, the court observed, "does not require the doing of a
vain thing as a condition of relief."

18

The court distin

guished the cases at bar from Carson v. Warlick on the grounds
that in the latter case "ah adequate administrative remedy had
19
. . .

been prescribed by statute.

. . ."

While the Virginia Pupil

Placement Plan was not an issue, the court's emphasis on
"adequate" administrative remedies strengthened the case of
the Negro plaintiffs in Norfolk and Newport News.
On January 11, 1957, the newly created Pupil Placement
Board was placed in jeopardy when Judge Iioffman ruled that the

16Id. at 63.
17Id.o at 64.
18

Ib id.

19Ibid.
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Pupil Placement Act was unconstitutional.

20

In determining

the constitutionality of the placement plan, Judge Hoffman
examined the events leading to the special session as well as
the laws passed in conjunction with the assignment plan.

After

discussing the Gray Report, the interposition resolution, and
remarks made by Governor Stanley, the judge concluded that the
Pupil Placement Plan was part of a scheme to defy the Supreme
Court and was therefore "unconstitutional on its face."

21

Even if the intent of the General Assembly was not un
constitutional, Judge Hoffman held that the assignment plan
failed to offer the plaintiffs an adequate administrative
remedy.

The Virginia plan had several serious flaws according

to Judge Hoffman.

First, most children were automatically pre

vented from attending a desegregated school by a requirement
that they remain in the school they were presently attending
until graduation.

The only exceptions to this rule were stu

dents who moved or demonstrated a "good cause" for requesting

2D

Adkins v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 14 8 F .
Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957). On December 25, 1956, Governor
Stanley appointed Hugh V. White, Nansemond County School Super
intendent, Beverly H. Randolph, a Richmond attorney who lived
in Charles City County, and Andrew A. Farley, publisher of the
Danville Register and Danville Bee to the Pupil Placement Board.
Since all three men lived in the black belt and were opposed to
desegregation, their selection seemed to guarantee segregated
schools for Virginia.
^Id.

at 436.
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a transfer.

Judge Hoffman thought a successful demonstration

of a "good cause" was "problematical."

22

Second, the plain

tiffs were subjected to a variety of criteria aimed at pre
venting integration.

The most onerous was the requirement that

the Placement Board consider the effect of a pupil's assignment
on the "efficient operation" of the school.

Since the law

makers during the special session had defined an "efficient"
school as a segregated school, Judge Hoffman observed that "the
Pupil Placement Board would indeed be derelict in its duty if
it ever permitted admission of a Negro child in a school here23
tofore reserved for white children, and vice versa."
Third,
if not automatically eliminated, a student unhappy with his
assignment faced a procedure of administrative appeals which
could consume as much as 105 days before court action.

Judge

Hoffman feared that the school year would be over before the
student received satisfaction which might not even apply to
admission to the next grade.

24

Finally, if a Negro was even

tually assigned to a white school, the effort would be negated
by the activation of the school closing and fund withholding
statutes.

The judge dismissed the argument advanced by the

defendants that local financing provided a "loophole" which
25
preserved the constitutionality of the assignment plan.
As

22Id. at 441.
23Id. at 442.
24Id. at 443.
25Id o at 444.

a result of the "loophole", Judge Hoffman predicted that the
class of schools ultimately affected would be left with a
"mere pittance to what is required to operate the public
schools in any community." 2 6
Judge Hoffman distinguished the Virginia plan from
North and South Carolina statutes upheld by the Fourth Cir
cuit Court of Appeals.

The North Carolina plan contained

neither fund withholding nor school closing provisions.

The

South Carolina plan provided for fund cut off, but it did not
order integrated schools to be closed.

27

Although the objec

tive of the two Carolinas was similar to Virginia's, the Old
Dominion's bold statement of purpose prevented its plan from
falling under the precedent of Carson v. Warlick.

In survey

ing the events up to and including the 19 56 special session,
Judge Hoffman concluded:

"The pattern is plain-the Legis

lature had adopted procedures to defeat the Brown decision.
In doing so it is safe to say that Chapter 70 (the assignment
plan) is invalid on its face."

28

Although Judge Hoffman voided the assignment plan, like
Judges Paul and Bryan, he endorsed the interpretation of the
Brown decision in Briggs v. Elliot.

"Nothing herein shall be

construed as automatically granting to plaintiffs the right
to enter schools of their choice,,"

As long as race was not

a criteria for assignment, Judge Hoffman wrote "there is no
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inherent right of any child to attend any particular school
in which children of another race are in attendance."29
Despite the ruling, Virginia was left with a lot of
maneuverability.

A future placement plan consistent with the

and Carson opinions was not precluded by the Hoffman
decision.

Even the Pupil Placement Board was still in busi

ness since no injunction preventing it from meeting was asked
for by the plaintiffs.

"Unless and until lawfully prevented,"

the three-man board announced that it intended "to carry out
its duties and responsibilities under the Pupil Placement Act
in strict accordance with its terms."30
The Prince Edward County case provided the only excep
tion to the trend of federal court decisions chipping away at
massive resistance.

On January 23, 1957, Judge Sterling

Hutcheson, a native of Southside, Virginia, refused to desig
nate a date for beginning the desegregation of Prince Edward1s
31
public schools .
Quoting liberally from the second Brown de
cision, Judge Hutcheson concluded that "it is clear that the
law must be enforced but the Court is conscious of the variety
of problems of a local nature constituting factors to be con32
sidered m the enforcement."
Although citizens deprived of

29

Id. at 446.

30Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 15, 1957, p. 1.
31
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
149 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. V a . 1957).
32I d . at 435 . ,
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their constitutional rights were entitled to a remedy, Judge
Hutcheson thought that "in view of the grave and perplexing
problems involved, the exercise of that right must be de33
ferred."
Considering the provisions for closing Prince
Edward’s public schools, Hutcheson believed "a continuation of
the present method could not be so harmful as an interrupted
education."

34

A presence of a large Negro school population coupled
with the propaganda of the Defenders made the Prince Edward
suit the most difficult of the early Virginia school cases.
Judge Hutcheson correctly predicted that Prince Edward County
would close its public schools rather than integrate.

However,

by refusing to set a date for instituting even the most gradual
plan of desegregation, Judge Hutcheson’s decision, in effect,
rewarded resistance to the;Brown decision.

Applied to other

school districts, the Hutcheson decision held out the hope that
•by demonstrating potential racial unrest a desegregation order
would be postponed.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch thought

Hutcheson's ruling would be useful in the Newport News case
where the Negro was approximately forty-three percent of the
population and white resistance to desegregation was reported

33

Ibid.

34Id, at 439.
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to be strong.

35

Perhaps, the editor wrote, Judge Hutcheson

had provided the Supreme Court with a "rationale for relaxing its pressure on the ’black belts' of the South."
In early February, Judge Hoffman ordered the school
boards of Newport News and Norfolk to desegregate their publie schools beginning in September, 1957.

37

The basis for

Judge Hoffman's ruling in both cases was the failure of the
school board to take any steps toward complying with the Supreme Court’s decision. 38

Judge Hoffman saw no indication that

"prolonged delay will lead to leadership in the direction of
compliance."

Extensions of time because of local unrest,

Judge Hoffman argued, were used instead to devise methods of
preventing desegregation. 39 Thus, reliance on community unrest
as a defense against a desegregation order, used in the Prince
Edward case, was rejected in the Norfolk case.
Although an extremely unpopular decision, the substance
of Judge Hoffman's opinion was by no means radical.

After re

ferring to the Briggs dictum, the judge emphasized that housing

Editorial,

Richmond Times-Dispatch , January 25, 1957,

p. 12.
3^Ibid.
37Adkins v. School Board of the City of Newport N e w s ,

II Race Rel. L. Rep. 33 4 (E.D. Va. 19 57") Beckett v. The School
Board of Norfolk, II Race Rel. L. Rep. 337 (E.D. Va. 1957).
38Adkins at 335-36; Beckett at 339.

3^Adkins at 336.
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patterns would restrict actual desegregation,,

Natural and

artificial boundaries, Hoffman explained, would preserve se
gregated schoolso

"I do not know of any particular law that

prevents the so-called gerrymandering of the school areas„
In prescribing a gradual plan of desegregation in Newport News,
Judge Hoffman anticipated "ample time to arrange for any necessary reallocation „ « „ of white school children,. "41
Ihe Hoffman decisions were subjected to greater criti
cism than the earlier decisions of Judges Bryan and

Pa ul o

Un-

like the latter judges, Hoffman's rulings followed the passage
of the massive resistance legislation

Since he ignored the

special legislation, except as evidence of bad faith, the judge
was viewed as a traitor„

The Ricbmond Times-Pispatch charged

that when Hoffman "donned the judicial robes of a federal court,
he detached himself from his state, and became an instrument of
federal power,"

If he was torn between federal and state loyal42
ty,- the editor suggested that Hoffman "could have resigned."
Ihe heated response to Hoffman's decision was also re
lated to his method of dealing with the cases.

In both decisions

Judge Hoffman delivered his opinion immediately following the
hearings from notes or extemporaneously,,

Although the procedure

quickened the pace of the litigation, Hoffman opened himself to

40Ibido
44lbid c
&

o

"Editorial, Riclimond Time s-Pi spat ch, February 13, 19 57,

P o 14-a
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the charge of having prejudged the cases .43

Just as irritat

ing to massive resisters was Hoffman's habit of interrupting
his legal opinions with occasional criticisms of Virginia's
political leaders.

Scoffing at the claim that more time was

needed to develop a better solution, Hoffman observed:

"I

have heard no proclamation from our distinguished leaders
announcing plans to reverse themselves." 44 Although Hoffman's
observations were accurate, their result was to invite public
censure and to challenge the credibility of his rulings.
The criticism leveled at Judge Hoffman was also related
to the campaign for governor.

The organization intended to

make massive resistance the central issue of the campaign.
However, if the heart of the resistance legislation was voided
by November, 1957, the Democratic claim that the Brown deci
sion was reversible would lack credibility.

Also the federal

court decisions strengthened the case for a local assignment
plan which the expected Republican candidate, Ted Dalton, was
known to favor.

The organization suspected Judge Hoffman, who

had been the Republican candidate for Attorney General in 1953,
of helping his old running mate along.
personally lashed out at the judge.
Byrd confessed:

Thus, Senator Byrd

Speaking at Hampton Roads

"Had I known he would resort to prejudiced

and political statements I would have fought his confirmation

43 Ibid.

February 12, 1957, p. 1; February 13, 1957, p. 1.

44Richmond News Leader, February 12, 19 57, p. 1.
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as long as I could stand on my feet."

Hoffman's conduct,

Byrd thought, "could not fail to cause bitter resentment and
45
inflame public opinion."
The Virginia senator left the im
pression that Judge Hoffman's decisions would be overturned by
a court less politically motivated.

Also, Senator Byrd appeared

to be repaying Judge Hoffman for his criticism of the organi
zation .
In addition to attacking Judge Hoffman, massive resisters
took advantage of other opportunities to suppress, ridicule or
ignore critics of the school closing policy.

A brief contro

versy was precipitated by an unsigned "Statement of Conviction
on Race" issued by the Richmond Ministers Association in late
January.

The statement accused Governor Stanley and a majority

of the legislators of taking "long strides toward a vindictive
dictatorial way of government, foreign to our tradition and
guaranteeing years of tension if not tragedy among the citizens
4fi
o-f Virginia."
Especially odious to the ministers was the
law requiring the registration of individuals or groups engaged
in promoting or obstructing desegregation.

The ministers

viewed the law as an attempt "to restrict the open, free criti
cism of its the [General Assembly's] coerced rule by forbidding
unhampered freedom to discuss the matter or to enter litigation

A

^
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, May 10, 1957, p. 1.

^ E d i t o r i a l , Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 1, 1957,
p. 1.
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over it.

Adding insult to injury, it has, furthermore, exempted
47
politicians and political groups from these restrictions."
In response to the ministers' charge, Delegate James JVL
Thomson, the zealous chairman of the Committee on Law Reform
and Racial Activities, announced that he planned to study the
statement in order to determine whether it violated recent
legislation regarding racial activities,,

The ministers were

warned that they "may criticize all they want . . . but if they
are urging legislation to foster integration or segregation
48
they would be getting themselves into t r o u b l e A l t h o u g h
the Richmond News Leader joined the ministers in their criti
cism of the registration law, the editor ridiculed the histori
cal and legal justification for the statement.

Editor Kilpatrick

was especially amused by the ministers 1 reluctance to identify
49
themselves unlike the legislators whom they attacked.

The

incident demonstrated that the effectiveness of the ministers
as a pressure group was easily checked since they could not
advance too far ahead of their congregations.

4"7Richmond Mews Leader, January 29, 1957, p. 1. Section
nine of the statute said;
"This act shall also not apply to any
person, firm, partnership, corporation, association, organization
or candidate in any political election campaign. . . . "
Acts of
the General Assembly, Chapter 32, Extra Sess., 19 56, p. 33.
48 Ibid.e The Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activities
was one of the two committees created by the special session to
harass the NAACP. James M. Thomson is the brother of Mrs. Harry
Byrd, Jr.
^Editorial, Ibid., p. 10,
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Almost overlooked in the attempt to portray a unanimous
support of massive resistance was a report submitted by the
Richmond First Club offering a five point program for achiev50
m g desegregation.
The plan which included such criteria as
geography and student achievement would have allowed only token
desegregation.

A non-partisan organization of business and

professional men,, it had submitted a report, similarly ignored
during the debate over interposition, which concluded that de~
segregation could work in the Richmond public schools.51

Though

unsuccessful in presenting its case, the Richmond First Club
demonstrated that some influential citizens preferred limited
desegregation to the school closing legislation.
Another casulty of massive resistance was State Senator
Blake T „ Newton who was not reappointed to the State Board of
Education when his term expired.

As a legislator and as a

board member, Newton had opposed the Stanley Plan.

Though

'Stanley explained his decision as an effort to give all regions
better representation on the Board, the Governor’s objective
was widely viewed as an attempt to secure a majority vote in
favor of his position.

52

.
•
The goal was achieved with the

appointment of the arch-segregationist State Senator Garland
53
Gray to the State Board of Education.

^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 1 , 19 57 , p. 1.
^Ibid., February 24 , 1956, p. 1.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 29, 1957, p. 1.
53Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 15, 19 57, p. 1.
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As the federal courts chipped away at the school-clos
ing legislation and massive resisters attempted to thwart
unorthodox views of the school crisis, Virginia settled down
to a long political campaign.

Without serious opposition in

the primary, the Democratic organization concentrated its
efforts on demolishing the Republicans,
the campaign was massive resistance.

The major issue of

The organization argued

that only by completely disregarding the Supreme Court could
Virginia preserve segregation.

In mid-March Senator Harry

Byrd set the tone for the campaign.
saids

Speaking in Richmond, he

"We have a right to defy the Supreme Court, if we do so

without violence and do not try to overthrow the government."
Arguing that the Brown decision overturned a precedent upheld
in the Gong Lum case, Byrd concluded^
right to choose between these two,"

l!I say we still have a
The Senator explained that

massive resisters were incorrectly identified as school
closers.

Instead Byrd described resisters as school savers

since he believed that it was impossible to "have integration
in Virginia and preserve the public schools."

By ignoring the

Supreme Court, Senator Byrd held out the hope that the Brown
decision would be reversed„
Ted Dalton, who would be the Republican standard bearer,
explained the GOP5s position on desegregation.

He charged

that Senator Byrd raised false hopes by holding out the possi
bility that the Supreme Court would reverse the Brown decision.

54Ibid., March 15, 19 57, p. 1.
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Attacking massive resistance, Dalton favored a pupil assign
ment plan similar to the one adopted by North Carolina«,
"Keep the schools white as possible under law and order but,
55
by all means, keep the public schools„"
The soundness of
Dalton's position was reinforced on March 25 when the United
States Supreme Court declined to review Virginia's appeal of
the Fourth Circuit's decisions in the Charlottesville-Arlington caseso 56

As a result, school desegregation m

the two

localities by September of 1957 appeared likely,,
Although consistent with federal court decisions, Dalton's
stance had obvious political liabilities„

Following the Repub

lican's remarks, Governor Stanley invited Dalton to enter the
campaign as an "integregationist" which Stanley defined as
any person "willing to accept any integration. «, . „"

57

The

plan to exploit the race issue was repeated at the JeffersonJackson Day Dinner held in Richmond on March 29, 1957.

James

Latimer reported that privately the organization hoped that
Ted Dalton would run for Governor.

The Democrats, according to

Latimer, aimed "quite simply and frankly, to paste the label
'integrationist' all over Dalton if he runs— -and they're sure
they can make it stick through the campaign propaganda battle."

55

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 25, 19 56, p 9 1.

~^Ibid,, March 26, 1957, p„ 1„
^IbicL , March 27, 195 7, p, 1.
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The Democrats hoped "to clobber him so badly as to demolish
him and the GOP as a force in state level politics for years
,,58
to come.
Perhaps no man was more aware of the legal fragility
or political potential of massive resistance than the Demo™
cratic candidate for governor, J, Lindsay Almond.

As attor

ney general, he had been cautious in his legal opinions so
that as late as July of 1957 Almond's resister credentials
were still being questioned. 59 But in the course of the
election campaign, using all of his oratorical skills, Almond
became the champion of massive resistance.

Attacking the

local assignment plan proposed by Dalton, Almond claimed it
would "not and cannot preserve the public school system from
the destructive effects of integration."

60

The admission of

several Negro children to North Carolina schools under a local
placement plan proved, Almond charged, that Dalton "embraces
and accepts the principle of race mixing in the public
schools."

5R

As a result, the Democratic candidate warned, the

Richmond Times-Dispateh, March 2.9, 1957, p. 1.

^Editorial, Richmond Times-"Dispatch, July 5, 1957 , p. 14.
cn

N 03:folk Virginian-Pilot , July 7 , 1957 , p. 1.

^Ibid„, July 25, 1957, p. 1.
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"NAACP and 'fellow travelers5" would be aided in reaching their
?
goal of a "totally amalgamated society,"
f)

The highlight of Almond's campaign was his promise to
provide a plan that would save Virginia from a desegreation
order.

The Dalton plan, he explained,, not only legalized inte

gration, but, through litigation, turned over "to the NAACP
the placement of Negro children in white schools.
government by NAACP in Virginia.

This is

This I cannot embrace.

This

I will resist with every honorable means at my command."
Almond's solution was "a position of flexibility so as to meet
to the best advantage any condition which may arise and adopt
[Virginia's] power and government machinery to the most effec
tive means in resisting integration."
not ■’compromise with principle."

63

Above all Virginia must

When challenged by Dalton

to reveal his plan, Almond weakly replied that he did not want
to expose it to the NAACP.

64

In his campaign, Ted Dalton attacked the secrecy and
machine-like quality of the Byrd organization.

Virginia's de

fense of states' rights, he asserted, was accompanied by an
65
attack upon local rights. ‘ The Republican candidate explained
that Almond had no alternative plan for maintaining segregated

Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 11, 19 57, p. 1.
^ Ibid., August 27, 1957, p. 1.
^ Ibid., August 24, 1957, p. 3,
65Ibid., September 14, 1957, p. 2.

181
public schools.

The example of North Carolina showed, accord

ing to Dalton, that a state could strengthen its legal posi
tion "by token compliance with the Supreme Court decision.
Virginia, he explained, would either have no public schools
or public schools accompanied by some desegregation.

The

choice was not between integration and segregation as the
67
Democratic party led the voters to believe.
Finally, Dalton
ridiculed the argument that the Supreme Court would reverse
itself.

"Think about it--don't be swayed by somebody who can

holler the most for white supremacy.
Legally, Ted Dalton’s position was stronger than Lindsay
Almond3s.

With the various federal district court rulings,

the ability of the state to maintain segregated schools through
out the state in the fall of 1957, without school closings,
appeared questionable.

The only legal tactic left to Vir

ginia's attorneys was to slow the judicial process by a series
of -time-consuming appeals.

The Democratic organization recog

nized, that considering its campaign promises, a court order to
desegregate public schools might have a dramatic effect on the
election returns„

^Ibid *, July 25 , 1957, p. 1.
67Ibid., July 30, 1957, p. 4.
(TO

Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 17, 1957, p. 1.
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The dim future of the school closing laws was made more
apparent on July 13, 1957, when the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed Judge Hoffman's desegregation order and his
interpretation of the placement laws. 59

Attorneys for the

Norfolk and Newport News school boards immediately announced
their intention to appeal the decision before the Supreme Court.
Simultaneously, the school boards' lawyers asked the Fourth
Circuit Court to stay its desegregation order pending action by
the Supreme Court.

Since circuit courts normally refused stays

when a review was being sought from the Supreme Court, massive
70
resistance was m serious trouble.
The Norfolk VirginianPilot predicted that "the distance to the last ditch of resis
tance in the federal

courts may be shorter than the Stanley

Plan authors thought

it would be.

The distance . . . might be
71
measured in months rather than years."
Virginia won a re
prieve in the Norfoik-Newport News cases when the Fourth Cir
cuit Court decided to grant the requested stay.

Since the

Supreme Court was adjourned until October and Judge Hoffman
said he would not order desegregation during a school year,
segregated schools were preserved for another year in the
Norfolk-Newport News area.

72

59

School Board of theCity of Newport News v. Atkins;
School Board"o~f~1Ehe"'''cTty~of Norfolk v. Beckett,2 Race Rel. L.
Rep o "8~08 f4th Ciri
..
1 9

5 1 )

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 14, 1957, p. 1.
^Editorial, I b i d p. 4.
72Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 19, 1957, p. 1.
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Desegregation orders were still in effect in Charlottes
ville and Arlington.

Pending the Supreme Court ruling on the

Norfolk-Newport News cases, Attorney General Almond asked
Judges

Paul and Bryan to stay their decrees.

The state argued

that the judges should wait until the United States Supreme
Court ruled on the pupil placement law which had not been an
73
issue m the Charlottesville-Arlington cases.
For contra
dictory reasons Almond's legal strategy was successful.
In the Charlottesville case, Judge Paul, as a matter of
courtesy, suspended his decree pending action by the United
States Supreme Court.

However he also enjoined the enforcement

of the pupil placement law in Charlottesville until the Su
preme Court acted.

Thus, Charlottesville's Negro pupils were

not required to apply with the pupil placement board as a prerequisite for attending a white school.

74

The following day, July 27, Judge Bryan ruled that the
stay issued by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was not a
sufficient reason for postponing his ruling.

However, Judge

Bryan rejected the plea of the NAACP that the original deseg
regation order be amended so as to specify that Arlington stu
dents could bypass the pupil placement law.

Since the law had

not been an issue in the Arlington case, Judge Bryan believed

73t.
.,
Ibid
.
"^Allen v. School Board of Charlottesville, 2 Race R el.
L. Rep. 98 6 (W.D.V a i '195TTb
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that the NAACP request was premature.

75

Consequently, the

Negro plaintiffs would have to apply with the Pupil Placement
Board for a transfer in order to test the lav/'s constitution
ality.

Bryan concluded:

"In this way, specificity and pre

cision will be given to each complaint, it will be individual
ized and it will be appraised in its own peculiar environment,
of course in the light, too, of the regulations and precedents
76
than at hand."

The latter observation seemed to preclude the

use of class action suits by the NAACP.

As Attorney General

Almond later commented, the ruling appeared "to foreclose any
NAACP concept of mass integration."

77

The effect of the Bryan-Paul decisions were identical-the postponement of desegregation orders.

However, quick ac

tion on the part of Arlington's Negro plaintiffs provided Judge
Bryan with another opportunity to integrate Arlington's white
schools.

Following Bryan's ruling, a number of Negro students

applied for transfers with the Pupil Placement Board.

Their

applications were rejected "for reasons which the board deems
to be good and sufficient."

78

Returning to the district court

on September 14, Judge Bryan ordered the Arlington School Board

75Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 2 Race
Rel. L. Rep.‘810, 811 (E.D. Va. 1957).
^Id. at 811.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 30, 1957, p. 1.
^Ibid., August 30, 19 57, p. 1.
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to admit seven Negroes to previously all white schools. 79

In

Judge Bryan's opinion the administrative remedies of the Pupil
Placement Act were "too sluggish and prolix to constitute a
reasonable remedial process."

The only explanation for the

Pupil Placement Board's action, thought Judge Bryan, was a
"simple adherence to the prior practice of segregation."

He

added that for a Negro to submit "to that act amounts almost
to assent to a racially segregated school."

In conclusion, Judge

Bryan reminded the defendants that seven Negroes in a white
school population of 21,245 could hardly have a significant
80
impact on public education in Arlington.
Since Bryan had set September 23 as the date of admission,
his ruling posed a sticky problem for the organization.

Vir

ginia's attorneys immediately made plans to seek a suspension
of the order pending another appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 81

Fortunately for the Democrats, Bryan granted a

stay of his order on the grounds that tremendous injury would
result if his order was reversed.

82

Considering that the Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals had already turned down an appeal from
Norfolk and Newport News on the same issue, Bryan's ruling was

Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 2 Race Rel.
L. Rep. 987 (E.D. Va. 1957).
80 Id. at 788-91.
O1

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 15, 1957, p. 1.

o9

Ibid., September 19, p. 1.
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extremely generous.

Thus, once again, the Democratic organi

zation was spared the embarrassment of closed schools prior
to the November 5 election.
The flow of adverse federal district and appellate court
rulings had worried the organization hierarchy.

Congressman

Howard Smith warned that Almond must be prepared for an adverse
ruling from the Supreme Court on the Norfolk appeal.

He

cautioned:

"It will catch us in the middle of a gubernatorial
83
campaign in which segregation is the chief issue."
Congress

man Burr P. Harrison, who represented the Shenandoah Valley,
was even more alarmed.

He wrote Smith:

"By the appointment of

a Commission, the support of its plan, and the enactment of
laws constituting a different scheme, we have placed ourselves
in a position before the people of saying that we have the
answer and we are suffering•today when the people examine our
'answer' and conclude that we have been inconsistent and that
our present laws constitute no answer."

Harrison reminded Smith

that in the Shenandoah Valley, with its slight Negro population,
84
voters did not like the fund cut off plan.0
On October 7, Attorney General Kenneth C. Patty appeared
before the Supreme Court with the request that the Court defer

83Letter, Howard W. Smith to Honorable Burr P. Harrison,
September 30, 1957, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith
Letter File.
84Letter, Burr P. Harrison to Howard W. Smith, October 9,
19 57, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter File.
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action on the Norfolk caseD

The reason given for requesting

the delay was "to avoid confusion, prevent conflict, and pro
mote comity between federal and state courts, conformable with
85
established doctrine of the Courto"
Circumstantial evidence
indicated that the Democrats did not want a United States Su
preme Court ruling until after November 5„

The Democrats were

not to have their way as the Supreme Court dealt another blow
to massive resistance on October 21, 1957, by refusing to review
the Fourth Circuit Court's decision upholding Judge Hoffman,,88
Ted Dalton immediately called for a special session but Governor
Stanley and Lindsay Almond pretended that the Court's action had
no significanceo

87

Stanley rather dryly commented:

"There is

no cause for .school patrons, faculties or pupils to be apprehensive0"88

Almond, in his typical fashion, told an audience

R5
.
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 8, 19 57, p„ 1. The
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was about to rule on a case
dealing with the placement plan, Defebio v„ School Board of
Fairfax County, 100 SoEn 2d 760 (Va0 Sup0 Ct „ of App„ 1957)„
'Fhe Defebio case was not exactly analogous to the Norfolk case
since the plaintiffs were white„ As it turned out the appeal of
the white plaintiffs was rejected by the Virginia Supreme Court
because the plaintiffs failed to show a violation of equal pro
tection of the laws, Kenneth Patty replaced Lindsay Almond as
Attorney General during the political campaign.
88Ibid0, October 22, 1957, p, 10
87Ibid0
88Ibido, October 23, 1957, p D 1°
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in Princess Anne County;

"I have faith that the decision

ultimately will be reversed since the record of the Supreme
Court is one of reversing itself because it doesn't know what
89
it's doing or what it's talking about."
Dalton replied
that "after losing round after round in federal courts . „ .
[Almond] should be more aware than anyone else that the Supreme
90
Court will not reverse itself."
For Ted Dalton the trend of federal court decisions was
not enough to overcome the integrationist tag which Almond and
the organization had pinned on him.

The organization deceptively

but successfully portrayed the election as offering Virginians
a choice between white schools or integrated schools.

Senator

Byrd told a Leesburg audience that the Virginia contest would
have far reaching effects "because this is the first Southern
state wherein the issue has been clearly defined in a state election as being between integration and segregation." 91

In addi

tion to fighting the integrationist label, national events were
also unkind to Ted Dalton.

In the midst of the campaign a

school crisis developed in Little Rock, Arkansas.

When Governor

Orville Faubus summoned the Arkansas National Guard, preventing
desegregation, Almond approved.

"It's very apparent that he

[Faubus] faces a crucial situation of non-acceptance by the
people."

As governor, Almond promised to "exercise every resource

^9Ibidc, October 25 , 1957, p. 1.
" ibid. , October 26, 1957, p. 1.
91Ibid., October 8, 19 57, p. 1.
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to preserve law and order everywhere in Virginia."

Reluctant

to criticize a Republican president and fearful of alienating
voters, Dalton evasively observed that limited information prevented him from commenting on the situation. 92

Virginia's

political observers recognized the resolution of the Little Rock
situation would determine the limits of Virginia's resistance.
The editor of the Richmond Times-Dispatch hoped that Faubus
would "somehow manage to vindicate the right of sovereign
states to control its own affairs, including its public
93
schools."
When President Eisenhower sent federal troops into Little
Rock, the Democrats siezed the issue in a final effort to
embarrass Dalton.

Almond declared that Little Rock was only a

"token of what will transpire in Virginia and throughout the
South if these states are compelled to mix races in their public
schools.

I say Little Rock is a living example of Mr. Dalton's

concept of limited integration."

The Democratic candidate ac

cused President Eisenhower of abdicating leadership "for motives
of political expediency to the demands of a power crazed minority
pressure group."

Then Almond challenged Dalton to "tell the

people whether he endorses and approves of the President's hasty
94
action and the derogation of the rights of a sovereign state."

^Ibid. , September 4, 1957 , p. 1.
^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 7, 1957,
p. 12.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 25, 1957, p. 1;
September 26, 1957, p. 1.
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Faced with a political dilemma of choosing between party
loyalty and the realities of Virginia politics, Dalton asked
President Eisenhower to withdraw the troops.

The Republican

candidate, however, did not challenge the legality of the
President’s action.

Instead, Dalton chose to argue that the

President had broken with the 1956 party platform, 9 5

Albertis

S. Harrison, the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor,
said Dalton responded too late.

Arguing that the troops were

unnecessary, Harrison held that "through sheer force the
President of the United States stripped the states of their
, „9 6
sovereignty„
Along with the Little Rock crisis, the newly enacted
Civil Rights Bill was also unpopular in Virginia,

Senator Byrd

identified Dalton as part of an anti-Southern phalanx which
included President Eisenhower, Attorney General Herbert
97
Brownell, and the NAACP.

The Republican candidate suffered

from the sharp dip in the President’s popularity as a result
of Little Rock and the Civil Rights Bill.
When the votes were tabulated, to no one's surprise,
Almond had soundly defeated Dalton by a vote of 326,921 to
188,628,

By receiving thirty-seven percent of the vote, the

Republican party lost eight percentage points off its total

9^Ibid., September 29, 1957, p. 1,
^ Ibldo , October 2 , 19 57 , p. 1.
^7Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 12, 1957, p. 1.
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m

1953.

98

Considering the manipulation of racial themes and

unpopular national events, the Republican candidate nonethe
less made a respectable showing.

Dalton thought that Little

Rock had destroyed him.
"It wasn't a little rock, it was a
99
big rock."
The Arkansas confrontation obviously had hurt
the Republican candidate, but well before Little Rock he was
beaten by the exploitation of the race issue in Virginia.

Only

a court order prior to the election desegregating several pub
lic schools could have upset the organization's strategy.
Desegregation would have led to school closings, dissatisfac
tion outside the black belt, and the revelation that Virginia
had to pursue a course similar to the one proposed by Dalton.

98
Latimer, p. 86.
99 Richmond Times-Dispa:tch, November 7 , 1957 , p. 1.

CHAPTER VII
THE COLLAPSE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE
Before the new governor took office, several important
developments occurred on the school front.

After approxi

mately a year, the two committees investigating the NAACP
made their reports.

The Committee on Offenses Against the

Administration of Justice, chaired by Delegate John Boat
wright, concluded its findings by charging ten NAACP lawyers,
including Oliver Hill and Spotswood Robinson III, with ille
gally promoting and soliciting litigation."*"

The committee

charged that Negro plaintiffs often were unaware that deseg
regation was the goal of the school suits; that sometimes
individuals did not know they were party to a suit; that the
NAACP paid lawyers' fees and court costs regardless of the
plaintiffs' ability to pay; and that the NAACP generally so2

licited business.

The NAACP used several arguments in combatting the
charges.

First, it held that the Virginia statutes were un-

"*"Report of the Committee on Offenses Against the Ad
ministration of Justice (Commonwealth of Virginia: Division
of Purchase and Printing, 1957), p. 20.
2

Ibid., pp. 16-19; Report of the Committee on Law Re
form and Racial Activities (Commonwealth of Virginia: Divi
sion of Purchase and Printing, 1959), pp. 8-11.
192
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constitutional.

Second, even if the laws were valid, the

NAACP argued that it was not involved in illegal activity.
Finally, the Negro organization refused to disclose the names
and addresses of its membership on the grounds that members
would be subject to local harassment.

3

Appearing before the investigative committees and
fighting the attempts to obtain the membership lists absorbed
the time and resources of the NAACP lawyers.

Such diversions

prompted speculation that the Negro attorneys "may well find
themselves too limited in time and resources to take the offensive with any new desegregation suits."

4

Delegate James

M. Thomson, Chairman of the Committee on Law Reform and
Racial Activities, reportedly remarked that his committee had
acquired enough information to keep the NAACP from litigating
5
which, "after all [is] the heart of the organization.”
Con
sidering the purpose of the legislation, the findings were no
surprise.

Consequently, the Virginia Conference of the

NAACP, as massive resisters hoped, was forced to defend its
very existence while directing the school litigation.
Following Almond’s election, the Fourth Circuit Court

3

National Association For Advancement of Colored People v. Patty, 159 F . Supp. 503, 507 (E .D . V a . 1958) . In his opinion, Judge Soper has a concise discussion of the organization
of the NAACP and of the effects of Virginia’s attempt to restrict
or destroy its influence.
^Richmond News Leader, February 27, 1957, p. 1.
^Ibid., March 14, 1957, p. 3.

of Appeals reversed Judge Hutcheson's decision that unfavor
able conditions justified delaying desegregation in Prince
Edward County.

The court held that a person "may not be de

nied enforcement of rights to which he is entitled under the
Constitution of the United States because of action taken or
threatened in defiance of such rights.11^

Endeavoring to

soften the effects of the ruling, the court reminded the dis
trict court judge that segregation did not have to be abol
ished "at once with respect to all grades in the schools, if
a reasonable start were made to that end with deliberate
speed considering the problems of proper administration. 117
Applied to other areas of Virginia, the Fourth Circuit
Court's ruling meant that the threat of racial unrest pro
vided no defense against a desegregation order.

Yet the

court continued to emphasize that the most limited compliance
would satisfy the Supreme Court.
On January 11, 1958, Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.,
delivered his inaugural address.

A month earlier, Senator

Byrd had urged Almond to make "a great address such as you
are capable of delivering on the encroachment of the Federal
Government upon the States with special reference to the seg

^Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County, II
Race Rel. L. Rep. 1119 (4th Cir. 1957).
7Id. at 1120.
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regation decision, . . . "

8

The address was no disappointment

to Byrd, as Almond devoted ninety percent of his speech to
the themes of the federal invasion of state powers and his
mandate to resist such encroachments,

Almond pointed to the

"tyranny of majority" as the fundamental threat to democracy.
Paradoxically, he said, the greatest menace to Virginia came
from "minority spokesmen" who were "armed out of political
expediency with inordinate power to force their will upon the
9
majority."
On the school issue, the new governor held that
sound education and desegregation were incompatible in Vir
ginia.

He predicted that "integration anywhere means des

truction everywhere.

And to paraphrase a great statesman, I

say to you simply that I have not been elected Governor to
preside over the liquidation of Virginia’s schools."^
Almond made only two recommendations to the General Assembly.
One, a direct product of the Little Rock crisis, was a re
quest for the power to close any school policed by federal
authorities.

Second, Governor Almond wanted the legislature

to establish a commission devoted to the study of constitug
Letter, Harry F. Byrd to J. Lindsay Almond, Decem
ber 10, 1957, University of Virginia, Archives, Kilpatrick
Papers.
9
"Inaugural Address of J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.," Janu
ary 11, 1958, in Inaugural Address and Addresses delivered to
the General Assembly by J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. 1958-1962
(Commonwealth of Virginia: Division of Purchase and Printing)
p p . 4, 8.
10

Ibid., p. 7.
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tional government. ^
The next day the General Assembly went to work, on a
number of measures designed to repair the weaknesses in the
massive resistance armor.

The supplementary legislation won

virtually unanimous approval in both houses, despite further
indications: from the federal courts- that the defiance was
doomed.
To improve Virginia's case before the federal courts,
the legislators amended the Pupil Placement Act.

The word

"efficient" which, had given the placement law difficulty in
the district courts, was eliminated.

Also, the long list of

criteria for judging assignments was replaced by the less
elaborate phrase found m

the North Carolina placement plan.

12

The intention of the amendments was to improve the appearance
of the assignment plan so that the Negro plaintiffs would
have to retest its constitutionality.

13

In explaining the

purpose of the legislation, Almond stressed:

"We are not

coming around to the North. Carolina viewpoint as far as the
policy of this state Is concerned."

14

However, as long as

the placement plan was related to school closing and fund
cut-off legislation, the courts would regard such attempts to

11Ibid., pp. 6-8.
12

Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 500, Reg.
Sess., 1958, p. 638.
13
. .
Norfolk Virginia—Pilot, February 14, 1958, p. 1
14Ibid.
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purify the assignment law as superficial.
At Governor Almond's request, the General Assembly
eliminated the "loophole" in the school closing legislation
which permitted a locality to operate desegregated schools
without state funds.

The new legislation provided that the

Governor was not required to return a closed school to local
authorities upon the requests of the Board of Supervisors and
the Board of Education. 15

Thus the possibility of desegrega

tion in a community unwilling to tolerate closed schools was
virtually prohibited.
The General Assembly also passed the legislation re
quested by the Governor in his inaugural address.

The so-

called "Little Rock bill" provided for the closure of any
school policed by federal authorities.^

A second bill,

nicknamed "Little Rock Junior," authorized the Governor to
close all of the remaining schools m

the school district. 17

The legislature also passed a bill creating the Virginia Com
mission on Constitutional Government and appropriated funds
to subsidize its work.

18

The Virginia Commission on Consti

tutional Government would devote the next ten years to ex
pounding the doctrines of states1 rights and strict construc

15Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 631, Reg.
Sess., 1958, p. 939.
~^Ibid., Chapter 41, p. 26.
~^Ibid., Chapter 319, p. 367.
1O
Ibid., Chapter 233, p. 275.
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tion through publications, seminars on constitutional govern
ment, and meetings with like-minded groups throughout the
nation.

In 1968, the organization's efforts came to an end

when the General Assembly- refused to appropriate the funds
needed to maintain its operation. 19
Complementing the legislation which dealt with school
districts and the assignment plan were another series of
bills designed to hobble the NAACP.

The General Assembly

consolidated into one body' the two legislative committees
created to harass the NAACP— 'the Committee on Offenses
Against the Administration of Justice.

When Delegate Kathryn

H. Stone of Arlington submitted an amendment providing for
opening committee hearings to the public, she was rudely re
buked.

The sponsors of the legislation consolidating the

committee, Delegates Boatwright and Thomson, were categori
cally opposed to any amendment from Delegate Stone since they
considered her unfriendly to the legislation.

Delegate Frank

P. Moncure viewed the amendment as automatically ill-

conceived, since uthe lady- from Arlington is an integrationist and has admitted it on the floor of the House."

20

Three other measures were passed by the legislators to
hamper the. effectiveness of the NAACP.

19

First, a joint reso-

I.n 196 8 the General Assembly repealed the statute
creating the Commission on Constitutional Government. See
Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 536, Reg. Sess., 196 8,
p. 759.
?n
Richmond News Leader, February 21, 195 8, p. 1.
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lution was passed which requested the Virginia State Bar to
take action against cases of unethical and illegal practice
of the law.

The bar was directed to use the findings of the

Boatwright and Thomson committees.

Second, tax deductions

for contributions to organizations involved in litigation in
which they were not a party were made illegal. The law's ob
jective was to undercut the financial resources of the NAACP.
Finally, the General Assembly approved a bill which required
non-stock corporations to disclose their membership rolls if
they were accused of illegal practice of the law. 21
The continued tenacity of the massive resisters in
their efforts to obtain the NAACP membership lists came at a
moment when the future of such a tactic seemed to have no
prospect of holding up in the federal courts.

On January 21,

1958, prior to the introduction of the bill, a three-judge
federal district court found that the 1956 legislation re
quiring the NAACP to disclose its membership was prohibited

by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 22

21

Judge

Acts of the General Assembly, HJR, No. 50, Reg.
Sess., 1958, p. 1102; Chapter 34, p. 22; Chapter 506, p. 644
22
National Association for Advancement of Colored Peo
ple v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, (E-.D. Va. 1958). The regis
tration statutes were Chapters 31 and 32 of the acts passed
by the 1956 special session. The court focused its attention
on Chapter 32 which required the registration of persons or
organizations engaged in (1) promoting or opposing racial
legislation, (2) advocating racial integration or segrega
tion, (3) raising or expending funds to promote litigation or
(4) whose activities led to racial conflict. The NAACP and
the Virginia Conference agreed that they were involved in the
first three activities. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educa^tion Fund admitted that it engaged in activities two and three
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Morris Soper, who wrote the majority opinion, held that the
legislation was part of Virginia's plan of massive resistance
to the Brown decision.

He found that the Negro organization,

as a result of the laws, had suffered a decline in revenue
while individual members were the victims of assorted harass23
ments.

The result, Judge Soper concluded, was unquestion

able a restriction of the rights of free speech and due pro24
cess.
The major issue, to Judge Soper, was whether or not
Virginia had exceeded its police powers in passing the regis
tration legislation.

His conclusion was that the restric

tions placed on free speech were unjustified since the Negro
organizations endeavored "to abide by and enforce the law and
have not themselves engaged in acts of violence or disturbance of the public peace."

25

The discriminatory character

of the legislation, Judge Soper wrote, was "emphasized by the
exemption of persons engaged in a political election campaign
who are free to speak without registration whereas persons
having no direct interest in elections as such and concerned
only with securing equal rights for all persons are covered
by the Statute," 26

Although organizations advocating segre

gation, like the Defenders, also had to register, Judge Soper

23Id. at 515-16.
24Id. at 524, 528.
25Id. at 526.
26Id. at 525.

201
wrote that equality of treatment was not a result.

"Regis

tration of persons engaged in a popular cause imposes no
hardship while, as the evidence of this case shows, registra
tions of names and persons who resist the popular will would
lead not only to expressions of ill will and hostility but to
loss of members by the plaintiff's Association." 27
Judge Soper was especially critical of Virginia's at
tempt to identify the names of NAACP financial contributors
or fund raisers.

He believed that the attempt to damage the

financial ability of the NAACP to support litigation was pos
sibly the most important part of Virginia's plan to prevent
desegregation.

On this point Soper observed:

"The right of

access to the courts is one of the great safeguards of the
liberties of the people and its denial or undue restriction
is a violation of the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments."

The requirement that every contribu

tor register, Soper concluded, was oppressive and "part of a
deliberate plan to impede the contributors in the assertion
of their constitutional rights."

28

The court also voided the statutes defining the crime
of barratry.

In an expanded definition of barratry, the law

made it illegal for a person or persons without a direct in
terest in a case to contribute to the expense of the litiga
tion.

Legal aid societies were excluded as agencies which

27Id. at 527-28.
28Id. at 528.
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dealt with, the general public on a variety of legal matters.

29

To Judge Soper, the major issue raised by this statute was
whether Virginia could make it a crime for an organization to
contribute money to defend the cause of civil rights.3^

Al

though Judge Soper readily acknowledged Virginia's rights to
maintain high standards of legal practice, he held that the
barratry statute violated the. equal protection and due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The equal protection

clause was violated because the statute "forbids the plain
tiffs to defray the expenses of racial litigation while at the
same time it legalizes the activities of legal aid societies
that serve all needy persons in all sorts of litigation."

31

By attempting "to put the plaintiff corporations out of busi
ness by forbidding them to encourage and assist colored per
sons to assert rights, established by the decisions of the
Supreme Court," Judge Soper found the statute in violation of
the due process clause. 32

Judge Soper concluded that the

Negro organizations were not engaged in soliciting or stirring
up litigation, but instead were devoted to instructing and
33
assisting Negroes in the realization of their rights.

29
Acts of General Assembly, Chapter 35, Extra Sess.,
1956, p. J6~.
'
3QNAACP v. Patty at 531.
31Id. at 533.
32

Ibid.

33
Ibid.
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Judge Soper refused to interpret the constitutionality
of two other statutes which dealt with malpractice on the
grounds that the laws were too vague.

Judge Walter Hoffman

concurred with Judge Soper to give the NAACP its victory.34
Judge Sterling Hutcheson wrote a lengthy dissent which
was devoted to an essay on the doctrine of abstention.

At

stake in this case, Judge Hutcheson wrote, was "the tradition
ally delicate balance between the courts of the states and the
federal courts."

35

The federal courts, he argued, were not to

construe a state statute involving a federal right until the
state court had acted.

The basis for this rule was the "fun

damental concept of separate sovereigns embodied in the Cons
titution of the United States."33
Despite the district court's ruling, the legislators
passed a new registration bill into law.

37

Delegate Harrison

Mann, who had sponsored the 1956 bill, defended the new bill
on the grounds that the district court's decision was subject
to a reversal by a higher court.

38

Considering the political

liabilities of identification with the NAACP, legislators did
oppose a measure designed to vex the Negro organization.

34

Id. at 533-34.

35Id. at 535.
33Ibid♦, at 540.
37Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 419, Reg.
Sess., 1958, p. 549.
38Richmond News Leader, February 25, 1958, p. 1.

The
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sponsors of the legislation also believed that it had a good
chance of being upheld by the state courts.
This, opinion was bolstered by a decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia on the day before the federal
district court's decision, holding that the power of investi
gative committees to subpoena the membership lists of the
NAACP was a "reasonable exercise of the state's police
39
power."
The "obvious purpose" of the legislation, the court
held, was to direct "the committee to investigate and report
on the manner in which such malpractice laws are administered
and enforced. . ."

40

Thus the Virginia Supreme Court rejected

the incontrovertible evidence that the real purpose of the
legislation was to handcuff the NAACP.

In construing statutes

the court retreated to the position that it was "well^-settled
that it is not within the functions of the judiciary to in
quire into the motives which inspire the legislature to enact
laws."4^
The apparent consensus on massive resistance in the
General Assembly disguised continued differences between urban
and rural legislators which, surfaced on other issues.

The

"country boys" made two unsuccessful attempts to reverse the

39

National Association For the Advancement of Colored
People v. Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of
Justice, 101 S.E. 2nd 631, 639.
(Va. Sup. Ct. of App.,
1957).
40id. at 640.
41T.r •.j
Ibid.
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growing influence of urban and black Virginia which were dir
ectly related to the school question.

On January 29, Garland

Gray introduced a bill which provided that prospective voters
would have to register on blank sheets of paper without the
benefit of any advice from th.e registrar.

The bill's un

stated purpose was reportedly to frustrate the registration
of Virginia's Negro citizens'.

42

However, many legislators

opposed the measure because they believed the NAACP would

carefully instruct blacks, so that only uninformed whites
43
would be disfranchised.
Urban legislators were also re
minded that the rural wing of the Democratic organization had
thrived on a restricted electorate.

After vigorous debate, the

bill was passed in an amended form which allowed the applicant

to refer to the pertinent provision of the Virginia Constitu44
tion during the registration.
Another attempt by rural legislators to maintain the
status quo surfaced in the form of a House Resolution which
declared that population should be de-emphasized as a factor
in redistricting the General Assembly in 196 2.

The sponsor

of the legislation, Delegate John H. Daniel, believed that
the perpetuation of rural dominion in the General Assembly

42 Richmond Times,-Dispatch, January 30 , 1958, p. 1.
43Ibid.
44Ibid. , March. 5, 1958, p. 1. The bill passed the
House of Delegates by a narrow vote of 50-46. Two days later
the bill passed the Senate by 3 2-0,
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would ensure "sound government."

45

After a successful fili

buster, organized by urban legislators, the House of Dele
gates passed instead a resolution which retained population
as the primary criteria for reapportioning the General Assembly.

46

Th.e inability- of rural legislators to push their

resolution through, the House was a sign that the grip of the
conservative wing of the Democratic organization was not as
strong as massive resistance indicated.

Although urban legi

slators supported much, of massive resistance, they were not
about to surrender the prospect of future power on the school
issue.
Another indication of the split within the organiza
tion was demonstrated by the response to Senator Harry Byrd's
announcement on February 10 that he would not run for reelection in 1958.

Although the Senator desired to devote

more time to his invalid wife, Byrd reversed his decision two
weeks later.

Most political observers believed that Byrd's

reassessment was prompted by the prospect of a battle for his
Senate seat between ex-Governors John Battle and William
Tuck.

A Battle-Tuck primary was expected to evolve into a

feud having the prospect of undermining massive resistance
and the organization.

45
46

To prevent such a destructive cam-

Ibi.d. , February 20, 1958, p. 1.

^

Ibid. , March. 5, 1958, p. 1; March 6 r 1958, p. 1.
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paign, Byrd decided to seek re-election. 47
With the adjournment of the General

Assembly, Governor

Almond prepared for the expected school closings in the fall.
In February, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Judge
Bryan's order admitting seven Negro children to white
48
schools.
In May, the Supreme Court refused to review the
Fourth Circuit's ruling in the Arlington case so that Virginia was left without any other legal recourse. 49

Conse

quently, Arlington, like Norfolk and Charlottesville, appeared
likely to have either desegregated or closed schools in
September of 1958.
Governor Almond and his attorney general, Albertis
S. Harrison, recognized that Virginia had exhausted all of
its legal ploys in behalf of massive resistance.

At a high

level meeting in Washington on July 2, 1958, this viewpoint
was stressed by Harrison.

According to the Attorney General,

however, Representative Howard Smith still "hoped at some
time there would be a test of the right of a Governor of a
state to interpose the sovereignty of such State."

Attorney

General Harrison pointed out that this alternative was elimi-

47

Latimer, pp. 87-88. Byrd easily defeated Dr. Louise
Wensel, a physician from Augusta County by 317, 221 to 120,
224 (p. 89).
48 School Board of Arlington County v. Thompson, 3 Race
Re 1. L . Re pi 187 , (4th Cir. 1958) .
4 9Arlington School Board v. Thompson, 3 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 423 (4th Cir. 1958) .
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nated by the Little Rock precedent.

Governor Almond, Harri

son explained, would find himself "in the same position as
Governor Faubus if he uses either the state police force or
the National Guard to prevent the enforcement of an order of
one of our Virginia Federal Judges." 50
Of greatest distress to Harrison was the failure of
the Democratic organization to work out a well-conceived plan
to cope with the expected desegregation order.

Despite the

massive resistance propaganda, the Attorney General predicted
that only a quarter of Virginia would "close their schools
rather than integrate."

Arlington, Charlottesville, and Nor

folk were expected to insist on reopening the public schools.
Harrison believed that eventually a private school system
would emerge in areas with dense Negro populations once black
enrollments surpassed token levels.

Until then, he urged the

organization to provide a formula for the transition period.
If the organization failed to provide a plan, Harrison
warned, "it will be supplied by others, and we may be in even
more travail."51
The confidential views of the Attorney General illumi
nated a major problem for the Almond Administration.

Recog

nizing that the legal realities dictated a retreat from mas-

50 Letter, Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., to Howard W.
Smith, July 11, 1958, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith
Letter File.
51
Ibid.
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sive resistance, Almond and Harrison were discomforted by the
inflexibility of the organization's hierarchy.

Thus the last

months of massive resistance were dominated by Governor Al
mond's attempt to deal with the dilemma of satisfying the
courts while averting political disaster.
Anticipating a crisis in the fall, Almond intended to
exploit all the remaining legal loopholes for evading a de
segregation order before closing the schools.

The Governor

hoped to satisfy the people of Virginia that he had utilized
every legal maneuver to prevent desegregated schools.
legal developments took several directions.

The

One was an at

tempt to capitalize on a ruling delivered on June 20 by Fede
ral District Court Judge Harry L. Lemley in Arkansas, which

ordered the postponement of desegregation in the Little Rock
case for two and one-half years. 52 Judge Lemley considered
his decision a "tactical delay," necessitated by the violent
53
opposition to the Brown decision in the Arkansas city.
Until Judge Lemley's order was reversed, Virginia's leaders
argued that desegregation would be accomplished by turmoil
similar to that experienced by Little Rock.

A second devel

opment was the formulation of local assignment plans designed
to prevent desegregation in Charlottesville and Norfolk where
Judges Paul and Hoffman had discredited the Pupil Placement

52
Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp 13 (E .D . Ark. 1958).
53Ibid., at 28.
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Board.

54

Finally, a half-hearted effort was made to argue

that the General Assembly's revision of the Placement Act
justified new litigation.
One by one the last legal maneuvers were knocked down
by the federal courts.

On August 18, the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals overruled Judge Lemley's order on the
grounds that if upheld it "would amount to an open invitation
to elements in other districts

to overtly act out public op-

position through violent and unlawful means." 55

On September

12, after a special term, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron
upheld the Court of Appeals in a brief per curiam order. 56
Two weeks later the Court delivered an expanded opinion signed
by all the justices, which declared that the rights of Negro
children "can neither be nullified openly and directly by
state legislators or state executive or judicial officers,
nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for
segregation."

57

"directly . . .

The Court traced the turmoil in Little Rock
to the actions of legislators and executive

officials of the State of Arkansas . . .

which reflect their

own determination to resist this Court's

decision in the

Southern School News, vol. V, No. 2, (August, 1958),
p. 6.
Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F. 2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1958).
cc
Aaron v. Cooper, 78 S. Ct. 1399 (1958).
~^Cooper v. Aaron,

358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).

Brown case."

58

Although the Little Rock decision was a war

ning to the South in general, Governor Almond believed that
the justices wrote their opinions "with their eyes on Virginia," where several schools were already closed.

The

Court's opinion, Almond declared, "indicts and insults every
state legislator, every state judicial officer, and every
governor whose convictions relating to the oath 'to support
this constitution' differ from the court's." 59

Taking issue

with the Governor's interpretation, the editor of the Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot wrote that the Court instead had demolished
the false idea that "legislation and litigation will buy time,
and that in time something may- turn up" which will reverse
the Brown decision.^
On August 18, the same day that the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reported its decision in the Little Rock
case, the Norfolk School Board announced that it rejected the
applications of all one hundred and fifty-one Negroes who
61
sought admission to white schools.
Using the assignment
criteria established by the School Board, one hundred and
twenty-three students were eliminated for failing to meet
scholastic requirements, for refusing to submit to testing

58Id. at 15.
n;q
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 1, 195 8, p. 1.
^Editorial, Ibid. , p. 4.
^"School Board Resolution of August 18, 195 8," III
Race Rel. L. Rep. 9 45.

212
procedures, or for other "equally cogent reasons."

The re

maining twenty-eight students were rejected on the grounds
that their educational progress would be hindered by racial
isolation, by too many school transfers, or by possible
62
racial conflicts.
On August 25, Judge Hoffman told the
Norfolk School Board that racial isolation or the expectation
of racial disorder were not acceptable legal grounds for denying applications to white schools. 63
position was most difficult.

The School Board's

If it refused to admit some

Negroes, the School Board was subject to a contempt citation
from Judge Hoffman.

However, by admitting Negro students,

the school closing law would be activated.

Furthermore, the

Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, on the request of seg
regationists, had issued an injunction forbidding the School
Board to make any assignments on the grounds that this was
the responsibility of the State Pupil Placement Board.

64

Faced with a difficult choice, the School Board, on August 29,
announced that it would assign seventeen Negroes to white
schools m

September.

65

Massive resisters reacted to the Norfolk decision by

62Ibid., at 945, 946.
^"District Judge's Statement of August 25, 1958"
3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 946 at 951-52.
^ Coley v. Brewbaker, III Race Rel. L. Rep. 944.
a c.
"School Board's Report of August 29, 1958," III Race
Rel. L. Rep. 955.
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rededicating their opposition to the Supreme Court.

By coin

cidence, the Norfolk announcement was made a day before the
annual meeting of the Democratic organization's faithful at
Senator Byrd's apple orchard in Berryville.

Seated on apple

crates and munching box lunches, the quasi-political rally
listened approvingly as the Senator vilified the Supreme
Court and the NAACP.

Byrd charged:

"It is the Warren Court

school decision that has forced this ordeal upon us."

The

Court's accomplice was the NAACP, which the Senator described
as "a fourth branch of the federal government."

The leader of

the Democratic organization urged his followers to continue
the fight against the Warren Court "fortified by the belief
that we are fighting to preserve the fundamental principles of
our constitutional democracy.
More specifically, the leaders of massive resistance
believed that Governor Almond had not properly utilized the
Pupil Placement Ace in the struggle to preserve segregation.
Representative Watkins Abbitt urged:

"If the Pupil Placement

Act is ever going to be used, it has to be used now."

67

In

his editorials, James Kilpatrick tore into Almond for not
using the' "cleaned-up" assignment plan.

The editor wondered:

"If the Governor of Virginia won't defend the laws of Vir
ginia, who will?"^

66

Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 31, 1958, p. 1.

67Richmond News Leader, September 1, 1958, p. 1.
co
Editorial, Ibid., August 30, 1958, p. 6. Two weeks
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As pressure for some dramatic act of resistance
mounted from organization stalwarts, Governor Almond made his
only attempt to prepare Virginia for the end of massive resis
tance.

At a September press conference, the Governor dis

missed the pleas to interpose the Pupil Placement Board be
tween the federal courts and the Norfolk School Board or any
other school board.

As long as the statute was tied to school

closing laws, Almond realized, the federal courts would not
re-examine the assignment plan because of a few superficial
alterations.

School closing and fund cutoff were all that

remained to prevent desegregation.

On the subject of inter

position, Almond frankly stated that;
I've tried to make it clear the question is the
power of the federal government. I must recognize
that no state could require a citizen to confine him
self to state judicial remedies in solution of a fede
ral question involving his rights.
So long as school boards are under the coercive
powers of the court, no act can relieve the school
board members of their responsibilities to that court
as determined by the court.69
Governor Almond also sympathized with the Norfolk School
Board's decision to assign Negro pupils to white schools.

He

later Kilpatrick publically apologized to Almond and Harri
son. The editor explained that the Pupil Placement Act was
an "empty thing" which had been destroyed by Judges Paul and
Hoffman. Editorial, Ibid., September 13, 19 58, p. 8. The
apology followed a two hour conversation between Kilpatrick,
Almond, and Harrison in which the state officials ostensibly
convinced the editor that the Pupil Placement Act provided
Virginia with no legal defense. Letter, James J. Kilpatrick
to J. Segar Gravatt, September 19, 1958, Univeristy of Vir
ginia, Archives, Kilpatrick Letter File.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 3, 195 8, p. 1.
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explained that he could not "criticize a lawyer who refuses
to advise his client to go to jail."

70

Perhaps Almond was

also suggesting that he had no intention of going to jail to
satisfy massive resisters.
No powerful organization Democrat, including the Gov
ernor, had ever offered such a candid assessment of Virginia's
massive resistance.

The Governor's observations were an ad

mission that Virginia was at the end of the line.

Yet, be

cause of the political risks, Almond refused to call a spe
cial session of the General Assembly, because that would show
"no faith in what we have tried to do thus far to protect our
schools."

71

Politically, school closings were virtually ne

cessary in the hope that massive resisters would be satisfied
that the Governor had "walked the last mile" in the defense
of segregated schools.
Two days after his press conference, Governor Almond
succumbed to political pressure and reversed his position on
the Pupil Placement Act.

Most likely his statement of Sep

tember 2 was a trial balloon aimed at detecting signs of sup
port for a shift in school strategy.

Speaking for massive

resisters on September 3, Garland Gray said:

"The Pupil

Placement Board was provided by the legislature to intervene
i.n situations such as this.

71
7-1-ibid.

T support wholeheartedly the po-
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. .
72
sition taken by the Defenders."

The next day, the Governor

delivered a statement to school officials which proclaimed
that the authority to assign students rested with the Pupil
Placement Board.

"The Court may assume the power but lacks

the authority to make the assignment or enrollment itself."

73

Because of the nature of the injunctive process and the Briggs
dictum, Governor Almond advised school officials that they
were under no obligation "to operate any public school,
whether integrated or not."

74

Referring to state court in

junctions in the Norfolk and Charlottesville cases, the Gov
ernor warned that for "a school board to violate such state

injunctions . . . would be susceptible to the construction
that the action was voluntary and wilful." 75 Almond increased
the pressure on school boards by reminding them that the re
sponsibility for school closing rested on their shoulders.
He hoped that "no charge be justifiably made that any School
Board has thwarted the will of the overwhelming majority of
the people of Virginia . . . " 76

^ Ibid. , September 4, 1958, p. 1.
73

"Governor's statement of September 4, 195 8," III Race
Rel. L. Rep. 9 59.
74T,
..
Ibid.
75 Ibid.

In Charlottesville the judge of the corpora
tion court issued an injunction prohibiting the local school
board from making any assignments until October 15, 1958.
Southern School News, vol V, No. 3 (September, 1958), p. 6.
Ibid.
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The Governor's statement won the approval of the mas
sive resisters.

Agreeing with Almond that school boards could

not assign pupils to schools, Representative Tuck declared
that consequently "the federal courts had no authority to
enter any orders directing them to do so, and such orders are
a nullity and ought not to be obeyed." 77

However, the Norfolk

School Board announced its intention to continue enrolling
students under the local assignment plan. 7 8

On September 18,

Judge Hoffman ordered the admission of Negro students to Nor
folk's white school and dissolved the state court injunc79
tion.
On September 27, following the refusal of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals to stay- the order to desegregate,
the Governor issued an order closing six of Norfolk's white
senior and junior high schools.

80

Ironically, all of the

city's Negro schools opened on September 29.
The same pattern of events occurred in Charlottesville.
After finding the local assignment plan unsatisfactory, on
September 9, Judge John Paul ordered the admission of twelve
Negro children to Charlottesville's white schools.

Judge Paul

77 Richmond News Leader, September 5, 1958, p. 1.
78
"School Board Statement, Resolution of September 5,"
3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 950.
79
. . .
Text of Hoffman's, opinion, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,
September 19, 195 8, p. 12.
80
School Board of the City of Norfolk v. Beckett,
3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 961 (4th Cir. 1958); "Governor Orders
Closing of Schools," 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 96 3.
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admitted that it was "unpleasant to be at odds with the gov
ernment of my own state."

But he did not believe that Vir

ginians were "less able to cope with a new and different sitOT
uation than the people of . . . other states."
Following
an unsuccessful appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Governor Almond closed two Charlottesville schools on Sep82

tember 19.

Like Norfolk, neither a local assignment plan

nor the Pupil Placement Board prevented school closings in
Charlottesville.
The first school closed by Governor Almond, however,
was the Warren County High School in Front Royal.

The Warren

County suit was not filed until August 29, 1958, the day the
Pupil Placement Board refused the applications of twenty-six
Negroes attempting to enter the all white high school.

Since

the Negro high school students were bused out of the county
to receive their education, the suit involved a blatant case
of racial discrimination. 83

On September 8, 1958, Judge John

Paul ordered the Warren County School Board to admit twentytwo Negro students to the white high school.

84

During the

81Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 10, 1958, p. 1.
OO
Southern School News, Vol. V, No. 4 (October, 1958),
p . 3.
83Ibid., Fifty-nine Negroes were bused approximately
fifty-five miles to Manassas Regional High School. They were
boarded there during the week and returned home on the week
ends. Another forty-seven Negro pupils traveled to Berryville daily, a round trip of about fifty miles.
84
Kilby v. School Board of Warren County, 3 Race Rel.
L. Rep. 972 (W.D. Va. 1958).
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hearing Judge Paul indicated that Virginia would gain little
by postponing the desegregation order.

"I think you will

agree that two or three years ago the atmosphere was much
more favorable to the acceptance of integrated schools than
it is now.

The last two or three years have been consumed by

officers of the state government and politicians building hos85
tility."
On September 12, Governor Almond closed the Warren
County High School following an unsuccessful appeal to the
Fourth. Circuit Court of Appeals.

86

In September of 195 8 nine schools were closed in three
Virginia communities, and approximately 12,700 children were
forced out of their normal school routine.

Arlington County

narrowly missed an order closing its schools.

On September

17, 195 8, Judge Bryan approved the transfer of four Negro
children to white schools, but postponed their admission until
mid-term since school had already started.

87

The only legal triumph of the massive resisters was in
the Prince Edward County case.

The Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeals had reversed Judge Hutcheson's refusal to set a date
for the beginning of desegregation in the Southside County.

85

88

Norfolk yirginian^Pilot, September 9, 19 58, p. 1.

^ Southern School News, vol. V, No. 4 (October, 1958),
p. 3.
Ibid.
OO
Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 249
F. 2d. 462, (4th Cir. 1957). .
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On remand, Judge Hutcheson decided, in a rather unique opin
ion, that the Prince Edward School Board could have until
1965, or ten years after Brown II, to comply with the deseg. .
89
regation decision.
The ruling was based on the assumption
that there was no evidence "that in accepting new theories of
social and moral reform, the modern human is any more adap
table than that of the Athenians of 500 B.C."99

Thus Judge

Hutcheson held that Prince Edward should have ten years to
adjust to the Brown decision, since the Athenians were given
the same period to adjust to the laws of Solon.91

Even the

finality of this order was qualified by the assertion that
the court could "modify it by accelerating or extending that
date of compliance . . .

as the best interest of the parties

and the public may appear. . . ."

92

The school closings meant that the Almond administra
tion would have to find a politically graceful method of re
opening the schools.

The method settled upon was to institute

a suit in the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that would
test the constitutionality of the tuition grant plan and the
school closing legislation.
two objectives.

The suit was expected to achieve

First, if the Virginia Supreme Court of

89
Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 164
F. Supp. 786 (E.D. V a . 1958).
90
91
92

Id. at 79 2.
Id. at 794.
Ibid.
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Appeals declared the massive resistance legislation unconsti
tutional, Governor Almond hoped to avoid the charge that he
had capitulated to the federal government.

The administra

tion figured that most Virginians would accept the verdict of
the state's, highest court on massive resistance.

Second, by

knocking down the school closing law, the Supreme Court of
Appeals would give the tuition grant plan a new vitality.
Almond and Harrison expected Virginia to move in the direction
of a private school system, and they expected tuition grants
to play an important role in such a transition.

They recog

nized, however, that tuition grants would meet with great
difficulty in federal courts, if granted to individuals where
no public schools existed.

When State Comptroller Sidney Day

refused to issue tuition grants- on the grounds that their re
lationship to the school closing legislation made them uncon
stitutional, the stage was set for the friendly suit filed by
Attorney General Harrison. 9 3
Subsequent events demonstrated that the Almond-Harrison
strategy did not have the approval of Senator Byrd, who did
not budge from the position of massive resistance.

Senator

Byrd, Howard Smith, Bill Tuck and their followers wanted Gov
ernor Almond to meet the federal authorities at the school
house door.

Nevertheless, the Attorney General attempted to

explain the purpose of Harrison v. Day to the Senator.

93

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 14, 195 8, p. 1.
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Harrison wrote;
It was certain that suits, were going to be filed
in the Federal courts attacking the school closing law
and the fund cut-off law-. We felt that we would have
no chance whatever of sustaining these laws in the
Federal courts, and, furthermore, that if the laws were
to be tested, such test should come in the State’s own
appellate court.94
Several months later, the Attorney- General admitted that the
administration held out little hope for a favorable verdict in
. . Supreme Court. 95
the Virginia
Though Almond expected the state and federal courts to
knock down the school closing legislation, he failed to pre
pare Virginians for the end of massive resistance.

The Gover

nor instead continued to engage in race—baiting and discour
aged any discussion of compromise.

If Virginia surrendered,

Almond predicted that the state would be left "in the defense
less position of having white teachers teaching Negroes and
Negro teachers teaching white pupils." 96
schools were closed, Almond pledged;

After nine Virginia

"I will never volun

tarily yield to that which I am convinced will destroy our
public school system." 97

. •
Unwilling to accept any responsibi

lity for the closed schools, the Governor asserted;

"If

94
Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., to Harry F. Byrd, Septem
ber 22, 195 8, University of Virginia, Archives, September 22,
195 8, Smith Letter File.
95

Albertis S'- Harrison, Jr. , to Harry F. Byrd, Janu
ary 6, 1959., University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter
File.
96
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 17, 195 8, p. 1.
97

Ibid., October 1, 1958, p. 1.
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public education is destroyed in Virginia, the sole responsi
bility for that unhappy and tragic event must rest and abide
with those official and unofficial, who have confederated to98
gether to achieve that result."
Governor Almond did not
want to expose himself to charges of capitulating to the Fed
eral Government.

Besides, he had built up the hopes of many

a segregationist by promising that he had a plan to preserve
segregated schools.

By yielding reluctantly to the verdict

of Virginia's, highest court, Almond hoped to end massive re
sistance without splitting the organization.

Ultimately the

plan failed.
One development that Almond and other organization men
hoped to avoid was voluntary' desegregation by a Virginia city
or county.

Massive resistance had been sold on the principle

that it had the support of the entire state.

After the high

school in Front Royal was closed, Almond urged all the coun
ties to "stand firm in this crisis so the state may utilize
every avenue possible to prevent the destruction of public
schools in Virginia." 99

While Virginia had pictured itself

as the defender of the states against an oppressive federal
government, ironically it was, for the moment, completely in
sensitive to local differences within the state.
ging local action, Almond said;

Discoura

"Tfie political subdivisions

98.,Ibid.
., •
^ Ibid. , September 17, 1958, p. 1.
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are creatures of the people through the General Assembly with
the people retaining all the powers unless they have con
ferred them in the General Assembly to exercise.
point the News Leader was characteristically blunt.

On this
It sim

ply stated that
there's no such thing as local rights. The localities
exist by sufference of the State as a whole. Whatever
rights the counties and cities have are no more than
revocable privileges, and it might be just as well, at
this particular time.
Former Governor Tuck was even more forceful in his disappro
val of independent local action against state policy.
don't want to stand.

"Some

As much as I love local self-government,

I say if they don't want to stand make them stand." 102

The

News Leader, which had prided itself on raising transcendent
principles, also appealed to white racism in order to discou
rage local action.

It made the familiar argument that "Our

society is predicated upon the maintenance of a social wall
between the races."

103

This principle was bolstered by sta

tistics demonstrating that the role of illegitimate births
among Negroes far exceeded that of whites.

In Warren County,

for example, the editor emphasized that one of four Warren

loo.,., .j

Ibid.

^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, September 8, 1958,
p. 12.
10?
Richmond News Leader, November 13, 1958, p. 5.
103

Editorial, Ibid., September 15, p. 10.
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. .
104
Negroes was illegitimate.
If the localities were not to be permitted to deal
with their problems, what solution did the state offer?

Re

jecting interposition, the Governor and his advisers thought
more seriously about encouraging the conversion of Virginia's
public school system to a private school system over a period of
105
years.
From 1954 through the Gray Plan, some form of pri
vate education had been contemplated.

Amending Section 141

had been done in recognition of the financial difficulties
related to the establishment of private schools.

The con

stitutionality of tuition grants was vital to the transition
to private schools.

More so was the willingness of Virginians

to put up with the Spartan conditions characteristic of such
a venture.
Private school foundations sprouted in Charlottesville,
Arlington, Warren County and N o r f o l k . G e n e r a l l y classes
were held in vacant homes and other make-shift buildings.
Governor Almond made a concerted effort to encourage the pri
vate school experiment.

"From the standpoint of culture, re

finement, education, patriotsm and loyalty," he predicted

105

. . .
Norfolk Vircrinian-Pilot, September 17, 1958, p. 1.

■^^Since Prince Edward County was not forced to dese
gregate in the fall of 1958, it held its plans for private
schools in reserve.
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that Virginia's future citizens would not be inferior.

107

Yet the early experiments demonstrated that private education
could not win widespread support except in towns and small
cities.

In communities like Charlottesville, Front Royal in

Warren County and Farmville in Prince Edward County, leaders
of private school movements found it easier to mobilize the
community.

Carpenters, bricklayers, and other skilled wor

kers were willing to donate their services in order to main
tain segregated schools.
The city of Norfolk demonstrated the difficulty of
converting to a private school system in a large metropolitan
area.

A booming seaport, businessmen feared that closed

schools would prompt the Navy to loosen its connections with
the community, and discourage private industry from moving
into the area.

Though reluctant to take a public stand, Nor

folk businessmen, like their colleagues throughout the state,
eventually used their influence to urge the re-opening of the
109
closed public schools.
Though at times curiously apathe-

1Q7

. .
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, September 26, 195 8, p. 1.

10 8

Bob Smith, They Closed Their Schools CChapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 163-168. A
similar effort is described by Clyde Walter Mathews, A Study
of the Political and Economic Effects of School Integration
on Front Royal and Warren County, Virginia. M.A. Thesis,
East Carolina College, 196 3.
109

Luther j. Carter, ’’Desegregation in Norfolk,” The
South Atlantic Quarterly 58 (Autumn, 1959), 507-520. A hundred prominent businessmen signed a full page advertisement
supporting public schools which appeared in both. Norfolk
papers on January 26, 1959, after state and federal courts
had knocked down the school closing laws. Businessmen,
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tic about the future of their public schools, the citizens of
Norfolk indicated that they would not support a private
school system.

A private school corporation in Norfolk was

able to raise only fourteen thousand dollars in a fund drive
advertised as a test of strength for the private school move-

Another crucial factor in any private school operation
was the attitude of the public school teachers.

In the case

of Virginia, as in other Southern states, the teachers had to
make a choice between supporting public education or the
racial mores of the community.

In Norfolk, the teachers

voted to support desegregated schools if they could not be
reopened on any other b a s i s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,

Norfolk

teachers refused to teach in the private schools organized by
the Tidewater Educational Foundation, and only reluctantly

Carter argued, feared the General Assembly would withdraw
their support for the port and highway improvements prior to
the court decisions (p. 518).
~^^Ibid., p. 519. An example of Norfolk's apathy was
the sparse participation of the city's voters on a referendum
held on November 18, 1958. The referendum asked the voters
whether or not they wished the control of the schools returned
to the city on an integrated basis and at increased expense.
Only twenty-one thousand of some fifty thousand qualified vo
ters participated in the referendum. By a vote of 12,340 to
8,172, the citizens of Norfolk preferred to keep the schools
under state authority. Since the question presented to the
voters was drafted to encourage this result, the meaning of
the referendum was unclear.
(Carter, p. 515).
Washington Post, October 5, 1958, p. 1. On October
4, the Norfolk Education Association voted 4-1 in favor of
desegregation, if schools could not be opened otherwise.
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agreed to supervise tutoring groups.

Neither substitute, the

Norfolk teachers held, could "adequately and efficiently replace our public schools."

112

The stand taken by the Norfolk

teachers earned the rebuke of Representative Tuck who charged
that the teachers were, "unwilling to stand up for prin
ciples. . . . "

had "little devotion to the great profession to

which they belong . . . "

and were "undertaking to coerce them

Ithe children] to return to integrated schools."

The result,

Tuck predicted, would be to "make of our little, children a
seed bed for the infiltration and implantation of spurious
views and doctrines." 113 In contrast, the teachers in small
cities and towns like Farmville and Front Royal moved more
easily from public to private schools. 114
Up to the fall of 1958, the Virginia Education Association had been extremely cautious regarding its statements on
massive resistance.

Nevertheless, on October 30, the VEA

passed a resolution by a 4-1 margin which expressed "grave
concern" over the school closings and asked for a special
legislative assembly which would "assure the continued opera
tion of the Virginia public schools as a state supported function." 115

112

113

The vote was taken after the teachers listened to

Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 9, 195 8, p. 1.
Richmond News Leader, November 13, 195 8, p. 5.

■^^Smith., p, 16.8,
116

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 31, 195 8, p. 1.
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the Governor condemn the NAACP, elaborate on the penalties of
mixed faculties, and describe the Supreme Court as a "cancer
gnawing at the heart of our constitution.”

On the follow

ing day, Lieutenant Governor A.E.S. Stephens observed dejec
tedly "when you pick up a newspaper and see that a large body
of teachers has voted not to parti.ci.pate in a private school
movement, you ask yourself 'where is their loyalty.'" 117
The private school movement received other jolts.

In

Charlottesville and Warren County, Judge Paul enjoined pri
vate schools from employing publicly paid teachers idled by
the school closing.

118

Also the Virginia Congress of Parents

and Teachers defeated a resolution supporting massive resis
tance by a tie vote, 55 7-557.

It then adopted a resolution

favor of local option by a narrow 515-513 margin. 119

m

These votes came after Almond promised that he would not per
mit white and colored to be taught together in the public
,

,

120

schools.

By mid-October the Virginia press, with, the exception
of the Richmond dailies, had turned against massive resistance.

121

Finally in mid-November the News Leader and the

116 Ibid.
-r, .
117 Richmond Times^Dispatch, November 1, 195 8, p. 1.
118

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 9, 1959, p. 1.

119
120
121

Ibid., October 23, 195 8, p. 1.
Richmond Times-Djspa,tch, Octoher 21, 1958, p. 1.

Muse, p. 96. In November businessmen also applied
pressure on Almond to open the schools. Generally they were
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Times-Dispatch called for a change in strategy.

Editor

Kilpatrick wrote that such Supreme Court rulings as Cooper v.
Aaron meant that Virginia had to abandon its legal position.
The 1956 laws, he continued, had accomplished their goal
which was "to deter integration and to buy time."

Kilpatrick

urged Virginia to move in the direction of a private school
system based on tuition grants.

To guarantee the constitu

tionality of the grants he cautioned that they should not be
"geared in any way to the integration controversy."

The com

bination of tuition grants and private schools provided Vir
ginia’s only hope of maintaining "both segregation . . . and
education m

the indefinite future."

122

Although a private

school policy would damage public education, the editor con
cluded that considering the threat of integration to society,
"such a prospect no longer holds great terrors." 123
Although the News Leader was resigned to the destruc
tion of the 19 56 legislation, it was not giving up the battle
against the Supreme Court.

One of the keys to the new defen

sive strategy was a "policy of studied contempt by the State
for the Supreme Court." 124

In contriving litigation and leg-

concerned about the cost of private education and the regres
sive effect of closed public schools on the economy (Muse,
pp. 106-10, 120-21).
122

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, November 12, 1958,

p. 10.
12 3
1 24

Ibid., November 13, 1958, p. 12.
Ibid., November 10, 1958, p. 10.
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islation, Kilpatrick thought in terms of prolonged struggle.
In a debate with Thurgood Marshall, Kilpatrick said:
The hope of the white South is that in time— over
the next fifteen years or so-— the rest of the country
will awaken to the damage that is done to constitu
tional government by the usurpation of the Supreme
Court.125
Although the South.1s economy and race relations might be dam
aged, Kilpatrick, believed this preferable to 11the evils of
race mixing."

The Richmond editor predicted that Thurgood

Marshall had "won the last inch of ground he will win
easily."126
Governor Almond took advantage of the shift in edito
rial policy to announce a new plan.

Responding to a sugges

tion offered by a Richmond Times-Dispatch editorial, Almond
said that he would select a new school study commission if
Virginia's school closing laws were knocked down by the
courts.

127

Since the laws were, expected to be invalidated,

the prospect of returning to some form of a placement plan
seemed imminent.

Governor Almond, at the last moment, admit

ted that "it's very probable that there will be Negro chil
dren in the schools in Norfolk, Charlottesville and perhaps
everywhere."

He confessed that after the massive resistance

125 Charleston News and Courier, November 17, 195 8, in
Facts on Film.
126T, .
Ibid.

127

Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 13, 195 8, p. 1.

laws, "I have no weapon left."

128

Byrd, Tuck and Abbi.tt did not share Almond's resign^ation over the fate of massive resistance.

Tuck refused to

make any concession and promised to support "every firm and
determined effort to prevent mixing of the races in our
schools.

If we shed the armor of principle, there is nothing
129
for which to fight."
If integration was forced by the

courts, Representative Abbitt thought "the Negro schools
would be closed and the whites will educate their children in
private schools.

There is plenty of m o n e y . T h e

refusal

of the organization hierarchy to turn away from massive res
istance would plague Almond to the end of his administration.
After one year in office, Almond's promise to preserve
segregated education was all but shattered.

The most glaring

fault of the Governor's first year was his failure to prepare
the Old Dominion for the end of massive resistance.

As a

lawyer, he recognized the limitations of Virginia's power to
obstruct a federal court order to desegregate.

But, with the

exception of one brief attempt, at the beginning of Septem^
ber, Almond spoke the rhetoric of resistance.

In his heart,

no doubt, Almond wished he could make good his campaign prom
ises.

More importantly, the Governor recognized that to pro

claim the end of massive resistance meant breaking with.

^Norfolk Virginian^Pllot, January 4, 1959, p. 1.
129

Ibid., November 13, 195 8, p. 1.

^~2^Pbid., January 4, 1959, p. 1.
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Senator Byrd and the heart of the Democratic organization.
Governor Almond was partly responsible for his predica
ment.

The Governor h.ad led the politicians and the people to

believe that he had a variety of tactics in his legal arsenal.
But by 195 8, the federal courts, had cut through, a variety of
legal obstacles to desegregation which., in turn, triggered
Virginia's, school closing laws in three communities.

Of the

12,70 0 students barred from their regular classes, 10,000
were from Norfolk.

The resort to makeshift classrooms, espe

cially in Norfolk, was terribly inadequate.

Confronted with

the consequences of the 1956 legislation, the Governor saw
that outside of the Southsi.de, most Virginians would not
accept such chaos.

Thus, Almond moved in the direction of a

return to local assignment and tuition grants.

A decision by

the Virginia Supreme Court was expected to give Almond the
political leverage to lead Virginia out of massive resistance.

CHAPTER VIII
RETURN TO LOCAL OPTION
On January 19, 1959, the Virginia Supreme Court of Ap
peals declared the legal foundation of massive resistance un
constitutional.'*'

In a 5-2 decision, the majority of the jus

tices rejected Attorney General Harrison's argument that a
conditional relationship existed between Section 129, which
provided for a statewide system of public schools, and Sec
tion 140, which had required the separation of races in the
public schools.

Consequently, the court held that when Sec

tion 140 was invalidated by the Brown decision, Section 129
was left unaffected, since the two sections were "independent
and separable."

2

The court also found that the school clo

sing and fund cutoff statutes were prohibited by the Consti
tution of Virginia, since they left the public schools with
out the support required by Section 129.

Virginia, the court

ruled, "must support such public free schools in the State as
are necessary to an efficient system, including those in
which the pupils of both, races are compelled to be enrolled

■^Harrison v. Day, 106 S. E. 2d 6 36 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. ,
1959) .
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and taught together, however unfortunate that situation may
be."

An "efficient system," the court continued, was to be

determined by the number of teachers and the quality of the
facilities, rather than by its racial composition.

Finally,

the tuition grant plan was invalidated on the grounds that
supporting funds ware derived from money normally appropriated
for the public schools.

however, if properly appropriated,

the. court had no objection to tuition grants per s e /

Thus

the Governor and General Assembly were assured that an amended
tuition grant plan would be endorsed by the state court.

In

its concluding remarks the court sympathized with Virginia's
political leaders.

The majority opinion attacked the United

States Supreme Court's "lack of judicial restraint evinced . .
. in trespassing on the sovereign rights of this Common
wealth."

The legislation passed by the General Assembly was

described as "an understandable effort to diminish the evils
expected from the decision in the Brown case."

5

On the same day that the Virginia Supreme Court issued
its decision, a three-judge federal district court in James v .
Almond enjoined the enforcement of the school closing laws in
Norfolk.^

In a per curiam opinion the court ruled that Vir-

3Id. at 646.
4Id. at 645, 647.
5Id. at 64 7.
^James v. A,lmond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va, 1959) .
This suit was instituted by a group of white parents. See
Paul L. Puryear, "The Implementation of the Desegregation De-
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ginia violated the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment by closing some Norfolk public
schools while maintaining others.

The court added:

"We do

not suggest that, aside from the Constitution of Virginia, the
state must maintain a public school system. That is a matter
7
for state determination."
But as long as Virginia operated a
public school system, schools could not be selectively closed
for racial reasons.

Even if Virginia withdrew its support

from public schools, the court held that while the schools
relied on public funds, localities would be required to satisQ
fy the Fourteenth Amendment.
Governor Almond was expected to acquiese in the state
court's ruling.

The Richmond News Leader accepted the judi

cial verdict and seemed to be clearing a path for Almond's re
treat from massive resistance.

Editor Kilpatrick wrote:

"The slate is clean now, and for our own part we have no re
grets.

These laws were intended to interpose the power of the

State between Federal courts and local school officials; the
laws were intended, in Madison's famous phrase,

'to arrest the

progress of the evil1 and this they have done.

Let them rest

m

9

peace." ■ Yet, to the astonishment of most political anal-

cision in the Federal Courts of Virginia: A Case Study of
Legal Resistance to Federal Authority"
(unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1960), pp. 344-47.
^Id. at 337.
8Id. at 338.
9Richmond
.
News Leader, January 20, 1959, p. 10.
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ysts, on the evening of January 20, Governor Almond told a
state audience that:

"We have just begun to fight."

The

Governor said he would not surrender to amalgamationists and
those who closed "their eyes to the livid stench of sadism,
sex, immorality and juvenile pregnancy infesting the mixed
schools of the District of Columbia and elsewhere.

..."

Once more Almond promised not to "break faith" with the people
of Virginia who elected h i m . ^
The speech was a political blunder.

Besides passing up

the opportunity provided by Harrison v. Day to retreat grace
fully, Governor Almond once again raised the false hope that
somehow desegregation could be prevented.

Five years later,

Almond explained that fatigue and tension were responsible for
the slip.

"My underlying thought and motivation was to show

the people that we had done everything we could do." 11

Byrd,

Tuck, and Abbitt enthusiastically endorsed Almond’s January

. 12
remarks.
One week later massive resisters were furious when Gover
nor Almond reported to an extra session of the General Assembly
that the state and federal court decisions meant that some
Virginia public schools would be integrated in February of
1959.

During his speech, Almond recommended the repeal of the

compulsory school statute, asked for immediate action on

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 21, 1959, p. 1.
^^Ibid., June 9, 1964, p. 1.
^Muse, p. 129; Wilkinson, 146.
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a new tuition grant plan unrelated to public school funds,
encouraged the development of private education, suggested
the passage of stricter laws associated with school violence
and announced his intention to appoint a commission to study
a variety of problems associated with public education.

With

the exception of his emergency recommendations, Almond asked
the legislature to recess until the commission made its re. 13
port.
In addition to outlining his school proposals, Almond
devoted considerable time to defending his management of mas
sive resistance.

He was most concerned about the charges

that neither the Governor nor the Attorney General had ex
hausted their options in maintaining segregated schools.

Ex

ercising the police power, interposing the Pupil Placement
Board, or locking the school doors, Almond explained, could
not save Virginia from the effects of a Federal Court order.
Placing his past promise to save Virginia's segregated
schools in the background, he said:

"I have repeatedly stated

that I did not possess the power and knew of none that could
be evolved that would enable Virginia to overthrow or negate
the overriding power of the Federal Government." 14

Anticipa

ting a fierce struggle in the extra session, the Governor

13

"Address to the General Assembly," January 28, 1959,
in Inaugural Address and Addresses delivered to the General
Assembly of Virginia by J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., 1958-1962
(Commonwealth of Virginia: Division of Purchase and Printing,) pp. 3-10.
14

Ibid., p . 9.
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hoped that the legislators would not allow their convictions
to jeopardize the future of Virginia.

The plea was to no

avail as the General Assembly readied itself for a bitter
struggle on the future of Virginia's public schools. IS
Except for bitter-end segregationists, Virginians in
dicated that Almond's position was realistic.

The Richmond

Times-Dispatch applauded the Governor's approach to the
school problem.

"It has taken great courage on the part of

Governor Almond to accept the reality of our situation, and
to avoid mere theatrics of resistance, which would accomplish
nothing except the loss of dignity for the state as a
whole."

16

Considering the unfavorable reaction throughout

the nation to continued resistance, the News Leader also sup
ported the Governor's proposals as "the wise man's course."
Kilpatrick reminded his readers "that it is in the rest of
the country that ultimately the war must be won." 17
The Richmond dailies emphasized that some school de
segregation must not be construed as evidence of a change of
heart in Virginia.

"The simple fact is that we have come to

another stage in our resistance program," observed the Times-

^5Ibid., p. 10.
"^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 31,
1959, p. 6 . On February 4 the Times-Dispatch published edi
torials from around the state supporting Governor Almond. On
February 2 the results of a public opinion poll showed two to
one support for Almond.
17
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 29, 1959,
p. 12.
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18
Dispatch.

The editor predicted that the experience of

Washington, D „C. would not be duplicated 11if Virginia con
tinues to fight with the will and determination shown in the
19
past four years."
Echoing the morning newspaper, the News
Leader added that "Virginia does not submit to integration in
the thought that race-mixing is morally right, because we
.

.

conceive race-mixing to be morally wrong."

20

Virginia, the

editor emphasized, was merely acquiescing to a superior
force.^
Following Governor Almond's speech, the General Assem
bly went to work on his recommendations amid rumors that
rabid segregationists intended to place the blame for dese
gregation on Almond's shoulders.

Nevertheless, legislators

supporting the Governor easily passed tuition grant legisla
tion, repealed the compulsory attendance law and made bombing
threats unlawful.

22

Simultaneously the Almond forces were

beating back legislative attempts by the segregationist bloc
to restore massive resistance.

18

A bill sponsored by Garland

Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
1959, p. 6.
1 9 ,..
Ibid.
20

January 31,

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, February 2, 1959,

p. 10.
2L,
Ibid.
22

Acts of the General Assembly, Chapters 1-4, Extra
Sess., 1959, pp. 3-5, 76,77.
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Gray which would have placed all school funds in the hands of
the Governor, who was to distribute the money to segregated
schools only, was killed in the Senate Finance Committee. 23
Another bill giving the Governor the power to close ineffi
cient, in other words integrated schools, was defeated in the
Senate by a vote of 17 to 22.

24-

On February 2, the legislature recessed until March 31
when the assembly reconvened to consider the report of the
school study commission.

On the same day that the legisla

ture recessed, Negro students, for the first time in Vir
ginia's history, entered white public schools without inci25
dent.
Assessing the day's events, the Times-Dispatch
viewed the lack of violence in Arlington and Norfolk as con
sistent with "the reputation of Virginia for law and
order."

26

Virginia's nonviolent tradition combined with

Governor Almond's program, the editor predicted, would result
in the "orderly containment of the amount of integration in

23

Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 1, 1959, p. 1.
24
Ibid., February 3, 1959, p. 1.

25 - .
Ibid.
26
Editorial, Ibid., p. 12. On February 10, Alexandria
desegregated its public schools. On February 18, Warren Coun
ty High School opened its doors to 21 Negroes, but none of
the white students returned. Over four hundred white stu
dents returned in September, 1959. Southern School News,
vol. V, No. 9 (March, 1959), p. 14. Charlottesville was per
mitted to reopen its schools on a segregated basis until Sep
tember, after submitting an acceptable plan for desegregating
the schools with the federal courts. Southern School News,
vol. V, No. 8 (February, 1959), p. 1.
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the schools of the Commonwealth.11
The first victories of the Almond forces and the inte
gration of the Commonwealth's public schools were bitterly
received by the Southside delegation.

State Senator Mills

Godwin, who was a champion of massive resistance, believed
that with the integration of Virginia's public schools "the
rape of our constitutional rights is an accomplished fact."
In reviewing the past three years, Godwin said:

28

"And let it

be firmly understood that those of us who support the massive
resistance laws . . . have no apology to make.

We would

gladly do so over again and we believe the people of Virginia
would give us their full support."

29

Joined by other extreme

segregationists, Godwin promised to continue the search for
new anti-integration legislation.

The refusal of the con

servative wing of the Byrd organization to surrender was a
portent of future legislative battles over school legisla
tion.
On February 4, Governor Almond appointed forty legis
lators to devise a program for Virginia's public schools
which would minimize desegregation.

Unlike the Gray Commis

sion, which had been heavily weighted in favor of the Southside, this Commission had four representatives from each

27
'Ibid.
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congressional district.

Almond named Mosby G. Perrow, Jr.,

of Lynchburg the chairman of the study commission. 30

Senator

Perrow joined a small cadre of normally loyal organization
men who supported the Governor throughout the special sess
ion.
The format of the Perrow Commission was similar to the
Gray Commission.

One public hearing was held, but the subs

tantive issues were hammered out in private meetings.

Ironi

cally, the conservative leadership of the organization at
tacked the Commission for its closed meetings.

To meet the

charge, Perrow invited Representatives Tuck and Abbitt to
appear before the commission and offer their suggestions.
Both men rejected the offer and claimed that no solution
could be found to Virginia’s problems until the meetings were
open to the public.

Tuck described the "so-called program of

'containment111 as a "subterfuge and another name for integra39
tion."
The major objective of the bitter-enders was to per
suade the Perrow Commission to recommend an amendment re
pealing Section 129.

In a letter to Perrow, Representative

Howard W. Smith placed all his prestige behind such an ac
tion.

Repeal of 129, Smith argued, would "leave to the elec

torate and to their elected Legislature complete freedom of

30

Ibid., February 5, 1959, p. 1.

^Muse, p. 163.
32
.
Norfolk Vircrinian-Pilot, March 5, 1959, p. 1.
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action to determine their future course."

Significantly, he

added that this "would not mean the abolition of public edu
cation, unless the people of Virginia who have the right to
make the determination should so decide."

Congressman Smith

thought that Virginia had a choice between "private schools
with tuition grants from the State, or integration.

You and

I know that the agitators from without the State who exert a
powerful xnfluence will not submit to token integration."

33

The Richmond News Leader joined the proponents of re
pealing Section 129.

"So long as it remains on the books,

members of the General Assemhly are caught in a dilemma by
which they stand legally obligated to support schools that
they morally cannot support.

Abolishing Section 129 was

directly related to the private school movement championed by
segregationists.

As long as the obligation to provide a sys

tem of public schools remained, Kilpatrick warned that the
tuition grant plan was in legal trouble.

Dropping Section

129, the News Leader explained, was consistent with Vir
ginia's effort "to minimize the consequences of these rulings
[Harrison v. Day and James v. Almond] and to delay their impact until new defensive steps can be taken."

35

3 3Letter, Howard W. Smith to Mosby G. Perrow, Jr.,
March 5, 1959, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith Letter
File.
34Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 20, 1959,
p. 10.
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To editor Kilpatrick, the construction of "genuinely
private schools" offered "a strategic concept on which a prolonged war may be waged."

36

Furthermore, private schools

were glamorized as experiments in progressive education.
Public schools supposedly would profit from the competition
provided by private schools.

The editor predicted that the

possible result in ten or twenty years could be "a truly out
standing system of schools in Virginia— some public, some
private— and all geared to community wishes." 37
While massive resisters favored the repeal of Section
129, Governor Almond cautioned the Perrow Commission against
that alternative.

38

Public education, the Governor stressed,

was vital to Virginia's economic progress. 39

Before the

Perrow Commission, Almond and Attorney General Harrison urged
the adoption of a school plan that supported continued public
education, but which also provided for local option, facili
tated the development of private schools and generally guaranteed no enforced integration. 40
While the Perrow Commission met, Roy Wilkins,

^Editorial, Ibid., January 29, 1959, p. 2.
37

Editorial, Ibid., February 11, 19 59, p. 11.

3 8Minutes of the Perrow Commission, February 11, 1959,
Whitehead Letter File.
39 Lorin A. Thompson, "Virginia Education Crisis and
Its Economic Aspects," New South, 14 (February, 1959),
pp. 3-8.
40Minutes, Whitehead Letter File.
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Executive Secretary of the NAACP, created a storm by urging
Virginia's Negroes to apply to white schools "not by twos and
threes, but by the hundreds."

41

Even among Virginia's white

moderates this reminder to Negroes that they could not relax
their efforts following the demise of massive resistance was
considered extremely dangerous.

Robert Whitehead, who was

considered a moderate, thought the "NAACP and some of the
Federal judges as dangerous as the die-hard segregationists."

42

In a letter to Oliver Hill, Whitehead urged the

NAACP to be less forceful in its demands and described Wil
kin's speech as "harmful and detrimental and contrary to the
best interest of all concerned." 43
Hill and Wilkins disagreed categorically with White
head.

Wilkins pointed out that in Norfolk, of the 151 Negro

children who applied for transfers to white schools, only 17
had been accepted.

At this rate, 2500 Negroes would have to

apply to secure 250 admissions amounting to only two and onehalf percent of the total white enrollment.

The essence of

Wilkins' argument was that "we must encourage a substantial
number of applications in order to secure more than a mere

^^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 16 , 1959, p. 1.
42

.
Letter, Robert Whitehead to Colonel Francis Pickens
Miller, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter
File.
^Letter, Robert Whitehead to Oliver W. Hill, Mr.
Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Dr. J.M. Tinsley, February 17,
1959, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter
File.
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trickle of admissions.M^

Hill explained:

"For Negroes to

lie quietly and pretend to be satisfied with token desegrega
tion would not only be dishonest, but it would not accomplish
anything of a constructive nature."

To Hill, the only true

friends of public education were those who firmly believed
"in our Declaration of Independence . . . guaranteed by the
45
Constitution of the United States."
Moderate segregationists, like Robert Whitehead,
feared the white reaction to Negro objectives would streng
then the position of the rabid segregationists in the General
Assembly.

For example, State Senator Godwin immediately at

tacked Wilkins' statement and asked:
Virginia and her leaders to stand fast, resist with
courage, assert her constitutional rights.
We must be willing to make some sacrifices and
take such, actions as a deplorable situation demands.
To do less would make us summer patriots and un
worthy of our heritage as Virginians.46
Other critics of Wilkins seemed to believe that desegregation
above token levels would precipitate white flight from the
public schools,.

No legislator disagreed with Robert F. Wil

liams, the Executive Secretary of the Virginia Education
Association, when he appealed to Negro parents to practice

44Letter, Roy Wilkins to Robert Whitehead, February 26,
1959, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter
File.
45
Letter, Oliver Hill to Robert Whitehead, February 20,
1959, University of Virginia, Archives, Whitehead Letter
File.
46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 17, 1959, p. 1.
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"massive voluntary segregation to help insure free mass edu47
cation."
The plea was virtually identical to Governor
Stanley's request in his May, 1954, meeting with Negro
48
leaders.
The end of massive resistance was reminiscent of
the reaction to the Brown decision.

White leadership con

tinued to counsel their black counterparts to be satisfied
with the form rather than the substance of their victory.
The unwillingness of the Negro leaders to drop their
efforts to make the Brown decision a reality prompted a vic
ious attack on the NAACP by the News Leader.

The assault was

sparked by Oliver Hill's remark that communication between
whites and Negroes broken by massive resistance could "easily
be reunited once the white people decide to work construc
tively upon the problems, real and fancied, incident to the
elimination of racial segregation."

49

Editor Kilpatrick ob

jected that white citizens had done enough since they had
carried "the social burden of Negro crime, Negro illegiti
macy, and Negro disease."

The responsibility for the break

down of race relations was Oliver Hill's, asserted Kilpat
rick, for "coercing the white people, in disrupting their
schools, in tearing old relationships to shreds."

The only

47 Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 5, 1959, p. 1.
48~
See supra, p. 32.
49Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 30, 1959,
p. 10. Hill made the statement during a radio broadcast fol
lowing Governor Almond's speech of January 20, 1959.

goal of Hill and the NAACP, explained Kilpatrick, was "to ram
total integration down the throats of white people utterly
unwilling to accept it." 50
As a result of the furor raised by massive resistance,
white political leaders demonstrated little confidence in
Virginia's ability to desegregate beyond a token level.
Fearful of further exploitation of the race issue, moderate
segregationists hoped that the NAACP would slow down its
legal efforts.

Simultaneously, segregationists like Kilpat

rick, continued to describe Virginia's problems as the result
of the unreasonable policies of the NAACP.

On the other

hand, Negro leaders, given the experience of desegregation,
were convinced that their goals could be achieved only by
continued pressure.

Oliver Hill promised that there would be

"no let up in the activities of Negroes until we are granted
the full and unremitted rights of an American citizen."

51

On March 6 , the Perrow Commission held its only public
hearing.

Although the entire spectrum of opinion was heard,

the so-called freedom-of-choice plan championed by Leon Dure,
a former journalist turned gentleman farmer, attracted the
52
greatest attention.
Dure did not attack desegregated

50 Ibid.
-T--I .
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 7, 1959, p. 1.
52
Muse, 161; Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 10
(April, 1961), p. 7. Dure launched a one man campaign on be
half of "Freedom of choice" and freedom of association.
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education, but argued instead that every student should have
the opportunity to receive a tuition grant in order to facil
itate enrollment in a qualified private school, regardless of
religious affiliation, if he desired to leave the public
53
schools.
The theoretical basis of freedom of choice, ac
cording to Dure, was the supposed "right" of association or
disassociation which Dure contended was guaranteed by the
First Amendment.

As a result of compulsory attendance laws,

Dure argued, the freedom to associate or disassociate, had
been surrendered, with the exception of the well-to-do who
could afford the expense of private education.

Tuition

grants, he believed, would restore freedom of choice and
negate the advantages of wealth.

By distributing the grants

to the individual student rather than the private school,
Dure believed Virginia could avoid the expanding definition
of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.

54

Freedom of choice was appealing for several reasons.
First, the idea permitted segregationists to obscure their
intense racial opposition to desegregation by an appeal to
more neutral abstract principles.

Second, freedom of choice

financed by tuition grants offered a method of underwriting
the private school movement.

Finally, some were attracted to

the plan as a means for reducing the opposition to even token

53

Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 7, 1959, p. 1.

54 Leon Dure, "Individual Freedom Versus State Action,"
Virginia Quarterly Review, 38 (Summer, 1962), pp. 400-09.
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desegregation.
Two University of Virginia law professors, Dean F.D.G.
Ribble and Hardy Cross Dillard, expressed their doubts con
cerning the constitutionality of the tuition grant plan.
Dean Ribble predicted the invalidation of the program by the
federal courts unless it was part of a general scheme to ac
hieve desegregation.

Professor Dillard thought that the

Supreme Court's decision upholding an Alabama pupil assign
ment plan offered Virginia a better formula for controlling
the rate of desegregation. 55

Dillard also believed that the

federal courts examined the consequences as well as the mo
tives of school legislation.

If the result of the tuition

grant policy was the perpetuation of segregated schools, Dillard expected the grants to be declared unconstitutional. 56
The NAACP also registered its objection to the estab
lishment of a tuition grant program.

"No one in a democratic

society has the right to have his private prejudices financed
at public expense," declared Oliver Hill. 57
For the remainder of March, the Perrow Commission
worked on a school plan.

At the same time, the massive re

sisters made one final bid to influence the Governor and the

55Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 7, 1959, p. 1. The
Alabama case was Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Educa
tion of Jefferson County, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
56Hardy Cross Dillard "Freedom of Choice and Democra
tic Values," Virginia Quarterly Review, 38 (Summer, 1962),
pp. 410-35.
57 Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 7, 1959, p. 1.
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Legislature.

Dominated by the Defenders and supported by

Southside Virginia, an organization entitled the "Bill of
Rights Crusade" sponsored a march to Richmond.

On March 31,

a crowd estimated at 5,000, mostly from the Southside, occu
pied Capitol Square demanding the General Assembly to invoke
the resolution of interposition.

The rally proved to be un

successful and marked the decline in number and influence of
58
Defender-type rallies.
The next day, April 1, the Governor released the re
port of the Perrow Commission signed by thirty-one of the
forty members.

Before making their recommendations the com

mission members denounced integration, but found that Vir
ginia had exhausted every legal means of resistance in the
face of the superior force of the Federal Government. 59

Turn'

ing to the future of Virginia's schools, the Perrow Commis
sion recommended a package of bills which permitted the lo
calities to choose whether or not they wished to desegregate.
In localities which desegregated, scholarships were to be
available to students who desired to attend nonsectarian
private schools.^
Equally significant, the Perrow majority recommended

~^Muse, pp. 160-61; Southern School News, Vol. V,
No. 11 (May, 1959), p. 2.
59 Report of the Commission on Education to the Govern
or of Virginia, Mosby G. Perrow, Chairman (Commonwealth of
Virginia: Department of Purchases and Supply, 1959), p. 5.
^ Ibid., pp. 12-18.

253
against amending Section 129.

According to the majority's

interpretation of Section 135 of the Virginia Constitution,
the General Assembly was only required to make a minimum ap
propriation which was insufficient to support the schools of
a locality.

Believing that the localities were not constitu

tionally required under Section 136 to provide funds for pub
lic education, the Perrow forces asserted that communities
could prevent desegregation without abolishing Section 129.^
The Perrow Report tried to insure Virginia's general commit
ment to public education and simultaneously to calm the fears
of Southside legislators.

The plan virtually duplicated the

recommendation of the Gray Commission which the legislators

61

Ibid., pp. 9-12, Section 135 of the Constitution
stated:
"The General Assembly shall apply the annual inter
est on the literary fund; that portion of the capitation tax
provided for in the Constitution to be paid into the State
treasury, and not returnable to the counties and the cities;
and an amount equal to the total that would be received from
an annual tax on property of not less than one nor more than
five mills on the dollar to the schools of the primary and
grammar grades, for the equal benefit of all the people of
the State, to be apportioned on a basis of school population;
the number of children between the ages of seven and twenty
years in each school to be the basis of such apportionment.
And the General Assembly shall make such other appropriations
for school purpose as it may deem best, to be apportioned on
a basis provided by law.11 According to the majority report,
the revenue received from the interest on the literary fund,
the capitation tax (two-thirds of 1.50), and the property tax
amounted to only $9,000,000 of a budget of $163, 370, 000.
Thus the operation of public schools depended on state and
local money beyond the minimum funds. However, such funds,
the majority argued, were appropriated at the discretion of
the General Assembly (Section 135) and the localities (Sec
tion 136). The Perrow Report held that by tradition, state
funds were triggered by a local appropriation. By refusing
to provide money for public schools, the majority report
thought localities could successfully close their schools.
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had dropped for massive resistance nearly three years ear
lier.
The dissenting report, signed by nine bitter-end seg
regationists described the majority report as a containment
policy which would allow "a locality to proceed with as much
integration as that particular locality desires . . . .
not willing to strive simply for containment." 62

We are

The

major recommendation of the minority report was to repeal
Section 129 and to amend other sections of the Constitution
so that the General Assembly could "refuse to support any in
tegrated school and provide for educational and tuition
grants without restriction."^3
The majority report had constitutional weaknesses
which the minority Commission members readily pointed out.
Mills Godwin thought that the majority raised a "foolish
hope" by suggesting that a locality could prevent integration
by refusing to appropriate funds.

Citing Harrison v. Day and

James v. Almond, which required the operation of all public
schools under Section 129, the black belt Senator was on firm

^3Ibid., p. 23.
63 Ibid., p. 24. Delegate James M. Thomson, who signed
the minority report, also wrote a separate dissenting state
ment. He revealed that the Commission had turned back a
proposal to permit a referendum on the question of amending
Article Nine of the Virginia Constitution [Education and
Public Instruction] by a vote of 22-16.

legal ground.6^
Anticipating constitutional objections, the Perrow
majority admitted that the case of Harrison v. Day could in
validate local school closings.

However, after receiving the

advice of counsel, including Attorney General Harrison, the
majority was satisfied that its recommendations would be
"upheld by our court, should the question be presented to
it."

65

Like the massive resistance legislation, the Perrow

plan was expected to prompt lengthy and expensive litigation.
If declared unconstitutional, the time consumed in court was
expected to delay desegregation in black belt counties for a
number of years.
With the publication of the Perrow Report, the divi
sion within the Democratic organization became more apparent.
Representative Watkins Abbitt considered the Perrow plan a
"complete surrender to integrationists.

Agreeing with

Abbitt, Representative Tuck added that "we need more resistance, not less."

6V

However, Lieutenant Governor A. E. S.

Stephens, a longtime organization stalwart from the Southside, explained;

"It's not capitulation.

It's just realism,

drawing up'lines for the next battle in a long, long war."

^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, April 2, 1959, p. 1.
65 Report of the Commission on Education, p. 9.
^ Richmond News Leader, April 2, 1959, p. 1.
6 7t,

.

Ibid.

68Ibid., April 4, 1959, p. 1.

Lieutenant Governor

68

256
The News Leader, long the champion of statewide massive re
sistance, endorsed the switch to local option.
wrote:

"So long

a State power to

Kilpatrick

as there was the faintest hope of preserving
separate the races, it was important to act

as a State; it was imperative that we maintain a Statewide
policy.

Now that the state line has been breached, we will

haveto fight

a different sort of fight."

69

On April 6, 1959, Governor Almond asked the General
Assembly to pass
Commission.

into law the proposals offered by the Perrow

TheCommission's

plan, the Governor argued, per

mitted massive resistance to continue on the individual level
through freedom-of-choice.

Believing the repeal of Section

129 unnecessary, Almond asserted that neither the state nor
the federal constitution required a locality to support pub
lic schools.
rested on the
In the

The future of the Perrow Plan, of course,
accuracy of this judgement. 70
General Assembly a battle shaped upbetween

the

Almond-Perrow forces and their critics over the assignment
plan and over a referendum offered by the latter to amend

Stephens stuck by the Perrow-Almond plan during the Extra
Session. In 1961 he was defeated in the Democratic primary
for Governor by Attorney General Harrison. During the cam
paign, Stephens broke with the organization and lashed out at
its leadership.
69
Editorial, Ibid., March 6, 1959, p. 12.
70

"Address to the General Assembly," April 6, 1959, m
Inaugural Address and Addresses delivered to the General As
sembly of Virginia by J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., 1958-1962,
(Commonwealth of Virginia: Division of Purchases and Prin
ting) , p. 4.

257
Article IX of the Constitution, which dealt with Education
and Public Instruction and included Section 129.

The opposi-

tion preferred retaining the three-man placement board rather
than adopting the local assignment plan advanced by the Perrow Commission.
marked:

A Southside Delegate, Samuel E. Pope, re

"I can't see any difference between the Perrow and

the Dalton assignment plan.

I don't believe a locality

should have the right to assign a single pupil." 71

Along

with other massive resisters, Delegate Pope thought that "if
there is to be integration, we should make sure the court
does the assigning."

72

Bitter-end segregationists, in short,

viewed local assignment as an open invitation to massive de
segregation.

A pupil placement board, composed of "right-

thinking" men and women, was viewed as a more reliable buffer
against desegregation, especially in localities outside
Southside Virginia.
The administration's advocacy of local assignment was
partly legal and partly practical.

The state Pupil Placement

Act, designed to prevent desegregation, had been rejected by
three federal district courts.

Eventually a new statewide

assignment plan, which resulted in some desegregation, was
acceptable to the federal courts.

But in 1959, Governor

Almond contended that the state would have to bear the

71Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 5, 1959, p. 1.
72Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, April 8, 1959, p. 1.
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unnecessary expense of a permanent state agency. 73

Local

assignment was not only less expensive, but consistent with
local initiative in school policy.

Advocates of local as

signment also pointed to the effectiveness of such a policy
in North Carolina, where Negro admissions were limited to
sixteen m one year. 74
The legislative battle over the Perrow Plan was com
plicated by politics.

According to rumors, Governor Almond

ejxpected to use the victory to capture a wing of the Demo
cratic organization in order to promote his future political
fortunes.

Simultaneously, the bitter-^end segregationists

reportedly planned to pin the failure of massive resistance
on the Governor.

They hoped to frustrate Almond's ambitions

and also to prove their loyalty to massive resistance.

Con

sequently, the entire debate took place in an atmosphere in
which the very unity of the Democratic organization seemed to
be at stake.^
The debate over amending Article IX of the Virginia
Constitution involved a most serious threat to public educa
tion.

On April 9, Delegate W. Stuart Wheatley, a diehard

massive reslster, introduced a joint resolution to amend Ar
ticle IX.

In effect, the amendment, which included a

^ Address, April 6, 19 59, p. 7.
74 Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 24, 1959, p. 2.
75Latimer, unpublished manuscript, p. 93; Richmond
Times^-Dispatch, April 17, 1959; April 26, 1959.
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provision for repealing Section 129, gave localities the option of selecting between public or private schools.

7£

Thus

the massive resisters accepted the inevitability of desegre
gation in localities which chose to operate public schools.
But in the black belt the conversion from a public to a pri
vate school system was to be reinforced by striking out the
state’s obligation to provide a statewide public school sys
tem.

The major legal flaw in the amendment was that the

state was to continue to provide funds for the institutions
replacing public schools.

77

Under the expanded definition of

"state action," such schools were subject to the prohibition
of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though they were designated
as private schools.

Only the few Southside localities pre

pared to privately finance their schools could have strengthened their legal position from the repeal of Section 129.

78

The Almond-Perrow forces continued to oppose any revi
sion of the state's obligation to provide a statewide system
of public schools.

To neutralize the opposition's proposal,

the Almond-Perrow forces introduced a bill which called for
an advisory referendum in November of 1959.

The referendum

7£
Journal of the House of Delegates, A.J.R. 23, Extra
Sess., 1959, p. 114.
^ Ibid. , p. 116.
7 8Prince Edward County, for example, already indicated
its readiness to drop public education. Whether or not other
black belt counties would follow suit was still uncertain.
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was to ask the voters to advise the legislators on the ques
tion of whether or not Virginia should contine to operate
79
and support public schools.
The question was purposely
broad so that even higher education was included.

The advo

cates of the bill presumably wrote the resolution to insure
80
a large "yes" vote.
They hoped the massive resisters would
lose enthusiasm for their amendment, if faced with the pros
pect of a referendum designed to serve as a mandate for Vir
ginia's public schools.
With the aid of some unprecedented parliamentary man
euvering, the administration was successful in passing its
assignment bill and blocking the bid to repeal Section 129 of
the Virginia Constitution.

As expected, the Senate Education

Committee, dominated by Southsiders, killed the administra81
tion's local placement bill.
But in the House of Dele
gates, a similar bill squeezed through its Education Committee by a 9-8 vote.

82

On April 16, the House passed the bill

by a narrow 53 to 46 votes.

83

During the House debate, Dele

gate Whitehead turned to the black belt legislators and said:
"I know you're up a creek gentlemen . . . .

But the time has

79 Journal of the House of Delegates H.B. 104, Extra
Sess., 1959, p. 151; Richmond Times-Pispatch, April 16, 1959,
p. 1.
80 Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 23, 1959, p. 1.
8^Ibid., April 15, 1959, p. 1.
8^Ibid., April 14, 1959, p. 1.
83 Journal of the House of Delegates, H.D. 50, p. 164.
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come when we're going to legislate for all Virginia.11
Though Whitehead pointed to the numerous safeguards against
desegregation for the Southside, Delegate Pope considered the
bill automatically suspect since it had the support of "libe
rals and integrationi.sts.

I say when these people favor it,

we. had better look in the woodpile for the proverbial you85
know-what."
Convinced that the Senate Education Committee
planned to smother the House's assignment bill, the AlmondPerrow forces successfully converted the Senate into a Com^mittee of the Whole by a narrow 20-19 vote.^

This parlia

mentary tactic precipated emotional charges and counter
charges which threatened to split the Democratic organization
in half.

Leading the criticism was State Senator Harry Byrd,

Jr., who charged:

"This action, we believe, has grave poten

tial consequences for the future.

This action shatters pre-

cedent going back at least seventy-five years."

87

By another

one vote margin, the Committee of the Whole reported the as
signment bill to the Senate floor where it was passed by a

84Richmond Times-Dispatch., April 16, 1959, p. 1.
o tr

Norfolk Virginian-vPilot, April 16, 1959, p. 1.
ft6

Journal of the Senate, April 17, 1959, p. 156;
Richmond Times-Dlspatch, April 19, 1959, p. 1. To give the
Perrow forces their one vote majority, Senator Stuart B.
Carter was flown in from Botetourt County where he was recu
perating from an operation. Senator Robert F. Baldwin, who
would have supported Almond was in Europe.
87
Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 23, 1959, p. 1.
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vote of 21-18.

88

As the Committee of the Whole, the Senate

also passed an innocuous bill making compulsory attendance
optional for each locality. 89
The Almond-Perrow forces had to make some concessions
in order to get their placement plan through the legislature.
Lacking the four-fifths majority to pass the bill as an emer
gency measure, the administration agreed to accept March 1,
1960, as the effective date of the measure.

In another im

portant compromise localities were to remain under the autho
rity of the existing Pupil Placement Board until their school
boards and governing bodies elected to adopt a local assignment plan.

90

By retaining the Pupil Placement Board, Vir

ginia was. left with a dual assignment system.

For several

years school districts continued to operate under the direc
tion of the Board in order to prolong the assignment process
and also to escape the onus of admitting Negro children to
white schools.

In practice, the Placement Board dealt prima

rily with assignments which were appealed from the local
level.

Usually contested assignments involved black students

who were protesting their assignments to black schools.
The resolution to repeal Section 129 was defeated in
the House of Delegates by a narrow margin of 45 for to 53

OO

Journal of the Senate, H.B. 50, Extra Sess., 1959,
p. 218.
89
90
p. 2.

Ibid., H.B. 68, Extra Sess., 1959, pp. 201-02.
Southern School News, Vol. V, No. 11, (May, 19 59},
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against.

91

Representatives, of urban and white belt Virginia

combined to defeat the massive resisters.

A white belt dele

gate, Lawrence H. Hoover, argued that no area of Virginia demanded a constitutional change except the Southside.

92

Dele

gate Harrison Mann of Arlington cautioned Southsiders that
when public schools closed their doors "that is the day you
will open up your private schools to integration." 93
Ironically, the referendum bill, sponsored by the
Almond-Perrow forces, passed the House of Delegates by a 54
to 42 vote, with the massive resisters voting in the negative.

94

Diehard segregationists now were very apprehensive

about the results of a referendum which asked the people to
choose between public schools with some integration or con
tinued massive resistance.

In the Senate, the referendum

bill was buried in the Privileges and Election Committee.
Since the bill had sidetracked the amendment resolution, the
Perrow forces were not perturbed.

The administration pre

ferred to take the spotlight off the school problem and turn
to other issues, rather than to rekindle emotions by another
referendum. 95

91Journal of the House, H.J.R. 23, Extra Sess., p. 194.
92
93

pp.

Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 21, 1959, p. 1.
Ibid.

94 Journal of the House, H.B. 104, Extra Sess.,
226-^27.
95 .
Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 23, 1959, p. 1.
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The remainder of the Perrow legislation moved easily
through the General Assembly.

All the measures were designed

to aid the localities in their efforts to resist desegrega
tion.

Among the most important were the tuition grant plan,

a procedure for selling public school property, free trans
portation for pupils attending nonsectarian private schools,
and permission for a locality to cut its budget in thirty
days.96
The mas.si.ve resisters hoped to make the Perrow legis
lation the major issue in the July Democratic primary and the
November, 1959, state election.

If moderates were turned out

of office, the resisters planned to return to the General As
sembly in January, 1960, with the goal of modifying or re
pealing the legislation of the 1959 special session.

Moder

ates, however, were not defeated by resisters in the primary
or general elections so that the Perrow legislation remained
secure during the regular session of the Legislature.

97

The

only challenge to the administration's package of laws was a
bill which proposed to delay the effective date of local as
signment by two years.

Passed by the narrowest of margins in

the House, 50^-49, the bill was killed in the Senate by a 21

^ Acts of the General Assembly, Chapters 53, 68, 47,
69, Extra Sess., 1959, pp. 52, 56, 91-93.
^ Southern School News, Vol. 6, No. 2 (August, 1959),
p. 13.
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to 19 vote.

98

New school legislation was limited to several

measures providing greater state and local aid to private
schools.

Localities were given the power to appropriate

funds for "educational purposes," and taxpayers were given
local tax deductions for gifts to nonsectarian private
schools.

The tuition grant plan was altered so that each

elementary child would receive $250.00 and each secondary
child $275.00, unless per pupil cost of instruction in a
locality was a smaller figure. 99
The school issue, oddly enough, produced less excite
ment than the debate over the three percent sales tax in the
1960 session of the General Assembly.

Generally, legislators

agreed that Virginia needed more revenue to keep up with the
costs, of public services demanded by an increasing popula
tion.

However, the sales tax posed a great number of prob

lems including the sticky matter of distribution between the
counties and the cities.

Moreover, the sales tax had acquired

the reputation in Virginia as a "last resort" tax.'*'^

The

conservative wing of the organization, led by Harry Byrd, Jr.,
succeeded in defeating the bill and substituting a patchwork

98

Journal of the House of Delegates, H.B. 723, Reg.
Sess., 1960, p. 617; Journal of the Senate, H.B. 723, Reg.
Sess., 1960, p. 957.
99

Acts of the General Assembly, Chapters 191, 44 8,
461, Reg. Sess., pp. 202-03, 703-05, 721.
^Richmond News Leader, January 27, 1960, p. 1.
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of taxes to provide the needed revenue.

In the midst of

the legislative battle, Governor Almond charged that the op
posing lines were determined by his efforts to save public
. . 102
education m Virginia.
Delegate James Thomson replied for
the massive resisters that Almond "might have put it the
other way— a lot of his opposition is coming from those
people he let down on the school segregation question.11103
Some segregationists were genuinely distraught because Almond
had not stood at the school house door.

Faithful Byrd Demo

crats feared that Almond would pose as a public school saver
to challenge the traditional leadership of the organization.
After the sales tax was killed by the House Finance Commit
tee, the naturally combative Almond singled out Speaker E.
Blackburn Moore and Harry Byrd, Jr., and charged:

"If these

gentlemen want to play it rough, that suits me, for the re
mainder of the administration and for the days to come after
the close of the administration.

in describing the op

position as unconcerned with the public interest, Governor
Almond cut himself off from the organization.

The break

marked the end of his political career and plagued him prior
to his appointment to the Court of Customs and Patent

^ ^Ibid., March 12, 1960, p. 1.
102

103

Ibid., February 1, 1960, p. 1.

Ibid.
104.
Ibid., February 18, 1960, p. 1.
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i 105
Appeals.
Accompanying the legislative events of 1959-1960 were
important developments in the courts which gave some indica
tion of the future issues, which would divide white school
boards and Negro plaintiffs.

One stream of litigation dealt

writh the theory and implementation of placement plans devised
by local and state school officials.

The use of assignment

criteria had been widely hailed in the press and in the Gene
ral Assembly as assuring token desegregation.

Segregationists

were, encouraged by the Supreme Court's per curiam decision up
holding an Alabama Placement Law clearly designed to prevent
desegregation."*"^

In a series of suits, NAACP lawyers at

tacked the discriminatory application of assignment plans.
Their major objective, however, was to persuade the federal
courts that school districts had an obligation to desegregate
schools rather than just preventing discrimination.
In 1959 and 1960 the NAACP met with mixed success in

105At the end of his administration, Almond, m his.
typically blunt manner, directed some unflattering remarks
toward the Senator Harry Byrd and the organization. After
some controversey, he was named to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.
■*"^Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education,
35 8 U.S. 101 (.1958) . The Supreme Court upheld an Alabama
federal district court which ruled that the Alabama Pupil
Enrollment Act was more analogous to the North Carolina school
plan than Virginia's placement plan. Shuttlesworth v Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372. (N.D. Ala. 195 8).
When the Alabama legislature drafted the plan, individual mem
bers indicated that their objective was to prevent desegrega
tion. The plan included a member of vague criteria which
aimed at preventing desegregation. Southern School News,
Vol. V, No. 6 ('December, 1958), p. 3.
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their assault on the placement law.

In reviewing the rejec

tion of twenty-six Arlington Negroes, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that their "applications for transfers
were subject to tests that were not applied to the applications of white students asking transfers." 107

The circuit

court returned the case to the lower court with instructions
that neither the school board's nor the district court's
108
action should serve as precedents for "future action."

On

remand Judge Bryan ordered twelve Negro students previously
rejected for academic reasons admitted to white schools, since
white students with comparable achievement scores were admit
ted to the same schools.

However, consistent with the Briggs

dictum, Judge Bryan refused to order the school board to de
vise a desegregation plan.^^
In the Norfolk case, Judge Hoffman side-stepped the
implications of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion
in rejecting the application of one hundred and thirty-four
Negro students to white schools.^0

The plaintiffs argued

107

Hamm v. County School Board of Arlington County,
264 F. 2d 945, 946 (4th Cir., 1959).
108 -Ibid.
r^.^

109 Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 4
Race Rel. L. Rep. 609, 610-11, (E.D. Va. 1959). In the Ar
lington case Judge Bryan rejected overcrowding, psychological
testing and adaptability as suitable assignment criteria, but
he did uphold geographical and attendance zones.
^^Beckett v. School Board of the City of Norfolk,
Va. 181 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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that the Norfolk placement plan was unconstitutional since
Negro students seeking admission to white schools were auto
matically subjected to a battery of tests which white stu
dents applying for the identical school were spared.

The

school board based its distinction on the grounds that an as
signment leading to desegregation resulted in an "unusual
111
circumstance. 11
Judge Hoffman rejected the plaintiffs'
contention by arguing that the school plan was not unconsti
tutional unless the assignment criteria were applied in an
illegal manner.

The admission of seventeen Negro students,

Hoffman believed, was proof that the school board was not at
tempting to prevent desegregation.

In evaluating any assign

ment plan, Hoffman wrote that the court must balance indivi
dual rights against the mores of the community.

"We are

dealing not with the individual right, but with the resulting
condition brought about by the granting of the right.

The

constitutional right lies in the denial of admission because
of race— not in the prerequisite leading up to such
, • n |,H2
denial.
One result of Judge Hoffman's ruling was that only a
limited number of extraordinarily bright Negro children could
expect to be admitted to white schools.

This forecast was

tempered by the observation that Negro admissions to white
schools should not "forever be confined to such Negro

111Ic[. at 873-74.
112
Id. at 874.

children who have superior intelligence."

113

Although deseg

regation was restricted, Judge Hoffman reminded the liti
gants:

"The United States Supreme Court has never suggested

that mass mixing of races is required in the public
114
school."
The Norfolk. School Board had devised a plan
which was expected to provide "orderly transition to a rad a l l y nondiscriminatory school system."

115

The Hoffman decision complemented the transition in
Virginia's politics.

The Almond-Perrow forces submitted its

placement plan on the theory that the federal courts would
restrict desegregation to a mere trickle.

The refusal of

Judge Hoffman to assign any of the Negro plaintiffs streng
thened the credibility of the Almond-Perrow position.

Fur

thermore, by clinging to the Briggs dictum, Hoffman stated
that Virginia did not have to provide a desegregated school
system, but merely a "nondiscriminatory school system."
Ironically, with the end of massive resistance, Judge Hoffman
and Governor Almond, antagonists for three years, now found
themselves agreeing on Virginia's school policy.
To the NAACP lawyers, rulings such as those of Judges

113
114
115

Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.

Ibid. The Fourth. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
Judge Hoffman in Hill v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 282
F. 2d 473 (,4th CirT 196 0) . The Court gave much weight to
Judge Hoffman's efforts up to 1959 and the belief that the
Norfolk plan was merely an interim measure.
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Bryan and Hoffman indicated that with, the end of massive re
sistance they faced a new but equally difficult road.

To

settle for a "nondiscriminatory school system" meant to sur
render the substance of the Brown ruling.

The obstacles to

desegregation inherent in placement plans and grade-a-year
plans prompted Thurgood Marshall, still director-counsel of
the NAACP1s Legal Defense and Education Fund, to remark:
"Now we're in for real hard legal maneuvering in court,
counter-motions and back and forth.
delay.

They're going to try and

We're going to try and push ahead.

more litigation now than before.

It's going to be

We're going into what I

call a lot of fast play around second base."^^^
As. pupil assignment laws were being scrutinized, Vir
ginia's statutes permitting localities to close their
schools, by refusing to appropriate the required funds were
also about to be tested.

On May 5, 1959, the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals reversed Judge Sterling Hutcheson's decision
giving Prince Edward County until 1965 to comply with the
Brown decision.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled

that Prince Edward County's school officials had been given
sufficient time to cope with their school problems.

Since

Prince Edward County had taken no action and planned no
future action, the Court instructed Judge Hutcheson to order
the Southside county to make plans for desegregating its

Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 8, (February,
I960.);, p. 16.
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schools by September, according to the state placement
117
laws.
The Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors answered
the ruling by refusing to appropriate funds for public
schools in the budget adopted in June of 1959.

Property

taxes were reduced by fifty-three percent, and the Prince Ed
ward School Foundation made plans to operate a private school
for white children.

The foundation reported that it had col

lected about $300,000, or seventy percent of its budget.

The

faculty was to be composed of the same white teachers for
merly employed by the public schools.

Expecting tuition

grants to be declared unconstitutional, the Board of Supervisors, at first, made no provisions for such aid. 118

Begin

ning with the September, 1959, school year, Prince Edward
County's public schools were to be closed for five years.
During this period the legislators, lawyers, and judges de
bated the constitutionality of a county's right to close its
public schools and the state's constitutional responsibility
when this occurred.

Ironically, Virginia's most infamous ex

ample of resistance to the Brown decision came after massive
resistance had been abandoned as a state policy.
Measures adopted by the Norfolk City Council, somewhat
analogous to Prince Edward County's were declared unconstitu-

117Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County,
266 F. 2d 507 (4th Cir. 1959).
1]o

Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 1 (July, 1959),
p. 6.
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tional by Judge Walter Hoffman.

On January 13, after appro

ving other actions which restricted the use of public funds
for education, the City Council passed a resolution declaring
that it would not authorize the transfer of money to the
School Board for any class above the sixth grade.

Ex

plained as a measure to preserve the public safety, the deci
sion was regarded as a vindictive action aimed at the city’s
Negroes who, with the exception of the black plaintiffs, were
unaffected by the school closures. 120

After issuing a pre

liminary injunction against the enforcement of the ordinances
and resolutions, Judge Hoffman refused to lift the order be
cause ’’Council’s action is tantamount to an evasive scheme or
device seeking to perpetuate the program of massive resistance m

the public schools of the city of Norfolk."

121

On

May 18, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Judge
Hoffman's ruling that the Council’s action was part of the
plan of massive resistance.

122

The Court found that the

Council had "invaded the domain of the School Board and at
tempted to exercise the power to operate the schools vested
in-the school authorities."

123

Citing Harrison v. Day, the

^^"City Council Resolution of January 13, 1959,”
4 Race Rel. L. Hep. 44.
^^Puryear, p. 351.
191
James v. Duckworth, 17 0 F. Supp. 342, 351 (E.D. Va.
1959) .
1 99

123

Duckworth v. James, 267 F. 2d 224 (4th Cir. 1959).
Id. at 228.
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opinion emphasized that the highest state court held that
"Section 129 of the State Constitution requires the State to
maintain an efficient system of public schools throughout the
124
State."
Applied to Prince Edward County, school closures
also ran the risk of clashing with the state's obligation
under Section 129.
In September of 1959 eighty-six Negroes in five Vir
ginia localities reported for their first full year of de
segregated public school education.

Prince Edward County was

the only locality to completely abandon the operation of
public schools.

In Warren County four hundred white children

returned to Warren High School after a year of schooling at
the County's private school or assorted schools around the
community.

125

Besides Prince Edward and Warren counties,

only Charlottesville and Norfolk were reported to be opera
ting private schools which were a direct result of an order
126
to desegregate public schools.
On October 22, 1958, another vestige of massive resis
tance was attacked when Judge Hoffman ordered the Norfolk
School Board to consider all applications for placement

1oc

Southern School News, Vol. VI, No, 4 (October, 1959),
p. 14. Besides Warren County, Norfolk, Charlottesville,
Alexandria and Arlington County were desegregated. Five years
after the first Brown decision, eighty-six Negroes were
attending public schools with white children.
126Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 11 (May, 1960), p. 10.
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without reference to the instructions of the Virginia Pupil
Placement Board until its assignment policy was altered.

1 27

The State Board's policy of racial assignments, Hoffman
wrote, not only denied Negro children their rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment but also was an unconstitutional appli128
cation of the revised Pupil Placement Act,
Independent of
the written opinion, Judge Hoffman told the State Placement
Board to assign four Negroes to the Norfolk school "or take
12 9
the consequences,"
On November 2, 1959, fearful of a
contempt citation, the Virginia Pupil Placement Board assigned
four Negroes to white schools for the first time in its three
130
year history.
Though massive resisters were bitter, Judge
Hoffman's decision once again complemented the political ob
jectives of the Almond administration.

Admission of a few

Negroes allowed the Pupil Placement Board to make the legal
argument that its purpose was not to prohibit desegregation.
At the same time, Negro admissions could be restricted to a
handful of applicants.

127 Beckett v. School Board of Norfolk, 185 F. Supp.
459 (E.D, Va. 1959) . During the hearing one school member
admitted that he could not conceive of a set of circumstances
which would permit him to assign a Negro to a white school.
The other board members said they would admit the "perfect
child" under "perfect conditions,"
1oo
Id. at 462. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld Judge" Hoffman in Farley v. Turner, 281 F. 2d 131 (4th
Cir. 1960).
12 9
Southern School News, Vol. 6, No. 5 (November,
1959), p. 9.
i
Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 6 (December, 1959), p. 2.
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Between January of 1959 and March of 1960, Virginia
dropped its policy of statewide massive resistance and adopt
ed a program of containment under the title of "freedom of
choice."

Passive resistance was not a new idea, for Vir

ginia's leaders had proposed a similar strategy in November
of 1955, in the form of the Gray Plan.

The end of massive

resistance was not a triumph of integrationists over segrega
tionists.

Instead, moderates within the Democratic organiza

tion joined by anti-Byrd Democrats and a few Republicans re
cognized that Virginia had reached the end of its legal rope.
The confusion precipitated by school closings and the effect
of such a condition on Virginia's economic program, convinced
moderate and urban organization politicians that public
schools must be preserved.
The transition from massive to passive resistance was
bolstered by the successful example of similar programs in
such states as North Carolina.

131

However, the success of

Virginia's neighbor in restricting desegregation raises the
question of the effectiveness of massive resistance as a de
vice for blocking integration.

In defense of Virginia's

policy, Mills Godwin, Jr., said that it "gave our people time
to adjust to what inevitably had to happen."

132

Yet, as of

131

Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 4 (October, 1959), p. 1. In
September of 1959 North Carolina had seven desegregated
school districts to five for Virginia.
132

M. Carl Andrews, No Higher Honor: The Story of
Mills E. Godwin, Jr. (Richmond: Dietz Press, Inc., 197 0),
p. 42.
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1959, there was no evidence of significant progress over the
previous five years on the part of Virginians to accept de
segregation.

The major claim of the resisters is that in

February of 1959 desegregation was not accompanied by vio
lence.

More convincing is the alternative explanation that

Virginia's tradition of non-violence and preventive measures
taken by the administration prevented disorder. 133

Moreover,

the first localities to desegregate, Norfolk and Arlington,
offered to take steps to desegregate as early as 1955-1956
but were blocked by the massive resisters.

The tensions cre

ated in predominately white Warren County and continued re
sistance in Prince Edward County were examples of escalating
tensions encouraged by appeals to "transcendent principles."
The Southsiders who marched to Richmond felt cheated.

They

would have agreed with Danville Councilman John W. Carter
that Governor Almond "surrendered your constitutional rights
as if he owned them and had a right to give them away."

134

Resistance based on legislation of doubtful constitu
tionality and "transcendent principles" had several unfortu
nate consequences.
impossible.

First, negotiation and compromise were

Secondly, false hopes were continually raised

and regularly disappointed.

Consequently, white Virginians

were convinced that the fault was with the courts.

13 3

Black

Latimer, 91 1/2; Wilkinson, pp. 150-51.

^Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 6 (December,
1959), p. 2.
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Virginians, on the other hand, were disillusioned with the
unresponsiveness of the legal process.

Although subjected to

much abuse, even Virginia's, most controversial judges stayed
within the interpretation of the Brown decision rendered by
Judge Parker in the Briggs and Carson cases.

In 1959, deci

sions in Arlington and Norfolk suggested that Virginia could
satisfy the federal courts by prohibiting racial discrimina
tion,; even though, this, did not result in significant desegre
gation.
The switch to a containment policy placed a severe
strain on the bonds, of the Democratic organization.

The be

leaguered Governor, a victim of his own ambition and rhe
toric, became a champion of public education.

Formerly

willing to cut off his right arm to prevent desegregation,
after massive resistance Almond exclaimed that "closing down
the public schools meant going back to the dark ages."

135

The threat posed by Almond to the Democratic organization
proved to be exaggerated.

His coalition was too fragile and

included men with strong ties to the organization.

In 1961,

the Democratic organization selected Attorney General Albertis
S. Harrisoh, Jr., as its candidate for governor.

Highly re

spected and acceptable to both wings of the organization,
Harrison won a hard-fought Democratic primary and then rolled
to an easy victory in the general election.

135

135

136

Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 5 (November, 1959], p. 9.
Wilkinson, pp. 239-40.
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For the NAACP, Virginia's adoption of the Perrow Plan
meant another round of litigation in its attempt to make
school desegregation a reality.

The NAACP had successfully

attacked a variety of constitutional arguments presented by
the state and defendant school boards to prevent integration.
The resort to the Eleventh Amendment, to a variety of unrea
sonable administrative remedies, to threats of community vio
lence and to the police power all had been knocked down by
the courts.

However, assignment plans, tuition grants and a

variety of other evasive techniques still faced NAACP lawyers.
But their foremost legal task was to convince the courts that
the Brown decision meant that school boards had the positive
obligation to desegregate rather than the negative duty of
prohibiting racially discriminatory assignments.
The Negro lawyers of Virginia were still plagued by
the state's effort to limit their effectiveness through the
anti-NAACP laws.

In NAACP v. Patty, a three-judge federal

court declared Virginia's registration and barratry statutes
unconstitutional. 137

However, on appeal from the state of

Virginia, the United States Supreme Court, in Harrison v .
13 8
NAACP, overruled the lower court in a 6-3 decision.
In
the majority's opinion, delivered by Justice John Marshall
Harlan, the major issue was whether the federal courts should

T 37

NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958),
is discussed on page 199.
^^Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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have deferred action until the state courts had construed the
139
statutes.
After a discussion of the doctrine of absten
tion, Justice Harlan concluded that the district court had
acted prematurely in considering the Virginia statutes which
he considered "fairly open to interpretation.11"*"49
Justice William Douglas wrote;

In dissent.

"We need not— we should not—

give deference to a state policy that seeks to undermine fed
eral law."

The appeal to the abstention rule, he continued,

was a "delaying tactic that may involve years of time and that
Inevitably doubles the cost of litigation." 141

Thus, once

again the NAACP would have to return to the state courts, a
legal arena which they tried to avoid.
The Supreme Court's decision appeared to be part of a
"tactical withdrawal" of the Warren Court after a series of
controversial decisions between 1954 and 1957 in civil rights
142
and civil liberties.
Despite the setback, oddly enough,
NAACP leaders urged that the organization's members no longer
hide their identity.

Before the annual meeting of the Vir

ginia Conference Oliver Hill said;
afraid.

"We must stop being

The time has come for Negroes to stand up and say

139Id. at 176.
140T,
.n
Ibid.
141Id. at 184.
142 Walter P. Murphy, Congress and the Courts: A Case
Study in the American Political Process
(Chicago and London;
The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 245-46.
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they belong to the NAACP.11
Oliver Hill's exhortations anticipated a new and more
militant stage in the civil rights movement.

Soon Negro

students would launch sit-ins in Virginia and throughout the
South.

144

The adoption of more militant tactics not only

aggravated whites,, but posed a challenge to the leadership of
the NAACP, which had struggled to achieve civil rights by re
lying on the legal process.

As the Negro turned to more ag

gressive tactics, the NAACP, considered subversive during
massive resistance, gained some respectability in Virginia.
Beginning in 1960, the leaders of the Old Dominion em
barked on a new course which accepted the prospects of some
desegregation.

At the head of the Democratic organization,

Senator Harry Byrd still disapproved of this accommodation to
the Brown decision.

At his annual picnic in Berryville,

Senator Byrd ended his silence on Virginia affairs and de
clared:

"I stand now as. I stood when I first urged massive

resistance.

I believe now, as then, that it's either massive

145
resistance or massive integration.11

143 Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 5 (November,
1959), p.
Hill still defended the NAACP's right to with
hold membership lists.
^‘
^ Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 9 (March, 1960),
p. 5.
1 45

Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 4 (October, 1959), p. 15.

PART III.

THE DESEGREGATION CASES IN VIRGINIA, 1959 to 1972

CHAPTER IX
PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY
Beginning in 1960 the school issue slowly moved off the
center stage.

The gubernatorial victory of Albertis S.

Harrison, Jr. in 1961 brought a low-keyed official to the
governor's mansion whose temperament was perfectly suited for
cooling the fires of massive resistance.

With the exception of

the Prince Edward County suit, the school battle was quietly
waged in the federal courts for the remainder of the Almond
administration and during his successor's tenure.
Between 1959 and 1964 state and federal courts struggled
with several basic questions regarding the Prince Edward
County school case:

Could a state or federal court order a

county to levy taxes to support public schools?

What was the

state's constitutional responsibility in the face of the coun
ty's inaction?

Unfortunately, compromise between white and

Negro leaders on these questions was difficult, since both
sides viewed the stalemate as having far-reaching effects on
desegregation in Virginia and in the South.
The NAACP saw the Prince Edward case as a major test of
its ability to realize the goal of a desegregated education for
every Negro child in Virginia.
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When the white segregationists
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offered to establish private schools for Negro children at the
end of 1959 with the aid of tuition grants, black leaders ad
vised against accepting the offer.1

The example of private

Negro schools subsidized by state money had unpleasant legal
ramifications for the NAACP.

In 1963 W. Lester Banks, execu

tive -secretary of the Virginia Conference of the NAACP, said:
"Had there been any wide acceptance of private schools, it would
have had a disastrous effect on other Negro centers, in the
Black Belt and elsewhere in the South.

Even if the case was

still prosecuted, the effect would have been disastrous."

By

accepting tuition grants the NAACP's case against the grants
would have been damaged.

By refusing to compromise, the NAACP

expected that a large number of Negro children would be without
adequate education for at least two years.

The unhappy effects

of closed schools for blacks children was accepted as part.of
the sacrifice required to achieve better schools.

Also, Negro

leaders expected Prince Edward's resistance to break in the face
of economic problems and a hostile state and national public
3
opinion.
Oliver Hill told a group of Prince Edward Negroes:

1Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 7 (January, 1960),
p . 2. In They Closed Their Schools, Prince Edward County,
Virginia, 1951-1964~ (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1965), p. 172, Bob Smith wrote that Prince Ed
ward County's white leaders hoped the Negroes would accept
tuition grants so that white children could also apply without
fear of having the grants declared unconstitutional.
^Smith, p. 197.
^Ibid., p . 193.
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"All you will lose will be one or two years of Jim Crow educa
tion.

But at the same time, in your leisure you can gather

more in basic education than you would get in five years of Jim
4

Crow schools."

Unfortunately Hill underestimated the determi

nation of whites to prevent desegregation and overestimated the
residual benefits of closed schools.
The white segregationists of Prince Edward argued that
fundamental constitutional principles were at stake in the
school issue.

The federal courts had ruled that Virginia, as

long as it operated a public school system, could not close
some of the state's public schools.

But, argued those who wanted

to close the public schools, federal courts could not force a
5
locality to appropriate money for public schools.
Consequently,
Prince Edward's lawyers and its only paper, the Farmville
Herald, published and edited by J. Barrye Wall, held that Prince
Edward whites were fighting for the principle of no taxation
without representation.

Southsiders featured themselves as

representing the entire South in a struggle against judicial
tyranny.^
Prince Edward segregationists had the implicit support
of Governor Harrison during the course of the court litigation.

^Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 7 (January, 1960),

p. 2.
"’Smith, p. 152.
^Ibid., p. 189.
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As Attorney General, Harrison thought Virginia would eventually adopt a dual school system--part public and part private.

7

After Harrison was elected governor in 19 61, he adopted the
position that his office and the General Assembly could do
nothing to solve the plight of school-less Prince Edward County
Negroes.

The Governor held that public schooling was a joint

state and local effort.

If the state stepped in to support

public education in Prince Edward County it "would necessarily
g
result in a similar type of operation in other counties."
Virginians, Harrison thought, would not long accept the res
ponsibility of supporting another county’s burden of educating
9
its school children.
Initially, then, in 1959, segregationists believed that
a victory for Prince Edward County would facilitate the develop
ment of private schools throughout the black belt.

However,

due to the economic expense and the success of various assign
ment plans in frustrating desegregation, other counties did
not follow the exact example of Prince Edward County.

Conse

quently by 1962, the litigation in question appeared irrelevant

7
Letter, Albertis S. Harrison to Honorable Howard W.
Smith, July 11, 1958, University of Virginia, Archives, Smith
Letter File.
o

Letter, Albertis S. Harrison to Honorable John C. Webb,
April 22, 1963, Virginia State Library, Archives, Harrison
Letter File.
9
Ibid.
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As Bob Smith observed:

“What good would it do to prove that

legally counties could raise money and close public schools in
favor of private schools if none wished to do this?"10

In the

end Prince Edward whites only managed to postpone the day when
a few white children, unable to pay the private school tuition,
would return to public schools with the black children of the
county.
In the summer of 1960, lawyers for the NAACP asked the
district court to order Prince Edward County to operate its
public schools, to prohibit officials from disposing of public
school property and to prevent the use of public funds for the
support of private schools.

The closing of the county's public

schools, the plaintiffs argued, denied Negro children a public
education in violation of Section 129 of the Virginia Constitu
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu
tion.

In April the district court permitted the NAACP to file

a supplemental complaint which attacked the use of public funds
m

support of private schools. 11

Smith, p. 161. The Prince Edward case persuaded other
rural counties to establish private schools without abandoning
public schools.
11Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 1 (July, 1960),
p. 8; Vol. VII, No. 8 (February, 1961), p. 5; Vol. VII, No. 11
(May, 1961), p. 5. The next phase of the litigation was handled
by Judge Oren R. Lewis who replaced Judge Sterling Hutcheson on
the latter's retirement. Prince Edward County did not use tui
tion grants during the 1959-1960 school year. But for the 19601961 school year Prince Edward County supplemented private
contributions by provisions for state and local tuition grants
and a twenty-five percent tax credit for contributions to private
non-secretarian schools (Southern School News, Vol. VI, No. 12
(June, I960)), p. 12.
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Accompanying the effort to reopen Prince Edward's
public schools was a vigorous debate over the state tuition
grant plan.

In November the Virginia Education Association

passed a resolution condemning tuition grant abuses.

The

teacher's organization charged that parents already sending
their children to nonsectarian private schools were profiting
from the program.

The association wanted grants limited to

children whose parents objected to their attendance at a dese
gregated school.

Local public school officials were also

fearful of a pupil exodus which would also result in a reduction
of state funds based on per-pupil attendance.

12

Dr. Edward E.

Haddock, State Senator from Richmond, summed up the fears of
public school educators throughout Virginia when he warned:
"Unless this law is repealed, it will drain the lifeblood out of
our public school system and increase the tax burden even more
on an already overburdened public."

13

The defense of tuition grants was led by James J. Kil
patrick of the Richmond News Leader who joined this debate with
the same zeal that he demonstrated during the interposition
controversy.

Virginia, Kilpatrick explained, was embarking upon

an experiment in progressive education.

For the first time in

American history, wrote Kilpatrick, "a State has given up,

12Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 6 (December, 1960), p. 6.
12Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 7 (January, 1961), p. 7.
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voluntarily, its monopoly in education that came about by the
use . . .

of tax money in public institutions only."14

The

editor reasoned that "the State's proper interest is in the
education of its children— not necessarily in the public edu
cation of its children, and not in the segregated education of
its children— but simply in any education that meets State
academic requirements."

15

In response to those who feared the

collapse of public education, Kilpatrick countered by arguing
that the impact of the new private schools would be "wonderfully
good."

Competition, he thought, would have the same salubrious

effect on public education as in other aspects of American
life.1^

Thus, Kilpatrick and other proponents of "freedom of

choice" asserted that a bona fide plan must provide grants for
all applicants, even those attending private schools established
before the desegregation decision.

17

The emphasis on educational pioneering had a practical
side.

Adherents of freedom of choice, subsidized by tuition

grants, knew that the plan faced difficulty in the federal courts
as long as it was identified with the desegregation controversy.

14 Editorial,
•
Richmond News Leader, April 4, 1960, p. 12.
15 Ibid., December 8, 1959, p. 12. Today this argument has
been taken up by the proponents of tuition vouchers.
1^Ibid., June 24, 1960, p. 12.
^ Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 7 (January, 1961),
pp. 7-11.
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■Thus, when Kilpatrick discussed the accomplishments of the 1959
extra session of the General Assembly he completely misrepre
sented its objective.

He wrote:

"The program reflected the

General Assembly’s proper interest in education totally."

1ft

Turning to the actual application of the tuition grant program
editor Kilpatrick stressed that the "questions of racial inte
gration . . .

no longer have anything to do with the granting

of pupil scholarships."

19

Yet, statistics provided by a News

Leader survey disproved the editor's claim.

In November of

I960, the survey showed that 6,104 scholarships had been
approved by localities.

Significantly, 4,863 of the grant re

cipients were located in communities involved in desegregation
suits.

At least 3,158 of the students in desegregated com

munities were using their grants to attend newly established
20
private schools.
Neither the history nor the implementation
of the tuition grant plan supported the thesis that scholar
ships were independent of the desegregation controversy.
Tuition grants and the Prince Edward case were issues in
the 1961 Democratic primary.

18
19

Harrison, the organization

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, December 5, 1960, p. 12.
Ibid.

20 .

Richmond News Leader, November 30, 1960, p. 1. Between
1959 and 1960, the number of grants approved had increased by
1,599. However much of this increase was due to the approval of
1,324 tuition grants in Prince Edward County. Norfolk did not
report whether the students who received grants used them to
attend private or public schools.
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candidate, was opposed by Lieutenant Governor A. E. S.
Stephens, a Southsider who unexpectedly attacked the organiza
tion in the fashion of an anti-Byrd Democrat.

Stephens'

running mates were Armistead Boothe, for Lieutenant Governor,
and T. Munford Boyd, a University of Virginia law professor for
Attorney General.

Joining Harrison were Mills Godwin and

Robert Button, both identified with the conservative wing of
the organization.

The organization candidates endorsed the

tuition grants without qualification and believed that Prince
Edward County should be allowed to handle its school problems
without state interference.

The Stephens-Boothe-Boyd slate

endorsed tuition grant plans but were critical of its abuses.

21

"They were not meant for people already in private schools,"
Boothe explained.

22

The Stephens slate also favored reopening

Prince Edward's public schools, even if the governor and the
General Assembly were required to intervene.

23

As the campaign

developed, the most interesting contest proved to be between
Armistead Boothe and Mills Godwin since their records on the
school issue were most distinguishable.
Byrd Democrats received unexpected help during the cam
paign from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and the Justice

^ Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 10 (April, 1961),
p. 7.
99

Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 11 (May, 1961), p. 6.

23Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 1 (July, 1961), p. 2.
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Department.

On April 26, 19 61, the Attorney General filed a

petition with Judge Oren B. Lewis of the federal district court
asking him to permit the Justice Department to enter the Prince
Edward case as a co-plaintiff.

The request marked the first

time that the federal government took the role of a complain
ing party in a desegregation suit.

The Justice Department

asked the court to stop payment of state and county grants
to the county's private school, to prohibit local tax credits
in favor of Prince Edward's private schools and to
order the county's officials to reopen the public school.
Until the public schools of Prince Edward were reopened, the
Justice Department requested that the court order the state to
withhold funds from all Virginia localities.

The legal basis

of the Justice Department's intervention was its interest in
preserving the judicial process and administration of justice
against attempts to undermine them by circumvention and nulli24
fication.
Attorney General Kennedy's intervention was condemned
by all of Virginia's political leaders.

Although the Justice

Department's objective was to open Prince Edward's public
schools and not to close Virginia's public schools, Byrd Demo
crats emphasized the ramifications of the latter possibility.
By opposing the Justice Department, organization Democrats were
placed in the unfamiliar role of public school savers.

24Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 11 (May, 1961), p. 1.
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293
Democrats predicted that to give in on the Prince Edward case
would merely invite greater federal tyranny.

Representative

Watkins M. Abbitt, Jr. described the intervention as "an
attempt by totalitarian executive action and judicial usurpa
tion of power to make hollow shells of our state and local
government and assume dictatorial control over purely local
functions."

25

The News Leader denied that Prince Edward County

was disobeying any court order.

"The federal courts have no

right to command Prince Edward County to operate any particu
lar schools.

All the courts can lawfully do is to say to

Prince Edward County, 'You must treat all residents of the
26
county alike.1"
Since all students were prevented from
attending the public school and all students were qualified to
receive tuition grants, Kilpatrick reasoned that there was no
discrimination.
On June 24, Judge Oren Lewis denied the request of the
United States to enter the Prince Edward case.

27

In his

opinion, Judge Lewis held that neither the Rules of Civil
Procedure nor federal statutes gave the Justice Department the
authority to intervene in the case.

28

Moreover, Judge Lewis

rejected the major contention of the Justice Department which

2^Ibid., p. 5.
26

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, April 27, 1961, p. 10.

27Allen v. School Board of Prince Edward County, VI Race
Rel. L. Rep. 432 (E.D. Va. 1961).
28Id. at 434.
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was that Virginia's conduct was comparable to that of Little
Rock or New Orleans and thus in contravention of a federal
court order.

In Virginia and Prince Edward County, "there has

been no known defiance of this Court's orders." 29

In contrast

to the use of violence, Judge Lewis wrote that the court had
not yet determined whether or not a community violated an order
to prohibit assignments based on race by closing its schools.
Until it was determined that a court order was violated, Judge
Lewis found no justification for the intervention of the United
States.

Furthermore, Judge Lewis was of the opinion that he

could not rule on the validity of Prince Edward's action until
Virginia's courts had construed the county's obligation under
30
the state constitution.
Finally, in spite of the Justice
Department's denials that it did not want to close all of
Virginia's schools, Judge Lewis wrote that to permit the fede
ral government to intervene "could jeopardize the education of
several hundred thousand Virginia children." 31
The attempted intervention by the Justice Department
played directly into the hands of the old massive resisters.
Though it attempted to underscore the plight of the Negro chil
dren, the Justice Department gave ardent segregationists another

29

Id. at 435.

30Id. at 435, 438.
^Id. at 438.
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opportunity to assert their argument that the defense of local
rights rather than desegregation was the issue in the Prince
Edward case.

Federal intervention also undermined the position

of the Stephens slate which had indicated greater determination
to use state power to open Prince Edward's public schools.
On July 11, Albertis Harrison won the Democratic guber
natorial primary by defeating A. E. S. Stephens by a vote of
199,519 to 152,639.

Mills Godwin and Robert Button won by

slightly smaller margins.

While the organization seemingly was

as strong as ever, the voting returns demonstrated that it was
relying more heavily than ever on the dwindling rural white
vote.

Harrison received only fifty-three percent of the urban

vote but won an impressive seventy-one percent in the Southside.
Godwin's margin of victory in the cities was slightly over a
thousand votes, but he also carried the Southside by a lopsided
margin.

The results of the election suggested that the school

issue had lost its political value.

With the establishment of

a consensus that Virginia could not return to massive resistance,
the elections of the 1960's would hinge more on differences between urban and rural interests.

32

On August 25, 1961, Judge Lewis issued his ruling on the
two questions raised by the NAACP in the Prince Edward litiga
tion.

As expected, Judge Lewis refused to deal with questions

of the constitutionality of Prince Edward County's decision to
close the public schools.

In reviewing the previous holdings,

3 2Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, pp. 239-240. Harrison easily
defeated the Republican candidate, H. Clyde Pearson.
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Lewis indicated that in construing Section 129 of the state
constitution, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Harri
son v. Day appeared to determine "that public schools must be
maintained m

33
Prince Edward County, Virginia."

But the Judge

believed that the defense's contention that public education
was a local rather than a state responsibility under the Vir
ginia Constitution must be settled.

Since the question of

authority over public schools involved interpreting the Virginia
Constitution, Judge Lewis decided to defer a ruling on this
■ the state courts had acted. 34
matter until
Turning to the issue of local tax credits and state and
local tuition grants, Judge Lewis found them to be unlawful as
long as Prince Edward County refused to operate its public
schools. 35

Judge Lewis did not say that state and local aid to a

private school was illegal per se.

In Prince Edward County

local grants and tax credits became "unlawful when used to
accomplish an unlawful end,

(the perpetuation of segregated

schooling in Prince Edward County)."

36

A number of Virginia's editors saw Lewis's decision as
an opportunity to end the Prince Edward litigation.

Their hope

33 Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
198 F. Supp. 497, 500 (E.D. Va. 1961).
34Id. at 500-01.
35Id. at 504.
36Id. at 503.
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was that Prince Edward County would reopen some of its public
schools in order to solidify the tuition grant plan.37

Lead

ing the editorialists was James Kilpatrick, one of Prince
Edward County's staunchest admirers.

In urging county offi

cials to open a few public schools, Kilpatrick reasoned:

"It

would be good for white and Negro children (if for different
reasons); it would be good for the county's economy, and it
would be good for the rest of Virginia in the stability it
would give the 'Freedom of Choice' plan." 3 8

By eliminating

blatant violations of freedom of choice in Virginia, Kilpatrick
thought the state would strengthen its case for tuition grants
in the federal courts.

Since the white children of Prince

Edward County would continue to attend private schools, Kil
patrick reminded the county that its social and educational
goals were not compromised by reopening some public schools.
Finally, Kilpatrick suggested that to win the right to close
public schools was ultimately self-destructive.

Though not

belittling the county's legal struggle, Kilpatrick observed

37

Editorials, Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 30, 1961,
p. 20. In .its survey of editorial response to Judge Lewis'
decision the Charlottesville Daily Progress, Lynchburg News,
Roanoke Times, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot joined the Times-Dispatch and News Leader in hoping that Prince Edward would open
its public schools in order to save the tuition grant plan.
3 8Editorial, Richmond News Leader, August 30, 1961,
p . 12.
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that "beyond the delimited area of what is right; a course of
action can be legal and still be, in a deeper sense, wrong.
The leaders of Prince Edward County refused to budge
from their position that principle precluded any compromise.
In analyzing the Lewis opinion, J. Barrye Wall, editor of the
Farmville Herald, believed that the Virginia Supreme Court must
settle the question of Prince Edward's authority over public
schools.

Furthermore, Wall stressed the fact that Lewis did

not specifically rule that tuition grants to segregated private
schools would be upheld if the public schools were reopened. 40
Determined to preserve its private schools without opening
public schools which permitted desegregation, the Prince Edward
School Foundation launched a statewide campaign for private
contributions to subsidize students unable to pay tuition
fees.^
Following Judge Lewis' opinion the NAACP asked the Vir
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing
the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors to levy taxes and
42
appropriate funds for the operation of public schools.
The
crux of the NAACP1s argument was that under Section 129 of the
Constitution Virginia was required to operate public schools.
Boards of Supervisors, the plaintiffs argued, were "mere

39

Ibid., August 25, 1961, p. 12.

^ Farmville Herald, August 29, 1961, p. 4-A.
^ Richmond News Leader, August 28, 1961, p. 1.
A9

p. 4.

Southern School News, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (October, 1961),
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administrative agencies of the State," and could not be re
lieved of their duties under Section 136 to provide funds for
43
public schools.
In reply, the state and the county argued
that Section 136 authorized but did not require localities to
44
appropriate funds for public schools.
The defense also con
tended that to order the board of supervisors to finance public
education would destroy the principle that citizens cannot be
taxed without their consent or that of their representatives. 45
While the Virginia Supreme Court weighed the presenta
tions of the litigants, the General Assembly gathered in Rich
mond for its regular biennial session.

Unlike the previous

three regular sessions, the desegregation question was virtually
neglected.

Toward the end of the session, John C. Webb of Fair

fax made an effort to amend the budget bill in the House of
Delegates so that state funds could be provided to "correct the
appalling condition" of Prince Edward County.

The amendment

was defeated by a voice vote of the House members.

Inaction

was defended on the grounds that the problem was a county matter
and that nothing should be done to interfere with the litigation
before the state and federal courts.

46

43Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 5 (January, 1962), p. 8.
44t, .,
Ibid.
4 5Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 9, 1962, p. 3.
4^Southern School News, Vol. VIII, No. 9 (March, 1962),
p. 1. Governor Harrison joined the General Assembly in champion
ing a "hands off" policy.
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On March 5, 1962, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
in a unanimous decision ruled that the Virginia Constitution
imposed no duty on the county's board of supervisors to levy
taxes or appropriate money for the support of public schools.

47

The court held that the board of supervisors was a legislative
body and that taxing was a legislative function not subject to
. .
48
judicial control.
The court emphasized that under Section
136 a locality was authorized but not required to raise money
for public schools.

Regardless of the meaning of Section 129,

the court found that this section was aimed at the General
Assembly and therefore, irrelevant to the present proceedings.

49

Southside legislators and Governor Harrison were pleased
. .
50
with the state court's decision.

The decision, however, did

not point to any solution to the school problem.

Rumors spread

that the county would voluntarily open its school in order to
receive tuition grants, since they seemed to have won the legal
issue.

However, if the county intended to open the public

schools, it had no intention to reopen them on a desegregated
basis.

Rather than reopening the entire school system, the

Board of Supervisors was reported to be willing to appropriate
money for a few Negro schools. 51

47 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County,
124 S.E. 2d 227 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1962).
48Id. at 233.
49
Id. at 231-3 2.
50

Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 6, 1962, p. 2.

^ I b i d . , March 11, 1962, p. B-l.
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But any such plan was dropped when the attorneys for the Negro
plaintiffs announced that they would renew their fight in the
federal courts.

Believing that they had satisfied Judge Lewis'

instructions to test certain sections of the Virginia Constitu
tion in the state courts, the Negro attorneys returned to his
court asking him to rule on the federal constitutional issues.
Besides seeking an order reopening the public schools, the
NAACP requested that the temporary injunction on tuition grants
52
be made permanent.
With the legal issues unresolved, Prince
Edward's Board of Supervisors for the fourth consecutive year,
decided against appropriating funds for public schools. 53
In May of 1962 when the case was reargued before Judge
Lewis, he was critical of the NAACP lawyers.

During a lengthy

oral argument, the Judge charged that the NAACP attorneys had
failed to follow his directions prescribed in August. 54

Accord

ing to Judge Lewis, they had been instructed to ask the Virginia
Supreme Court whether Prince Edward County had violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 129 of the Virginia Constitu
tion.

Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that no agreement was

52

Southern School News, Vol. VIII, No. 10 (April, 1962),
p. 16. Judge Lewis had implied that tuition grants would be
enjoined only until public schools were reopened. The NAACP
appealed this decision in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
on the grounds that public funds converted the private schools
into de facto public schools. On April 4 Judge Lewis extended
the injunction of tuition grants until public schools were
reopened.
53Ibid., Vol. IX, No. 1 (July, 1962), p. 1.
54

Judge Lewis' directions are found in Allen v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, 198 F. Supp. 497 501
(E.D. Va. 1961). See page 295.
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made to raise federal issues in the state court.

After a

sharp exchange with Judge Lewis, Robert L. Carter, of New York,
said that any order to argue a federal issue before a Virginia
state court would be appealed.

The NAACP position on Section

12 9 was that it operated on the General Assembly and not the
55
county.
Judge Lewis took the position that the "paramount
issue" was whether county schools "can be closed in the face of
129.

This should have been answered five years ago."

56

Yet in

Harrison v. Day, decided in January of 1959, the Virginia Su
preme Court of Appeals supposedly decided this question.
Judge Lewis himself acknowledged as much in his August, 1961,
ruling when he wrote, "it would appear from this decision that
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had determined that
public schools must be maintained in Prince Edward County,
. .
57
Virginia."

Unlike Judge Lewis, Robert L. Carter believed

that instead of Prince Edward's obligation under Section 129,
the primary question was "whether the closed schools violate
the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment." 5 8
Judge Lewis' comments led numerous observers to believe
that he would order the Negro plaintiffs to return to the state
court. 59

However, on July 25, 1962, Lewis held that Prince

55 Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 19, 1962, p. 1.

^^Ibid.
57Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
198 F. Supp. “497 , 500 (E.D. Va. 1961).
co

Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 19, 1962, p. 1.

5^Southern School News, Vol. VIII, No. 12 (June, 1962),
p . 10.
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Edward County's public schools "may not be closed while the
Commonwealth of Virginia permits other public schools to rem a m open at the expense of the taxpayers." 60

In his opinion,

the Judge neatly summarized the major issues of fact and law.
In examining the purpose of closing its schools, Judge Lewis
asserted that without question the object of Prince Edward was
to defy the Brown decisions.

After citing the pertinent sec

tions of the Virginia Constitution, and the tradition of state
and local responsibility for operating public schools, Lewis
found no basis for the county's claim that public schools were
strictly a local matter outside the purview of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Furthermore, Judge Lewis thought Prince Edward's

defiance was not strictly limited to the community, since it
had the approval of state school officials and state attor
neys.^

Finally, Judge Lewis considered the county as

an agency or arm of the state government. The United
States Constitution recognizes no governing units except
the federal government and the states. A contrary posi
tion would allow a state to evade its constitutional
responsibilities by carve-outs of small units. At least
in the area of constitutional rights, specifically with
respect to education, a state can no more delegate to
its subdivision the power to discriminate than it can it
self directly establish inequalities.62

^ Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
207 F. Supp. 349, 355 (E.D. Va. 1962).
61Id. at 3 52, 3 53.
62Id. at 354.
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Judge Lewis ordered Prince Edward County to open its
schools in September, 1962.

As an incentive, Judge Lewis

wrote that the injunction placed on tuition grants would be
lifted with the resumption of classes in public schools. 63
The leading state newspapers urged Prince Edward County
64
to submit to the federal court's ruling.
Editorialists united
in the view that the Prince Edward stalemate was resulting in
irreparable damage to the Negro children as well as to the
image of Virginia in the nation and the world.

Pragmatically,

the resumption of classes was advised, once again, as a method
of strengthening the tuition grant plan. 65

But Prince Edward

remained intransigent as its editorial spokesman, J. Barrye
Wall, reminded his readers that the county's position was
"fundamental to the perpetuation of the republic.
Judge Lewis' ruling failed to end the deadlock in Prince
Edward County.

The lawyers for the school board appealed the

district court's ruling to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
and simultaneously asked for a ruling in the state circuit court

63Id. at 3 55.
64
Editorials, Richmond News Leader, July 27, 1962, p. 8;
Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 27, 1962, p. 8; Lynchburcr News,
July 27, 1962, p. 6; Norfolk Virginia-Pilot, July 27, 1962,
p. 4; Roanoke Times, July 27, 1962, p. 6.
65

In July the State Department of Education reported that
8,518 grants were approved during the 1961-1962 school year val
ued at $2,074,690. This amounted to 391 more grants than the
previous year. The figures were found in the Southern School News,
Vol. IX, No. 2 (August, 1962), p. 3.
66

Editorial, Farmville Herald, July 27, 1962, p. 1.
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of Richmond on Section 129.

67

When Judge Lewis stayed the

execution of his order pending action by higher federal courts,
Prince Edward's schools were closed for the fourth consecutive
year.

68

While the Prince Edward case was lodged in the federal
court for almost a year, similar issues were raised in Powhatan
County, where the school population was almost evenly divided
between Negro and white students.

In the face of rumored school

closures, a desegregation suit was instituted on behalf of
Negro school children.

On January 2, 1963, Federal District

Judge John D. Butzner ordered that three plaintiffs be admitted
to white schools and enjoined the Powhatan School Board from
making assignments based on race.

69

Moreover, Judge Butzner,

after citing the Prince Edward case, entered an injunction prohabiting the closing of public schools.

70

Although the Butz

ner ruling may have prevented a repetition of the Prince Edward
disaster, his decision met with a mixed reaction.

The moderate

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot praised Butzner's wisdom in preventing
another school closing. 71

67

. .
However, the Richmond dailies
were

Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 2 (September, 1962),

p . 3.
^Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
7 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1080 (E.D. Va. 1962).
69

Bell v. County School Board of Powhatan County, 7
Race Rel. L . Rep. 1083 (E.D. V a . 1963).
70 Id. at 1087. The next day Butzner stayed the desegragation order but remained firm on the injunction against school
closings.
71Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 5, 1963, p. 4.
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furious with Butzner1s decision to prevent local officials from
withdrawing financial support from the public schools.

"The

issue (.taxation without representation) is greater than whether
or not there shall be public schools in any county," wrote the
72
Trmes-Dispatch.
Something equally fundamental was also bothering segre
gationists.

In the Powhatan case, as in desegregation suits

throughout the state, the NAACP attorneys were beginning to
argue that ever since 1955 every school board had a duty to
73
desegregate.
The objective was to smash the well-known dic
tum enunciated by Judge Parker in Briggs v. Elliot.

In the

Powhatan case, Judge Butzner refused to issue an order requir74
m g the school board to desegregate the schools.
Yet, if the
court could prevent a school from closing, the News Leader,
for one wondered why the same court could not order school
boards to take steps to ensure the desegregation of all public
schools.

"The next step is an injunction directed to white

parents of the county, commanding them to march their children
by lockstep into the school rooms, lest the three Negro

72 Editorial, Richmond-Times-Dispatch, January 5, 1963,
p. 4.
73This point will be developed in the next chapter. Not
until 19 65 did Negro attorney ask for an order which required a
school district to insure a desegregated education for every
black student.
^^Bell v. County School Board of Powhatan County, 7 Race
Rel. L. Rep.' 1083, 1086 (E.D. Va. 1963).
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plaintiffs be forever wounded in their hearts and minds for
75
want of white companionship."
Editor Kilpatrick, to his
regret, proved to be an able forecaster of the future court
holdings requiring school boards to draft plans for desegrega
ting public schools.

No matter what the federal courts said,

Kilpatrick and his approving readers believed that desegregation
trampled upon the so-called right of white parents to send their
children to schools which were overwhelmingly white.
The futility and confusion surrounding the Prince Ed
ward case were magnified in 1963.

The attorneys for Prince

Edward County went to the state courts in order to obtain a de
cision on the county's responsibility to provide public schools
under state or federal law.

The strategy of the Prince Edward

lawyers was based on the hope that higher federal courts would
be influenced by a judgment made by the highest court of Virgin76
ia.
In the Richmond Circuit Court, the county's position was
upheld by Judge John Wingo Knowles.

Finding no federal statute

requiring a state to operate a public school, Judge Knowles
emphasized that in Virginia, public education was based upon

"the theory of home rule and local option." 77

He upheld tuition

grants for the same reason.

75Editorial, Richmond News Leader, January 4, 1963, p. 8.
^ Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 10 (April, 1963),
p. 5.
77

Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County v. G n f f r n ,
(Circuit Court, City of Richmond) 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 94,
109-10.
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Though in agreement with Judge Knowles' reasoning, both
Richmond newspapers continued to urge Prince Edward County to
open its public schools.

After praising Knowles' judicial

reasoning, Editor Kilpatrick concluded that the time had come
"to think a little less about rights, and to think a little
78
more about wrongs."
His counterpart on the morning paper,
Virginius Dabney, made the same plea.

Dabney also correctly

predicted that the Knowles decision was bound to be overruled
by a higher federal court.

79

Governor Harrison meanwhile re

mained immovable in the face of the growing criticism of his do
nothing policy while the case was in the courts.

He broke his

silence only to point out that Judge Knowles' ruling vindicated
the state's position.

80

To intervene, Harrison remarked again,

meant "extensive and far-reaching revision of laws relating to
public schools and taxation."

81

helplessness lacked credibility.

In retrospect, the plea of
In 1956, Harrison played a key

role in "extensive" legislation which prevented a locality from
opening its schools against the wishes of the state.

A major

assumption of massive resistance was that education was a state
rather than a local responsibility.

In 1959, Virginia legis

lators once again passed "extensive" legislation to ensure token

7 8Editorial, Richmond News Leader, March 29, 1963, p. 10.
79 Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 29, 1963,
p. 10.
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 21, 1963, p. 2; March 18,
1963, p. 5.
o•]
Ibid. March 29, 1963, p. 5.
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desegregation.

One of the saddest ironies of the Virginia

school crisis was that the legislators were willing to pass
"extensive" legislation to close a maverick school, but were
unable to pass "extensive" legislation to keep a school open.
One perceptive explanation for the governor1s inaction
was given by the editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot.

"Mr.

Harrison, the NAACP, Prince Edward authorities, and the people
of Virginia are waiting for the Supreme Court to make them do
their duty."

82

Paradoxically, a state which cherished home rule

and vilified the Supreme Court had placed itself in a position
in which only the Supreme Court could open the schools of Prince
Edward County.
vantages.

Politically a court solution had several ad

First, the public schools would be opened, an objec

tive which most state political leaders and editorialists
publicly supported.

Second, the Governor, a Southsider, would

have to make no apologies to his colleagues within the organi
zation once classes resumed.

The state government had supported

Prince Edward County to the end of the judicial rope.

Finally,

court action would permit the organization to once again lead
the way in crying out against judicial legislation.
On August 12, 1963, after a delay of a year, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Judge Lewis1 ruling that Prince
Edward County must be reopened as long as Virginia's public
schools were open in the remainder of the state.

The three-

judge panel split 2-1, with the majority holding that the

o9

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 22, 1963, p. 4.
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district court should have abstained until state courts had
83
decided questions of state law.
In the majority opinion,
Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. subscribed to three major ar
guments consistently made by Virginia segregationists.

First,

he cited Briggs v. Elliot and repeated the familiar dictum that
neither a state nor a locality was required to integrate its
schools as long as admission policies were not racially dis
criminatory.

As if to put the legal debate over the Briggs

dictum to rest, Judge Haynsworth implied it was no longer an
issue since "the negative application of the Fourteenth Amendment is too well settled for argument." 84

Judge Haynsworth

believed that the school closings were not a violation of a
court order since the county had "abandoned discriminatory ad
mission practices when they closed all schools as fully as if
they had continued to operate schools, but without discrimination."

85

Third, Haynsworth considered Prince Edward's private

school effort genuinely independent rather than a clever
evasion of the Brown ruling in which the state conspired.

86

Ultimately the question of the "state action", according to the
Judge, rested on a "determination, under state law of Virginia's

83Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County,
322 F. 2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963).
84Id. at 336.
85x,
.j
Ibid.
86Id. at 337-38.
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role in the operation of public schools in Virginia "by the
on

Supreme Court of Appeals1
.'
In a brief dissenting opinion, Judge J. Spencer Bell
wrote that public education was indisputably a state function
in Virginia as evidenced by provisions for state funding, a
State Board of Education, and State Superintendent of Public
Instruction.

88

Judge Bell objected strenuously to the major

ity's opinion that school closing was "a permissible compliance
with the Supreme Court's order."

89

took issue with the Briggs dictum.

Then, significantly, he
"Equal educational oppor

tunity through access to nonsegregated public schools is secured
by the Constitution.

The state has an affirmative duty to

accord to all persons within its jurisdiction the benefits of
that constitutional guarantee." 90
An appeal was made by the NAACP to the United States
Supreme Court.

However, before the Supreme Court acted the Vir

ginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled on the appeal from the
state circuit court.

In a 6-1 decision the highest Virginia

Court upheld the lower state court.

91

Prince Edward could not

o7
Id. at 340.
88Id. at 345.
89

Id. at 348.

90TU..
Ibid.
91County School Board of Prince Edward County v. Griffin,
■
133 S.E. 2d. 565 (V a . Sup. C t . App. 1963).

be compelled to appropriate funds "by the General Assembly, by
this court or by any authority except its own people."92

Lo

calities, the court held, were merely "authorized" to appropriate
local funds which then triggered state aid. 93

In a semantical

argument, the majority held that Section 129 required the
General Assembly to provide an "efficient system" of public
schools but not a particular school or group of public schools.

94

To permit the General Assembly to assume the county's responsi
bility would result in a "centralization of control and of
operation foreign to the spirit as well as to the letter of the
95
Constitution."
The majority also upheld tuition grants to
Prince Edward students and saw no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

96

Chief Justice John W. Eggleston wrote a sharp dissent.
Interpreting Section 129 literally, Judge Eggleston argued that
the General Assembly had the responsibility not only to establish
but to maintain a public school system.

By providing funds to

the local school board, the General Assembly, wrote Judge
Eggleston, in no way interfered with local operation.

To the

Chief Justice the local-state distinction made by the majority
. . as agents of
was contrived. 97 Since he viewed the localities
the state, Judge Eggleston saw the school closing as a direct
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

313
Amendment.
dicted:

98

In a prophetic conclusion, the Chief Justice pre

"The refusal of the highest court of this State to

recognize here the rights of the citizens of Prince Edward
County, guaranteed to them under the Constitution of the United
States, is a clear invitation to the federal courts to step in
and enforce such rights.
be promptly accepted.

I am sure that that invitation will

We shall see!" 99

The Fourth Circuit and Virginia’s Supreme Court decisions
brought Virginia no closer to a solution of the Prince Edward
problem.

The Roanoke and Norfolk papers were critical of the

state and federal court decisions. Although the Richmond
papers approved of the decisions, they remained firm in their
belief that legal victories were self-defeating.'*'^

In Septem

ber of 1963, however, Negro children attended full time schools
for the first time in four years under the direction of the
Prince Edward Free School Association, the result of cooperation
of federal, state and local leaders.

Using public school build

ings and financed by private donations, the schools were viewed
as a stop-gap measure aimed at ending the educational drought

98

Id. at 584.

99
Ibid.
^Editorials, Roanoke Times, August 14, 1963, p. 6;
December 4, 1963, p. 6; Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 3, 1963, p.
A-4; Richmond News Leader, August 13, 1963, p. 10, December 3,
1963, p. 18; Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 13, 1963, p. 12,
December 3, 1963, p. 22.
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for black children.

Negro leaders gave their support on the

condition that they would not be expected to relax their
effort to win a favorable court decision.'^'*"
On May 25, 1964, ten years after the first Brown deci
sion, the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. School
Board of Prince Edward County held that Prince Edward County
had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by closing its public
102
schools.
Writing for the majority, Justice Black found that
the public schools had clearly been closed with the intent of
preventing desegregation.

If a state permitted its public

schools to be closed, he emphasized that the "object must be a
constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.11103

Black agreed

with the district court's order enjoining tuition grants and
tax credits as long as public schools were closed.

Furthermore,

he suggested that the district court, in order to prevent dis
crimination, "may" require the Board of Supervisors to levy
taxes for the support of public schools.

104

On this controver

sial point of the decision, Justices Clark and Harlan registered
dissents.

105

Ihe threat of such an unprecedented order probably

~^4Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 4 (October, 1963),
p. 3. Bob Smith has a good discussion of the background events
in They Closed Iheir Schools, pp. 236-40.
102

Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
103

Id. at 231.

104Id. at 23 2-33.
105

°Id. at 234.
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was influenced by the case's long and complicated history.
Justice Black observed:

"The time for mere 'deliberate speed'

has run out, and that phrase can no longer justify denying
these Prince Edward County school children their constitu
tional rights to an education equal to that afforded by public
schools in other parts of Virginia."

10 6

The Virginia reaction to the Griffin decision was not
monolithic.

Congressman Watkins Abbitt, who represented Prince

Edward County, immediately introduced a bill in the House of Rep
resentatives which would have prohibited a federal court from
requiring a state or a locality to levy a tax.

Crying out

against "brazen power" and "judicial dictatorship," Abbitt charg
ed that the Griffin decision destroyed "the separation doctrine.
Temporarily, he was joined by the News Leader which said
that the Supreme Court's decision amounted to a "dictatorship
imposed by judicial oligarchy" since it undermined the principle
of "no taxation without representation."

108

However, the Roa

noke Times and Norfolk Virginian-Pilot were more critical of the
inactivity of Prince Edward County and generally supported the
decision. 109

To Governor Harrison, the most significant aspect

^ ^ Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 12 (June, 1964),
p . 10.
^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 26, 1964, p. 10.
‘'■^Editorial, Roanoke Times, May 26, 1964, p. 6.

107
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of the ruling was that the Supreme Court's opinion did not
categorically rule out the use of tuition grants.

"If the Court

wanted to say they [tuition grants] were illegal, it had a won
derful opportunity to do so," commented the Governor.110

Roa

noke, Norfolk, and Richmond papers joined Governor Harrison in
emphasizing that the most important issue related to the Prince
Edward case was the future of the tuition grant plan.111

Editor

Kilpatrick saw a splendid opportunity for a trade in which
Prince Edward would voluntarily reopen its classes in return for
a resumption of tuition grants and a Negro promise to keep hands
off the Prince Edward School Foundation.

112

Because of the great concern for preserving the tuition
grant plan, Virginians were concentrating their attention on
another Southside county case which raised some of the same
issues found in the Prince Edward litigation.

In August of 1963,

the Surry County School Board elected to close its white public
school following instructions from the State Pupil Placement
Board to enroll seven Negro students.

White students, with the

aid of tuition grants, enrolled in the newly created white pri
vate schools.

Unlike the Prince Edward case, however, the county

continued to operate its two Negro public schools.

The Negro

110Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 12 (June, 1964),
p. 10.
111Ibid. and Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 26,
1964, p. 18; Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 29, 1964,
p. 14 .
112
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 29, 1964,
p . 14 .
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plaintiffs immediately asked for an injunction requiring the
reopening of the closed public school and restraining the pay113
ment of tuition grants.
Advocates of the tuition grant
plan were under the impression that federal courts would uphold
the plan provided that public schools were available for Negro
students.

The Surry County Case was accordingly viewed as an
114
important test case.
On June 18, 1964, Federal District Judge John D. Butzner
ordered the school board to reopen its white school and enjoined
115
further tuition grants.
In comparing the Surry case to the
Prince Edward case, the availability of Negro public schools
was not considered a significant distinction.

Butzner wrote:

"Both situations are variations upon the same theme.

State and

County funds are used to perpetuate racial segregation in the
schools of Surry C o u n t y . T h e

effect of Butzner's decision

was limited by his conclusion that the order applied specifi
cally to Surry County and not to any other communities or the
. .
tuition
grant plan itself. 117
Both admirers and critics of Butzner recognized that his
decision was a big step in the direction of overturning the
113 Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 3 (September, 1963),
p. 18; Vol. X, No. 4 (October, 1963), p. 3.
114 Editorial, Richmond News Leader, June 4, 1964, p. 10.
Editor Kilpatrick entitled his editorial "The Big Case" in which
he defended the tuition grant plan.
115 Pettaway v. County School Board of Surry County, 23 0
F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1964).
116Id. at 485-86.
117Id. at 486-87.
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the tuition grant program.

Editor Kilpatrick viewed the ruling

as "the worst yet" of a series of rulings amounting to a "rape"
118
of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot praised the "courageous” Butzner for shattering "the
hopes of the Deep South and Southside Virginia of setting up a
device where an entire white public school system would simply
put on a private guise to perpetuate segregation." 119
Following the Butzner decision, the NAACP continued to
attack the tuition grant plan until it was declared unconstitu
tional in 1969.

Although Prince Edward County finally opened

its public schools in the fall of 1964, Negro attorneys asked
the district court to prohibit tuition grants for the 1964-1965
school year.

Judge Lewis agreed to enjoin retroactive tuition

grants but not payments for the coming school year.

He cited

the Supreme Court's failure to rule on tuition grants in Griffin
as authority for his decision. 120

The Negro plaintiffs, there

upon, appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which
consolidated the Prince Edward and Surry County cases since
they dealt with the same issues.

121

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, June 22, 1964, p. 12.
119

Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 20, 1964,

p . 10.
12 0

Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, ix
Race Rel. L7 Rep". 1313 CE.D. V a . 1964) .
~~~
121The Surry School Board appealed Butzner's ruling pro
hibiting tuition grants and ordering attorney's fees.
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On December 2, 1964, in a unanimous decision of five
judges, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that tui
tion grants to Surry County and Prince Edward County were unconstitutional.

122

in an opinion written by Judge Simon Sobeloff,

the court dealt with several key aspects of the tuition grant
debate. Accepting the argument of the Negro attorneys, the
court found:

"The involvement of public officials and public

funds so essentially characterizes the enterprise in each of the
counties that the Foundation schools must be regarded as public
facilities in which discrimination on racial lines is constitutionally impossible."

123

Knocking down a basic argument of the

defenders of tuition grants, the court said:

"It is of no

importance whether grants are made directly to Foundation schools
or indirectly through the conduit of pupil subventions for
restricted use as tuition fees.

In the circumstances disclosed

in the present cases there is a transparent evasion of the Fourteenth Amendment."

124

Finally, the court dismissed the argument

that tuition grants were guaranteed by the right of freedom of
association.

"The clear and unavoidable implication of the Brown

decision is that white persons have no constitutional right to
associate in publicly maintained facilities on a segregated
basis.

We do not deal here with the right of persons to send

122

Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County,
339 F. 2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964)
123Id. at 492.
124..,
Ibid.
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their children to segregated schools at their own expense."125
The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
only to Prince Edward and Surry counties, but held out little
hope for other localities employing public funds in segregated
schools.
After the victory in the Fourth Circuit, the Negro
attorneys attacked the tuition grant laws "on their face" in a
suit against the State Board of Education and ten localities.
In Griffin v. State Board of Education a three-judge district
court held that tuition grants were not automatically unconstitutional.

X 26

Tuition grants to private schools, the court ruled,

only violated the equal protection clause when they represented
the "preponderant", "main", or "greater part" of the financial
127
support.
In the case at hand the court found that Virginia
was "nurturing segregated schools" and enjoined further grants
as long as the private schools excluded Negroes and received preponderant financial support from the state.

128

In response to the legal attack, the General Assembly
met in December of 1964 at the request of the Governor to
"purify" the tuition grant plan.

125

New legislation was passed

Id. at 493.

12^Griffin v. State Board of Education, 23 9 F. Supp. 560
(E.D. Va. 1965)”
12^Id. at 565.
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which provided that grants could not exceed the per-pupil cost
behind public school pupils and that teachers in all private
nonsectarian schools were eligible for state retirement benefits,
not just the teachers in private nonsectarian schools organized
after 1956.

The legislators also repealed a series of laws

which had been passed to facilitate the construction of private
schools.

Private schools would no longer benefit from laws per

mitting them to ignore zoning and building ordinances, allowing
local tax credits to citizens contributing to private schools,
and providing transportation grants in order to bus private
school children.

129

The Negro attorneys were not satisfied with either the
legislation or the judicial action concerning tuition grants.
Almost immediately private schools recognized that they could
easily circumvent the ruling by establishing a quota of tuition
grant students which would be below fifty percent.

Consequently,

the newly created private schools figured to receive substan
tial benefits from the grant program without falling under the
court's preponderant rule.

However, the chairman of the NAACP's

legal staff, S. W. Tucker, was determined to press the case
against tuition grants until the presence of only one tuitiongrant child in a segregated school was construed as an unconstitutional state action.

130

In February, 1969, four years after

"lOQ

Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 6 (December, 1964),
p . 11.

130Ibid., Vol. XI, No. 10 (April, 1965), p. 7.
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Tucker had designated his goal, the same three judges who had
established the "preponderant" rule declared the tuition grant
131
statutes unconstitutional.
In re-evaluating the 1965 deci
sion, the court emphasized that its old ruling had to be adjusted
in accordance with two intervening United States Supreme Court
rulings upholding federal district court decisions in Louisiana
132
and South Carolina.
Based upon the interpretation of these
cases, the district court found that "any assist whatever by
the State towards provision of a racially segregated education
exceeds the pale of tolerance demarked by the Constitution." 133
Thus, the tuition grant statutes were put to rest almost ten
years after they were introduced as an integral part of a plan
to prevent "enforced desegregation."

134

As of the fall of 197 0, only a handful of white students
attended Prince Edward County's public schools.

The outcome

of the litigation in 19 64 did not undermine the community's
commitment to segregated education or to its private schools.
Likewise, for Negroes, the legal victory did not result in de
segregation.

Only the future can tell whether white students

131

Griffin v. State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp.
1178 (E.D. Va. 1969).
13 2
.
.
.
Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission v. Poindexter, 38 9 U.S. 571 (,1968) ; South Carolina State Board of
Education v . Brown, 393 U.S. 222 (1968).
13 3

Griffin v. State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp.
1178, 1181.
■^^Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 6 (December,
1964), p. n
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will ever return in significant numbers to the public schools.
The Prince Edward case demonstrated the limitations of the
judicial process in cases where a community's opposition to
desegregation was extreme and either implicitly or explicitly
supported by the state's political leaders.

Prince Edward

County also showed that the policy of passive resistance
based on local differences could be as effective in prohibiting
desegregation as the earlier strategy of massive resistance.
In their zeal to defend local rights, Virginia's leading news
papers parted company with Prince Edward for several reasons.
First, they saw the litigation as senseless, since, win or
lose, the schools would remain segregated in the county.

Second,

they wanted Negro children in school and an end to unfavorable
national publicity.

Finally, Prince Edward's resistance

jeopardized the tuition grant plan which was the heart of the
freedom to choose a segregated education, especially in rural
Virginia.

CHAPTER X
LITIGATION, 1959-1964
The stalemate in Prince Edward County dominated the
publicity given to the segregation activities in Virginia from
19 59 to 196 4.

However, in the Old Dominion, the extreme mea

sures adopted by Prince Edward County were the exception and
not the rule.

Nevertheless, by employing more subtle tech

niques, desegregation progressed at a snail's pace following
the collapse of massive resistance.

By the fall of 196 3, only

3,720 or 1.63 percent of Virginia's Negroes were attending
schools with white children.^

After 1959 school boards found

a variety of techniques for upsetting Negro efforts to enter
white schools.

This chapter will trace the stream of litigation

instituted by black attorneys as they attempted to knock down
the evasive devices of token desegregation.
Between 1959 and 196 4, the NAACP lawyers had their
greatest success in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

In a

number of cases the district court judges upheld plans which, on
their face, were not discriminatory, but which had the result of
perpetuating token desegration.

On appeal the Fourth Circuit

Court frequently overturned the lower courts and, in turn,

^Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 11 (May, 1964), p. 1.

324

325
forced school boards to draw up more liberal desegregation
plans.

The case for tokenism was built on the apparently un-

shakeable dictum enunciated in Briggs v. Elliott

by a three-

judge federal district court in South Carolina which included
Judge John J. Parker, the South's leading jurist at the time.
This court wrote that Brown did not order integration but re
quired merely the prohibition of student assignments based on
3
race.
Under this dictum, racially separate schools did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment as long as an assignment was
racially neutral on its face.

Judge Parker's prestige in the

South, the long accepted theory that a state's obligation under
the Fourteenth Amendment was negative rather than positive,
and the favorable results from a Southern white viewpoint made
^ le Briggs opinion a formidable legal obstacle to desegregation.
Consequently, school boards utilized a variety of placement
methods which superficially were unrelated to race, in order
to limit desegregation.

Academic testing, grade-a-year plans,

dual attendance zones, minority transfers, and the neighborhood
school were a few of the assignment techniques used to restrict
black enrollment.

The black students who initially succeeded

in passing through this maize were usually of the highest cali
bre.

The official rationale for this policy was that most Negro

^Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. supp. 776 (E.D. S.C. 1955).
3Id. at 777.
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children would suffer psychologically if they were placed in
more competitive schools.

Unofficially, white school officials

and parents believed that their children were spared the sup
posed threat to quality education resulting from desegregation.
As a result, in the early 1960's desegregation was limited to
brighter and usually older black children.

But legally and

educationally such a policy was intolerable to the NAACP.
The State Pupil Placement Board ably assisted local
school boards in their efforts to slow the pace of school de
segregation.

The Board, controlled by massive resisters from

its inception in 1956, was reformed in July of 1960.

Three

members were appointed by Governor Almond, since the previous
threesome was unwilling to bridge the gap from a policy of
massive resistance to passive resistance.

The new Placement

Board recognized that its legal viability depended on assign
ing a few Negroes to white schools, and in July, for the first
time in its history, the Board reflected Virginia's new school
policy and voluntarily assigned a Negro to a white school.
However, the Board's conservative position on desegregation was
insured by its carefully selected membership, which included
Dr. E. J. Oglesby, a mathematics professor at the University of
Virginia and president of the Albermarle-Charlottesville chap
ter of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Li
berties .^

^Southern School News, Vol. VII, No. 2 (August, 1960),
p. 10.
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The Pupil Placement Board, in theory, handled all the
assignments of Virginia's public schools unless a school dis
trict at the request of its school board and governing body,
chose to withdraw from its authority.

In practice, the Board

rubber-stamped most assignment recommendations by the local
officials and considered carefully only contested assignments.
Usually these were black students who desired to enter a white
school.

As a result, the desegregation procedure was more

complicated and also had the effect of shifting the responsi
bility for desegregation away from local school officials on
controversial cases.
Beginning in 1959 and 1960, Negro attorneys conducted
litigation which directed the school boards to apply assign
ment

criteria equally to white and black children.

As early

as March of 1959, in Hamm v. County School Board of Arlington
County (19 59), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Negro applications for transfer were not to be subjected to
tests which were not applied to white students.^

The following

year, in April, the Fourth Circuit of Appeals forcefully re
iterated this rule regarding the use of residence and academic

5
. . .
Local school officials preferred to have the Virginia
Placement Board take the responsibility for assigning black
children to white schools. Not until 1961 did the first school
districts withdraw from the supervision of the Placement Board.
Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196 4, this
trend accelerated until the Placement Board was dissolved in
1966.
^Hamm v. County School Board of Arlington County, 26 4
F. 2d 945 (4th Cir. 1959).
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•
•
achievement m

Jones v. School Board of Alexandria (1960).

7

However, the court carefully added that both criteria "could
be properly used as a plan to bring about racial desegregation
O
m accordance with the Supreme Court's directive."
Further
more, in line with the Briggs dictum, the court saw no reason
to order "the complete reassignment of all pupils in the pub9
lie schools of Alexandria."
In Blackwell v. Fairfax County School Board (1960) ,
Negro plaintiffs charged that the Fairfax grade-a-year plan
was discriminatory and dilatory.'1'0

Fifteen Negro children had

been refused admission to white schools because they did not
fall within the prescribed grades of the School Board's assign
ment plan.

The plaintiffs contended successfully that the speed

of desegregation was too slow under the school board's plan.
In accepting the plaintiff's argument, District Judge Albert V.
Bryan did not categorically rule out such plans.

Instead,

he emphasized that they must be judged according to the char
acter of the community.

Since the Negro school population of

7

Jones v. School Board of City of Alexandria, 278 F.
2d. 72, 77 (4th Cir. 1960).
^Ibid.
°Id. at 76.
^°Blackwell v. Fairfax County School Board, 5 Race Rel.
L. Rep. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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Fairfax County was less than four percent, Bryan considered
the fear of racial friction an unacceptable justification for
such a cautious desegregation plan. 11
Another scheme for delaying desegregation in Virginia
was the minority transfer plan.

The Charlottesville Board of

Education was the first of Virginia's school boards to have its
minority transfer plan tested m

the federal courts. 12

The

Charlottesville assignment plan placed all elementary school
students in the school of their residential district.

However,

any student assigned to a school where the other race predomi
nated was permitted to transfer to a school where his or her
race prevailed.

The minority transfer was designed to rescue

white elementary students located in the city's only predomi
nately black residential district.

The assignment plan for

secondary students also worked to the disadvantage of Negro
students.

White students attended the only white public high

school in the city whereas black students were required to at
tend the black high school unless they lived closer to the
white school and passed an aptitude test. 13
On December 18, 1961, in Allen v. School Board of
Charlottesville, (1961), Judge Paul upheld the minority transfer

11

Id. at 1058. Three years later the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in Jackson v. School Board of City of
Lynchburg, 321 F. 2d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 1963), that grade-ayear plans were not acceptable in Virginia.
12

Allen v. School Board of City of Charlottesville, 203
F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Va. 1961).
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plan for elementary schools, but found the high school plan
14
discriminatory.
in evaluating the elementary school plan,
Paul acknowledged that it fell "far short of any complete or
enforced integration.

In fact, it contemplates that there

should be no compulsory integration.

Nevertheless, this court

feels it is permissible and is not discriminatory." 15

Judge

Paul found no evidence of discrimination in the minority trans
fer plan because both white and black children were permitted
to exercise this option.

However, Negro attorneys objected

that black children residing in the predominately Negro ele
mentary school district should be allowed to transfer out like
their white counterparts.

In reply, Judge Paul explained:

"In insisting that Negroes resident in Jefferson district (the
Negro district) attend Jefferson school the authorities are
merely following the principle of requiring pupils to attend
the school within their area of residence."^

Judge Paul

firmly believed that the law did not require forced integra
tion and thought the majority of both races supported this
view. 17
In overturning the high school plan and ordering free
dom of choice for secondary students, Judge Paul contradicted
his emphasis on the neighborhood principle and minority trans
fer used in upholding the elementary school plan.

14

Ibid.

15Id. at 227.
16Ibid.
■^Ibid.

The most
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objectionable part of the secondary assignment plan, to Judge
Paul, was its discriminatory use of academic testing.

As a

result only above average Negro students were automatically
18
enrolled.
Judge Paul gave no explanation for adopting a
freedom of choice plan for the high schools.

However, he re

jected freedom of choice on the elementary level because he
thought the result "would be chaotic with some schools practically deserted and others crowded beyond capacity." 19
The Charlottesville precedent was adopted by other
federal district court judges in Virginia.

In Arlington Judge

Oren B. Lewis upheld a minority transfer provision which was
combined with a neighborhood assignment plan.
on Judge Paul's opinion, Lewis wrote:

20

Relying heavily

"To prohibit the right

of transfer, granted both Negro and white pupils under like
condition, would be to require assignment of all pupils sole
ly on the basis of residence, resulting in the enforced integration of all public schools."

21

The law, Lewis held, did not

require integration, and, he added, "a substantial number of
both Negro and white parents desire the right to send their
children to a school in which a majority of their race attend."

18Id. at 228-29.
19Id. at 227.
70
Thompson v. County School Board of Arlington County,
7 Race Rel. L." Rep. 45 (E.D. Va. 1962).
21Id. at 49.
22

zzIbid.

22
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Judge Lewis agreed with Judge Paul that freedom of choice in
vited administrative chaos.
In Jackson v. Lynchburg, (1962), Judge Thomas J. Michie
reached the same conclusion as Judges Paul and Lewis.

23

Judge

Michie believed that without a minority transfer plan white
parents would abandon public schools in Lynchburg and through24
out the South.
The minority transfer in combination with neighborhood
school assignments was widely viewed as the best method for
achieving Virginia's goal of no enforced desegregation.

Fol

lowing the Charlottesville and Arlington decisions the Richmond-Times-Dispatch approvingly observed:

"If the rulings of

Judges Lewis and Paul continue to prevail in Virginia, no
child in this state will ever be forced to attend a school in
which most of the other students are of another race."

25

By

1962, schools boards had found out that the minority transfer
and residential assignments were the best means of satisfying
the courts' prohibition against discrimination and restricting
desegregation in Virginia's public schools.

School officials

dropped other assignment criteria such as achievement tests
rather than applying them to white children which risked
greater desegregation.

23

Jackson v. School Board of City of Lynchburg, 203 F.
Supp. 701 (W.D. Va. 1962).
24Id. at 705.
2"*Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 23, 1962,
p. 10.
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In Dillard v. School Board of Charlottesville (1962),
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a narrow 3-2 decision held
0£
unconstitutional the use of minority transfers.
In Charlottes
ville all 149 white elementary students who would have attended
the Negro elementary school exercised their option to transfer
out of the school.

The school board argued that the transfers

were not discriminatory, since all the children had the same
opportunity to exercise the option to transfer.
In a per curiam opinion, the majority held that the
apparent equality of the minority transfer plan was not signifi
cant "if the purpose and effect of the arrangement is to retard
27
integration and retain the segregation of the races."
Enroll
ment statistics proved to the majority's satisfaction, that
"the actual effect of the rule is unequal and discriminatory."

28

Finally the court held that personal preferences of both races
were more equitably honored "not by restricting the right of
transfer but by a system which eliminates restrictions for the
29
.
.
.
.
right."
The majority indicated that its decision was m line
with rulings by the Fifth Circuit Court which had already in
validated a minority transfer plan and the Sixth Circuit which
had warned that the minority transfer plan could become uncon-

Dillard v. School Board of City of Charlottesville,
308 F. 2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962).
27Id. at 923.
2 8r-u•A
Ibid.
29Id. at 923-24.
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stitutional if it perpetuated segregation. 30
There were separate dissenting opinions by Judge Albert
V. Bryan, recently elevated to the circuit court, and Judge
Clement Haynsworth, Jr.

Though desegregation was retarded,

Judge Bryan did not consider the result a violation of the
Brown decision.

The Fourteenth Amendment, Bryan held, did not

"guarantee a student an integrated school to attend." 31

The

concentration of Negroes in one elementary school, Bryan wrote,
was not by design but by residence.

Until housing patterns

changed, Judge Bryan argued that Negroes "must abide by rules
and regulations based on just and fair district lines." 3 2
Bryan defended the minority transfer rule as "permitting a
child to express his wishes . . . even though his wishes be
based

33
on racial grounds." Yet

gro plaintiffs,

did notpermit

such a rule, countered the

Ne

a Negro living in the same dis

trict to exercise his choice.
Judge Haynsworth elected to discuss the psychological
basis for the minority transfer.

Haynsworth believed that com

pared to segregated education, attending a school with a majority of another race was "a much more searing experience."

34

30 Id. at 923. The cases cited by the court were Boson v.
Rippy, 285 F. 2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960); Goss v. Board of Education
of City of Knoxville, 301 F. 2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962).
34Id. at

925.

32Id. at

926.

33Id. at

927.

34Id. at

928.
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Though he believed that the problem of adjustment existed for
both races, Haynsworth, in effect, saw the minority transfer
as necessary to retain the support of the white community for
public schools. 35
Virginia's Attorney General Robert Y. Button considered
the Dillard decision "one of the most far-reaching decisions
entered by any court involving segregation in schools since
Of
Brown v. Board of Education.11
Considering the decisions al
ready handed down in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeal, the claim was an exaggeration. 37

Moreover, the major

ity's opinion did not upset the Briggs dictum.

In voiding the

minority transfer, the Fourth Circuit said it preferred a plan
which eliminated all restrictions on transfers.

This was free

dom of choice, but not a holding which required desegregation.
Thus, the Dillard decision dealt a blow to school boards using
the minority transfer but was narrow enough to permit the adop38
tion of other evasive assignment plans by school authorities.
On May 22, 1962, in Green v. School Board of Roanoke,
(1962), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed another
district court decision when it rejected an assignment plan

35Id. at 929.
^ Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 4 (October, 1962)
p. 2 .
^ Boson v. Rippy, 285 F. 2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Goss v .
v. Knoxville, 301 F. 2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962).
38Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 4 (October, 1962)
p. 2.
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which included dual attendance zones and a "feeder system" de39
vised by the City of Roanoke.
Initially all black children,
regardless of residence, were placed in segregated schools.
Negroes, who attended the black elementary schools in one sec
tion of the city, were, on graduation, automatically placed in
black schools which served this zone exclusively.

As a result

of the so-called "feeder system," a black child once again was
placed in a segregated school even if he lived closer to a
white school.

A Negro child who requested a transfer to the

closer white school faced two more hurdles.

First, the student

had to score "well above" the median of the white class to which
he or she sought enrollment.

Even if successful, the applica

tion was refused if the child's brother or sister were not
above the median of the classes which they chose to enter.

Cit

ing its opinions in cases from Charlottesville, Norfolk, and
Alexandria which held that assignment and transfer criteria must
be applied equally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had no
. .
.
40
difficulty voiding the Roanoke pupil assignment plan.
In the Roanoke case, the Fourth Circuit Court also
singled out the State Pupil Placement Board for special criticism.
Technically the State Board made all the assignments for Roanoke.
In actual practice the court showed that the State Board

•3Q
Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke, 304 F. 2d
118 (4th Cir. 1962). Dual attendance zones referred to a prac
tice where a school district had one set of attendance lines for
black children and another set for white children.
40Id. at 122-23.
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considered only local assignments which were protested.

On

contested Negro applications, the court found that the State
Board "wanted to know if there were any Negro pupils who cannot
be excluded from attending white schools except for race."^1
The court's conclusion was that the State Board was preoccupied
with race, "and its approach was to find some excuse for deny
ing the Negroes' applications for transfers.
The decisions nullifying dual attendance zones, academic
tests for Negroes only, and the minority transfer led to an ad
justment in assignment policy by the State Pupil Placement Board
and local school boards in the direction of freedom of choice.
On May 14, 1963, E. J. Oglesby reported that the distance a
Negro lived from a white school and academic qualifications
were no longer to be considered in placing a Negro student.
Oglesby promised:

"If a Negro child wants to attend a school on

the opposite side of the county, he will be assigned to that
school if a white child in his area is entitled to attend the
43
same school."
Although the thrust of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decisions was to force school authorities to adopt freedom of
choice assignment plans, this court refused to abandon the Briggs
dictum as demonstrated in the Richmond school case Bradley v .
44
School Board of Richmond.
The fear of black engulfment was

41

Id. at 123.

42
* Ibid.
43

44

Southern School News, Vol. IX, No. 12 (June, 1963), p. 19.

.
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 317 F.
2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963).

especially pronounced in the capital city where, by 1960,
black enrollment exceeded white enrollment in the public
schools.

45

The Richmond school officials, however, were very

successful in limiting desegregation to a token number through
the employment of dual attendance zones, a feeder system and
a discriminatory use of achievement tests.

46

Furthermore,

the Richmond school officials disclaimed any responsibility for
integrating the schools by arguing that this responsibility belonged to the Pupil Placement Board. 47

On May 10, 1963, the

Fourth Circuit Court enjoined Richmond's discriminatory prac
tices and registered its disbelief that school authorities were
unaware of the decisions in Charlottesville, Norfolk, Alexan
dria and Roanoke which had spoken on these issues.48

In criti

cizing the Richmond school officials, the court charged that
their assignment plan was not only discriminatory, but that the
plan also "demonstrated its potential as an effective instru. .
.
49
mentality for creating and maintaining racial segregation."
Thus, the court suggested that the Brown decision meant that
school officials must attack segregation as well as discrimi
nation.

However, in its conclusion, the court returned to the

45 Staff Reports submitted
.
.
.
to the United
States Commission
of Civil Rights, Civil Rights U.S.A., Public Schools Southern
States, 1962, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1962), pp. 185-88.
46Bradlev, 317 F. 2d 429, 31-34.
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guidelines of Briggs v. Elliot.

The plaintiffs, the court

held, were not "entitled to an order requiring the defendants
^° a general intermixture of the races in the schools but they
are entitled to an order enjoining the defendants from refusing
admission to any school of any pupil because of the pupil's
race." (the court's emphasis) 50
By the fall of 196 3, the NAACP litigation was yielding
steady but not dramatic results.

In February of 1959 Negroes

entered white schools in Virginia for the first time, a total
of thirty blacks being so enrolled.

In September of 1963, the

beginning of the fifth school year since the end of massive
resistance, this number increased to 3,721 or a mere 1.57 percent of the black students enrolled in Virginia's, schools.

51

However, Negro lawyers had successfully overturned a number of
devices to perpetuate token desegregation such as the dual
attendance zones, feeder systems, discriminatory achievement
tests and minority transfer plans.

With these victories in the

background and the most extensive civil rights bill in the
nation's history before Congress, Virginia's Negro leaders were
ready to attack what Roy Wilkins described as "the largest and

Cjfl

,

Id. at 438. On March 18, 1963, in anticipation of the
Fourth Circuit Court's order the Richmond School Board dropped
dual attendance zones and the feeder system for a "freedom of
choice" plan.
51

pp. 1, 5.

Southern School News, Vol. X, No. 6 (December, 1963),
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and most successful token integration program in the country."
S. W. Tucker, chief attorney for the Virginia NAACP, promised
a "big push" to end all segregation in Virginia.

The NAACP1s

effort would end, Tucker promised, "only when there are no
white and Negro schools in Virginia, only public schools."

c3

As a first step toward implementing this goal, W. Lester Banks,
executive-secretary of the NAACP announced that petitions were
to be sent to all 128 biracial schools districts asking them to
54
desegregate their schools.
Consistent with their strategy to end all segregated
schools, the NAACP initiated suits against school districts
which it believed had not gone far enough in eliminating
segregation.

In pursuing this litigation, the black lawyers

continually advanced the argument that the Brown decision
prohibited segregation as well as discrimination.

In Fairfax

County, with a sparse Negro population, the plaintiffs argued
that the existence of all Negro schools was evidence of dis
crimination.

Judge Lewis, in Blakeney v. Fairfax County School

Board, (1964), disagreed and found that children attended allNegro schools "solely on account of their place of residence or
• 55
by choice."

When the Negro plaintiffs appealed the decision,

52Ibid.,

Vol.X, No. 5 (November, 1963), p. 8.

53Ibid.,

Vol.X, No. 7 (January, 1964), p. 2.

54Ibid.,

Vol.X, No. 11 (May, 1964), p. 4-A.

CC

Blakeney v. Fairfax County School Board, 226 F. Supp.
713, 715 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that "the injunction
to prohibit a system of segregated schools . . . should have
56
been granted."
On remand, Judge Lewis found the question moot
since all the plaintiffs had been assigned to white schools and
all Negro children were permitted to attend the closest white
school upon request.

57

Judge Lewis denied that the school

board had to choose between integrating or closing white schools,
as the plaintiffs demanded.

"The Supreme Court, he emphasized,

had not ordered enforced integration. It has outlawed discri58
mination."
Anticipating the future course of the litigation,
Judge Lewis added that school authorities would never have to
transport students "for the purpose of integrating those segregated schools." 59
In Beckett v. School Board of Norfolk, (1964), Judge
Walter Hoffman adopted the same position as Judge Lewis in up
holding a desegregation plan which utilized a combination of
freedom of choice and neighborhood assignments.89

The Negro

Blakeney v. Fairfax County School Board, 334 F. 2d
239, 240 (4th Cir. 1964).
c7

Blakeney v. Fairfax County School Board, 2 31 F. Supp.
1006 (E.D. Va. 1964).
58Id. at 1009.
59Ibid.
80Beckett v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 9 Race
Rel. L. Rep. 1315 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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attorneys, who pressed for the elimination of all identifiable
Negro schools, argued that Norfolk's plan was not adequate un
til both faculties and student bodies were racially balanced.
Judge Hoffman made no apologies for the schools which were
still segregated.

"This is the principle of the neighborhood

school which had received at least tacit approval of the
United States Supreme Court when certiorari was denied in Bell
v. City of Gary. " ^ Continuing, Hoffman thought that "a free
dom of choice plan, so long as all children living within a
designated area have an equal choice available, is constitution62

al."

Finally, Hoffman emphasized:

"A racially desegregated

school system was not intended to correct racial imbalance in
certain schools." 63

Judge Hoffman argued that desegregation in

Norfolk was de facto rather than de jure.

Implicit in Hoffman's

opinion was the belief that the law of desegregation should not
treat Norfolk any differently than a northern city such as Gary.
The demand to desegregate faculties had several objec
tives.

First, the Negro attorneys argued that the racial com

position of a faculty contributed significantly to the identifi
cation of a school as a white or black school.

Second, lawyers

^Id. at 1317. See Bell v. City of Gary, 324 F. 2d 209
(7th Cir.T963) cert, denied 377 U.S. 924 (1963) in which the
federal courts upheld a neighborhood school plan for Gary,
Indiana.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
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hoped to protect black teachers and administrators who were
often released following the implementation of a desegregation
64
order.
There were a number of educational and sociological
reasons for demanding desegregated faculties.

The ability of

black and white faculty members to work together was, and is
still viewed as indispensable in achieving an integrated, as
compared to a desegregated, school system.

Also, many educa

tors considered it necessary for black children to see Negroes
administrative and supervisory positions. 65

m

However, the

Negro attorneys met stiff resistance in their advocacy of de
segregated faculties.

Judge Hoffman remarked:

"If it is not

incumbent upon a school board to 'force' integration among the
pupils, why is it required that a school board 'force' integra- 6 6
tion upon the school faculties."
•

The tenacity of the Negro attorneys reaped some results
in the number of Negroes entering white schools in the fall of
1964.

The 11,833 Negroes who attended classes with white stu

dents far exceeded earlier expectations for that year.

Of all

the southern states only Texas had more black students in white
schools.

f.A

Nevertheless only 5.07 percent of Virginia's black

Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 2 (August, 1964),

p. 5.
65

Interview, Dr. Robert T. Greene, director of the Tech
nical Assistance Program to assist Virginia School Divisions
on Problems Relating to Desegregation.
Beckett v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 9 Race
Rel. L. Rep. 1315 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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enrollment was m

white schools.

67

In terms of numbers, the

NAACP strategy of massive litigation was not successful.
The time-consuming legal process, as Virginia's leadership
expected, worked to the advantage of segregationists.

However,

the NAACP did succeed in maintaining a steady pressure upon
Virginia to integrate its schools.

When Congress passed the

1964 Civil Rights Act the NAACP was prepared to take advantage
of the federal legislation.
By 1964 the status of the Virginia Conference of the
NAACP, as an organization within Virginia, was more secure.
For several reasons the campaign to limit the Virginia NAACP's
effectiveness had failed.

First, the anti-NAACP laws of 1956

and 1959, because of their rather poorly disguised purpose,
never received broad editorial support from Virginia's news
papers.

Second, the lawyers for the NAACP were never convicted

of any gross indiscretions regarding the practice of law.

Finally, as a result of the litigation testing the anti-NAACP
laws, the activities of this civil rights organization won
broad guarantees from the Supreme Court protecting its activities.

In NAACP v. Button (1963),

68

the Supreme Court declared

^ Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 6 (December, 1964),
p. 1 .
^ N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The other
anti-NAACP laws were declared unconstitutional by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142 (1960),
116 S.E. 2d 55 (1960) and the circuit court of Richmond in NAACP
Lecral Defense and Education Fund v. Harrison, 7 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 864 (1962).
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declared unconstitutional the last Virginia statute aimed at
thwarting the NAACP, and took a big step in the direction of
making the supervision of litigation a constitutionally privileged activity under the Fourtheenth Amendment. 69

This law

prohibited attorneys from accepting employment or compensations
from persons or organizations which were not parties to judi
cial proceedings.

In the Supreme Court's opinion written by

Justice Brennan, the Court said "the activities of the NAACP,
its affiliates and legal staff are modes of expression and
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate
70
the legal profession. . . . "
Thus as the Negro Revolution
in the United States entered a more militant phase, the NAACP
appeared decidedly more respectable to white Virginians.

On

the ninth anniversary of the Brown decision the Norfolk Vir
ginian-Pilot wrote it was "time to re-evaluate the entire
civil rights scene."

In comparison to the Black Muslims and

Martin Luther King, the editor thought:
now seems conservative m

"The NAACP . . .

its reliance on the courts."

71

69 Harry P. Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 75-86.
7QId. at 428-29.
"^Editorial, Norfolk Virginia-Pilot, May 17, 1963,
p. 10.
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In the Fall of 1964, with its legal position strength
ened and its spirits buoyed by legal victories and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, S. W. Tucker, Chairman of the legal staff
of the Virginia NAACP announced that suits would be filed ask
ing the courts to order school boards to initiate plans to end
segregation.

Beginning in 1965, Negro attorneys embarked on

a legal campaign to place every black child in an integrated
1
72
classroom.

^ Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 5 (November, 1964),
p. 8 .

CHAPTER XI
THE ATTACK UPON FREEDOM OF CHOICE
Beginning in 1965 the NAACP concentrated its legal effort
on persuading the federal courts that the Brown decision meant
all Negro children had the right to attend desegregated public
schools.

After unsuccessfully petitioning Virginia school

boards to draw up voluntary desegregation plans, in March of
19 65 Negro lawyers filed eight law suits asking the courts to
order the defendant school boards to take the initiative in
desegregating their classrooms. Negro lawyers promised as many
as fifty such suits in Virginia until the responsibility for
desegregation was shifted from solitary Negroes to the respec
tive school boards.'*'
By 1965 the greatest legal obstacle to desegregation was
the freedom of choice plan.

Although it permitted students to

enroll in any school within a school district, the initiative
for admission and the burden of transportation were placed with
the Negro parent or child.

In other words, responsibility for

desegregating the public schools still rested with the blacks
rather than the school officials.

Black leaders feared a cas

ual acceptance of freedom of choice for two reasons.

First,

^Southern School News, Vol. XI, No. 10 (April, 1965),
p. 7.
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they were convinced that parental inertia meant that actual
desegregation would be negligible.

W. Lester Banks, executive

secretary of the Virginia Conference of the NAACP, wrote to
the state branches that white school officials were aware that
"Negro parents are too indifferent, too afraid and too satis
fied and contented to accept the responsibility of helping
their children escape from the damaging effects of a Jim Crow
educational system."

2

Secondly, without white students in

"black" schools, Negro leaders were persuaded that the "black"
schools would not receive the same financial support as "white"
schools.2
On April 7, 1965, in a 3 to 2 decision a freedom of
choice plan was upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond.^

In 1963

the city's school officials erased all school boundaries, al
though free choice was limited by the enrollment capacity of
the school which the student desired to attend.

The Negro

plaintiffs did not question the existence of a freedom of
choice plan, but argued that the plan failed to eliminate se
gregation.

However, in the opinion of the majority, written

2Ibid., Vol. XI, No. 12 (June, 1965), p. 5.
3
Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 18, 19 71, p. C-l.
Financial statistics reported by the Citizens for Excellent
Public Schools, a Richmond biracial organization dedicated to
strong public education, supported this argument.
^Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 345 F.
2d 310 (4th Cir. 1965).

by Judge Clement Haynsworth, the Briggs dictum still governed
desegregation suits.

"It has been held again and again . . .

that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition is not against se
gregation as such.

The proscription is against discrimi5

nation," wrote Haynsworth.

Within the boundaries of the

Briggs dictum, it followed logically that freedom of choice
was a perfectly "acceptable device for achieving a legal de
segregation of schools."^

Although free choice resulted in

little desegregation, Haynsworth found this the result of
"voluntary associations” which were not prohibited by the law.
Failing to see any mandate under the Constitution to
order actual desegregation, Judge Haynsworth also saw the
plaintiffs plea for desegregated faculties as irrelevant in
this case.

The plaintiffs, he wrote, had failed to demonstrate

any relationships between teacher assignments and pupil discri
mination.

Curiously, although Haynsworth saw the connection

between teacher-pupil desegregation as "speculative," he pre
dicted that desegregation in teacher placement would be
g
achieved after the elimination of pupil discrimination.
The dissent, written by Judge Simon Sobeloff, doubted
that the Richmond scheme was "a plan of desegregation."

The

test of any desegregation plan, Sobeloff argued, depended on
whether the initiative came from the school board and whether
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the plan achieved actual results.9

Sobeloff suggested that

freedom of choice might be just another "strategic retreat
to a new position behind which the forces of opposition will
regroup."10

His opinion was predicated on the testimony of a

Richmond school official who saw no obligation to integrate
schools, and on Richmond's long record of resistance to deseg
regation.

Considering the history of lost opportunity,

Sobeloff charged that school administrators must "bestow extra
effort and expense to bring the deprived pupils up to the
level where they can avail themselves of the choice in fact as
11
well as m theory."
On the subject of faculty desegregation,
Sobeloff saw a direct relationship between the racial composi
tion of faculty and student bodies.

The racial complexion of

the faculty, he explained, contributed to the identification
of schools as either "white" or "black."

Sobeloff envisioned

no obstacle to simultaneously desegregating teachers and
.. 12
pupils.
On the same day that the Richmond school plan was accept
ed, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a school assignment plan based on geographic zoning m

the city of Hopewell. 13

9Id. at 321.
1QId. at 322.
i;LIbid.
12Id. at 324.
12Gilliam v. School Board of the City of Hopewell, 345 F.
2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965).
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The plaintiffs had claimed that some of the school lines were
gerrymandered to preserve segregation and that the general
result of the assignment plan was to promote segregation.
However, the Court, through Haynsworth, found that the school
boundaries were not gerrymandered to perpetuate segregation.‘*‘4
Haynsworth agreed that segregation was increased but added that
this was not because

of school board policy but because of

existing "residential segregation." 15

More importantly„ Judge

Haynsworth believed that the law offered no legal method of
destroying segregated schools in Hopewell or similar school
systems.

"The Constitution," he wrote, "does not require the

abandonment of neighborhood schools and the transportation of
pupils from one area to another solely for the purpose of mix
ing the races in the schools.
Judges Simon Sobeloff and J. Spencer Bell in a separate
concurring opinion accepted the concept of a neighborhood
system but with a significant reservation.

They counseled:

"In applying the neighborhood school concept, the school
board . . . must keep in mind its paramount duty to afford
equal educational opportunity to all children without dis
crimination;

otherwise, school building plans may be employed
i!7

to perpetuate and promote segregation.1

By inference, the

14Id. at 328.

15Ibid.

16Ibid.

17Id. at 329.

352
Sobeloff-Bell qualification meant that the neighborhood school,
though convenient, was not sacred when it interfered with
equalizing educational opportunity.
The Haynsworth-Sobeloff exchange presented, in microcosm,
the two poles of the school debate from 1965 to 1972.

Judge

Haynsworth accepted freedom of choice assignment plans, en
dorsed the neighborhood school, and opposed techniques for
ensuring actual desegregation.

Judge Sobeloff thought that the

true test of any school plan under the Brown decision was its
contribution to desegregating the schools.

The logical exten

sion of this position was an approval of faculty desegregation,
busing, consolidation, or any other technique which seemed to
increase the probability of school desegregation.
The Richmond Times-Dispatch approved of the Fourth Cir
cuit's decision in Bradley and warned that "unless it wants to
break new ground and go beyond the 1954 ruling, the high tri
bunal will uphold the view so soundly presented yesterday by
the Fourth Circuit majority."

18

However, when the NAACP pro

ceeded immediately to appeal the Bradley and Gilliam cases,
the Warren Court responded by indicating a readiness to explore
techniques for maximizing school desegregating.

19

In granting

certiorari, the Supreme Court consolidated the Bradley and

18Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 8, 1965,
p. A-16.
19Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 382
U.S. 10 3 (1965)“
—
—
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Gilliam cases for the limited purpose of determining whether
the Fourth Circuit could approve school plans without con
sidering, in a full hearing, the effect of alleged racial dis
crimination in faculty apportionment on the student assignment
plans.

On November 15, 1965, the Supreme Court found "no merit

to the suggestion [by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals]
that the relation between faculty allocation on an alleged
racial basis and the adequacy of the desegregation plans is
entirely speculative." 20

Thus, the Court remanded the case to

the district court for full evidentiary hearings on this issue.
In March of 1966, Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. approved a faculty

desegregation plan for Richmond which provided for recruitment
and assignment policies aimed at desegregation.

21

In seeing a symbiotic relationship between faculty and
student segregation, the Supreme Court, for the first time,
went beyond affirming Brown I to engage cautiously in the details of desegregation.

22

Although it restricted the hearing

in the Bradley and Gilliam cases to faculty assignments, the

20Id. at 105.
21

Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, XI
Race RelT L . Rep. 1289 (E.D. V a . 1966).
22

Jack Greenberg, "The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and
Civil Dissonance," Yale Law Journal, 77 (July, 1968), 1520.
Greenberg saw the Bradley case as the Supreme Court's first
attempt at outlining the details of desegregation. He sug
gested that the Civil Rights Act of 196 4, by giving school
desegregation legislative support, sparked greater judicial
activism in implementing Brown I .
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Supreme Court wrote that this did not preclude further exami
nation of the school plans.
m

Furthermore, it warned:

"Delays

desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable."

23

Thus, the Supreme Court gave notice of its impatience with
"deliberate speed" and forewarned its subsequent disapproval
of school plans which did not lead to desegregation.
The attempt to make desegregated education a reality in
Virginia and elsewhere, gained impetus from the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.

24

Up to 1964 the burden of desegre

gation had rested completely on the shoulders of black children
and the courts.

However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided

the federal government with an administrative method of attack
ing segregated schools.

Title VI of this law prohibited dis25
crimination in federally funded programs.
Refusal to comply
26
triggered a procedure for termination of federal funds.
Thus,
the Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, to which was delegated the responsibility of pro
moting desegregation, was armed with a powerful financial
weapon in its assault on dual school systems.

To Southerners

the federal government's financial leverage appeared even more

^Bradley, 382 U.S. at 105.
2478 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. 2000 a-1 C1964).
2^Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 601, 78 Stat. 241
(1964), 42 U.S.C. 2 000d C1964).
2^Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 602, 78 Stat. 241
(1964), 42 U.S.C. 2 000d-l (1964).
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ominous when Congress increased the amount of federal funds
for southern schools in the Elementary and Secondary Education
27
Acts of 1965.
Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro
vided a mechanism by which the United States Attorney General
was permitted to initiate suits against stubborn school
boards.23
The story of HEW's educational victories and defeats in

Virginia has already been told by Gary Orfield. 29

At first

glance, the results of the federal government's effort, when
contrasted with the first ten years of implementation, were
dramatic.

The percentage of Negro students in desegregated

schools jumped from five percent in 196 4, to eleven percent
in 1965, to twenty percent m

1966.

30

However, this picture

of relatively impressive progress in the rate of desegregation
in Virginia was in fact distorted, since HEW was most success
ful in the less resistant areas of Virginia, where the Negro
31
. . .
population was small.
By contrast, desegregation m Vir

ginia's black belt counties, following three years of freedom

2779 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. 236 (1965).
23Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 407, 78 Stat. 241
(1964), 42 U.S.C. 2000 c-6 (1964).
9

Q

Gary Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Education (.New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969) , pp. 208-63 .
3QIbid., 227, 250-57.
31Ibid. 227.
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of choice, was frozen at token levels. 32
There were four broad explanations for the failure of
the federal government in Tidewater and Southside Virginia.
First, federal implementation of desegregation guidelines was
not vigorous.

HEW, for example, used its most potent weapon,

the fund cutoff, infrequently and reluctantly.

This caution

was partially explained by the political pressure applied by
Southern politicians on HEW to relax the enforcement of de
segregation guidelines.

Equally important, however, HEW

officials believed that the fund cutoff worked its greatest
damage on the poor and the black who desperately needed feder
al funds.

Politically and educationally, in other words, the
33
fund cutoff technique had serious strategic drawbacks.
Also
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the federal government
in Virginia was the poor record of the Justice Department in
instituting desegregation suits.

Limited staffing, concentra

tion on the Deep South, and cumbersome public complaint pro
cedures were factors in the Justice Department's inactivity in
. . 34
Virginia.
A second obstacle to desegregation was the freedom of
choice plan.

Although HEW considered the elimination of

32

Report of the Virginia State Advisory Committee to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, "The Federal Role In
School Desegregation In Selected Virginia Districts," 1968,
pp. 24-25.
(Mimeographed.)
330rfield, Southern Education, pp. 259-63.
"^Ibid. , p. 256
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desegrated schools its ultimate objective, local officials
interpreted the adoption of freedom of choice plans, whatever the result, to be legal and final.

35

Thus, by initially

accepting freedom of choice, HEW officials lost their capacity
to negotiate new school plans which would provide for greater
desegregation.
Thirdly, state and local officials played an important
role in the failure of desegregation in the black belt counties.
The Virginia State Advisory Committee to the Commission on
Civil Rights found that one of the keys to destroying dual
school systems involved changing the attitude of local school
officials.

In black belt counties, the Committee reported

that school officials took no initiative to end discrimination
until there was a complaint. 36

On the state level, the Depart

ment of Public Instruction did not prod local officials to
increase the pace of desegregation.

The deputy superintendent

of the State Department of Education, Harry Elmore, who ad
ministered the state's compliance with the 196 4 Civil Right's
Act, thought that it was unwise "politically or otherwise. . .
37

for our department to align itself with the federal government."
Furthermore, Elmore refused to allow his office to become "a means

3S

Ibid., p. 244; Virginia State Advisory Comm., pp. 13,

21 .
or

Virginia State Advisory Comm., pp. 9, 22-23.
37Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 338
F. Supp. "67, 153 (E.D. Va. 1972).

358
of getting information that HEW should get from the locality."

oo

Although the state officials, according to Gary Orfield, saw
themselves as "neutral bystanders, conveying information, 1139
their "neutrality" benefited local officials opposed to desegregation.
Finally, federal implementation of desegregation guide
lines in Virginia was hindered by national disaffection with
the civil rights movement.

Initially, in Virginia, HEW won

its early desegregation victories by capitalizing on the last
stages of the national drive for civil rights and the move
ment's impact on Virginia's politics.

The grip of the rural

leadership over the fortunes of the Democratic party was final
ly weakened by the rapid increase of the Negro vote and the
steady growth of the urban delegation to the state’s General
Assembly.

Virginia's blacks also benefited from federal action

which facilitated voter registration.

40

Likewise, urban Vir

ginia picked up eleven seats in the 196 4 General Assembly as
an aftermath to the Supreme Court reapportionment ruling in
41
Reynolds v. Sims.

38ld. at 152. It was not until 1970 that the Virginia
Department of Education applied for a federal grant to establish
a staff trained to assist school boards in the transition from a
dual to unitary school systems. Id. at 154.
3^Orfield, p. 220.
40Buni, Negro in Virginia Politics, p. 229; Wilkinson,
Harry Byrd, pp. 258-59, 334.
41337 U.S. 533 (1964); Wilkinson, p. 248.

The impact of the new voting trends was best repre
sented in the 1965 race for governor which was won by Mills
Godwin, a former massive resister.

The Godwin platform made

education Virginia's highest priority and won the endorsement
of labor, Negroes, conservative businessmen, and organization
42
stalwarts.
By 1967, however, it was politically possible,
for various reasons, to take a stand against desegregation
guidelines that extended beyond freedom of choice.

First, the

waning of the national civil rights movement removed a source
of important pressure of Virginia's politicians.

Second, re

segregation in the northern cities made Virginia's relative
progress in school desegregation appear more dramatic and de
fensible.

This was especially so since freedom of choice was

considered the limit of the law.

Thirdly, in view of national

racial problems, the attempt by the federal government to go
beyond freedom of choice encouraged a conservative rural-subur
ban voting coalition against further desegregation techniques.
This convergence of the national mood with state opposition to
steps beyond freedom of choice threatened to bring desegrega
tion to a standstill.

Fearing such a result, the NAACP Legal

Defense and Education Fund and the Virginia Conference of the
NAACP looked to the courts for rulings which would break the
44
stalemate.

47

Wilkinson, pp. 263-84.

^Orfield, pp. 260-63.
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After the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld free
dom of choice in the Richmond case, civil rights lawyers
consistently asked the courts to move beyond freedom of choice
to increase the speed of school desegregation.

Between 1965

and 1967 the assault upon freedom of choice made some headway
in western and northern Virginia where the Negro population was
small.

In these "pepper and salt" areas, the black lawyers

argued that there was no administrative obstacle to complete
desegregation.

Freedom of choice, they submitted, applied only

to urban areas.
City of Staunton

For example, in Bell v. School Board of the
45

the black plaintiffs won an important vic

tory when the city schools were ordered to close all "Negro"
schools and to assign all students according to non-racial
geographic zones.

46

Although Judge Thomas J. Michie did not

reject the principle of freedom of choice, he thought geo
graphic zones were superior in areas of sparse Negro population.47
The breakthrough in the campaign against freedom of
choice was achieved on May 27, 19 68, in the Supreme Court's
decision m

48
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County.

New Kent County was a sparsely populated black belt county east

45

Bell v. School Board of the City of Staunton, 249 F.
Supp. 249 (W.D. Va. 1966).
46

Id. at 251.

4^Ibid.
48391 U.S. 430 (1968).

of Richmond, in which white and black students were bused to
segregated schools located at opposite ends of the county.
Since freedom of choice had not succeeded in desegregating the
public schools, the plaintiffs asked for assignment plans based
on geographical zoning.

Justice William J. Brennan's opinion

laid to rest the dictum that the Brown decision merely prohibi
ted discrimination as Judge Parker had written in Briggs v.
Elliott.

Instead, Justice Brennan asserted, "the transition to

a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the
ultimate end to be brought about."

49

Moreover, the school

boards, rather than the parents, were "clearly charged with the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would
be eliminated root and branch."

50

A school board, the Court

held, must produce a plan that promised "to work now"

51

rather

than at some distant undetermined point in the future.
The Supreme Court did not categorically rule out the
use of freedom of choice as a technique for attacking segrega
tion.

However, freedom of choice was reduced to only one of a

number of means potentially useful in desegregating public
schools.

If other methods promised to be more effective, the
52
Court said, "freedom of choice must be held unacceptable."
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In Richmond, whose schools had been operating under a
freedom of choice plan since 1965, the News Leader blasted the
Supreme Court for trying "to satisfy the capricious appetites
of sociology gone mad."

The ruling, the editorial continued,

was"merely the logical extension of the mistaken notions of
equalitarianism that have affected the Court for years."

In

undermining the so-called principle of free choice in public
education, the paper contended that the Court 11denied the
ability of parents— white and black— to select the schools
their children will attend."

Finally, contrary to the "soci

ology of the New Left," the News Leader explained that de facto
53
segregation was the "will of the people, black and white."
The shock registered by the News Leader was not shared
by the more moderate Virginian-Pilot.

The Norfolk paper re

minded its readers that the circuit courts and the "Supreme
Court Justices have been indicating that the Brown rules are no
longer adequate."

54

However, the Virginian-Pilot doubted the

wisdom of the broad condemnation of identifiably Negro schools.
From the perspective of the city, the New Kent case was easy
since that county's housing was, in effect, already integrated.
But, the advantages of massive desegregation in Norfolk were
outweighed by the costs of achieving this goal, according to
the Virginian-Pilot.

55

53Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 28, 1968, p. 14.
^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, May 28, 1968, p. 14.
33Ibid., June 3, 1968, p. 16.
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Following the Green decision, the desegregation contro
versy was centered in Virginia's cities, especially Norfolk
and Richmond, which had large black populations.

The NAACP

asked the courts to order the school boards to devise assign
ment plans which eliminated black schools.

As a guideline, the

NAACP lawyers thought that the ratio of black to white students
in each school should reflect the racial composition of the
entire school system.

In order to achieve this goal, where

housing patterns served as obstacles to integration, the black
plaintiffs considered bus transportation a legitimate desegre
gation tool.

The appeal to destroy barriers to desegregation

through busing, however, touched off an emotional response which
paralleled the reaction to Brown I .
In the federal district court, black plaintiffs chal
lenged the Norfolk assignment plan which left large percentages
of Negro children in all black schools.

The plaintiffs argued

that the law required the elimination of all black schools and
that busing was a legally acceptable means of achieving this
goal.

In Beckett v. School Board of Norfolk (1969), Judge Walter

Hoffman held that constitutional principles did not require
racial balancing in each individual school when busing was re56
quired to accomplish this end.
Although Hoffman recognized
the adverse effects of segregation, its remedy, he wrote, had to
be consistent "with a sound educational system." 57

In his

56 Beckett v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 308 F. Supp.
1274, 1276 (E.D. Va. 1969).
57Id. at 1283.
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judgment, busing was an obnoxious remedy particularly when it
involved young children.

In addition to the expense of busing,

its "principle [sic] vice," Hoffman wrote, was "the time re58
quired m getting to and from school."
In Norfolk, the school board defended its assignment
plan by arguing that the board was guided by the most recent
social science data.

The perpetuation of black schools was

defended by the school board on the grounds that the social class
mix of the student body, rather than race was the most important
factor in determining school assignments.

This contention was

based on the famous study, Equality of Educational Opportunity,
better known as the Coleman Report, which found that the most
significant correlate of educational achievement for all chil59
dren was the social class mix of the student body.
More im
portantly , the Coleman Report found that the student milieu had
its greatest "effect on those [students] from educationally de
ficient backgrounds."69

In Beckett v. Norfolk (1969), Hoffman

accepted the information regarding the influence of social
class as evidence against the advisability of correcting racial
imbalances.

As far as educational achievement was concerned,

he considered race "definitely a secondary factor."61

In fash

ioning an assignment plan for Norfolk, Hoffman observed:

"We

58Id. at 1302.
59James S. Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, iyb6),
p . 304.
60Ibid.
61Becket 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1285.
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cannot believe that the Supreme Court, in requiring 'desegre
gation,1 has merely ordered a mixing of racial bodies without
r9

consideration of the social class factor."
The assumption that attainment of the best social class
mix was a primary objective also served as an argument against
busing and eliminating all black schools.

Forcing desegrega

tion, Judge Hoffman stressed, led to the flight of the white
middle class from the city.

As a result, he concluded, the

best educational mix would be permanently unobtainable in Norfolk schools.

63

Furthermore, Hoffman saw nothing objection

able in all-black schools when the majority of their enrollment
was middle class. 64

He bolstered his case for retaining all

black schools by citing the evidence of educational experts
who thought desegregation worked best in schools which were
sixty to seventy percent white.^
In fashioning a busing plan for Norfolk, Judge Hoffman
made a plea for a national application of the desegregation
laws.

"We cannot believe that the Constitution may be inter

preted one way for a group of states, and still another way for

62Ibid.
63Id. at 1287-88.
^Id. at 1285. This contradicted the findings of Racial
Isolation which indicated that middle-class black students
benefited academically from integrated classrooms.
65Id. at 1290-91.
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the remaining s t a t e s . T h e

target of Hoffman's dissatis

faction was the de facto "escape hatch" of Northern cities.
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited busing to
achieve racial balance,

67

the courts held that this provision

only applied to situations of de facto segregation. 6 8

However,

Hoffman declared that all school segregation— North and South—
was essentially de jure.
m

Listing discriminatory legislation

state after state prior to 1954,

69

Hoffman concluded:

"Even when such statutes were repealed prior to 1954, the
pattern of segregation may have been so well established that
its continued existence could only be de jure." 70

Thus Hoffman

proposed that the courts should no longer consider the "de
jure - de facto issue . . .

a determinative factor in arriving

at what is required under Brown I ."

71

Instead, Hoffman sug

gested that the affirmative mandate to desegregate must fit

66Id. at 1305.
^7Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec 407 (a) (2) Stat. 241
(1964), 42 U.S.C. 2000 c-6 (1964).
68U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.
2d. 836, 878-86 (5th Cir. 1966); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402 U.S.l, 17 (1971).
^Beckett, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1311-1315.
70Id. at 1304.
7^Id. at 1305.
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the circumstances of the school systems.

72

Courts were not

required to order the "impossible . . . unreasonable, unpracti73
cable."
Applying this rule to Norfolk, Hoffman refused to
order busing in the first three grades or to erase all of
74
Norfolk's black schools.
The case that Judge Hoffman made for sectional equity
was a powerful one.

Reasonable men also were impressed by his

logic that the attempt to achieve the perfectly desegregated
school system was self-defeating, given the willingness of
white parents to leave the system.

The moderate Virginian-

Pilot agreed with Hoffman's thesis that the distinction between
de jure and de facto segregation was "a distinction without a
difference."
to sanity."

75

An editorial saw Hoffman's views as a "return
Virginia also hoped that a tougher policy toward

the North might bring relief to the South.

But the most signifi

cant aspect of Hoffman's opinion was his use of social science
data to defeat desegregation.

Hoffman justified continuation

of all-black schools as consistent "with sound educational
principles."

Thus, Judge Hoffman's opinion realized the fears

of earlier commentators of the first Brown decision.

Some legal

scholars were apprehensive that Brown I rested too heavily on

7^Id.. at 1278.
74Id. at 1279.
7“^Editorial, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 1, 1970,
p . A-8.
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social science evidence.

New evidence, they had feared, might

be used to slow or stop the desegregation process.^
To the plaintiffs in the Norfolk case, Hoffman's ruling
was totally unacceptable, and in the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals they immediately appealed Hoffman's decision refusing
to order busing in the first three grades and limiting desegregation to schools which were sixty percent white. 77

The

Fourth Circuit found Hoffman's order impermissable in view
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Green v. New Kent County
and Alexander v. Holmes and ordered the school boards to devise
a plan so that "no pupil is excluded because of his race from
a desegregated school." 78

Moreover, the Court held that the

76
Edmond Cahn, "Jurisprudence," New York University Law
Review, 30 (January, 1955), 150. Professor Cahn did not find
Brown I determined on social scientific evidence, but he warned
of the dangers of basing constitutional rights on such evidence.
Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral, Principles of Constitutional
Law," Harvard Law Review, 73 (November, 1959), 31-35. Professor
Wechsler like Cahn 'did hot think Brown I was decided on social
science data, but did point out the legal problems raised by
such evidence.
77
Brewer v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 434 F.
2d. 408 (4th Cir. 1970).
78
Id. at 1410. The Court found nineteen black elemen
tary schooTs, eleven all white elementary schools, three all
black junior high schools and one all white senior high school
in Norfolk. In Alexander v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 19 (1969), a
Mississippi desegregation case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Green decision by holding that the "obligation of every
school district is to terminate dual school systems at once
and to operate hereafter only unitary schools."
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legal ramifications of the social science data were unconsti
tutional.

A "rigid adherence to quotas," wrote the Court,

"preserves traditional racial characteristics of its schools."
The result "is the antithesis of a racially unitary system."

79

80

In August of 1970, Judge Hoffman accepted a Norfolk de^segregation plan which provided for more extensive busing in
order to desegregate the schools.

Although he authorized the

new school plan, Hoffman caustically observed that it was
accomplished with "a gun at my back."

81

In other words, his

freedom of action was restricted by the higher courts.

Pre

dictably, Judge Hoffman could not resist one more parting ver
bal slap at the NAACP and the federal government who, he charg
ed, were "forcing integration solely for the purpose of mixing
bodies."83
As the federal courts ordered school boards to make de
segregation a reality in Norfolk, the school controversy return
ed to Richmond, where on March 10, 1970, black plaintiffs asked
that freedom of choice be abandoned for a unitary school sys
tem.

Since freedom of choice failed to desegregate the schools

the plaintiffs asked the court to accept a busing plan which,
they hoped,- would destroy the dual school system in Richmond.

79Id. at 411.
80t,
■ ■,
Ibid.
81Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, August 13, 1970, p. 1.
82Ibid.
.,
t i

83Richmond News Leader, March 10, 1970, p. 1.

83
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This plea touched off an explosion.

Although opposi

tion to busing was vigorous in every Virginia city, Richmond's
past and present combined to set off a reaction reminiscent of
massive resistance.

Since 1954, the capitol city, especially

through its daily newspapers, had provided a stream of argu
ments protesting the invasion of states' rights by the federal
judiciary.

As the voice of Richmond's conservative white West-

end, the editorial pages of the city's jointly-owned newspapers
lashed out at busing and the courts.
The defense of individual liberty and states' rights
explained only a part of the city's reaction.

Beneath the

rhetoric was the more fundamental question of whether or not
Richmond was on the verge of becoming a black city.

Unlike

Lynchburg, Roanoke, or Norfolk, black students already made up
a majority of the school population.

84

In 1970, the total

white population of the city, supplemented by a contested annexation, barely exceeded the Negro population.

85

. .
The critics

of busing correctly viewed the composition of the schools as a
factor in maintaining the white balance.

They recognized that,

between 1965 and 1970, freedom of choice had played an important
role in perpetuating white schools and checking white flight.
Thus, crosstown busing to achieve desegregation was not only

^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 24, 1970, p. A-l. When
the suit was reopened, sixty percent of the 50,000 Richmond
public school system was black, Norfolk's schools included
24,000 Negro students, or approximately forty-two percent of
the total enrollment.
85R i ch mon d Times-Dispatch,

May 10, 1971, B-l.

an educational problem, but a vital issue in the political,
social, and economic future of the city.
In the spring and summer of 1970, as the Richmond School
case was considered by the federal district court, the Richmond
newspapers flailed away at the concept of enforced desegrega
tion.

In developing their case, the Times-Dispatch and News

Leader emphasized several major themes.

First, in opposing

busing, the Richmond dailies attempted to disconnect their pro
test from the heritage of massive resistance.

They formulated

an argument which offered a broad urban appeal rather than one
that was narrowly southern.
the News Leader charged:

In March of 1970, for example,

"Integration is one thing:

large the nation accepts it.

By and

But busing is quite another thing

Busing for the purpose of integration is unacceptable to most
Americans .1188

Secondly, the editorials vehemently attacked

the claims of educators who claimed that integration increased
educational achievement.

A News Leader editorial reported:

"Scientific thought remains divided.

Some sociologists believe

that white children suffer when educated in all black schools;
others believe that black children who attend integrated school
87
lose their sense of racial identity and pride."
The Times-

Dispatch preferred "to educate children where they are, with
special attention to basic educational needs . . . over

^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, March 16, 1970r p. 8.
87Ibid., July 29, 1970, p. 10.
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oo
feather-brained machinations to juggle racial percentages."
Thirdly, the Richmond papers passed as defenders of black
culture.

A News Leader editorial explained that:

"Now, through

forced integration Negroes find their racial culture and their
racial identity threatened and increasing numbers of them no
longer want forced togetherness.

They want their own schools,

in which their culture can be preserved, and they want to exer89 ■
cise control over their schools."
Mimicking the rhetoric of
black nationalists, the News Leader claimed that:

"It is rac

ist to contend that a child cannot get a good education unless
he is in a class with X or Y or Z number of children of
another race."

90

Finally, the editorials played on the arbi

trary nature of the federal judiciary.

The editors embellished

the principle of free choice and asked Virginia's leaders to
make their stand on this issue.

"Freedom of choice does not

91
smack of massive resistance," wrote the News Leader.

It is

92
"what makes this country tick," claimed the Times-Dispatch.
Two years after the Green decision, the News Leader still
claimed that "Richmond's school problems . . . stem from a lack
pp
Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 13, 1970,
p. F-6.
og

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, July 22, 1970,

p. 12.
9QIbid., July 24, 1970, p. 10.
9^Ibid., July 30, 1970, p. 10.
92Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 19, 1970,
p. F-6.
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of clear definitions and constitutional interpretations of
the Supreme Court of the United States."

93

Between March and August of 1970, the opponents of
busing received two major setbacks.

First, an effort by four

teen Virginia legislators to persuade Governor Linwood Holton
to direct the state to intervene in all desegregation suits
and to suspend all desegregation plans until the Supreme Court
ruled on racial balance was a failure.

94

Recalling the past,

the petition of the legislators, some of whom were veteran
"massives," held that "the state is primarily responsible for
the operation of an efficient public school system."

95

The

News Leader which supported their strategy, wrote, "The public
hears time and again that in Virginia, the localities are
creatures of the State.

By the same reasoning, the State is

the level of government to stand firmly on freedom of choice
especially as the doctrine has been practiced in Richmond."

96

But Governor Holton resisted the pressure to make Virginia a
party to the Richmond suit.

Urging calmness and rationality,

Holton counseled against dragging the schools into the thicket
of political expediency.

97

93

Editorial, Richmond News Leader, August 26, 1970, p. 10.

^ Richmond News Leader, July 29 , 1970 , p. 1.
95Ibid.
96Editorial, Ibid., July 30, 1970, p. 1.
^7Richmond News Leader, August 4, 1970, p. 1.
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The second defeat for the antibusing forces was in^flicted by a new federal district court decision which con
cluded that transportation was "an acceptable tool" for

achieving a unitary school system. 98

Judge Robert R. Mehrige,

Jr. rested his opinion on three major points.

First, he demon

strated that the change in the racial composition of the public
schools since the adoption of freedom of choice in 1965 was
. .
99
minimal.
The Mehrige opinion on this point was especially
strong, since the Richmond School Board admitted that it was
not operating a unitary school s y s t e m . N e x t , Mehrige held
that Richmond's segregation was de jure.

Racially restricted

covenants, public housing, and urban renewal projects, he
wrote, were designed to perpetuate segregation.
cluded:

The Judge con

"Negroes in Richmond live where they do because they

have no c h o i c e . S i n c e

"residence in a neighborhood is de

nied to Negro pupils solely on the ground of color," he re
jected a neighborhood school plan as an acceptable alternative

to busing. 10 2

Finally, Judge Mehrige wrote that since the

" Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 317
F. Supp. 555, 576 (E.D. Va. 1970). The interim mixing plan
ordered in this decision called for the transportation of
approximately 13,000 students. On April 5, 1971, Judge Mehrige
approved a plan which added another 8,000 students to those
already bused to school.
"id. at 560-61.
^"id. at 558.
101Id. at 564.
102Id. at 566.
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Green decision school officials had the affirmative duty to
10 3
dismantle dual school systems.
The Mehrige opinion carefully defined the terms which
had evolved in the course of the school litigation.

In the

Norfolk case, Judge Hoffman had used the findings of educa
tional testing to argue for white majorities in desegregated
schools.

However, Judge Mehrige now argued that the establish

ment of majority white classrooms had no relation to the re
quirements of the law.

Richmond's constitutional responsibil

ity was to create a unitary school system, and, to effectuate
104
a unitary school system "a racial balance is not required."
But what was a unitary school system?

According to Judge

Mehrige it was a school system in which the "racial identities
105
of the schools" were not "readily discernible."
Judge Mehrige's decision made him the most unpopular

public official in the Richmond area.

Yet, his ruling was the

logical culmination of the Brown decision.

The dilemma of

federal judges, like Mehrige, was capsulized by Alexander M.
Bickel, Yale Professor of Law and a critic of busing.

Federal

judges who wished to guarantee equal educational opportunity,
he observed', ordered busing "because that's all a court knows
106
how to do" to achieve this goal under the Constitution.

103Id. at 576.
1Q4Id. at 564.
105 , .-j
Ibid.
106Bill Connelly, "Bickel, Busing Foe, Hits Amendment,"
Media General News Service in Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 3,
1972, p. A-4.
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However, when the Supreme Court in 1971 upheld busing as a
method for achieving desegregation, Judge Mehrige's opinion
and his refusal to stay his busing order were vindicated.
Between 196 5 and 1970 the campaign to eliminate segre
gated schools scored several important victories in Virginia
and the South.

The most important was the Green v. New Kent

County decision which held that school boards had an "affirma
tive duty" to create unitary school systems.

With this ruling

the Supreme Court put to rest the Briggs dictum which held that
under Brown school boards merely had to prohibit discrimination.
Once the Supreme Court announced that school boards had to take
all steps necessary to destroy dual school systems, busing de
cisions followed and were ultimately upheld in the Swann
. . .
108
decision.
These legal victories for desegregation, substantial as
they were, were nonetheless, paralleled by a dramatic change in
the nation's mood on racial matters.

For a moment, in 1965 and

1966, the federal government worked in tandem with the state's
energetic NAACP, in spite of a national decline in civil rights
enthusiasm.

By 1967, however, the federal government responded

to the general deterioration in race relations by attacking se
gregation less aggressively.

Against this background, the

responsibility for destroying segregation in Virginia's most

107

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
108Ibid.
-,.,
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resistant regions, the cities and the black belt, once again
rested with black plaintiffs and the courts.
In Virginia, the desegregation struggle focused on
Norfolk and Richmond.

Judges Hoffman and Mehrige were confront

ed with the problems of desegregating cities with difficult
administrative problems due to racial housing patterns.

Judge

Hoffman adopted the position that the requirements of the law
must be adjusted to the situation.

He disliked busing and

predicted that resegregation would neutralize the effects of
busing.

Although overruled by the higher courts, Hoffman's

position won approval in the state.

To legal realists, Hoffman's

rulings offered a common sense approach.

Yet to the black

plaintiffs, his decision menant a denial of desegregated edu
cation to Negro children.

Since no alternative means of dese

gregating schools was proposed, the plaintiffs doggedly pressed
for and won a busing order.
In Richmond, Judge Mehrige argued that regardless of the
obstacles to desegregation presented by a city, the Brown de
cision demanded the immediate creation of a unitary school
system.

Yet, his opinion was so unpopular that it prompted

another wave of white departures from the already majority
black public schools.

Consequently, both the Richmond School

Board and black plaintiffs saw a consolidation with two neigh
boring counties, Henrico and Chesterfield, as the only means

of assuring a desegregated school system in Richmond and the
metropolitan area.

Thus, the intractable school problem

invited solutions which seemed totalitarian and self-destruc
tive to some and necessary to others.

The federal courts, in

turn, seemed to be irresistably bound to a course which invited
a constitutional crisis.

For Richmond, the explosion occurred

on January 10, 1972, when Judge Mehrige ordered the consolida
tion of Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield public schools.

CHAPTER XII
THE RICHMOND CONSOLIDATION CASE
The decision by Judge Robert Mehrige, Jr. to permit
busing as a technique for achieving a unitary school system
did not conclude the Richmond litigation.

Instead, Judge

Mehrige's ruling prompted the Richmond School Board and the
black plaintiffs to seek still another remedy for Richmond's
predominately black school system.

In order to insure Rich

mond students an integrated education, they asked the dis
trict court to order the State Board of Education to merge
the city school system with those of the adjoining counties
of Henrico and Chesterfield.

The consolidation case had

nationwide significance, since it offered a possible method
of combating urban resegregation by crossing political bound
aries to desegregate several school systems with one judicial
stroke.

Ironically, after ten years of litigation, the major

parties in the Richmond case were united in one of the most
controversial school cases in Virginia and the nation since
Brown I.
With the busing decision, the interests of the school
board and the black plaintiffs had become almost identical.
The Richmond city schools were already sixty-four percent black
and school officials expected the busing order to accelerate
379
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white flight and resegregation.

The end result of this pro

cess, in the school board’s judgment, was a loss of confidence
in the Richmond public schools.'*'

Black leaders shared the

school board's concern for the future of Richmond's schools.
They expected the school merger to broaden the economic base
of the school system and to increase the opportunities of black
and white children to receive a desegregated education.

2

Underlying the school problem was also a concern for
the future stability of Richmond.

The reality of rising ex

penditures and the spector of a shrinking tax base,

(an urban

dilemma throughout the nation), threatened the future of Vir
ginia' s capitol.

School merger was viewed by some as a method

of fostering greater regional planning, as a means of slowing
white flight, and as a way of encouraging open housing.

If

the citizens of the metropolitan area were unable to escape
the city's problems, according to this theory, self-interest
would dictate positive action to insure the city's continued
vitality.

Leading black and white spokesmen also hope that

a merger would persuade whites to open their neighborhoods as

^Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 20, 19 71, p. A-l.
School Superintendent L. D. Adams accounted for the poor read
ing and achievement scores of city students by their low "so
cioeconomic level." The proposed metro school system contem
plated 105,000 students, of which 78,000 would be bused. The
new school system was expected to be about thirty-four percent
black. Before the trial Henrico schools were eight percent
black and Chesterfield schools nine percent black.
2Richmond News Leader, .February 4, 1971, p. 20.
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a means of avoiding busing.

3

To the plaintiffs, the future of

the city and its schools were inseparable.

With the help of

the federal courts, they hoped to persuade the counties that
a healthy city was worth the cost of the inconvenience accomconsolidation. 4

p any m g

The action taken by the Richmond School Board, however,
only escalated the ill-will existing between the city and the
counties.

In the 1971 meeting of the General Assembly, both

Henrico and Chesterfield counties, the principal targets of
Richmond1s school consolidation suit, made applications for
city charters.

The motivation of the counties was twofold.

First, they hoped that city status might prove useful in
fighting a school merger.

Before a joint hearing of the

Senate and House committees on counties, cities and towns,
Linwood E. Toombs, a member of the Henrico County Board of
Supervisors, said:

"I wouldn't deny for one moment that one

of the large considerations in this charter bill was the curxent joinder motion that the city filed."

5

Secondly, city

status offered a guarantee against future annexation suits

3
Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 17, 19 71, p. A-l.
Thomas C. Little, Richmond's associate superintendent testi
fied that merger would spark open neighborhoods; Richmond AfroAmerican, January 15, 19 72, p. 1. Henry L. Marsh III, Rich
mond's black Vice-Mayor predicted that Judge Mehrige's deci
sion would help remove discrimination in housing and jobs.
^Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 17, 1971, p. A-l.
r

Richmond News Leader, February 4, 19 71, p. 20.
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planned by Richmond.^

Many county residents did not want to

be absorbed by the city, especially after Judge Mehrige's
busing decision.

The urgent request by the counties for a

city charter was one expression of the volatility of the
emotion-laden school issue.

The General Assembly's solution

was a compromise which imposed a five year moratorium on
annexations and on granting city charters in the Richmond
7
area.
It hoped that time and study* might afford the Richmond
area and the state an opportunity to deal with this problem in
a calmer atmosphere.
As the metropolitan area waited for the consolidation
trial, it turned its attention to the busing controversy.

The

Richmond newspapers represented the position of the antibusing
forces as they surveyed the busing experiment in Richmond and
the nation.

Regarding the city's experiment, most of their

attention was focused on administrative breakdowns and racial
tensions which accompanied the transition from freedom of
choice to crosstown busing.

School violence, a sensitive pub

lic issue, received special treatment in the News Leader.

An

editorial entitled "The School Decline," included a list of
violent acts by race which showed that white students were
0
always the victims of interracial conflict.
Although the
News Leader offered several explanations for the disorders,

^Ibid.
^Acts of the General Assembly, Chapter 234, Reg. Sess.
1971, p. 466.

^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, March 8, 1971, p. 10.
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the editorial had the effect of confirming white opinion that
racial harmony was best achieved through separation.

The

Richmond School Board, in turn, recognized that a crucial
factor in winning the public1s confidence in the schools rest
ed on its ability to insure the safety of city students.
In their efforts to record the failure of busing, the
Richmond newspapers frequently clashed with Governor Linwood
Holton, who repeatedly rejected the dismal picture painted
in their editorials. Although he opposed forced busing to
achieve racial balance, he stated that because of the efforts
of "young people", busing was making a positive contribution
to race relations in Virginia.

9

As the father of four chil

dren in Richmond's public schools, the Governor said:

"I am

seeing my children learn, as they can in no other way, how to
get along with children from backgrounds completely different
from our own.

I am seeing young people getting along, enjoy

ing themselves, and incidentally, setting an example from which
we parents and politicians could well benefit."^9

Given the

undoubted inconvenience and racial tensions, the Governor
offered Virginians and the nation another side of the story.
Holton's stance also was taken at a significant poli
tical risk.

Conservative Democrats, who were drifting into

the Republican party or voting an Independent ticket, reminded

9Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 12, 1971, p. B-l
10Quoted in Editorial, Richmond News Leader, October 1,
1971, p. 18.

him that their votes had helped to put him in o f f i c e . A
dramatic, forceful stand against busing by Holton might have
opened the possibility of higher office as the champion of a
Republican-Conservative Democratic coalition.

Instead,

Holton's moderate leadership of the Republican party faced a
strong challenge from the conservative wing of his party.
On April 20, 1971, Virginia learned that the resort to
the United States Supreme Court offered no immediate relief
to the critics of busing.

In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Board of Education,12 the Court appeared unruffled by the
waves made by the antibusing forces.

The Court found "no ba

sis for holding that the local school authorities may not be
required to employ bus transportation as one tool of school

desegregation.

Desegregation plans cannot be limited to the

walk-in school." 13

The pronouncement against busing in Title

IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a hope of busing foes, was
limited to "the situation of so-called 'de facto segregation.1"
The Court's objective, as in 1954, remained "to eliminate from
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.

„15

11
Editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 11, 1970, p. 11.
In the 1969 election conservative Democrats supported Holton
instead of the Democratic party's candidate, William Battle,
who was considered too liberal.
12402 U.S. 1 (1971).

The initial response of Richmond newspapers was to de^
nounce the Supreme Court decision.

Criticizing the Court's

"grotesque logic," the Times Dispatch wrote that Swann es
tablished a "dual standard on school integration in this
country."16

Swann was just one more "assault upon the hated

South," screamed the News Leader.

The Court's decision, it

continued, destroyed "freedom of choice" in the South and
threatened this liberty in the entire nation.17
Although Swann apparently offered the South no relief,
portions of the opinion were construed as "weak beacons of
18
hope."
The Supreme Court, a Times-Dispatch editorial re
ported, said objections to busing "may have validity" when
busing endangered a child's health or hindered his education.19
This qualification was viewed as a possible issue in any bus
ing case.

The editorial also found encouragement for the

fight against school merger.

It reported the Supreme Court's

objections to racial balancing and to yearly desegregation ad
justments by school authorities "once the affirmative duty to
desegregate has been accomplished," unless there was subsequent
discriminatory action.

20

Since the newspaper argued that the

16Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 21, 1971,
p . 10.

17Editorial, Richmond News Leader, April 10, 1971, p. 10.
18 Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 25, 1971,
p. 8.
19 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1 (.1971) quoted in Ibid.
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city and county schools were desegregated already and that
the counties had not drawn their political boundaries to
preserve segregation, it saw no requirement for further action
under Swann.

The Court's statement that racial balancing was

not required, the Times-Dispatch believed, provided the crux
of the case against school consolidation.

21

As subsequent

events demonstrated, the defense lawyers liked the editor's
analysis.
After the Swann decision the only hope for the antibus
ing forces was federal legislation or a constitutional amend
ment which would prohibit busing to achieve desegregation.
Of the two approaches, the Richmond newspapers preferred the
amending process.

Even President Richard Nixon's proposed

antibusing legislation, which included permanent restraints
of questionable constitutionality on busing,

22

less attractive than an antibusing amendment.

was considered
The Times-

Dispatch viewed Nixon's antibusing program as "a commendable
23
attempt" to remedy the busing issue.
However, even if the
Nixon plan got through Congress and the current Supreme Court,
the editorial sought the "more lasting relief" of an antibusing amendment.

24

22Professor Alexander Bickel discussed the constitutional
infirmities of President Richard Nixon's proposed busing legis
lation in "What's Wrong With Nixon's Busing Bill?" The New
Republic, April, 1972, pp. 19-22.
23Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 19, 1972, p. 6.
24Ibid.
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The support of the Richmond newspapers for the amend
ing process was not limited to antibusing action.

The Richmond

dailies also advocated a direct attack on the Supreme Court's
power of judicial review and the concept of an independent
judiciary.

The News Leader asked President Nixon to propose

a constitutional amendment empowering Congress to send all
"dubious decisions" cf the Supreme Court to the highest appel
late courts of the states.

If a majority of the fifty high

est state courts differed with the Supreme Court's ruling,
then the judgment was to be reversed. 25
A second technique for curbing the federal courts was
sponsored by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. and endorsed by the
Times-Dispatch.

Senator Byrd's proposed constitutional amend

ment provided for the reconfirmation of all federal judges
every eight years.

The Times-Dispatch argued that this was

the only method of checking "judicial autocrats."

26

The

paper's enthusiasm for the Byrd amendment was increased by the
expectation that the plan offered a way of removing Judge
Robert Mehrige from the bench.

The proposals discussed by the

Richmond newspapers were not new, but rather amounted to hy
brid forms- of past attempts to restrict the Supreme Court's
judicial power.

Nonetheless, school cases involving measures

which attacked the most stubborn obstacles to desegregation

25Editorial, Richmond News Leader, March 13, 1972, p. 14.
^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 25, 1972,
p . 14.
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risked the Court’s prestige and raised fears of a constitu
tional crisis.
Another consequence of the decision to press for an
antibusing amendment was a schizophrenic reaction in Richmond
to the outcry against busing in northern cities like Detroit,
Pontiac, Boston, and Indianapolis.

On the one hand, there

was an undisguised sense of vindication.

The News Leader

wondered why the national media did hot portray the events as
27
"symptoms of regional hysteria and sickly racist minds."
After the Department of Health, Education and Welfare accused
Boston of operating segregated schools, the satisfaction of
the antibusers was complete.

To the Richmond papers, Boston

represented the citadel of "sociology gone wild" and "do
gooderism." 28 The problems of Boston, according to a TimesDispatch editorial, had "its delicious ironies, as savored
29
from a Southern perspective."
Although they relished the accounts of northern turmoil,
the Richmond newspapers urged their readers to shun vindic
tiveness.

The Times-Dispatch advised that "too much is at

stake to wallow in the ironies of the situation."30

Instead,

Virginians were urged by the News Leader to recognize that
"compulsory busing" would "become a thing of the past," only

27Editorial, Richmond News Leader, September 22, 1971,
p. 10.
28Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 4, 1971,
p. 14.
29Ibid.
30Ibid., October 28, 1971, p. 14.
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if it were made a national issue.

31

"With the Supreme Court

sticking by its interpretation that the Constitution requires
children to be assigned on the criterion of color," wrote
the Times-Dispatch "there becomes but one alternative for
citizens who believe in the rule of law and opposing busing.

And that is to amend the Constitution." 32

The strategy of

the South was grounded on a faith in history which also had
guided Virginia's massive resisters in the 1950's.

This was

the belief that, as in the First Reconstruction, the South's

salvation was in the North.
In the summer of 1971 the attention given to busing
gave way to an individual concentration on the consolidation
trial.

In opposing consolidation, the Richmond newspapers

alternated between playing on emotions and demanding judicial
restraint.

In tones mildly reminiscent of Massive Resistance,

the News Leader condemned the proposed merger as ill-advised,
since the Richmond School Board and the NAACP were on the same
side of the argument.
lackey of the NAACP."

The former was described as a "virtual
33

Consolidation was variously described

as a "capitulation to perversity," "pernicious racism" and a

31Editorial, Richmond News Leader, September 22, 1971,
o
—1
1

p*

32

Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 28, 1971,

p- 14.
"^Editorial, Richmond News Leader, August 30, 1971,
p . 10.
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luxuriant crop of bosh."

34

However, the papers also argued

that merger raised an unprecedented constitutional question.
The Times-Dispatch warned that, if upheld, consolidation
would establish the principle "that an unelected judge could
ignore at will the political jurisdictions the people , act
ing through their democratic institutions, have set for them35
selves."
Given the urban dilemma, it suggested that a
better "way to tackle this problem is to make possible orderly
growth of the cities through procedures that elected representatives provide." 3 6

Finally, the Times-Dispatch insisted that

white majority schools, one objective of consolidation, ex
ceeded the Court’s desegregation requirements, humiliated
Negroes and required unreasonable personal sacrifice without

ensuring an increase in educational achievement. 37

Thus the

Richmond newspapers presented an argument that appealed to
white segregationists, black separatists, disgruntled subur
banites and advocates of judicial restraint.
In August and September of 1971, the Richmond School
Board and the black plaintiffs answered their critics before
Judge Mehrige.

The plaintiffs' argument was grounded on the

charge that, due to housing patterns, the Richmond metropolitan

34Ibid., May 5, 1971, p. 14; August 30, 1971, p. 10.
3^Editorial, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 6 , 1971, p. 12
3 6-r-i
■ -J
Ibid.
37Ibid.
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area operated a racially dual school system.

Moreover, the

appellants argued that state action contributed to the resi
dential segregation upon which the schools were built.

They

contended that the State Board of Education had the authority
and responsibility to ignore political boundaries in order to
insure rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

finally, the

plaintiffs believed that for academic and social reasons the
racial composition of the schools should reflect the racial
ratio of the larger community.

The metro area, they urged,

shared a community of interest which included providing a desegregated education for all its children.

38

In making its argument for establishing majority white
schools, the plaintiffs relied heavily on the testimony of
Richmond born Thomas Pettigrew r Harvard Professor of Social
Psychology.

A persuasive advocate of integration, Professor

Pettigrew joined Judge Mehrige and Governor Holton as a major
villain of the antibusing-consolidation forces.

Pettigrew

supported school consolidation for academic and non-academic
reasons.

As an educator, he was persuaded by all the major

studies of desegregation, such as Equality of Educational
Opportunity and Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, that
integrated schools increased the achievement of black students.
However, the mere mixing of bodies or desegregation, Pettigrew
cautioned, was not necessarily productive educationally.

^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 17, 1971, p. 1,
August 19„ 1971, p. 1.
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Integrated education was achieved only when desegregation was
combined with "a climate of interracial acceptance."

Studies

suggested that "interracial acceptance" was the variable which
accounted for the consistently better performance of Negroes
39
m integrated schools.
The stability required for meaning
ful integration, Pettigrew testified, was enhanced by the
metro provision to keep the Negro enrollment between twenty
and forty percent in all schools.

Whereas black attendance

below twenty percent was considered tokenism, black enrollment
above forty percent precipitated white flight.

The implemen

tation of the merger, Pettigrew believed, would make Richmond
the envy of urban America. 40
Given the controversy generated by the conclusions
41
regarding the academic value of integration,
both methodo
logical and emotional, Pettigrew also offered several nonacademic reasons for supporting consolidation.

The elimination

39 Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racially Separate or Together?
(New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1971), p p . 64-66. Professor
Pettigrew made the same argument in his testimony during the
Richmond consolidation trial which was reported in the Rich
mond Times-Dispatch, August 19, 1971, p. 1. Professor Pettigrew
endorsed the findings of Equality of Educational Opportunity or
the Coleman Report which concluded that the most important
factor in determining academic achievement was the student's
family class background. Since only one-fourth of America's
Negroes were middle-class, Pettigrew saw the dividends of the
social class mix as another argument for school integration.
See Racially Separate or Together, pp. 57-67.
4QRichmond Times-Dispatch, August 19, 1971, p. A-l.
41For a discussion of the Coleman Report by educators
who support and attack its findings see Vol. 38, No. 1 of
the Harvard Educational Review (1968).
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of majority black schools, he emphasized, was the surest
method of changing the community's unfavorable opinion of
these schools.

Furthermore, in an integrated school, Negro

students acquired experience in dealing with white people and
white institutions.

Both, according to Pettigrew, contri-

buted to the post-school success of Negro students. 42

Above

all, integrated education provided the best method of prepar
ing all children to live in an interracial world.

For this

reason, Pettigrew stressed, it was as important for white
students as black students to attend integrated schools.

43

The county and state defendants rebutted the plain
tiffs' case point by point.

They asserted that the counties

and the city already operated unitary school systems.

Neither

a meaningful integration nor a racial balance was required
by the law.

Residential housing patterns, including Richmond's

black ghetto, were considered the result of private choice.
The defense denied that a community of interest existed be
tween the counties and the city.

Besides, argued Henrico

lawyer R. D* Mcllwaine, III., a "community of interest" lacked
"constitutional standing" and standards of measurement.
Finally, the defendants found no authority giving the State
Board of Education the power to merge the school systems without

Ap
Lecture given by Professor Thomas Pettigrew at the
University of Richmond, April 24, 1972.

43Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 19, 1971, p. A-l.
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their consent.

According to this argument, education was a

local rather than a state responsibility.44
One central theme of the defense’s case was that the
city's objective was political rather than educational.

Mer

ger, Henrico County Manager E. A. Beck claimed, was "an
annexation attempt . . .

a way to accomplish by the back door

what they couldn't by the front door."

45

The counties not

only refused to see a community of interest, but also viewed
their struggle as a defense of local government.
The defense also attempted to nullify the testimony of
Professor Pettigrew.

Their expert witness was Professor

Clifford P. Hooker, a white education-finance specialist from
the University of Minnesota.

Claiming no expertise in edu

cational psychology, Professor Hooker offered the observation
that establishing majority white schools was "racist” and
"paternalistic.”4 6

Furthermore, he thought it "insulting" to

Negroes when white researchers identified black schools as
sub-standard and claimed some knowledge for remedying the
situation. 47

In effect,

•

Dr. Hooker adopted the position

44Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 15, 1971, p. A-l.
45Ibid.
4^Ibid. September 10, 1971, p. A-l.
47From a portion of a brief submitted by the State of
Virginia and the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and published, in part, by
the Richmond News Leader, April 13, 1972, pp. 16-17.

advanced by black separatists that white educators were
incompetent to deal with Negro educational problems.
Almost four months after the trial, on January 10, 1972,
Judge Robert R. Mehrige, Jr., ordered the consolidation of the
Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield school systems,48

Each of

the major questions raised during the trial was settled in
favor of the plaintiffs.

First, Judge Mehrige found "indivi

dual facilities and entire [school] systems racially identi
fiable" in the metropolitan area.4^

Pursuance of desegrega

tion policies and the achievement of "some results," the claim
of the counties, did not "relieve them of the remainder of
50
their affirmative obligation."
Secondly, the court declared
that racial differences in public school enrollment were
directly related to public and private discrimination in the
51
sale of housing.
Although, he did not charge that school
officials had gerrymandered school boundaries, Mehrige found
that school construction "contributed substantially" to school
segregation.

52

School authorities, he emphasized, "may not"

be constitutionally permitted "to reproduce in school facilities

48

Bradley v. The Board of the City of Richmond, 338 F.
Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).

the prevalent pattern of housing segregation."

To do so,

was to prolong by state action "the effects of discrimination."

54

Finally, Judge Mehrige ruled that the State Board of Education
had the legal authority and constitutional responsibility to
merge the school districts.

The State Board's involvement in

local education was extensive 55 and, in the past, had ignored
political boundaries for educational purposes. 56

In Mehrige's

judgment, political boundaries, when’unrelated to educational
needs, did not prevent the Court or the State Board from cross
ing school lines to secure the rights of Negroes under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

57

In ordering a merger, Judge Mehrige was impressed by
the evidence of educators that black schools, in white areas,
were "perceived as inferior." 58

This stigma, he was persuaded

by educational experts, not only penalized the child in school,
but accompanied the individual throughout life.

59

However,

Mehrige emphasized that racial identifiability, of concern to
educators, was also "a legal concept— a conclusion of law,
ultimately. . . .I|6°
those of educators."

In this case, the "law's demands parallel
61

Thus, he concluded, that "meaningful

integration in a bi-racial community is essential to equality
of education, and the failure to provide it is violative of
62
the Constitution of the United States."

53Id. at 84.

54Ibid.

55Id. at 116-19.

56Id. at 83.

57Ibid.

58I!- at 81.

60 -r
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on

Judge Mehrige devoted a large portion of his opinion
to the topics of busing and racial balance.

Concerning the

former, Mehrige accumulated significant data supporting the
argument, that for reasons unrelated to desegregation, busing
was already extensive in the counties.

In the 1969-1970 school

year the counties bused over forty-seven thousand students at
an expense approaching a million and a half dollars.

G3

Al

though the metro plan expected to bus an estimated seventyeight thousand students in 1971-1972, sixty-eight thousand
students already were transported to schools in the three
school districts.

64

Even the time of the bus rides, limited to

one hour-one way, under the metro plan, seemed less excessive
when compared to past practices.

In 1942, for example, the

State Board of Education permitted a one way bus ride of ninety
minutes for secondary students.

65

Regarding racial ratios, Judge Mehrige believed that a
twenty to forty percent black enrollment promised the greatest
stability for the new school system.66

The court did not

consider this figure arbitrary, but, instead, "established by
r —i

the Richmond area."

Thus, the court accepted the goal of

civil rights lawyers that school assignments should reflect
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the racial composition of the larger population.68

With the

establishment of racially stable schools, Mehrige believed
"there seems to be beneficial effect upon community percep
tions of the faculty, the teachers' expectations, and even the
. .
.
69
administration."
Integration, still offered "each race . . .
a substantially greater opportunity to develop realistic
attitudes toward the other race, productive of friendships and
positive social behavior. 7 0

Finally/ although impressed with

the educational impact of majority white middle-class schools,
Mehrige emphasized that consolidation was ordered so that
71
"racial desegregation would be made possible."
The Richmond newspapers described the decision as a
"bugle call for what could be the final, decisive battle in
the agonizing fight to preserve locally-controlled neighborhood public schools in America."

72

Although differing with

Mehrige on points of law and fact, the newspapers concentrated
their attack on the social objectives of his decision.

The

Times-Dispatch wrote that the opinion "warmly endorsed the

68Id. at 194. On this point Mehrige quoted with approval
Professor~Pettigrew's statement that he would not adhere to
the forty percent maximum where the Negro population exceeded
forty percent.
69Id. at 186.
7 8Id. at 195 .
7^Id. at 196.
72Editorial,

p. A-12.
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pernicious gibberish of those social engineers who argue, in
effect, that a school system's primary function is to pro
mote racial togetherness, not to give children the best possible academic education."

73

The paper reminded Negroes that

the decision "was insulting to black children in particular.1174
When combined with the promise to "bus dollars,”7 5 the appeal
to black pride sounded like a subtle bribe to exchange money
for a cessation of the integration campaign.
The Richmond Afro-American, the city's black weekly,
applauded the Mehrige decision.

If upheld, the order meant

that whites could no longer "run across a city or county line
in order to escape desegregated schools."

The editor rejected

the nostrums of segregationists and separatists and reasoned
that:

"Unless black and white work together to eliminate the

massive problems in both equal and quality education, they
cannot be solved.

Only ignorance and bitterness grow out of

the efforts to run away."
readers that:

The Afro-American reminded its

"A major facet of education is teaching young

Americans what many of their parents never learned— how to
77
live with each other in mutual respect."

7^Ibid. January 11, 1972, p. A-14.
74

Ibid.

7^Ibid. December 4, 1971, p. A-14.
76Editorial, Richmond Afro-American, January 22, 1972,
p. 4.
77Ibid. March 18, 1972, p. 4.
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The commitment to school integration championed by the
NAACP and the Afro-American, however, was challenged by Ne
groes who were disenchanted with that goal.

Roy Innis, nation

al director of the Congress of Racial Equality, announced that
his organization intended to file "friend of court" briefs in
the higher courts on the side of the state and counties. 7 8

In

stead of integration, CORE demanded black community controlled
schools.

Integrated schools were attacked by Innis on the

grounds that they implied "blackness was bad," aimed at "whiten
ing black minds" and prevented the improvement of black culture. 79

The appeal to emotions was combined with an argument

that community controlled schools permitted Negroes "to maximize resources."

80

The school described by Innis was, in

effect, an instrument of black community action.
The debate between CORE and the NAACP over educational
policy was only a facet of CORE'S challenge to the NAACP leader
ship of the black community.

Although Innis commended the

NAACP's contribution to the civil rights movement, he thought
it was blinded by white defiance to alternative strategies
81
for equal educational opportunity.
Moreover, CORE rejected

7 RRichmond Times-Dispatch, January 16, 1972, p. B-l.
79Tape recording of a debate between Roy Innis and
Henry Marsh, III, Richmond Vice-Mayor, Virginia Union Uni
versity, January 26, 1972.
80t, ..
Ibid.
81_,
.n
Ibid.
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the NAACP's goal of an interracial society.

"Let's face it,"

Innis exclaimed, "black and white life styles are basically
82
different."
To Richmond's black leaders, community control
was viewed as a return to the past.

Their apprehensions were

not relieved by the voluntary nature of the act— separatism
rather than segregation.
unanswered questions.

The CORE proposal raised too many

How long and how generously would

whites support black controlled schools? How could racial
83
myths be changed through separation?
Nevertheless, a size
able number of young blacks, frustrated by delay, viewed in
tegration suspiciously.

They, along with their leaders,

presented a new dimension to the school struggle in Virginia.
In the counties, the consolidation decision was fol
lowed by several protest demonstrations and

by reports of

newly formulated plans to send children to private schools.
However, the focus of attention was on the courts where the
school merger battle was expected to be won or lost.

As pre

dicted by most observers, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
84
reversed the Mehrige ruling in a 5-1 decision.
The majority
found that the city and the county had eliminated "the last
vestiges of state-imposed segregation" and had established

8 3 _-,.

Ihid.

84Excerpts of the Fourth Circuit's opinion printed by
the Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 7, 1972, p. A-6.

402
O C

"unitary school systems."

Since the Constitution was not

violated, Judge Mehrige "had exceeded his power of intervention."

86

Although the majority agreed that Negroes had been

past victims of housing discrimination, it saw no "interac
tion between any two of the units involved (or by higher state
officers) for the purpose of keeping one unit relatively white
by confining blacks to another." 87

Finally, the majority

judges thought Judge Mehrige's zeal for desegregation led to
a remedy which went beyond the authority of the courts.

The

majority chastized Mehrige for failing to "sufficiently con
sider . . .

a fundamental principle of federalism incorporated

in the Tenth Amendment." 8 8

The Fourth Circuit's ruling left

the next move of legal strategy to the Richmond School Board.
As a result of the Fourth Circuit Court's action, consolidation
was postponed, but the ultimate fate of metropolitan schools
hinged on the results of the School Board's appeal to the
Supreme Court.
In the Richmond case, Judge Mehrige held that political
boundaries must fall where there were great discrepancies in
the racial identities of adjacent political units.

School

officials,•he believed, could not constitutionally superimpose
school districts over residential areas which were segregated
by public or private action.

The major question, not decided

85Ibid.

86Ibid.

87Ibid.

88Ibid.
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■*"n Swann but raised in Richmond, was whether school segrega
tion as a "consequence of other types of action, without any
scriminatory action by school authorities, is a constitu
tional violation requiring remedial action by a school desegre—
89
gation decree.
The answer had nationwide ramifications
since it was applicable to urban centers throughout America.
In ordering a school merger, Judge Mehrige stressed the con
tinuity between Bradley and Brown.

The central role of public

education in preparing Americans to live economically and
socially productive lives, found in Brown, was reaffirmed by
Mehrige.

However, he emphasized that his decision was not

tied to social science data but to the Constitution.

Consoli

dation, Mehrige wrote, was the "first, reasonable and feasible
step toward the eradication of the effects of past unlawful
discrimination."90
In opposing the school merger, anticonsolidationists
relied on themes familiar to the school controversy since
1954.

However, in 19 72, the prospect of a segregationist

victory on the merger issue was enhanced also by several im
portant developments.

First, the angry reaction to efforts

to destroy -racial isolation in northern cities won new allies
for the South.

The demand for equity in the application of

89

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1, 22 (1972).
90Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 338
F. Supp. 67, 105 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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desegregation laws was finally heard, as anxiety over busing
was translated into legislative and executive action aimed
at relieving school boards.

Secondly, segregationists

attempted to exploit the division among blacks over school
policy.

The rejection of integration by black separatists was

used as evidence by the Richmond newspapers to challenge the
continued legitimacy of the NAACP's leadership in the school
issue.

Lastly, segregationists hoped' the politics of desegre

gation would force a judicial retreat by the Supreme Court.
After a second reading of the Swann opinion, the Court's foes
found reasons for guarded optimism.

The Court's pronounce

ments against racial balancing and yearly adjustment of racial
ratios after "official action" to eliminate discrimination
were considered especially important by the defense.

In the

spring of 1972 the interaction of national politics and
judicial policy making weighed heavily on the minds of many
Virginians as they awaited the next stage of the desegregation
controversy.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION
After eighteen years, the struggle to desegregate Vir
ginia's schools had made great headway but was far from over.
Statistics showed that in 1971-72, 99.4 percent of Virginia's
black students were in integrated schools.^

However, the

significance of this achievement was diminished by the large
number of desegregated schools where white students were al
most negligible.

For example, thirteen hundred Surry County

Negroes were counted as attending racially mixed schools,
although there were only seventeen white students in atten
dance.

In the cities, where busing accounted for the greatest

increase in desegregation over the previous year, predomi
nantly black schools existed and white flight threatened to
increase their numbers.

The present obstacles to desegrega

tion in black belt counties and large cities indicated that
the future of public school integration was not assured, des
pite rosy statistics.

This chapter will identify the factors

which have' shaped Virginia's reluctant accommodation with the
Brown decision.
The traditional structure of Virginia's political en
vironment played a vital role in determining the state's

^Richmond News Leader, April 25, 1972, p. 19. In 197071, 87.2 percent of Virginia's Negroes were listed in inte
grated schools.
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response to the segregation cases.

In 1954, some sections of

the Old Dominion, where the Negro population was small, were
prepared to desegregate the public schools by mixing the
students and dropping Negro teachers.

In the cities, Vir

ginia’s leaders expected shifting residential patterns to neu
tralize the Brown decision.

From the beginning however, the

leadership believed a different solution had to be worked out
for Southside Virginia, where white s'upremacy had its deepest
roots.

After some deliberation, the Gray Commission recommended

a local option plan which provided a flexible approach to school
desegregation.

This approach was unfortunately discarded,

not because of a state-wide grass roots rebellion, but because
of a decision made by the state's governing elite.
The switch in strategy was possible only because of the
structure of Virginia's politics.

As a result of discrimina

tory voting laws, malapportioned electoral districts, and
effective political organization, decision-making was monopo
lized by the Byrd wing of the Virginia Democratic party.

At

this level, black belt politicians had extraordinary influence.
This advantage was used to press for a state-wide policy to
resist desegregation.

More importantly, the closed nature

of

the political process permitted Byrd Democrats considerable
manuverability which facilitated the co-ordination of an
effective resistence campaign.
In shifting to Massive Resistance, the Byrd Machine
saw an opportunity to strengthen its position in Virginia and,
for a moment, believed it could defeat the Supreme Court in
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the school battle.

Hope for a victory over the Court was

encouraged by the belief that the federal government did not
have the resources nor the inclination to challenge massive
school closings.

Also, the Organization believed that Vir

ginia's reputation for moderation in race relations would give
its unequivocal rejection of school desegregation tremendous
influence throughout the nation.

The first step in this plan,

which was easily accomplished, was to win a mandate for segre
gation in Virginia.

Appeals to white supremacy and the

defense of states' rights accounted for a series of segrega
tionist victories which culminated in the passage of the
school closing laws and the gubernatorial victory of Lindsay
Almond in 1957.

However, in 195 9, Massive Resistance crumbled

after federal judges, despite local pressure, assigned black
children to white schools and after the school closing laws
failed to win support outside the South.

When Governor Almond

announced that Virginia would obey the law, the Organization
was left badly divided.
Massive Resistance did not end Virginia's struggle to
keep its public schools white.

In 1959-60 the school closing

laws were replaced by legislation designed to contain integra
tion.

A pupil placement board and a tuition grant law were

the backbone of the new program.

In addition to giving

immediate relief to white parents, the new legislation was
expected to tie up the desegregation process in the federal
courts, where the state and the localities were well-equipped
to provide the manpower and financial resources to defend
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school boards.

The return to local option was not accompa

nied by a change of heart regarding racial separation but
was expected to buy time and to slow integration until the
national mood proved more favorable to the segregationists'
cause.
Passive resistance proved to be eminently successful.
Five years after Massive Resistance, less than two percent
of Virginia's Negroes were in schools- with white children.
Virginia's skill in blocking integration demonstrated that
the courts, by themselves, were incapable of desegregating
Virginia's public schools.

In part, the problem of the courts

was inherent to the judicial system.

Black lawyers flooded

Virginia's courts with suits testing assignment plans.

Liti

gation moved slowly and the courts lacked broad powers of
enforcement.

Moreover, the loose language of BrownII played

into the hands of segregationists.

By failing to establish

clear desegregation guidelines, the Supreme Court invited
litigation and seemed to sympathize with the white South.
Although Virginia judges

(with one notable exception, Judge

Sterling Hutcheson) assigned Negroes to white schools, they
consistently held that school boards were not required to
integrate schools but to prohibit discrimination.

This prin

ciple spawned devious assignment plans and invited criticism
of the later affirmative order to desegregate, enunciated in
Green v. County Board of New Kent County.

Finally, and perhaps

most importantly, Virginians simply contested the legitimacy
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of the federal courts' authority to revolutionize the tradi
tional pattern of race relations in the South.

This argument

was strengthened by the contention that, in Brown I , the
Supreme Court abandoned the rules of jurisprudence to legislate
social attitudes.
The plodding pace of desegregation was finally jolted
by the active intervention of the federal government in 19 64.
In the 1950's, massive resisters benefited from President
Eisenhower's refusal to publicly endorse the Brown I decision.
However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 placed the power of the
federal government behind school desegregation.

The ability

to regulate the flow of large amounts of federal money into
Virginia's schools contributed to a sharp increase in school
desegregation.

When the administrative effort bogged down

on the acceptability of "freedom of choice" assignment plans,
the Supreme Court freed it in Green v. County Board of New
Kent County.

The administrative-legal assault on segregation

was aided by an upheaval in Virginia politics.

Largely due

to federal legislation and Supreme Court rulings which broad
ened the base of the electorate and reapportioned electoral
districts,- a period of political flux was precipitated in Vir
ginia.

The political uncertainties caused by a new pool of

black voters led to greater implementation of the Brown deci
sion, although it was not accompanied by a conversion regard
ing the wisdom of public school integration.

Thus, the period

after 1964 demonstrated that the most successful formula for
undermining segregated schools depended on co-operation between
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the federal courts, Congress, and the Administration.

This

combined effort broke down in 19 70 when black plaintiffs asked
the courts to order school boards to adopt busing plans as
a technique for eliminating racially isolated schools in Vir
ginia.

Although the Supreme Court accepted busing as a deseg

regation tool in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu
cation , the decision met national criticism as busing plans
were ordered throughout the United States.

Presidential and

congressional attacks on transportation plans designed to in
crease integration signaled the erosion of federal teamwork
on the school issue.
When Judge Robert R. Mehrige ignored political bound
aries to merge the Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield school
districts, the struggle to desegregate public schools approached
another watershed.

If upheld by the Supreme Court, the Rich

mond case offered a method of desegrating schools in large
metropolitan areas, where residential housing patterns led
to racially isolated schools.

However, as the issues raised

in the consolidation case approached the Supreme Court, Vir
ginia's outcry against busing and involuntary metropolitan
co-operation was matched in all sections of the nation.
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